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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
FIGHTING REBELLION, CRIMINALIZING DISSENT: 
GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES TO POLITICAL CRIMINALITY IN 
MEXICO AND COLOMBIA, 1870s – 1910s 
by 
Adrian Alzate Garcia 
Florida International University, 2016 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Victor Uribe, Major Professor 
Political Crimes represent one of the most neglected areas in the historical scholarship on 
modern Latin America. It is an enduring absence that, for decades, has prevented historians 
from developing richer understandings about the functioning of politics, the evolution of 
legal phenomena, and the workings of both war and peace in the region. This dissertation 
addresses this historiographical void trough a comparative study of governmental 
responses to political criminality in Mexico and Colombia between the 1870s and the 1910s 
–years that frame the rise and fall of the Mexican Porfiriato and the Colombian 
Regeneration. 
 A study of political, legal, and social history, the dissertation explores and analyzes 
how governments in Mexico and Colombia understood and responded to political offenses 
such as treason, rebellion, and subversion. How legalistic were these responses? How 
respectful of the rule of law they were? What do these responses reveal about the logics of 
justice, state power and repression in late-nineteenth century Latin America? What do they 
tell about the relationships between state and citizens in the region? A wide collection of 
 viii 
primary sources helps answer these questions. Sources include newspapers; memoires; 
collections of laws and decrees; legislative debates; legal essays; criminal expedients; 
judicial processes; and a diverse number of petitions for judicial protection and state 
leniency. 
 Overall, the dissertation argues that governmental responses to political criminality 
entailed different yet complementary purposes. First, they aimed to protect public order 
from episodes of rebellion and insurrection. Second, they had the goal of neutralizing the 
activities of dangerous dissidents. Third, they allowed governments to trace and retrace the 
limits between legitimate and criminal expressions of political dissent. Political crimes 
were a fluid and mutable criminal category that allowed authorities to prevent and fight 
rebellion and maintain dissenters under strict control. Responses to political crimes 
involved both legal and extralegal strategies, and often redefined the limits of what laws 
and constitutions considered valid regarding the state’s actions against its own citizens. 
These redefinitions had different meanings and consequences in Mexico and Colombia, 
conditioning substantial differences in the legal and judicial experiences of political 
dissidents in each country. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
On January 4, 1904, the Mexican journalist Ricardo Flores Magón arrived to Laredo, 
Texas, after fleeing his homeland. A few months after crossing the border, Flores Magón 
had walked out of Mexico City’s prison, after serving some time as a political prisoner. 
Authorities had arrested him after shutting down one of his many newspapers and accusing 
him of attacking and slandering governor Bernardo Reyes and other high-profile people at 
the service of President Porfirio Díaz. It was not the first time that Flores Magón had gone 
to jail under such accusations. Since the early 1890s, when he and his brother Enrique 
started what would become a protracted career as opposition journalists and antiporfirista 
agitators, Ricardo Flores Magón had had several encounters with Porfirian authorities. In 
1901, for instance, authorities had shut down his paper El Demócrata and forced him to 
flee Mexico City and seek refuge in the town of Pachuca. Later that year, the Porfirista 
General Bernardo Reyes ordered the suspension of another of his publications, 
Regeneración. This time, the brothers Flores Magón would be arrested on charges of 
slander and spent a few months in prison. A year later, the same Bernardo Reyes ordered 
the arrest of the writers of El Hijo del Ahuizote on analogous charges, which put the 
brothers Flores Magón back in jail. Ricardo and Enrique walked free soon after, but a judge 
allied of Reyes ordered their re-imprisonment after charging them with insulting the 
government.  
 By the moment Ricardo Flores Magón left his country, it was more than clear that 
there were no guarantees for his journalistic work in the Mexico of Porfirio Díaz. Little did 
he know that his years as a political exile in the United States would be even harder. Settled 
 2 
down in St. Louis, Missouri, the brothers Flores Magón reopened Regeneración and 
founded, with other fellow exiles, a political organization with the goal of coordinating 
antiporfirista resistance on both sides of the border. The thousands of miles between 
Ricardo Flores Magón and Mexico City, nevertheless, could not save the journalist from 
Díaz’s iron fist. In 1906, Mexican authorities hired a private detective company in Missouri 
with the goals of gathering information about their political organization and collecting 
proofs that could lead to eventual arrests by American authorities. The detective company 
succeeded in making a case against Flores Magón, and soon American authorities would 
order the shutting down of the paper and the temporary arrest of Ricardo and many of his 
fellows. His alleged participation in a frustrated revolutionary plot against Díaz that same 
year worsened his situation. Cornered, Ricardo moved to Los Angeles, where he 
clandestinely continued his journalistic work. By August 1907, the Missouri detectives 
discovered his hideout and, with no formal warrant or judicial order, arrested him and put 
him in jail. 
 Mexican authorities immediately requested Ricardo’s extradition. American 
authorities rejected the request by arguing that Flores Magón was a political prisoner, and 
the law protected political criminals and refugees from extradition. Díaz and his people did 
not give up, and filed a second extradition request after accusing Ricardo of a series of non-
political crimes including robbery, homicide, and criminal libel. This second request 
proved unsuccessful as well, not only because of the far-fetched nature of the charges but 
also because American authorities refused to treat the prisoner as a non-political criminal. 
Finally, their Mexican counterparts realized that, although it was impossible to have Flores 
Magón back in Mexico, it was still plausible to ensure his sentencing and imprisonment in 
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the United States. In consequence, Porfirian authorities tried to make a case against Ricardo 
and his people that could lead to a trial for violation of neutrality laws. They succeeded. In 
1909, Flores Magón and other Mexican exiles faced a trial in Arizona for conspiracy to 
initiate a military expedition against Mexico from American territory. Jurors found them 
guilty and a judge sentenced them to 18 months of prison. Their release in August 1910 
would not mark the end of Ricardo’s life as a prisoner in the United States. In fact, Flores 
Magón would spend in jail more than half of the time between his arrival to the United 
States in 1904 and his death in a prison in Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1922.1  
 The story of Ricardo Flores Magón is nothing but an over-dramatic, tragicomic 
version of many other stories involving dissenters, opposition journalists, political 
agitators, and revolutionaries in Porfirian Mexico, between the late 1870s and the late 
1900s. Across the Caribbean Sea, in Colombia, the experiences of dozens of liberal 
journalists and politicians during the same period paralleled those of their Mexican 
counterparts. Dissident leaders like Santiago Pérez and Rafael Uribe Uribe paid with 
prison, exile, and political and judicial persecution their challenges to the Regenerationist 
regime, a series of Conservative administrations that ruled the country between the 1880s 
and the first decade of the twentieth century. The cases of Flores Magón, Pérez, Uribe 
Uribe and many others on both sides of the Caribbean have more in common than the many 
circumstances linking the Porfiriato and the Regeneration in the late-19th and early 20th 
centuries. They all are cases of political dissenters whose actions were labelled as criminal; 
                                                
1 For two detailed accounts on Ricardo Flores Magón’s life and his time in the United States, see: Claudio 
Lomnitz, The Return of Comrade Ricardo Flores Magón (New York: Zone Books, 2014); and Colin 
MacLachlan, Anarchism and the Mexican Revolution: The Political Trials of Ricardo Flores Magón in the 
United States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).  
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experiences of dissidents suffering from state repression manifesting itself in several 
different forms; stories of political malcontents who paid with their freedom the price of 
their dissidence.  
The case of Flores Magón also sheds light on a series of matters directly and 
indirectly related to these many stories. It illustrates the workings of a government that 
responded to “dangerous” political dissidence with criminalization, and that was able –and 
willing– to use a variety of legal and extra-legal strategies in order to prosecute and punish 
those who challenged it. It also shows that there existed a series of crimes and punishments 
more or less applicable to criminalize political dissidents, and that there were differences 
between “political” and “non-political” crimes. Likewise, it exemplifies the legal and 
judicial experiences of political criminals and prisoners when dealing with the relentless 
logics of state repression. On a deeper level, Flores Magón’s story raises a number of 
questions regarding, for instance, the existing legislation that allowed governments to 
criminalize and punish political agitators and revolutionaries, or the legal and constitutional 
limits between “legal” and “illegal” political dissent. Other possible questions that the story 
raises have to do with the differences between “common” and “political” crimes; what 
political crimes meant to legislators, judges, legal experts, and political authorities; and 
how these actors reflected about the most appropriate ways to punish these offenses. 
Additional questions could include, for instance, whether or not punishment and repression 
were the only possible responses to these kinds of actions, and if there were other ways in 
which governments could have treated political criminals.  
This wide set of matters and questions sum up the subject of this monograph, a 
comparative study of governmental understandings of and responses to political crimes in 
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Mexico and Colombia between the 1870s and 1910s. As such, it is a work of legal history, 
interested in analyzing these responses in terms of the laws that made them possible, the 
legal reinventions they fostered, and the legal conversations that accompanied them. It also 
pays attention to the ways in which people and the state interacted through the law and the 
justice system, and reflects on how these interactions worked for the benefit of both parts. 
It is, as well, a work of political history that explores questions regarding state power and 
legitimacy; citizenship and political agency; and political dissent and resistance. As a 
political study, this monograph also revolves around a more general question concerning 
the nature and functioning of Latin American authoritarianisms in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries. It is, finally, a work of social history, focusing not only on the social –and 
political– uses of law and legislation, but also in how these laws and legal conversations 
affected people’s lives, actions, and expectations.  
 
The Porfiriato and the Regeneration: Comparing the Mexican and Colombian 
experiences 
This is a comparative study framed within the context of two political regimes that 
emerged, evolved, and collapsed more or less simultaneously between the late 1870s and 
the 1910s: The Mexican Porfiriato and the Colombian Regeneration. The Porfiriato 
encompasses a period of 34 years, starting with the election of Porfirio Díaz as President 
of Mexico in 1877, and concluding with his departure to exile, in May 1911, during the 
first year of the Mexican Revolution. Díaz rose to power as the victorious leader of the 
Tuxtepec Revolution, an armed movement that in 1876 overthrew the administration of 
Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada, Benito Juarez successor. It was not the first attempt of Díaz at 
 6 
seizing power. Before 1876, he had participated and lost in two presidential elections –one 
against Juarez and another against Lerdo– and led a failed rebellion in 1871. Both as a rebel 
and a presidential candidate, Díaz advocated for an anti-authoritarian and anti-centralist 
government, respectful of the constitution and of the division of public powers. His 
campaign against presidential reelection –a recurrent practice during the Juarez regime– 
was one of the most representative efforts of Díaz as an opposition leader during the early- 
and mid-1870s.2 
 As a new president, Díaz faced serious political and economic challenges. Decades 
of civil war had left Mexico in a critical state, with a ruined and poorly developed economy, 
high levels of external debt, a fragmented and disconnected national community, and a 
country plagued with local and regional strongmen unwilling to submit to a central 
authority. These challenges determined the goals of his administration: the reestablishment 
of public order and the prevention of civil warfare, the improvement of the country’s 
finances and the modernization of its economy, and the consolidation of his political 
hegemony throughout the country. “Peace and progress,” as well as “less politics, more 
administration,” became from the beginning the main banners of the Porfiriato.3  
 Díaz tackled these challenges with relative success. During his administration, he 
and his officials managed to stabilize public finances –by reducing public expenditures and 
creating new taxes– and to restructure Mexico’s foreign debt, which in turn stimulated the 
                                                
2 Elisa Speckman Guerra, “El Porfiriato,” in Nueva historia mínima de México ilustrada (México: El Colegio 
de México, 2008), 337-338. 
 
3 Speckman Guerra, “El Porfiriato,” 362. Also: Sandra Kuntz Ficker and Elisa Speckman Guerra, “El 
Porfiriato,” in Nueva Historia General de México, ed. Erik Velásquez García et al (México: El Colegio de 
México, 2010), 487-488. 
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flow of foreign capital and investment. The construction of railroads and the enhancement 
of ports helped connect the country’s many and diverse regions and boosted its economy. 
Porfirista administrations also succeeded in developing industry and foreign trade, as well 
as in integrating Mexico to the international economy through the exportation of mineral 
and agricultural products. An unprecedented demographic growth and strong migration 
processes that invigorated the Mexican population accompanied these economic changes. 
In the political field, Díaz tried to consolidate peace and order through a strategic 
combination of pragmatism, patronage, force, and intimidation. Although peace remained 
an elusive goal during most of his administration, these strategies would certainly help 
Díaz build and maintain a delicate balance of power between the center and the provinces. 
This would grant Mexico a level of political stability that, although relative, contrasted 
strikingly with what the country had gone through during most of its post-independent life.4 
 The Porfiriato experienced different phases throughout the three decades of its 
existence. Its first phase corresponds to Díaz’s first administration, from 1877 to 1880. 
During these first years, Díaz attempted to lay the foundations for the restructuring of the 
Mexican economy, the pacification of the country through the neutralization of potential –
and actual– contenders, and the building of a network of regional and local political 
alliances. Consistent with his initial political program, he would also promote a 
constitutional reform in 1878 prohibiting the immediate reelection of presidents, and once 
                                                
4 Speckman Guerra, “El Porfiriato,” 370-372; Romana Falcón, “La desaparición de jefes politicos en 
Coahuila. Una paradoja porfirista,” Historia Mexicana 17, no. 3 (1988), 423-424; William Beezley, Judas at 
the Jockey Club and Other Episodes of Porfirian Mexico (Lincoln: The University of Nebraska Press, 1987), 
16-17; and Paul Garner, “The Civilian and the General, 1867-1911,” in A Companion to Mexican History 
and Culture, ed. William Beezley (Sussex: Blackwell Publishing, 2011), 296. 
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his term was over, in 1880, he handed the presidency to his fellow Manuel González.5 Díaz 
would return to the presidency in 1884. This second phase of the Porfiriato would extend 
towards the early1900s, and was characterized, among other things, by Díaz’s efforts to 
concentrate and centralize power and consolidate his hegemony throughout the country.  
 The consolidation of the Porfirian hegemony during these years relied on multiple 
strategies of cooptation, patronage, manipulation and negotiation. Díaz used state 
governments, political jefaturas –local political headships–, and other mid- and high-rank 
administrative positions to both reward allies and bring potential contenders into the fold. 
He also managed to build and strengthen ties with regional political bosses in control of 
extensive clientele networks, and to maintain political stability in the regions through the 
strategic rotation of governors and jefes politicos in debt with him. By manipulating the 
appointment of regional and local authorities, Díaz succeeded in spreading his power 
throughout all Mexico and neutralizing possible threats against his hegemony. This 
network of allegiances, favors, and rewards also helped Díaz ensure the political cohesion 
of the nation and align the multiple and diverse regional powers under his wing.6 
During this second phase, Díaz’s style became increasingly personalist, and the 
figure of the democratic leader that rallied against reelection and supported the division of 
public powers experienced significant changes. The president would progressively 
diminish the power of the legislative and judicial branches, until making them mere 
appendixes of the federal Executive. Two constitutional reforms, one in 1887 and another 
                                                
5 Speckman Guerra, “El Porfiriato,” 338. 
 
6 Garner, “The Civilian,” 296; Falcón, “La desaparición,” 425-428; Kuntz Ficker and Speckman Guerra, “El 
Porfiriato,” 489; and Friedrich Katz, dir., Porfirio Díaz frente al descontento popular regional (1891-1893): 
Antología documental (México: Universidad Iberoamericana, 1986), 21. 
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in 1890, eliminated all restrictions to the immediate reelection of presidents and state 
governors, which allowed Díaz to be consecutively reelected in 1888, 1892, 1896, 1900, 
1906, and 1910. Several governors in the states seized this opportunity and managed to 
remain in power for a decade and even longer. In Tlaxcala, for instance, Prospero 
Cahuantzi remained in power for 26 years; Mucio Martínez, in Puebla, ruled for 18 years 
straight; while Bernardo Reyes, in Nuevo León, did it for 20 years. The progressive 
concentration of power into Díaz’s hands, the consolidation of his networks of patronage, 
and his uninterrupted reelections allowed him to claim for himself a role as “patriarch of 
the nation […], custodian and arbiter of the rules of conduct of political life.”7 The rise of 
Díaz as Mexico’s patriarch went hand in hand with the growing authoritarianism of his 
regime and the increasing repression against political dissent both in the states and at the 
federal level. 
The third phase of the Porfiriato corresponded to its crisis and ultimate debacle 
during the first decade of the twentieth century. Opposition to Díaz, his manipulation of 
regional politics, and his authoritarian style escalated throughout the decade, and became 
a serious threat with the foundation of the Partido Liberal Mexicano or PLM in 1906. Led 
by a group of antiporfiristas exiled in the United States, and supported by a handful of 
political clubs throughout Mexico, the PLM progressively succeeded in channeling 
discontent towards Díaz. Led by the brothers Ricardo and Enrique Flores Magón, the PLM 
had a political agenda that combined claims for economic nationalism, political freedom, 
and  presidential rotation , all combined with plans to overthrow Díaz through an armed 
                                                
7 Kuntz Ficker and Speckman Guerra, “El Porfiriato,” 493; and Garner, “The Civilian,” 297. The quote 
corresponds to Garner.  
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insurrection.8 Díaz’s repressive reactions against the PLM and its members both in Mexico 
and abroad not only proved unsuccessful, but also bolstered criticism of and opposition 
against his political style. His decision to run again for president in 1909 would stoke even 
more the flames of opposition. The Mexican revolution broke out just a few months after 
Díaz’s electoral victory in 1910.9   
The end of the regime and the outbreak of the Mexican revolution were not 
exclusively the result of a growing political dissidence under the leadership of the PLM. 
Years of political stagnation, internal factionalism, and deep rivalries between civilian and 
military Porfiristas also erode the regime and forced it to implode. The perpetuation in 
power of Díaz and several of his governors rendered the regime old and worn out. The 
regional networks of allegiance that supported the Porfirian hegemony turned stagnant and 
unable to respond to changing social and political circumstances in the states. Competition 
between Porfirista factions for political and administrative positions tore the regime apart, 
affected its self-confidence, and ultimately broke up the delicate balance of power that for 
years had maintained loyalties in relative order keeping rivalries at bay. The 1909 electoral 
campaign not only signaled the definitive breakup between the civilian and the military 
groups, but also made evident profound disagreements and uncertainties regarding Díaz’s 
succession and, therefore, the continuity of the regime. By Díaz’s new and final 
                                                
8 MacLachlan, Anarchism, x-xi, and 1-4. See also: Kuntz Ficker and Speckman Guerra, “El Porfiriato,” 501. 
 
9 Garner, “The Civilian,” 299. 
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inauguration in 1910, almost nothing remained of the powerful and cohesive political 
machinery that had prevailed almost unquestioned throughout more than three decades.10 
Díaz’s success at consolidating his hegemony throughout the country, stabilizing 
regional politics, and neutralizing or co-opting potential political and military contenders 
did not necessary translate into permanent peace and total absence of internal conflict. 
Despite the Porfiriato’s many efforts to prevent rebellion and internal turmoil, political 
turbulence proved unavoidable and the country experienced dozens of insurrections, 
insurgent movements, and revolutionary expeditions. The late 1870s, for instance, would 
witness a series of agrarian revolts in central Mexico involving people from the states of 
Mexico, Querétaro, Guanajuato, and San Luis Potosí. They extended from 1877 to 1881.11 
In June 1879, a Lerdista rebellion took place in the port of Veracruz, leaving a tragic 
balance for the rebels.12 Several rebellions and revolts took place in the 1880s. Only in 
1885 alone, the state of Veracruz would experience three revolts ranging from armed 
political movements to peasant uprisings. There were at least two regional rebellions in 
1886, one in Tamaulipas, led by Pedro Dávila, and another in Zacatecas, led by Trinidad 
García de la Cadena. 1887 would experience at least one regional insurrection, once again 
                                                
10 Garner, “The Civilian,” 299; and Speckman Guerra, “El Porfiriato,” 358 and 362. See also: Falcón, “La 
desaparición de jefes politicos,” 424. 
 
11 Galván, Luz Elena. “Estado de México.” In Porfirio Díaz frente al descontento popular regional (1891-
1893): Antología documental, ed. Friedrich Katz (México: Universidad Iberoamericana, 1986), 26. 
 
12 Carlo Di Fornaro, Díaz: Czar of Mexico, second edition (New York: Carlo de Fornaro, 1909), 41-46. 
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in the state of Veracruz. This state, in fact, remained in almost constant turmoil during a 
great part of the Porfiriato, with a total of 27 revolts between 1876 and 1898.13 
The 1890s were a particularly conflictive decade, resulting from mounting 
dissatisfaction towards Díaz, changing rivalries over regional power, and an agrarian crisis 
that affected a great portion of Mexico’s countryside.14 The decade started with the 
rebellion of Juan Galeana and Cornelio Álvarez in Guerrero, in April 1890, and the armed 
incursions from the United States led by Francisco Ruiz Sandoval, in mid-1890, and 
Catarino Garza, in September 1891.15 Between 1891 and 1892, at least two peasant revolts 
with religious overtones erupted in Guerrero and Chihuahua. The first one involved a short-
lived catholic insurrectionist movement led by José Cuevas in 1891. The second one was 
the indigenous and millenarian rebellion of Tomochic, which started in December that year 
and finished in October 1892 with the extermination of all rebels and the almost total 
eradication of the town by the federal military.16 1893 experienced at least four regional 
insurrections, one in Coahuila, led by the Carranza family, another in Chihuahua, led by 
Luis Terrazas, and three more episodes in Guerrero. The incidents in Guerrero included the 
rebellion of Canuto Neri, the uprising of Diego Álvarez, and an agrarian movement led by 
                                                
13 Reneé González de la Llama, “Los papeles de Díaz Manfort: una revuelta popular en Misantla (Veracruz), 
1885-1886,” Historia Mexicana 39, no. 2 (1989), 476. Elliot Young, Catarino Garza’s Revolution on the 
Texas-Mexico Border (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 60. 
 
14 Katz, Porfirio Díaz, 11-12, 15, and 18. 
 
15 Jaime Salazar Adame, “Movimientos populares durante el Porfiriato en el Estado de Guerrero,” in Porfirio 
Díaz frente al descontento popular regional (1891-1893): Antología documental, ed. Friedrich Katz (México: 
Universidad Iberoamericana, 1986), 98-99, and 113-116; and Young, Catarino Garza’s Revolution, 78 and 
98. 
 
16 Salazar Adame, “Movimientos populares,” 117; and Paul Vanderwood, The Power of God Against the 
Guns of Government: Religious Upheaval in Mexico at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1998), 1 and 277. 
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some Father Castañeda. In April that year, a multitudinous demonstration against governor 
Bernardo Reyes in Monterrey, Nuevo León, ended up in a serious riot that left dozens of 
casualties and a large number of political prisoners.17 The 1900s were far less conflictive 
than the previous decade, with only a major revolutionary attempt promoted by the PLM 
that Porfirian authorities discovered and frustrated on time.18 
 This sequence of rebellions and insurrectionary events not only helps debunk the 
myth of the “Pax Porfiriana” that the early historiography on the Porfiriato made common 
during most of the twentieth century.19 It also provides this study with numerous 
opportunities for exploring and analyzing how Díaz and his regime responded to political 
turbulence and internal strife. Partially inspired by the Mexican experience, the Colombian 
Regeneration also offers diverse opportunities to explore these questions in a comparative 
manner. 
 
As a period in Colombia’s political and legal history, the Regeneration covers roughly from 
the mid-1880s to the early 1900s. These years include, among other major processes and 
events, the temporary  arrival of “independent Liberalism” to power;  growing political 
centralization symbolized by the enactment of the 1886 Constitution; the rise to power of 
the Conservative party; the enhanced presence of the Catholic church in multiple spheres 
of life; a renewed emphasis on and celebration of Hispanic roots; and, related to some of 
                                                
17 Galván, “Estado de México,” 32-33; Falcón, “La desaparición,” 439-440; and Adolfo Duclós-Salinas, 
México Pacificado: El Progreso de México y los Hombres que lo Gobiernan (San Luis: Imprenta de Hughes 
y Ca., 1904), 284-286.  
 
18 Lomnitz, The Return, 194-209. 
 
19 Garner, “The Civilian,” 296; and González de la Llama, “Los papeles,” 476. 
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these aspects, the civil wars of 1885, 1895, and 1899-1902 known as the Thousand Days’ 
War. During the decades in question, Colombia would experience important political, 
legal, and economic transformations, as well as complex political conflicts whose 
escalation over time would bring serious and lasting consequences to the country. 
 As a political regime, Colombia’s Regeneration came into existence between the 
late 1870s and early 1880s. It emerged out of the debacle of the federal regime that the 
Liberal Party had inaugurated decades ago, with the 1863 Constitution. After almost twenty 
years of existence under liberal rule, the federal experiment had left behind a long series of 
local and regional insurrections, alarming degrees of political instability, and a weak and 
undeveloped domestic economy. The federal period also had important consequences 
concerning the organization of partisan struggle in Colombia. It left behind a deeply 
fragmented Liberal Party, divided into “radical” and “moderate” or “independent” liberals, 
and a Conservative party eager for power after two decades of political exclusion. Both 
conservatives and independent liberals claimed for a substantial reform of the federative 
regime and the end of the political hegemony of radical Liberals, in control of the federal 
government since 1867. The electoral victories of General Julián Trujillo, in 1878, and 
Rafael Núñez, in 1880, marked the arrival of the independent faction to the national 
presidency, as well as the beginning-of-the end of the Liberal federal regime. Under the 
motto “Regeneration or Catastrophe,” independent presidents advocated for a 
“reconstitution” of the nation based on political centralism, economic protectionism, and a 
stronger Executive able to ensure political stability and prevent further challenges to public 
order. The materialization of this political program, nonetheless, required the displacement 
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of radical Liberals from power, which independents managed to accomplish only by the 
mid-1880s.  
 By 1884, during the second presidency of Rafael Núñez, independent Liberals had 
managed to control the entire country with the exception of the department of Santander –
historic stronghold of radical Liberalism. Cornered, Santander’s radicals decided to make 
a final attempt at regaining power and started a rebellion against Núñez by the beginning 
of 1885. A coalition of independent and Conservative troops backed the president and 
suffocated the rebellion in a few months. The government’s victory allowed Núñez to 
control the entire country and obtain national support for a constitutional reform that put 
an end to the federal regime and set the grounds for materialization of the independent 
program. Both independent liberals and conservatives worked in the drafting of a new 
Constitution, finally enacted in 1886. The new charter replaced the federal order with a 
centralist political organization, created a powerful Executive with wide legislative 
privileges, and gave the Catholic Church recognition as guardian of social order, public 
morality, and public education. It also provided the government, and especially the 
President, with multiple legal tools to prevent political unrest and contain actual or 
potential enemies of public peace. It was, to a large extent, a Constitution designed to “grant 
the government the necessary power to inspire respect towards authority and to warrant 
political stability.”20 
                                                
20 Charles Bergquist, Café y conflicto en Colombia, 1886-1910: la guerra de los Mil Días, sus antecedentes 
y consecuencias (Medellín: Fundación Antioqueña para los Estudios Sociales FAES, 1981), 18; For its 
original English Version, see: Charles Bergquist, Coffee and Conflict in Colombia, 1886-1910 (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1978). 
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 The regenerationist program of Núñez revolved around the notions of order, 
progress, stability, security, liberty, and justice. The independent leader believed that it was 
time for Colombia to join the wave of political change that was sweeping most of Latin 
America, where nations were looking for “conservative institutions able to grant them 
secure and solid peace.” To Núñez and other contemporaries, Porfirian Mexico provided 
the most exemplary case of this continental process. In his opinion, Díaz had been more 
than successful in centralizing power, maintaining peace and order, and promoting 
progress. Under Díaz, Núñez maintained, Mexico finally enjoyed a situation of total peace. 
Díaz not only had been able to ensure security and order, but also to foster national unity, 
industrialization, and economic development. The Mexican leader, Núñez believed, had 
brought the regenerationist program to its full realization.21 Others, like Presbyter Federico 
C. Aguilar, maintained that Mexico, by the hand of Porfirio Díaz, had succeeded in leaving 
behind decades of civil, partisan hatred, political instability, and economic stagnation. To 
Aguilar, Porfirian Mexico provided Latin American nations with a proof that a strong 
government was the key for securing peace and fostering economic development.22 Núñez 
and his people did not succeed in replicating the Porfirian experience in Colombia, 
especially in economic terms. Yet, they still managed to introduce some important reforms 
tending to the modernization of Colombia’s economy.23 
                                                
21 María del Mar Melgarejo, El lenguaje político de la regeneración en Colombia y México (Bogotá: 
Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2010), 86. Núñez dedicated at least two essays to praise Díaz and his 
success as president of Mexico. One of them was “La ley o la libertad en la justicia,” published in 1891. 
Another was “La lección de México,” published in 1893. 
 
22 Adriana M. Suárez Mayorga, “La construcción de la nación colombiana a la luz del modelo porfirista.” 
Secuencia 98 (May-August 2017): 105-106. 
 
23 Opinions about the Porfiriato and its “exemplary” achievements were not uniform in the Colombia of the 
time, nonetheless. During the 1880s, some contemporaries of Núñez found the Porfiriato “anti-democratic” 
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 Throughout the 1880s, Núñez created a national bank, stimulated with a timid 
success the growth of national industry, and tried to make the economy less dependent on 
foreign trade and external loans. Later on, both Núñez and his successor, the Conservative 
Miguel Antonio Caro, tried to improve state finances by establishing a monetary system of 
nonredeemable paper money. The economic reforms of the Regeneration took advantage 
of the spectacular rise in world coffee prices between the late1880s and the mid1890s. The 
coffee boom benefited Colombian exportations, stimulated the expansion of the coffee 
economy throughout the country, and sparked processes of internal migration and 
colonization and expansion of the agrarian frontier that would continue until well into the 
20th century. The coffee bonanza, nonetheless, would last only until 1896, when world 
coffee prices began to fall precipitously.24 The coffee crisis increased the government’s 
dependence on its own paper money, which in turn caused a serious inflation that would 
reach its highest peak right after the Thousand Days. 
In the political field, regenerationist administrations also faced multiple challenges. 
After Núñez’s third presidential period (1887-1888), the Conservative Party took over the 
presidency and held it until the end of the Thousand Days. The Conservative regime 
excluded the Liberal Party from all positions of power, drastically limited its participation 
in Congress, enacted laws and decrees tending to criminalize its attempts at reorganization, 
                                                
and emphasized the fact that in Colombia, unlike Mexico, elections were regular and involved diverse 
candidates embracing different programs and ideas. Later on, people like Miguel A. Caro would criticize his 
contemporaries’ sympathies with Díaz and his government on the grounds that it had no sense to imitate what 
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Mayorga,  “La construcción,” 110 and 118. 
 
24 Bergquist, Café y conflicto, 23, 41-43 and 46-47. 
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and imprisoned and exiled many of its leaders.25 The situation of Colombian Liberals 
forced them to combine their efforts to regain power through electoral ways with multiple 
parallel attempts to overthrow the government through armed insurrections. In 1893, 
Liberals plotted a rebellion that should start on August, but the government, already in alert 
since a massive artisan revolt that had taken place in Bogotá in January that year, 
discovered the plot on time and was able to dissolve the conspiracy. A second attempt at 
rebellion, in April 1904, would suffer the same fate. Finally, in January 1895, a fraction of 
the Party took up arms against the Caro administration and managed to keep its rebellion 
alive until March that year. The Liberal defeat in the 1895 war would not put an end to the 
Party’s warlike efforts. On the contrary, it forced Liberals to regroup and prepare for a 
final, massive insurrection that would finally take place in October 1899.26 
Regenerationist administrations not only were incapable of containing the 
progressive reorganization of the Liberal Party, but also proved powerless to prevent 
division within its own ranks.  Discrepancies over the regime’s authoritarianism and 
monetary policies would cause, during the 1890s, a division between “Nationalist” and 
“Historical” conservatives. While Nationalist conservatives backed the rigid policies of 
presidents Carlos Holguín (1888-1892), Miguel Antonio Caro (1892-1898), and Manuel 
Antonio Sanclemente (1898-1900), the “Historical” dissidence criticized their extreme 
                                                
25 Helen Delpar, Red Against Blue: The Liberal Party in Colombian Politics, 1863-1899 (Tuscaloosa: The 
University of Alabama Press, 1981), 142-144, and 155-157.  
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exclusion of the Liberal Party as well as the disastrous financial consequences of the paper 
currency regime in place. The government’s reticence to reform its policies would cause a 
formal split between the two factions in 1896. From then on, Historical Conservatives 
would act as an opposition force, pushing not only for financial reforms but also for a more 
inclusive and less repressive government. During 1897 and 1898, the political platforms of 
Liberals and Historical Conservatives were almost similar, which made the Liberal Party 
believe that it was an appropriate moment to launch a final offensive against the Nationalist 
administration. Liberals tried in several occasions to lure Historical Conservatives into 
their revolutionary endeavor, but their efforts were in vain.27 The Liberal Party went to war 
in October 1899 without the support of the Conservative dissidence and even without the 
unanimous approval of its directorate. 
 The Thousand Days War broke out in October 18, 1899 in Santander and finished 
in November 21, 1902, in Panama. It was the biggest, costliest, and most destructive civil 
war in nineteenth-century Colombia. It caused the state immense material loses and 
indebtedness, and left behind a balance of casualties whose estimations range between 60 
thousand and 150 thousand people, equivalent to approximately 2% of the country’s 
population at the time. It was also one of the factors that contributed to the loss of Panama 
in 1903.28 The first phase of the war involved the confrontation of large regular armies in 
the Colombian north-east, and concluded in May 1900 with the defeat of the bulk of the 
                                                
27 Bergquist, Café y conflicto, 48, 66-67, and 85; see also: Jorge Villegas and José Yunis, La guerra de los 
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Liberal army in the battle of Palonegro. Soon after the end of this phase, Historical 
Conservatives carried out a successful coup that overthrew the Nationalist president 
Manuel Antonio Sanclemente on July 31, 1900. The dissident faction replaced 
Sanclemente with the apparently more moderate José Manuel Marroquín, from whom they 
expected a conciliatory attitude towards the rebellion and a willingness to reward a 
potential rebel surrender with political reforms. Marroquín, nevertheless, did not comply 
with the expectations of the faction that put him in power and, thus, the war continued.29 
The second phase of the conflict would last until the end of the hostilities. During 
these years, the maintenance of the rebel movement remained primarily in the hands of 
multiple guerrilla groups dispersed throughout the country’s central regions. Nonetheless, 
during the last year of the war, the guerrilla warfare in the center of the country went hand 
in hand with larger regular campaigns in Cauca, to the south, and Panamá, to the west, led 
by the rebel general Benjamín Herrera, and also in the Caribbean coast, under the direction 
of Herrera’s fellow Rafael Uribe Uribe. The capitulations of Uribe Uribe, in October 1902, 
and Herrera, a month later, signaled the end of the rebellion. Two treaties gave the war a 
formal closure: The Neerlandia Treaty, signed by Uribe Uribe on October 24, and the 
Wisconsin Treaty, signed by Herrera on November 21, 1902. The pacification of the center 
would take a few more months. Marroquín remained in power until 1904, when he handed 
the power to the democratically elected Rafael Reyes.30 Reyes would stay in power until 
1909, a period commonly known in Colombian historiography as the Quinquenio.   
                                                
29 Bergquist, Café y conflicto, 172-174, 176-178, and 180-181; see also: Carlos E. Jaramillo, Los guerrilleros 
del novecientos (Bogotá: CEREC, 1991), 37-39 and 42-43. 
 
30 Bergquist, Café y conflicto, 186-188. 
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Rafael Reyes, a Conservative veteran of the civil war of 1895, was a more ardent 
admirer of Porfirio Díaz than Núñez had been. A two-year trip to Mexico had made him 
familiar with the Porfiriato’s work and Díaz’s achievements in matters of economic 
development, industrialization, and political stability. Convinced that Colombia needed to 
walk the path Mexico had been walking since the late 1870s, Reyes was determined to 
foster industrialization, build railroads, reorganize the country’s fiscal policies, and prevent 
any possible political disturbance. “The example of Mexico is and should be a model to be 
copied by those Spanish-American nations which have not succeeded so far in solving in 
a stable and permanent manner the problem of public peace, which of necessity is linked 
to the economic and financial problems,” Reyes wrote in 1906.31 Reyes’s interest in 
reproducing Díaz’s work in Colombia made him even borrow the “less politics, more 
administration” motto, turning it into one of his government’s banners.32 In the post-war 
era, “less politics” meant leaving aside traditional partisan hatred and useless –if not 
detrimental– ideological and programmatic conflicts. In contrast, “more administration” 
meant a greater focus on practical priorities linked to economic growth and prosperity. 33 
In correspondence with the Mexican model, Reyes would make multiple efforts to promote 
economic development, foster international trade, restructure the nation’s foreign debt, and 
                                                
31 Rafael Reyes, “Mexico’s Great Finance Minister,” The North American Review 182, no. 590 (1906), 48; 
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protect and stimulate domestic industries. A new rise in international coffee prices set the 
conditions for a favorable economic growth during most of the quinquenio. 
 In political terms, Reyes arrived to the presidency with a message of national unity, 
political reconciliation, and attenuation of partisan hatred. Consequent with this message, 
Reyes granted the Liberal Party a significant participation in the Congress and put several 
liberal veterans in influential positions both in his government and in the military. This 
would grant him the almost unconditional support of many members of the Liberal Party, 
but also the animosity of several Conservative circles.34 Resentment against Reyes’s spirit 
of reconciliation was particularly high among those conservatives that had fought the 
liberals during the Thousand Days. Conservative resistance against the President’s policies 
and reform plans manifested soon after the beginning of his period. Resistance in the 1904 
Congress to Reyes’s project of territorial division forced him to shut down the Legislative, 
and to replace it the following year with a National Assembly with no members from the 
Conservative dissidence.35  
The measure did not deter the opposition, but rather radicalized it. Dissident 
Conservatives planned a coup that should take place in December 1905 but was ultimately 
thwarted by the government. Months later, on February 10, 1906, the same faction would 
carry out a failed attempt against the President’s life.36 The Government’s energetic 
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reaction to both plots disassembled most of the Conservative dissidence, but voices of 
discontent against the regime’s administrative policies and a growing authoritarianism 
remained. Resistance against Reyes and his government escalated in 1907 after the 
negotiation of a treaty with the United States concerning the separation of Panama. The 
imminent approval of the treaty by the National Assembly in March 1909 sparked a wave 
of violent protests in Bogotá that forced Reyes to temporarily resign the presidency. The 
treaty finally sank in the Assembly. In June that year, Reyes would call for a congressional 
election whose results did not favor him. This final drawback forced him to resign once 
again and leave the presidency in the hands of Jorge Holguín. Soon after his resignation, 
Reyes would leave the country going into exile.37 His departure marked the end of the 
quinquenio.  
  
How comparable are the Mexican and Colombian experiences between the late 1870s and 
the 1910s? As the previous pages show, there are a number of similarities between one 
country and another. The Porfiriato and the Regeneration emerged and developed in 
response to analogous interests of securing peace and progress through a strong, centralized 
government, for instance. This premise materialized in both countries in similar ways: 
strong political centralism, high levels of presidentialism, political exclusion, and 
governmental authoritarianism. There were also multiple links connecting both countries 
during the period. The Porfiriato was, to a certain point, a model for the Regeneration, and 
Porfirio Díaz represented an important source of inspiration for presidents like Rafael 
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Núñez and Rafael Reyes. Commonalities between both countries went beyond these 
connections and parallelisms, and even preceded the period in question. As James Sanders 
explains in The Vanguard of the Atlantic World, nineteenth-century Mexico and Colombia 
had very similar stories. Both countries faced civil warfare in their early stages, developed 
distinct Liberal and Conservative parties by mid-century, and suffered several civil wars 
resulting from power struggles between these two factions. Likewise, they both undertook 
extensive project of liberal reform of colonial institutions, and embraced republicanism and 
democratic innovation around mid-century. The Porfiriato and the Regeneration, in fact, 
represent analogous projects of “reorganization” tending to counter the effects and 
consequences of this early republicanism, as authors such as Sanders, María del M. 
Melgarejo and a few others maintain.38  
Besides these political commonalities, Mexico and Colombia shared a common 
constitutional and legal culture. The constitutional frameworks of the Porfiriato and the 
Regeneration privileged the maintenance of public order and the concentration of public 
powers in the hands of the Executive, for instance. They also shared the conviction that 
society’s integrity should prevail over the rights of its individuals. Mexican and Colombian 
criminal codes also involved common ideas that were part of broader, transnational 
developments in the field of criminal law. Many of these ideas shaped similar 
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understandings of what political crimes were and how governments should react to them, 
which in turn inspired relatively analogous ways of reacting to political crimes and 
criminals, as this dissertation shows.  
All these parallelisms, connections, and shared attributes make up a framework of 
commonalities that invite to comparison and make it methodologically possible. The 
Mexican Porfiriato and the Colombian Regeneration represent, at least to a certain point, 
analogous experiences, involving a shared set of common attributes and reasonably close 
in terms of both time and space. This sort of characteristics, according to Magnus Mörner, 
provide a basic ground for a proper comparative analysis.39 Furthermore, as geographical 
neighbors and historical contemporaries, Porfirian Mexico and Regenerationist Colombia 
share a common set of “over-all causes,” in terms of Marc Bloch’s classical work on 
comparative history.40 These “common causes” have to do not only with a relatively 
analogous past as post-independent Latin American nations, but also with a shared legal 
and constitutional culture combining elements and influences both from the colonial and 
the modern Atlantic world.  
There were, of course, important differences between the Mexican and Colombian 
contexts. Levels of economic development and insertion into world economy were 
drastically different between the two cases. Political differences were also substantial. 
Mexico had a federal organization, while Colombia was a centralized republic from 1886 
on. Mexico had only two presidents between 1877 and 1911, and one of them, Porfirio 
                                                
39 Magnus Mörner, Julia Fawaz, and John D. French, “Comparative Approaches to Latin American History.” 
Latin American Research Review 17, no. 3 (1982): 60-61. 
 
40 Marc Bloch, Toward a Comparative History of European Societies,” in Enterprise and Secular Change: 
Readings in Economic History, ed. Frederic C. Lane (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1953), 498. 
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Díaz, ruled for more than three decades. Colombia, on the contrary, had more regular and 
continuous changes in the Executive –regardless the fact that, from the late 1880s to the 
end of the quinquenio, all presidents belonged to the same political party. There were also 
important contrasts in terms of rebellion and insurrection. Although both countries suffered 
several episodes of internal turmoil between the late-nineteenth and the early-twentieth 
centuries, widespread, long-lasting rebellions were more common in Colombia than in 
Mexico –at least before the outbreak of the Mexican revolution.  
Do these differences affect the comparability of the Porfiriato and the Regeneration 
as subjects of historical analysis? This dissertation maintains that they do not. These 
contrasts, in fact, make comparison more rewarding and valuable from an analytical point 
of view. Historical comparison does not only involve similarities but also differences, as 
authors such as Magnus Mörner, Marc Bloch, Theda Skocpol, and Philippa Levine argue.41 
Combining similarities and differences, comparison between Mexico and Colombia has 
the advantage of uncovering and exploring processes that were common to both countries 
while emphasizing the particularities of each country regarding the problems in question. 
Furthermore, as these authors claim, this sort of comparative work pushes the study away 
from the simple description and typification of commonalities and towards the definition 
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of analytical concepts and the advancement of new, richer hypotheses and interpretations.42 
That is, precisely, what this study attempts to do when comparing the experiences of 
Mexico and Colombia regarding their governmental responses to political criminality. By 
studying these responses in two contexts or environments that encompass both similarities 
and differences, the dissertation aims to do much more than describing how Mexican and 
Colombian governments dealt with rebellions and rebels in their midst. It intends, also, to 
further a series of analytical and theoretical reflections concerning the workings of law, 
legislation, and state power in Mexico and Colombia, as a window into the broader legal 
and political experiences of modern Latin America.  
Accepting now that comparison between the Porfiriato and the Regeneration is 
possible, what does exactly the dissertation compare? More than comparing two 
“societies,” “structures,” or “contexts” that might not seem fully equivalent, the 
dissertation compares a problem that was both common and relevant for the two countries 
–the way in which governments in one country and another understood and responded to 
political crimes and criminality.43 The study is not interested in comparing neither the 
rebellions or insurrections that took place in Mexico and Colombia during the period nor 
the political circumstances in which they occurred. It simply intends to compare –and 
                                                
42 See: Mörner, “Comparative Approaches,” 66-67, and Scokpol, “Emerging Agendas,” 376. See 
additionally: Eugene Genovese, The Comparative Focus in Latin American History.” Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 12, no. 3 (July 1970): 320. 
 
43 On the centrality of problems in comparative history, see: Raymond Grew, “The Case for Comparing 
Histories.” American Historical Review 85, no. 4 (October 1980): 773 and 776. To Grew, “comparison is 
most enlightening when the choice of what to compare is made in terms of general and significant problems,” 
and the point of comparative history is to encourage historians “to think in terms of problems.” See also: 
Levine, “Is Comparative History,” 338. 
 28 
contrast, of course– the ways in which both countries responded to these episodes.44 In 
analytical terms, these responses represent a common ground, a single, coherent unifying 
principle that brings together the specificities of the Mexican and Colombian historical 
experiences. It is a way of avoiding artificial comparisons that obscure the social and 
historical particularities of each case in search of some abstract similarity that only exists 
in the imagination of the researcher.45  The dissertation, in fact, conceives these responses 
neither as empty and abstract categories nor as a priori notions existing outside the 
historical experience of both countries. Rather, it defines and understands them in 
relationship with the specific contexts in which they emerged and developed. Facing 
rebellion and internal turmoil, Mexican and Colombian governments had to develop 
specific understandings and responses to political criminality. These concrete responses, 
with their socio-historical meanings and specificities, represent thus the central focus of 
comparison.  
 
Problematizing Political Crimes and Responses to Political Criminality 
This is a comparative study on political crimes and political criminality, their historical 
understandings in two Latin American countries, and the ways in which their respective 
governments responded to them. What is, precisely, political criminality? How does this 
                                                
44 By choosing these responses as the study’s basic unit of comparison, the dissertation follows Mörner’s 
suggestion that the units of comparison must be a) related to the objectives of the study, b) representative of 
“the universe about which generalizations will be made;” and c) equally significant in relation to their 
respective contexts. See: Mörner, “Comparative Approaches,” 59. 
 
45 On “artificial” and “obscuring” comparisons and how to avoid them, see: Mörner, “Comparative 
Approaches,” 58, and Grew, “The Case,” 765. See additionally: Micol Seigel, “Beyond Compare: 
Comparative Method after the Transnational Turn.” Radical History Review 91 (Winter 2005): 67 and 73. 
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monograph understand political crimes? There are multiple ways of defining political 
offenses. Historical literature on the matter includes a panoply of definitions, some more 
concrete than others. Some scholars define political crimes as all offenses committed for 
altruistic or ideological purposes. Other authors conceive them as crimes against the state, 
the government, and its institutions. Some of these scholars even divide these offenses into 
several categories or sub-notions depending on their level of violence, their aims and 
impact, and the kind of political threat they entail –i.e. “violent” and “non-violent” political 
crimes; “oppositional” or “state” political crimes; “pure” or “mixed” political crimes.46 
This study draws on an “intermediate” definition of political crimes, inspired on the 
approaches of Barton Ingraham, Austin Turk, and Karl Harter.47 Political crimes, from this 
perspective, are actions and/or expressions of political dissidence, violent or non-violent, 
that state authorities and government officials consider criminal regardless their real nature 
and the motivation of their perpetrators. To the state, these acts are criminal because they 
entail more or less severe threats to the established structure of the government, the 
government institutions and/or representatives, the state authorities, and the public order. 
 As criminal manifestations of dissent, political crimes usually involve violent 
offenses such as terrorism, rebellion, sedition, political assassination, and political riot, as 
well as non-violent crimes such as “illegitimate” resistance or dissidence, disobedience, 
                                                
46 This brief overview is based on Jeffrey Ross, An Introduction to Political Crimes (Bristol: The Policy Press 
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47 Barton Ingraham, Political Crime in Europe: A Comparative Study of France, Germany, and England 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Austin Turk, Political Criminality (Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications, 1982); and Karl Harter, “Legal Responses to Violent Political Crimes in 19th Century Central 
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zwischen Fruher Neuzeit und 20 Jahrhundert, ed. Karl Härter and Beatrice de Graaf (Frankfurt: Vittorio 
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 30 
political and seditious libel, espionage, and treason –considered here as a mere violation of 
allegiance.48 Nonetheless, as authors like Jeffrey Ross, Karl Harter, and Thomas Walter 
point out, the sphere of “political crimes” is commonly imprecise, flexible, and mutable.49 
Governments, judges, and legislators can alter existing definitions of political crimes in 
order to criminalize political acts that were not originally criminal, or to prosecute political 
dissidents whose actions are not necessarily criminal according to the current legislation. 
It is a process of “reinvention” of political criminality that depends on multiple 
circumstances: local, national, and even international political contexts, existing 
mechanisms for social and political negotiation, current practices and proceedings of 
criminal justice, and existing legislation and legal doctrine.50 In correspondence with these 
considerations, this monograph understands political crimes and their historical 
reinventions in two complementary ways. On the one hand, they are legal and political 
resources for protecting the government, the state, and the public order against actual or 
potential threats by eventual “internal enemies.” On the other hand, they represent a 
flexible tool for controlling and repressing political opposition and dissidence, as well as 
for strengthening social policing and control. 
                                                
48 For an abridged description of these violent and non-violent offenses, see Ross, An Introduction, 40-46 
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49 See: Ross, An Introduction; Harter, “Legal Responses”; Karl Harter, “Images of Dishonoured Rebels and 
Infamous Revolts: Political Crime, Shaming Punishments and Defamation in the Early Modern Pictorial 
Media,” in Images of Shame: Infamy, Defamation and the Ethics of Oeconomia, ed. Carolin Behrmann 
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016); and Thomas Walter, “Punishing Rebels, Ringleaders and Followers. Punitive 
Responses to the Saxon Peasant Uprising of 1790,” in Revolts and Political Crime from the 12th to the 19th 
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(Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 2013). 
 
50 On the “invention” and “reinvention” of political crimes, see: Harter, “Legal Responses”; and Angela De 
Benedictis and Karl Härter, eds., Revolts and Political Crime from the 12th to the 19th Century: Legal 
Responses and Juridical-Political Discourses (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 2013). 
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 Analytical inspirations for this monograph come from American and European 
scholarship on political crimes and criminality. A combination of approaches from 
sociology, criminology, and political science characterize American studies on political 
offenses, as illustrated by the works of Barton Ingraham, Austin Turk, Jeffrey Ross, and 
Nicholas Kittrie and Eldon Wedlock.51 This interdisciplinary perspective allows them to 
delve into the social and historical making of notions of political crime as well as into the 
evolution of political criminality in the United States. They also pay special attention to 
the ways in which American and other governments have responded to dissent, resistance, 
collective violence and, more recently, terrorism. European scholarship involves more 
historical overtones, merging approaches from legal, social, and political history. This 
literature includes the works by Angela De Benedictis on revolts, disobedience, and the 
“right to resistance” in early modern Europe; Karl Harter on the legal responses to political 
crimes in early modern and modern Europe; and Beatrice De Graaf on political criminality 
and social policing.52 The studies by Thomas Walter, Johannes Dillinger, Malte Griesse, 
and Michael Lobban also add to this scholarship.53 Together, they shed light on the making 
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and unmaking of penalties for political crimes; the historical reinvention of certain political 
offenses; and the transnational nature of some legal and political discourses on collective 
political violence. They also delve into the legal invention of different classes of 
“illegitimate” and “dangerous” dissidence, as well as into the evolution of state repression 
and mercy concerning political crimes and violence. 
 Despite their differences in disciplinary approaches and historical contexts, 
American and European scholarship on political criminality provides this study with a 
series of questions that, for the case of modern Latin America, still await response. These 
questions include, among others, how legal and doctrinal notions of political criminality 
emerged and evolved, and how and why legislation on and penalties for political offenses 
changed throughout the period. There is also a question about the relationship between 
local and national discourses and laws on political violence, on the one hand, and 
transnational legal discourses on revolt, war, political rights, dissent, and social policing, 
on the other hand. This monograph attempts to answer some of these questions in the 
contexts of the Porfiriato and the Regeneration. As such, it is interested in uncovering and 
analyzing the logics through which Mexican and Colombian authorities criminalized 
dissent and dealt with criminal –or criminalized– dissenters. It is an analysis that also aims 
to shed light on the workings of law, politics, authoritarianism, and state power not only in 
Mexico and Colombia but also in modern Latin America.  
 Overall, this study maintains that governmental responses to political criminality in 
Mexico and Colombia were the result of a series of concerns about the maintenance of 
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public order and the relationship between government and dissidence. They originated in 
multiple places at the time: in constitutional and criminal law provisions; in legal and 
doctrinal conversations; in interpretation of current legislation; in the logics of justice 
administration; and in a series of legislative, judicial, and executive acts and decisions. 
Similarly, they emerged and evolved in response to changing legal, political, and military 
conjunctures and interests, as well as in correspondence with changing dynamics of 
political negotiation between governments and opposition. As a consequence, they were 
neither uniform nor stable. Fluidity and contingency characterized governmental 
understandings to political criminality legal definitions of political offenses, and penalties 
against political criminals alike. Legal definitions of political criminality, as well as 
governmental responses to political crimes experienced important transformations over 
time. Between the late 1870s and the 1910s, the repertoire of actions considered political 
offenses increased and diversified in both countries, while official responses to them 
became slightly more legalistic and reliant on judicial procedures. It was a subtle process 
of “legalization” that suggests a progressive change in the ways in which Mexican and 
Colombian governments addressed and reacted to political conflict and violence in their 
midst. 
 The dissertation also argues that legislation on political criminality in Mexico and 
Colombia never involved single, uniform notions defining what political crimes were. 
Constitutions and criminal codes involved ambiguous, imprecise notions of political 
crimes, and did not draw a clear line between “common” and “political” offenses. These 
ambiguities shaped a series of legal and constitutional grey areas that gave authorities 
ample wiggle room for deciding which offenses were political and how to proceed against 
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them. Ultimately, the definition and treatment of political offenders depended less on clear 
constitutional and criminal law provisions and more on the discretion of those who 
interpreted, applied, and reinvented the law.  
 These ambiguities and uncertainties impacted the exercise of armed and unarmed 
political opposition in at least two ways. On the one hand, they conditioned a changing 
legal framework according to which authorities could target and prosecute, as criminal, 
almost any manifestation of dissent, from simple opposition journalism to straightforward 
insurrection or rebellion. On the other hand, they allowed governments to repress criminal 
manifestations of dissent that often pushed the limits of what constitutions and codes 
prescribed for the punishment of political offenses –and crimes in general. That is the case, 
for instance, of the guarantees of the due process, the principle of no extradition of political 
offenders, or the constitutional prohibition of the death penalty for political crimes.  
 Building on these ambiguous and malleable legal frameworks, responses to 
political crimes in Mexico and Colombia often subjected criminal dissenters to alternative 
judicial and jurisdictional regimes. They were parallel legalities that involved their own 
sets of crimes and punishments and remained under the control of administrative and 
military authorities that operated with certain independence from the formal judicial power. 
These alternative legalities account for some sort of legal pluralism within the logics of 
state law, state power, and state repression in the Porfiriato and the Regeneration. They 
reveal, for instance, that state law concerning the treatment of political criminals was not 
necessarily uniform or coherent, and in certain circumstances could involve multiple, even 
conflicting authorities, jurisdictions, and legislations –ordinary and extraordinary, 
governmental and military, judicial and administrative, state-centered and international, for 
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instance.54 These parallelisms impacted governmental understandings of and responses to 
political crimes in different ways. They allowed the emergence of shifting and clashing 
definitions of the legal status of criminal(ized) dissenters. Likewise, they sparked legal and 
legislative conflicts over the existence of separate legal spheres for the prosecution and 
punishment of political crimes and criminals. Moreover, and in more practical terms, they 
allowed governments and authorities to put hundreds of dissenters away from the reach 
and protections of the formal justice system. It was a maneuver that, for many dissidents 
in both countries, translated into scarce judicial guarantees, limitations to the right to 
defense, judicial arbitrariness, and lack of proportionality in the administration of 
punishment.  
 Governmental endeavors against criminal dissenters involved much more than 
these legal and jurisdictional maneuvers. With the arguments of fighting revolutionary 
plots, preventing rebellion, and suppressing insurrections, Mexican and Colombian 
governments criminalized both armed and unarmed dissidents, repressed combatants and 
non-combatants alike, and generalized repression throughout their entire societies. This 
generalization of repression had dramatic manifestations. In Mexico, for instance, it led to 
massive imprisonments of journalists; extrajudicial assassinations of dissenters by 
paramilitary forces; and even political kidnappings and “forced” extraditions. In Colombia, 
it manifested through hundreds of “preventive” imprisonments and confinements; the 
realization of dozens of extrajudicial executions; and even the pecuniary punishment of 
entire towns just on the grounds of their political affiliation. These experiences account for 
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repertoires of punishment that combined formal and informal, legal and extralegal, judicial 
and extrajudicial penalties for political crimes and criminals, as well as both retributive and 
merciful displays of state power. Far from clashing, contradicting, or annulling one 
another, these multiple penalties and displays reveal complementary strategies of state 
retribution strategically crafted in response to a variety of legal, political, and military 
goals. They demonstrate that punishment and retribution did not work in a univocal, 
straightforward way, and that governmental responses to political crimes were diverse, 
complex, and fluid.  
 Dissenters in Mexico and Colombia rarely accepted their criminalization and the 
legal and judicial treatment that came with it. Just as there was retribution, punishment and 
repression, there was also resistance, rejection, bargaining, and negotiation. Resistance to 
governmental responses to political crimes sparked heated debates on the constitutional 
limits of state power and the interpretation and application of basic constitutional precepts. 
Bargaining and negotiation fostered a series of mechanisms of political and legal 
transaction between political criminals and authorities that often benefitted both parts. On 
the whole, resistance and bargaining had the ambiguous effect of upholding state’s power 
and sovereignty while providing criminal dissidents with some degree of redress from the 
logics of state punishment.  
 The dissertation reveals that, despite such commonalities, there were important 
differences between the Mexican and the Colombian experiences. Although politics in the 
Porfiriato appeared to be more authoritarian than in the Regeneration, the treatment of 
political criminals in Mexico involved greater degrees of legal security and judicial 
protection than in Colombia. It also encompassed more contained displays of state 
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retribution, as well as a more centralized and straightforward administration of justice. 
Levels of legal exceptionality underlying the treatment of political offenders were also 
different between the two cases. Compared to Colombia, Mexico relied less on 
extraordinary, alternative legalities and more on the provisions of its criminal code and the 
proceedings and decisions of its ordinary justice system. State law concerning political 
crimes was, therefore, more coherent and unified in Mexico than it was in Colombia. In 
this second case, the treatment of political criminals was subject to a complex jurisdictional 
network of ordinary judges and legislation, military tribunals and laws, and administrative 
authorities and prescriptions.  
 While it is tempting to think that the treatment of political criminals was more 
unpredictable, unregulated, and devoid of basic protections in Mexico than in Colombia, 
this study shows that the opposite was true. Political criminals in Colombia, unlike their 
Mexican counterparts, remained for most of the period at the mercy of a series of logics of 
state retribution that unfolded away from the procedures, limitations, and protections of the 
ordinary law and the formal justice system. Compared to the Mexican case, procedural 
guarantees for political offenders in Colombia were scarce, with a justice system that only 
on extraordinary occasions could intervene on their behalf. As authoritarian as the 
Porfiriato might have seemed, and as dramatic as its strategies against dissidents were, it 
still granted dissidents a series of legal and judicial conditions that dissenters in Colombia 
would never be able to fully enjoy.  
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Political Crimes and the Scholarship on Mexico, Colombia, and Latin America 
Political crimes represent one of the most neglected areas in the historical scholarship on 
modern Latin America. To be sure, there is a significant body of historical literature that 
addresses, directly and indirectly, the multiple social, political, and legal questions that 
were commonly linked to the problems of political criminality and its legal treatment in 
the region. Yet, this diverse –and certainly extensive– scholarship commonly pays scarce 
attention, if any, to the ways in which modern Latin American societies understood, 
defined, debated about, treated, and punished political crimes and criminals. It is a 
historiographical limitation that affects not only comparative literature on law, state 
formation and civil warfare in the continent, but also scholarship on the legal and political 
experiences of nineteenth-century Mexico and Colombia.  
  Comparative studies on state formation and civil warfare in modern Latin America 
are particularly rich in social, political, economic, and even legal problematizations. Works 
like State Formation and Democracy in Latin America (2000), by Fernando López-Alves, 
and Blood and Debt (2002), by Miguel Angel Centeno, offer thorough analyses of the role 
of civil warfare in the processes of state making in the region. Monographs like Brian 
Loveman’s The Constitution of Tyranny (1993) shed light on the links among law, 
constitutionalism, political repression, and authoritarianism in Latin America. 
Comparative volumes like Rebecca Earle’s Rumours of Wars: Civil Conflict in Nineteenth-
Century Latin America (2000) offer additional insights into the social, political, military, 
and legal experiences of political conflict and civil warfare in the region. The works by 
López-Alves, Centeno, and Loveman share the particularity of considering Latin America 
a whole, relatively coherent unit of analysis. Drawing on this methodological premise, each 
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author attempts to find regularities and differences among national experiences in the 
region by paying attention to specific units of comparison –defined in every case as socio-
historical problems. López-Alves, for instance, compares processes of state building (civil- 
or military-led) and patterns of political and military mobilization of subaltern groups, 
specially within contexts of civil warfare. Centeno contrasts modalities of warfare (internal 
or external), together with taxation systems. Loveman, finally, compares constitutions and 
constitutional provisions regarding state power and public order.  
Regardless their specific units of comparison, the three books share an interest in 
comparing ways of waging and regulating internal warfare in Latin America. This 
comparative preoccupation about civil warfare in the region is also present in this 
dissertation. There are, nonetheless, important methodological differences between these 
works and this study. The comparative scope of the dissertation is much more restricted, 
for instance. Similarly, it does not consider Mexico and Colombia parts of a single, 
coherent socio-historical entity. Its unit of comparison is also different, as are the major 
problems linked to it. By comparing governmental responses to political criminality in the 
Porfiriato and the Regeneration, this study tackles a series of voids that are common to 
these other comparative works on civil warfare in modern Latin America. Although they 
all deal with issues of rebellion and political repression, none of them consider political 
criminality a subject matter on its own, delve into the legal logics of state repression, or 
problematize civil warfare in legal terms. This dissertation represents, in this light, an effort 
to stimulate comparative studies on Latin American civil wars on the grounds of legal and 
political problems that remain poorly explored this far. Studying these conflicts in the 
region through comparative questions regarding the treatment of political crimes can offer 
 40 
valuable insights into the functioning of politics and law in the history of modern Latin 
America.  
 Literature on rebellion and civil warfare in Colombia and Mexico involves similar 
limitations regarding the study of political crimes and criminality. Scholarship on civil wars 
is particularly rich in the case of Colombia. General overviews of the country’s many 
internal conflicts include Alvaro Tirado’s Aspectos sociales de las guerras civiles in 
Colombia (1976); Maria T. Uribe’s Las palabras de la guerra (2006); the volume Ganarse 
el cielo defendiendo la religion (2006), edited by Luis Javier Ortiz; and Fernán González’s 
Partidos, guerras e Iglesia (2006). These books cover a variety of political, social, and 
even cultural aspects, but pay scarce attention to the legal side of these conflicts. That is 
also the case of the most important works on the Thousand Days’ War, a conflict that 
receives special attention in this monograph. Legal problematizations are practically absent 
from the classical works by Charles Bergquist, Coffee and Conflict in Colombia (1978); 
Jorge Villegas, La guerra de los mil días (1979); and Carlos E. Jaramillo, Los guerrilleros 
del novecientos (1991). Most recent scholarship on the conflict, including the volume 
Memoria de un país en guerra (2001), edited by Gonzalo Sánchez and Mario Aguilera, or 
the works by Brenda Escobar, have done little to fill these thematic and disciplinary gaps.55   
 Literature on the legal dynamics of punishment and mercy in Colombian civil wars 
is scarce. Before 2019, only a few works by Mario Aguilera and Joshua Rosenthal paid 
direct attention to the legal strategies that governments used to repress rebels and restore 
                                                
55 The works by Brenda Escobar include the book De los conflictos locales a la guerra civil: Tolima a finales 
del siglo XIX (2013) and the book chapter “La guerra de los mil días o mil conflictos fragmentados” (2017). 
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peace during and after civil conflicts.56 The volume Paz en la república, published in 
January 2019, represents perhaps the most notable contribution in this regard. Edited by 
Margarita Garrido, the book examines how nineteenth-century governments managed to 
give formal and legal closure to the many internal conflicts that erupted throughout the 
period. This monograph engages Aguilera’s work by questioning its analysis of the logics 
of state punishment and leniency underlying governmental responses to rebellion during 
the period.  It also addresses Garrido’s volume by offering a more detailed analysis of the 
legal instruments that governments used to punish and pardon political criminals, and by 
proposing more complex interpretations of the roles of punishment and mercy in contexts 
of civil war.  
 Although less developed than its Colombian counterpart, Mexican scholarship on 
rebellion and internal warfare in the nineteenth century also focuses on a variety of political 
and social issues. Works like the volume Porfirio Díaz frente al descontento popular 
regional (1986), edited by Friedrich Katz; Leticia Reina’s Las rebeliones campesinas en 
México (1980); John Tutino’s From Insurrection to Revolution (1986); and Paul 
Vanderwood’s The Power of God Against the Guns of Government (1998) are seminal 
studies combining approaches from both social and political history. That is also the case 
of Will Fowler’s series on Mexican pronunciamientos, which include the volumes Forceful 
Negotiations (2011); Malcontents, Rebels, and Pronunciados (2012); and Celebrating 
Insurrection (2013). Despite the diversity of their approaches, none of these studies pays 
considerable attention to the legal dynamics intervening either in the development of these 
                                                
56 See Aguilera’s article “Canje o fusilamiento: los presos políticos en las guerras del siglo XIX.” (2006), as 
well as Rosenthal’s “Constitutional Clemency after the Golpe de Melo of 1854: Constitutionalism and 
Tradition in Early Republican Colombia” (2017). See the “References” section. 
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insurrections or in the relationship between authorities and insurrectionists. This relative 
neglect of the legal logics of rebellion and civil warfare in Mexico is also present in more 
political approaches like the ones by Allen Wells and Gilbert Joseph in Summer of 
Discontent, Seasons of Upheaval (1996), and Elliot Young in Catarino Garza’s Revolution 
on the Texas-Mexico Border (2004). By problematizing Mexican rebellions in the late-
nineteenth century through a series of questions that scholars have not explored before in 
a systematic way, this monograph opens new ways to understand and analyze the 
experience of insurrection in modern Mexico.  
 Literature on law, crime, and criminality in modern Latin America also entail 
analogous limitations concerning the study of political offenses. Comparative volumes like 
Reconstructing Criminality in Latin America (2000) and Crime and Punishment in Latin 
America (2011), both edited by Carlos Aguirre, only offer and indirect and mostly 
superficial approach to the ways in which governments in the region understood and 
responded to political crimes. Similar limitations characterize Rosa del Olmo’s 
comparative history of Latin American criminology, América Latina y su criminología 
(1981). Recent scholarship on crime and criminality in modern Mexico pays a great deal 
of attention to the treatment of common offenses and the evolution of criminal law ideas 
during the Porfiriato. An example of these works are Pablo Piccato’s City of Suspects 
(2001), Elisa Speckman’s Crimen y castigo (2007), and James A. Garza’s The Imagined 
Underworld (2007). Although fundamental for understanding the treatment of certain 
forms of criminality in the Mexico of Porfirio Díaz, these studies tend to overlook how 
important responses to political criminality were in the shaping of the legal experience of 
 43 
the Porfiriato. This monograph represents, in this light, an effort to contribute to a new, 
more balanced understanding of the functioning of law and politics in Díaz’s regime. 
 The Colombian case offers a slightly different situation regarding the place of 
political crimes in the scholarship on law, crime, and criminality. Although there are no 
specific historical studies on the treatment of political crimes in nineteenth-century 
Colombia, there is a small but significant number of legal works more or less focused on 
the history of political criminality in the country. The most important book in this regard 
is Iván Orozco Abad’s Combatientes, rebeldes y terroristas (1992), a study that provides 
valuable information regarding the legal treatment of civil warfare in the nineteenth 
century. Legal literature on political crimes in Colombia also includes Rafael Flores 
Camacho’s El delito político and Luis Carlos Pérez’s Los delitos politicos, two pieces of 
legal theory from the 1930s and 1940s. More recently, works like Vivir en Policía (2007), 
by Miguel Malagón, and Governar, reformar y encarcelar (2010), by Lina Adarve, have 
elaborated on the ways in which Colombian administrations from the late-nineteenth 
century used the law to deal with problems of public order. These works, especially those 
by Orozco Abad and Adarve, trace a line of legal and historical scholarship that this 
dissertation hopes to enhance.  
 By studying issues of politics, law, public order, and civil warfare, this monograph 
also engages more general overviews concerning the political history of Mexico and 
Colombia in the late-nineteenth century. Although these broader perspectives are rich in 
details about the workings of politics, law, and state power and repression in both countries, 
they barely delve into more specific problems concerning political criminality and its legal 
treatment. In the Colombian case, these historiographical limitations are particularly 
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common in the political literature on the period. Some examples in this regard are Helen 
Delphar’s Red Against Blue (1981) and James Sander’s Contentious Republicans (2004) –
still an exemplary study on popular politics in the nineteenth-century Colombia. 
Approaches to the Regeneration from the perspective of intellectual history tend to pay 
more attention to legal questions linked to matters of political repression, public order, and 
civil warfare. That is the case, for instance, of María Melgarejo’s El lenguaje político de 
la regeneración (2010), Antonio Barreto’s Venturas y desventuras de la regeneración 
(2012), and the volume Miguel Antonio Caro y la cultura de su época (2002), edited by 
Rubén Sierra Mejía. Studies directly concerned with issues of public order and civil 
warfare during the Regeneration involve clearer references to issues of legislation and 
public criminality, offering this monograph a useful bibliographical ground. These works 
include, among others, Charles Bergquist’s Coffee and Conflict, Mario Aguilera’s 
Insurgencia urbana en Bogotá (1997), and the volume edited by Leopoldo Múnera La 
regeneración revisitada (2011).   
General overviews on Porfirian Mexico involve different degrees of interest on 
issues of political criminality. Questions about the legal workings of Díaz’s 
authoritarianism or the ways in which authorities during the Porfiriato responded to 
rebellion and insurrection are practically absent from those accounts that privilege social 
and intellectual approaches. William Beezley’s Judas at the Jockey Club (1987), together 
with Charles Hale’s The Transformation of Mexican Liberalism in the Late-Nineteenth 
Century (1989) are two illustrative examples. Overviews privileging a political approach 
tend to pay more attention to these questions. That is the case, for instance, of Elisa 
Speckman’s contributions to the volumes Nueva Historia Mínima de México (2008) and 
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Nueva Historia General de México (2010), or of Romana Falcón’s articles on rebellion and 
repression in the Juárez’s and Díaz’s eras.57 Another example in this regard is Paul Garner’s 
profile of Porfirio Díaz in the volume A Companion to Mexican History and Culture 
(2011). Their study of the legal logics of Porfirian authoritarianism, nonetheless, is for the 
most part superficial. It is possible to find more detailed and in-depth approaches on the 
matter in literature that deal directly with Díaz’s practices of repression and political 
persecution. This scholarship includes, among others, Paul Vanderwood’s Los Rurales 
Mexicanos (1982), Collin McLachlan’s Anarchism and the Mexican Revolution (1991), 
and Claudio Lomnitz’s The Return of Comrade Ricardo Flores Magón (2014). Certainly 
useful for the purposes of this monographs, these works still lack a proper and consistent 
legal perspective like the one inspiring this study and its problematizations.   
 Besides helping fill the mentioned gaps in the legal and political literature on 
Mexico, Colombia, and Latin America, this monograph also makes intensive use of a series 
of primary sources that scholars on the Porfiriato and the Regeneration have barely 
exploited. As most of the literature reviewed above, this study relies on newspapers; 
memoires; constitutions and criminal codes; collections of laws and decrees; legislative 
debates; and legal and political essays from the period. Yet, unlike many of these works, 
this monograph also relies on criminal expedients and judicial reports; rulings from the 
Mexican and Colombian Supreme Courts; requests for judicial protection before different 
authorities in both countries; petitions for pardon and other modalities of state leniency; 
and other documents involving the quotidian negotiation of penalties for political crimes. 
                                                
57 See, for instance, Falcón’s articles “La desaparición de jefes politicos en Coahuila. Una paradoja porfirista” 
(1988), and “El Estado liberal ante las rebeliones populares. México, 1867-1876” (2005). See the 
“References” section. 
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These “other,” commonly untapped sources reveal a whole new facet of the legal and 
judicial logics of state repression against political crimes and criminals, and provide this 
study with fresh, original insights about the historical dynamics of law, governance, and 
civil warfare in Mexico and Colombia.  
 
Chapter Outline 
This monograph consists of four major sections and six chapters. Each section focuses on 
specific problems regarding the governmental treatment of rebellion and political 
criminality in the Porfiriato and the Regeneration: legislation and lawmaking; prevention; 
repression; and pardon. Section one explores the treatment of rebels and political crimes in 
formal constitutional and legal terms. It explores how constitutions as well as criminal and 
military codes in Colombia and Mexico understood political criminality, and how such 
understandings materialized in particular criminal categories and specific sets of penalties. 
It also analyzes how authors of legal doctrine, legal experts, and lawmakers discussed about 
what political criminality was and what sort of punishments it deserved. Section two 
focuses on matters of prevention, and studies how Colombian and Mexican governments 
used in practice both legal and extralegal means in order to prevent episodes of internal 
conflict and neutralize revolutionary plots and conspiracies. Section three deals with issues 
of repression, and analyzes the repertoire of retributive practices that governments from 
both countries had in order to suppress rebellions and punish rebels and other armed 
dissidents. Finally, Section four looks at the treatment of political criminals from the 
perspective of state leniency. It studies how presidents and other authorities in Colombia 
and Mexico combined punishment and mercy in their responses to several modalities of 
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political criminality, and analyzes the multiple functions that state mercy had in the 
relationship between state and rebels. 
The study of legislation comprises the first three chapters, all in Section one. 
Chapter one analyzes the conception and treatment of political crimes and criminals in the 
Mexican Constitution of 1857 and the Colombian Charter of 1886. It argues, among other 
things, that Constitutional understandings of political criminality were closely linked to a 
series of concerns regarding the need to maintain public order and institutional stability. 
Constitutional dispositions on matters of public order contained several provisions 
regarding political crimes and criminals. The particular nature of these provisions helps 
explain, to a great extent, the singularities of the legal responses to political crimes that 
authorities in Mexico and Colombia put into effect during the period.  
 Chapter two focuses on the Criminal Codes of 1871 in Mexico and 1890 in 
Colombia, and studies how these codifications helped configure a criminal regime for the 
definition and punishment of political offenses during the Porfiriato and the Regeneration. 
It also reflects on the characteristics of the resulting regimes, as well as their impact on the 
ways in which Mexican and Colombian authorities criminalized and prosecuted internal 
enemies during the period. The chapter shows that both criminal codes addressed political 
criminality in relatively similar ways. Yet, there were important differences regarding the 
classification of political offenses and the repertoires of offenses defined in each case as 
“political.” It also argues that, in both countries, the definition and classification of political 
crimes gave governments ample wiggle room for legal interpretation and reinvention 
regarding the treatment of “dangerous” political dissidents.  
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 Chapter three reconstructs and analyzes a series of conversations that accompanied 
the making and enactment of constitutional and criminal law prescriptions on political 
criminality. These conversations encompassed a wide variety of positions and perspectives 
about what political crimes were, what made them criminal, and what made them political. 
While some jurists and lawmakers conceived political criminals as enemies of society, 
others merely perceived them as political fanatics led by misunderstood notions of “justice” 
or “patriotism.” The lack of clarity and consensus on these matters had serious political 
and legal consequences both in Mexico and Colombia, playing a substantial role in the 
particular ways in which the Porfiriato and the Regeneration responded to political 
criminality respectively.  
 The study of prevention, repression, and mercy corresponds to chapters four, five, 
and six, respectively. Chapter four studies how both countries used their respective legal 
and constitutional frameworks to prevent civil war, contain revolutionary waves, and 
neutralize potentially subversive political dissidents. Focusing on the preventive treatment 
of both political crimes and press offenses, it delves into the legal and judicial logics of 
political repression vis-à-vis actual or potential threats against public order in the 
Regeneration and the Porfiriato. It also sheds lights on the multiple ways in which 
governments in both countries understood “prevention” and defined what a “threat against 
public order” was. Overall, the chapter argues that governmental efforts aimed at 
preventing rebellion and internal turmoil were grounded in a series of laws and decrees that 
shaped, in both countries, alternative regimes of legality. Revolving around issues of press 
freedom and maintenance of public order, these “parallel legalities” put the prosecution 
and judgement of threats against the government and public peace outside the reach of the 
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formal laws and ordinary justice. Another effect of these alternative legalities had to do 
with the shaping of a practical equivalence between political crimes and press offenses 
against public order, which put dissident journalists, rebellion suspects, and political 
agitators in a similar criminal category as enemies of the state. 
Chapter five reconstructs and analyzes the different responses that Mexican and 
Colombian authorities gave to rebellion and revolutionary movements during the period 
under study. How did governments use the law and the justice system as mechanisms to 
punish rebels and revolutionaries? How “legal” and “judicial” were these responses, and 
to what extent did they combine both legal and extra-legal punitive practices? Those are 
some of the questions that the chapter tackles. It claims that governmental responses to 
rebellion in Colombia and Mexico encompassed a variety of legal, political, and military 
purposes that demanded a combination of both “legal” and “non-legal” measures. State 
repression, in consequence, was as formal and legalistic as it was informal and extralegal. 
In times of internal turmoil, it unfolded simultaneously in the legislation, the courts of 
justice, and both within and outside battlefields, involving not only actual rebels and active 
combatants but also dissidents of all sorts. Responses to rebellion in both countries turned 
political offenses into a flexible criminal category in which crimes and punishments were 
mutable and subject to constant redefinition.  
Chapter six studies the logics of state mercy by uncovering the multiple ways in 
which political criminals in Mexico and Colombia could obtain leniency from their 
governments. It reconstructs the multiple forms in which authorities in both counties 
administered mercy, and analyzes the functioning of some of the most recurrent 
mechanisms for pardoning political offenders in the period –namely, amnesty laws and 
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pardon decrees. Besides exploring the workings of these official, legalistic manifestations 
of state mercy, the chapter delves into the different ways Mexican and Colombian political 
criminals used to negotiate their penalties and claim mercy. State leniency not only 
consisted of acts of governmental magnanimity that authorities decided to perform at 
certain points during or after an internal conflict across the board or for collective benefit. 
It was also something that criminals could obtain in their individual interactions with the 
state. The chapter shows that, one way or another, state mercy always came at a price. 
Pardons, amnesties, and even individual bargains for mercy, demanded from criminals 
their legal and symbolic submission to the state’s authority, as well as the reinvention of 
their role as political dissidents. State mercy, in this light, was not only a mechanism for 
granting criminals some redress from the logics of state repression, but also a tool to 
reinforce state legitimacy, bolster governmental authority, and ensure political submission 
and obedience. 
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II. CHAPTER 1. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF PUBLIC ORDER 
AND POLITICAL CRIMINALITY IN THE PORFIRIATO AND THE 
REGENERATION 
 
The story of Ricardo Flores Magón, and by extension the experiences of dozens of fellow 
political dissidents in Mexico and Colombia during the period, raises a first series of 
questions regarding the rules that regulated their actions as citizens. What were the rules 
that organized the interactions between citizens and state, established the limits of what 
citizens could do as political actors, and limited what the state could and could not do in 
its relationship with them? What was the basic normative framework that allowed people 
like Flores Magón to carry out their activities as political dissenters while setting the 
conditions that made them legal? What were the rules that determined what governments 
could do and how far they could go in their responses against the threats posed by political 
dissenters? The answers to these questions lie in the constitutional frameworks of both the 
Porfiriato and the Regeneration.  
 
Constitutions set up the most basic framework for the legal definition and treatment of 
political crimes and criminals in Mexico and Colombia. Prescriptions from criminal codes, 
legislative and administrative decrees, executive orders, and every other legal act that 
criminalized and punished political offenses in the Porfiriato and the Regeneration drew to 
a certain point on constitutional provisions on the matter. This chapter explores how the 
Constitutions that were in order during the period conceived and understood political 
crimes. It also reconstructs and analyzes how these Charters laid down the foundations for 
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the further crafting of legal responses to political criminality during the Porfiriato and the 
Regeneration. How much attention did these Constitutions pay to issues of political 
criminality? What kind of definitions and treatments of political crimes did they involve or 
make possible? What were the major concerns that, in these Constitutions, were linked to 
matters of political criminality? And, ultimately, how did these constitutional frameworks 
help understand the particular ways in which authorities in the Porfiriato and the 
Regeneration responded to political crimes and criminals? These are the major questions 
guiding this chapter. 
 The Chapter focuses on the 1857 Mexican Constitution and the 1886 Colombian 
Charter. Part one reconstructs the history and trajectories of the constitutional regimes that 
were in place during the Porfiriato and the Regeneration. It pays special attention to the 
ways in which these regimes addressed concerns about public order and state power. Part 
two offers a comparative exam of the ways in which both Charters addressed issues of 
public order, internal conflict and turmoil, “dangerous” dissidence, and political 
criminality. Focusing on four sets of constitutional prescriptions, this section explores how 
the search for order, peace, and stability shaped in both nations similar provisions regarding 
rights and guarantees, limitations of state power, and even administration of punishment 
and mercy. Part three offers, by way of conclusion, an analysis of the legal frameworks 
stemming from these prescriptions, and of the ways in which they helped shape the 
authorities’ treatment of political crimes in Colombia and Mexico throughout the period.  
On the whole, the chapter develops four major arguments. The first claim is that, 
despite their different origins, both Charters coincided on their insistence on the need for 
maintaining public order and institutional stability. The second argument contends that this 
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premise materialized in a relatively common set of prescriptions limiting liberties, 
suspending guarantees, and providing extraordinary powers in cases of emergency. A third 
contention is that concerns about political criminality were present, directly and indirectly, 
in almost all of these prescriptions. A final argument, linked to the previous one, affirms 
that most of these provisions concerning political crimes had a vague nature that provided 
authorities with a great window for legal interpretation and reinvention. It is this vagueness 
what helps explain, to a great extent, the particularities of the legal responses to political 
crimes that authorities in Mexico and Colombia put into effect during the Porfiriato and 
the Regeneration.  
 
Constitutions in Context: From 1857 to 1886 
The Mexican 1857 Constitution: from Atuyla to the Porfiriato 
The 1857 Mexican Constitution was born out of the triumphant Revolution of Ayutla, the 
civil war that overthrew dictator Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna in 1855. It was the product 
of a coalition of liberal and conservative forces that had rebelled against a highly 
centralized, authoritarian, and personalistic regime.58 In correspondence with this 
revolutionary spirit, the charter leaned towards liberalism and thus heavily emphasized the 
protection of individual rights, the separation and independence of public powers, and the 
federative nature of the Mexican Nation. It also created a popular, representative, and 
                                                
58 Brian Hammet, “The Comonfort Presidency, 1855-1857,” Bulletin of Latin American Research, 15, no. 1 
(1996), 87; see also: Ricardo Forte, “Los acuerdos de Ayutla (1854) y de San Nicolás (1852) y las 
constituciones liberales. Orígenes del poder coactivo del Estado en México y Argentina,” Historia Mexicana 
53, no. 4 (2004), 877. 
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federal republic, and established a political regime in which Congress concentrated most 
of the public power at the expense of the Executive. Against a past of despotism, the new 
Constitution attempted to reduce the President’s powers almost to its minimal expression, 
granting the Executive only the authority necessary to be respected both within the nation 
and abroad.59 Additionally, and for the first time in Mexican history, the Constitution 
included a comprehensive bill of rights and set up the Federal Government as its guarantor. 
These rights granted Mexicans complete equality under the law, freedom of press and 
speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of education, among other individual rights.60 
The novelty of this bill of rights allowed Mexican constitution makers to proclaim that they 
had enacted the “most democratic” constitution that the nation had ever seen.61 
 The inclusion of a bill of rights at the very beginning of the Charter not only 
represented to Mexican constitution makers a major step towards the liberal and 
enlightened ideal of a citizenry with full individual rights. It represented, as well, a crucial 
mechanism of defense against despotism and state authoritarianism. Constitutional rights 
set the limits of state power and authority in the daily routine of politics and public 
administration. The establishment of the mechanism of judicial amparo, another novelty 
of the 1857 Constitution, reinforced these limits and provided Mexicans with a means to 
defend themselves against eventual abuses from judicial authorities. The amparo 
                                                
59 Forte, “Los acuerdos,” 885; see also: David Pantoja Morán, “La Constitución de 1857 y su interludio 
parlamentario,” Historia Mexicana 57, no. 4 (2008), 1067 and 1068. 
 
60 Richard Sinkin, “The Mexican Constitutional Congress, 1856-1857,” The Hispanic American Historical 
Review 43, no. 1 (1973), 1; see also: Erika Pani, “Republicans and Monarchists, 1848-1867,” in A Companion 
to Mexican History and Culture, ed. William Beezley (Sussex: Blackwell Publishing, 2011), 274. 
 
61 “El Congreso Constityente a la Nación” (February 5, 1857), in Derecho político de los Estados Unidos 
Mexicanos: Colección que comprende la Constitución General de la República y las Constituciones 
especiales, Tomo I (México: Imprenta del Gobierno, 1884), 10. 
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mechanism allowed individuals to request, before the nation’s Supreme Court of Justice, 
the revision and eventual suspension of judicial sentences that, in their opinion, violated 
their constitutional rights.62 Through the constitutional amparos, the 1857 Charter ensured 
the existence of a judicial system regulated by the law and guarantor of people’s rights.63 
By the time Porfirio Díaz came to power, the 1857 Constitution had experienced 
important challenges and reforms. In 1858, right after its enactment, president Ignacio 
Comonfort suspended it with the argument that it was impossible to govern with it. It would 
not be the first time a Mexican president would disown the new Constitution under such 
pretenses.64 Additionally, the progressive dissolution of the revolutionary alliance between 
liberals and conservatives brought civil war back. The Reform War shook Mexico between 
1858 and 1860. Its outcome gave way to the French Intervention and the creation of 
Mexico’s Second Empire between 1862 and 1867. Almost a decade of civil warfare left 
behind important constitutional changes and a complete redefinition of the priorities 
regarding law and order. Reforms included the enactment in 1859 and 1860 of the “Leyes 
de reforma,” a series of provisions separating State and Church and secularizing the 
nation’s political life. Further modifications throughout the 1870s altered the structure and 
functioning of the legislative power. More importantly, during the 1860s and 1870s, the 
social and political turmoil caused by civil warfare and foreign intervention gradually 
                                                
62 Erika Pani, “Constitución, ciudadanía y guerra civil: México y Estados Unidos en la década de 1860,” in 
El poder y la sangre, ed. Guillermo Palacios and Erika Pani (México: El Colegio de México, 2014), 70. 
 
63 Elisa Speckman Guerra, “La justicia penal en el siglo XIX y las primeras décadas del XX (Los legisladores 
y sus propuestas),” in Los abogados y la formación del estado mexicano, ed. Óscar Cruz Barney, Héctor Fix-
Fierro, and Elisa Speckman Guerra (México: UNAM – Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, 2013), 426. 
 
64 Pani, “Republicans and Monarchists,”  274-275. Comonfort’s sucesor, General Felix Zuloaga, would also 
suspend the constitution after considering it impracticable.  
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turned “order” into a more important premise than “law.” Overall, the Constitution 
responded to the changing priorities and veered towards the right. 
Growing concerns about public order and peace characterized the post-Intervention 
administrations of Benito Juarez (1868-1872) and Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada (1872-1876). 
Such concerns materialized in a progressive concentration of public powers in the hands 
of the President. The restoration of the republic after the Intervention hastened a gravitation 
toward a strong executive at the expense of the Congress.65 The decade preceding the 
arrival of Porfirio Díaz witnessed increasing levels of centralism and presidentialism, as 
well as continuous suspensions of constitutional rights as a means to fight banditry and 
political insurgency.66 The late years of Juarez’s administration left in their wake a 
personalistic style of governance, a strengthening of the Executive, a legacy of electoral 
manipulation and co-optation, and an authoritarian and repressive trend concerning the 
maintenance of public order and peace.67 By the time Díaz came to power, little remained 
of the foundational spirit of the 1857 Constitution. To a certain point, Díaz’s constitutional 
authoritarianism was the result of two decades of political and legal transformations 
fostered by Juarez and Lerdo. 
Diaz gave continuity to the trend of concentrating power initiated by Juarez and 
Lerdo. After the Tuxtepec revolution that brought him to power, “peace,” “order,” and 
                                                
65 Frank Knapp Jr., “Parliamentary Government and the Mexican Constitution of 1857: A Forgotten Phase 
of Mexican Political History,” The Hispanic American Historical Review 33, no. 1 (1953), 87; see also: 
Sinkin, “The Mexican,” 13. 
 
66 See, for instance: Paul Vanderwood, Los Rurales mexicanos (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1982), 
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 57 
“progress” became the government’s top priorities. After decades of civil warfare, and 
facing a long legacy of internal conflict and division, peace seemed to be Mexico’s utmost 
desire. Peace, in terms of the prominent Porfirista Justo Sierra, was meant to become 
Mexico’s political religion. It demanded the sacrifice of everything, even the Constitution 
itself.68 Such goal required a powerful Executive, capable of ruling without interferences 
from other public powers. Overtime, Diaz would succeed in concentrating the sum of all 
powers without threatening or altering –at least not significantly- the constitutional model 
of Ayutla. Respectful of the division of public powers, he managed to control both the 
Congress and the courts via cooptation, eroding the independence of both powers and 
turning them into mere appendixes of the Executive.69  
In general terms, the Constitutional framework of the Porfiriato remained relatively 
loyal to the original forms and precepts of the 1857 Charter: separation of powers –at least 
formally–, respect for individual rights, and subjection of public powers to the rule of law. 
The interpretation and application of these precepts during the age of Díaz, nonetheless, 
would differ significantly from the original goals of the Constituents of Ayutla. This would 
prove particularly true in matters concerning the managing of public order and the 
protection of individual guarantees for political dissidents, rebels, and other internal 
enemies of the government, as we will see in the next sections. 
 
                                                
68 Justo Sierra, Evolución política del pueblo mexicano (México: La casa de España en México, 1940). My 
quotes and page numbers from this work are based on the book’s digital version available at the “Biblioteca 
Virtual Universal.” This particular citation corresponds to the page 239 of the digital copy. 
 
69 Kuntz Ficker and Speckman Guerra, “El Porfiriato,” 495-496; see also: José López-Portillo y Rojas, 
Elevación y Caída de Porfirio Díaz (México: Librería Española, 1921), 30 and 130. 
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A Charter for Colombia’s Regeneration: The 1886 Constitution 
The Colombian 1886 Constitution was the result of a story relatively different from the 
Mexican one. In contrast to its Mexican counterpart, it emerged out of a failed rebellion: 
the Liberal uprising of 1885. The government’s victory in the war marked the demise of 
the radical, libertarian, and federalist regime in place in the nation since the early 1860s. 
Soon after the conflict’s end, president Rafael Nuñez, a moderate liberal that throughout 
the decade had managed to win the support of both conservatives and liberals alike, 
organized a Constituent Assembly. Its goal was to reform the Constitution enacted in 1863, 
considered by many as the main cause of the political instability facing the nation since the 
mid 1860s. The resulting charter was very different from the Mexican case. The new 
Colombian Constitution replaced the federative model adopted in 1863 with a centralized 
political and administrative regime, and established limits to the unrestricted liberties that 
the previous Constitution had granted. Along the same lines, the 1886 charter created a 
weak Legislative power in benefit of the Executive, and recognized the Catholic Church as 
a vital institution in matters of public education, social order, and national identity. It was, 
in short, a deeply conservative constitution, meant to bring order and stability through a 
strong central government, a narrowing of constitutional guarantees, and a concentration 
of public powers in the hands of the Executive.  
Like the Mexican charter, the Colombian Constitution of 1886 pursued a radical 
rupture with the past. In this case, the constitution makers aimed to break up with a past of 
disorder, administrative chaos, and civil warfare engendered –at least in the Constituents’ 
opinion– by the federative system and the unrestricted liberties that the 1863 Constitution 
had granted. The long series of regional uprisings experienced between late 1860s and mid-
 59 
1880s, together with the eruption of two national civil wars in 1876 and 1885, seemed to 
support their calls for a radical normative change. Delegates to the 1885 Constitutional 
Assembly focused on two major problems that, to moderate Liberals and Conservatives, 
had turned Colombia into an “organized anarchy” –an anarchy that could only lead to the 
perpetuation of civil warfare and the nation’s defragmentation.70 The first problem had to 
do with the federative model adopted in the previous Constitution. To Nuñez and his 
people, mid-century federalism had been nothing but “a desire for disorganization” that 
had been carried out to the point of “dividing what is indivisible by nature.”71 The 
“exaggerated” decentralization introduced by the 1863 Charter was and had been, in their 
opinion, a major source of chaos, disorder, and internal strife.  
The second problem had to do with the generous bill of rights that the previous 
Constitution had established. To the 1885 delegates, the 1863 charter had granted too many 
rights but not a single actual guarantee.72 The unrestricted nature of such liberties implicitly 
invalidated the duties that should counter-balance those rights.73 Furthermore, the overly 
generous liberties had annulled another crucial right: the government’s right to repress any 
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abuse of other liberties.74 All these liberties, in their account, had proven harmful to social 
order. The unlimited right of association had fostered the emergence of revolutionary 
groups. The absolute immunity of the freedoms of speech and press had made legitimate 
the appeal to all sorts of crime, especially crimes against the government and the public 
order. The incorporation of the International Law in cases of civil warfare –a mechanism 
that the 1863 Constitution had adopted in order to regularize and humanize internal 
conflicts– had legitimized rebellion and guaranteed the total impunity of political 
criminals.75 The 1863 Constitution, in short, had consecrated a series of “new, 
contradictory, and inapplicable” principles that had proven incapable of creating a stable 
social order.76  
The 1885 delegates conceived order and stability as the outcomes of two premises: 
strong government and limited liberties. Nuñez believed that young nations like Colombia 
required a great degree of state intervention and control. In correspondence, he advocated 
for a strong, centralized, and efficient state, able to inspire respect for authority, secure 
political stability, and limit individual rights for the benefit of society.77 He also believed 
that society’s needs should set the limits for individual freedom, and that the goal of politics 
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was to promote the general well-being over the particular needs and interests of 
individuals.78 These beliefs were in tune with the ones of the Conservative Miguel Antonio 
Caro, who drafted the bulk of the project for the new Constitution. Caro conceived society 
as an organic whole that was superior than the sum of individuals composing it. To him, 
the state was supposed to protect society’s rights, instead of securing individual freedoms. 
Society was a community in which every single individual had to give up some of their 
rights in order to benefit the collectivity, and the state was meant to protect the existence 
of that community.79  
Guided by such premises and conceptions, the 1885 delegates aimed to create a 
Constitution able to guarantee national unity, social order, and political stability over and 
above the protection of individual rights. Colombia’s regeneration required a realistic and 
protective Charter, not a “chimerical” and “prejudicial” work like its predecessor. Its 
central goals should be the prevention of any further subversions of public order and the 
achievement of peace, as the first and foremost condition for social, economic, and political 
progress.80 To Núñez and his people, the achievements of such goals depended on the 
materialization of three central principles: political centralization, presidentialism, and 
authoritarian control of public liberties.81 In correspondence with these premises, the new 
Constitution turned the Executive into the strongest public power, while respecting the 
                                                
78 Bergquist, Café y conflicto, 17. 
 
79 Jaramillo Uribe, El pensamiento, 314 and 347. 
 
80 “Los principios,” in Núñez, La Reforma, 21. 
 
81 Alejandro Valencia Villa, El pensamiento constitucional de Miguel Antonio Caro (Bogotá: Instituto Caro 
y Cuervo, 1992), 84. 
 
 
 62 
basic premise of division of powers. The Delegates extended the presidential period from 
two to six years; gave the president wide administrative and judicial powers; allowed him 
to intervene in legislative matters; and gave him almost unrestricted extraordinary powers 
in cases of emergency.82 This concentration of power would prove decisive in issues 
regarding public order and internal warfare throughout the next decades. As we will see 
later, the legal management of rebellion, insurrection, and “dangerous” political opposition 
would become almost exclusively a matter of emergency legislation by the Executive.  
 
 Mexico and Colombia: Between Differences and Commonalities 
As legal productions and artifacts, the 1857 Mexican Charter and its 1886 Colombian 
counterpart emerged from different processes, circumstances, and needs. Born out of 
different historical moments, both Constitutions originally established dissimilar political 
and administrative regimes, and even entailed different perspectives regarding public 
liberties, individual guarantees, and public order. Nonetheless, by the end of the nineteenth 
century, the constitutional trajectories of both countries would share a common ground of 
strong presidentialism, political centralization, and management by the Executive power 
of issues pertaining to public order.  
The need for preventing political disorder and internal strife would become a major 
priority for Mexican and Colombian governments alike, shaping over time relatively 
similar political and constitutional transformations. In both cases, the search for order, 
peace, and political instability ended up transforming the mid-century idea that 
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Constitutions and public powers had to protect the individual against the state’s power –or 
against state’s abuses. As a result, by the end of the century, the prevailing idea was that 
charters and governments had to protect society against individuals abusing their own 
liberties. This transition from the individual to society as subject of constitutional 
protection was not exclusive of the Mexican and Colombian cases, and in fact characterized 
many Latin American nations by the end of the century. It was yet another manifestation 
of the parable of modern republicanism in nineteenth-century Latin America.83 
 These similarities regarding individual rights, state power, and maintenance of 
public order help explain the multiple coincidences between the ways in which the 
Porfirian and the Regenerationist governments conceived political criminality and 
responded to rebellion, insurrection, and “dangerous” political dissidence. It is time now 
to take a closer look at those Constitutions, in order to see with detail their prescriptions 
and understandings in matters of public order, individual liberty, civil conflict, and internal 
enmity. 
 
Liberties, Order, and Internal Enmity in the Mexican and Colombian Constitutions 
Mexico’s and Colombia’s respective Constitutions tackled issues of public order, internal 
conflict and turmoil, “dangerous” dissidence, and political criminality through a relatively 
similar set of mandates and prescriptions.84 Overall, these common mandates had to do 
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with the application of the death penalty and other punishments, the delimitation and 
restriction of certain individual liberties, and the granting of extraordinary powers to the 
Executive in cases of public emergency. Although only a few of these provisions included 
specific references to political crimes, they all revolved around issues directly and 
indirectly linked to matters of political criminality. “Disruptions of and conspiracies 
against public order,” “alterations of public peace,” and even “press crimes against the 
government” represented some of the most recurrent examples in this regard.  
 
Death Penalty, Political Crimes, and Constitutional Exceptions 
One of the few literal references to “political crimes” included in both Constitutions 
concerned the ban on the application of penalties of death and extradition for political 
crimes. Article 23 of the Mexican Charter explicitly declared the abolition of capital 
punishment for political criminals, but left it in place for a series of crimes including treason 
during foreign war; road banditry (salteadores de caminos); arson; parricide; and homicide 
with premeditation. Serious military offenses, as well as some “piracy crimes defined by 
the law,” also fell into this category. Additionally, Article 15 of the same Constitution 
established that political crimes were also exempt from the penalty of extradition –a 
prescription not included in the 1886 Colombian charter but later include in its Criminal 
Code (Art. 18). Mexican constitution makers of the 1850s celebrated the abolition of capital 
punishment for political criminals  considering it a first and significant step towards the 
complete abolition of a “barbaric,” “ineffective,” and “sterile” punishment.85 
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 Colombian constitution makers did not have abolition in mind when they crafted 
the charter’s prescriptions on death penalty. The 1886 Constitution, in fact, reestablished 
capital punishment in Colombia after more than two decades of its initial abolition. 
Delegates based its reestablishment on the grounds that the current situation of the country 
and its problems of “instability” and “insecurity” demanded its reestablishment, mainly as 
an additional guarantee for the “conservation of order” and the “consolidation of the new 
institutions.”86 Colombian constitutional mandates on death penalty were relatively similar 
to the Mexican case. Articles 29 and 30 prohibited the application of death penalty to 
political crimes, but brought it back as a punishment for the most serious expressions of a 
series of crimes. Such offenses included treason during foreign war, parricide, murder, 
arson, piracy, some military offenses in correspondence with military law, and asalto en 
cuadrilla de malhechores –an offense more or less analogous to the crime of banditry in 
Mexico. It is noteworthy that, despite the significant legal and political implications of such 
prohibitions, neither of these Constitutions clearly established what political crimes were. 
These offenses would remain in both charters as part of an abstract criminal typology, 
devoid of precise content, that judges and legislators could define –and redefine– at their 
will. 
 
 Of Freedom and Order: Drawing the Limits of Individual Liberties 
Out of the different individual liberties that both Constitutions granted to Mexican and 
Colombian citizens, freedoms of speech and press involved the clearest and most direct 
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links with constitutional concerns on public order, political turmoil, and internal enmity. 
Articles 6 and 7 of the Mexican charter set the conditions for and limits of both freedoms. 
Article 6 established that the manifestation of ideas was free from any judicial or 
administrative inquiry as long as it did not attack morals, affect other people’s rights, 
encourage the commission of a particular crime, or disturbed public order. Article 7 
proclaimed the inviolability of the freedom of writing and publishing pieces on any subject. 
No law or authority could establish previous censorship to publications or repress the 
freedom or press. Three basic criteria, nonetheless, established basic limits to this liberty: 
respect for people’s private lives, respect for morality, and respect for public peace. The 
transgression of such limits constituted what the Article defined as “press offenses.” The 
Constitution also created two separated tribunals for judging this kind of crimes: one that 
decided on the criminal nature of the text in question, and another that imposed the 
corresponding penalty.  
Freedom of the press in the Colombian charter was subject of a simpler but less 
precise definition. Article 42 merely established that the press was free in times of peace, 
although accountable before the law when it attacked people’s honor, social order, or public 
peace. Additionally, a transitory “Article K” prescribed that, while the authorities enacted 
a printing act (ley de prensa), the government had all the power to prevent and repress 
“print abuses.” Unlike the Mexican charter, the Colombian Constitution did not specify 
what those “abuses” were. Throughout the rest of the century, governments would issue a 
series of laws and decrees, mostly during moments of high political tension, defining and 
redefining time and again these “abuses” and their corresponding penalties. None of these 
further decrees had the character of a formal, stable, and definitive Printing Act, though.  
 67 
Legal developments on matters of freedom of the press involved several attempts 
to limit this liberty under the pretext of protecting public order and peace. A first decree, 
enacted on November 1886, established for the first time a definite set of press crimes 
against social order and public peace.87 Crimes against public peace (tranquilidad pública) 
involved publications encouraging people to disobey the law or exert violence against 
public authorities. It also included publications that encouraged resistance to the 
authorities’ orders, that “fired up passions,” or that incited people to riot or rebel. Penalties 
in these cases ranked from short arrests and fines to the shutdown of the correspondent 
printing press. New developments on the matter came with the enactment of Decree 151 
of 1888.88 It prescribed that from then on it was the Executive, instead of the Judicial 
power, the one in charge of adjudicating cases of press offenses against social order and 
public peace. The 1888 Decree also created a new category of press crimes that fell under 
the Executive’s jurisdiction: “press offenses against society,” comprising about a dozen 
different crimes. Offenses included “attacking the mandatory force of laws;” “trying to 
justify acts conceived by law as crimes;” “disregarding or insulting the prerogatives of any 
civil or ecclesiastical authority;” and disseminating “fake news” that could lead to 
alteration of public order. A law from August 1897 would make this list of crimes even 
longer, by creating a category of “subversive press crimes” involving up to 17 different 
offenses.89 
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 In the Mexican case, prescriptions on freedom of press also experienced important 
developments. In February 1868, president Juárez enacted a Press Act that complemented 
the prescriptions of Articles 6 and 7 of the Mexican charter.90 The Act defined with greater 
detail than before the acts that represented press offenses against private life, public 
morality, and public order. Article 5 defined as press crimes against public order those texts 
that encouraged citizens to disobey the law or the legitimate authorities, or that incited 
them to use force against authorities. The law also established a series of penalties for 
offenses against public order (Article 8), consisting primarily of small periods of 
confinement. A second major development in this regard took place in 1883, after the first 
presidential period of Porfirio Díaz. This time, president Manuel González, considering the 
tribunals for press offenses inefficient and troublesome, opted for suppressing them. A 
reform ordered in May that year established that, from then on, all press crimes had to be 
judged by ordinary tribunals like any other offense.91 The demise of press tribunals would 
give federal and provincial authorities a better and more direct control over the prosecution 
and punishment of press offenses and offenders, especially in relationship with crimes 
against public order. By the late 1880s legislation on the press in both countries ended up 
converging not only in terms of their classification of press crimes, but also in their decision 
yo give governments a more direct control over press offenses against public order.  
Compared to freedom of press, freedom of association was subject of a less detailed 
elaboration. Its conditions and limitations, nonetheless, also reflected constitutional 
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concerns about the maintenance of public order and peace, especially in the Colombian 
case. Article 9 of the Mexican Charter established that all Mexicans had the right of 
creating or being part of any association as long as it had a peaceful character and a lawful 
goal. Only Mexican citizens could be part of political associations or establish collectivities 
with the aim of taking part in the nation’s political affairs. Finally, no armed collectivity –
i.e. the military– had the right to engage in political deliberation. Restrictions were greater 
in the Colombian case. Article 46 of the 1886 Constitution prescribed that people were free 
to reunite or associate in a pacific way, and gave authorities the power to dissolve every 
meeting or congregation that took a tumultuous or riotous nature. Article 47 allowed 
Colombians to create and make part of public and private associations as long as they were 
not contrary to public morality or legal order. The article also banned permanent popular 
political associations. It was a prohibition tending to contain the emergence and functioning 
of masonic lodges, “democratic” and “popular” societies, and other similar popular 
political associations.92 Many of the constituents of 1885 considered that the boom of these 
associations during the 1860s and 1870s had significantly contributed to the political 
instability and turmoil prevailing during the Federative period.93  
Colombian regulations on the right of association also experienced important 
developments throughout the period, especially on matters of public order and 
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“subversive” agitation. A law from May 1888 granted the president the right to suspend or 
shut down every society of institution that, under scientific or academic pretenses, were a 
“focus of subversive ideas or revolutionary propaganda.”94 More than a decade later, a 
decree from October 1904 established that authorities had the responsibility of policing all 
meetings and reunions in order to identify their “true tendencies” and intentions.95 The 
Decree authorized national police to inspect every current or future association and make 
sure they did not involve activities or purposes tending to endanger national security or 
promote crimes, riots, or other alterations of public peace. Additionally, the Decree 
prohibited the formation of any political society or association with political goals, and 
established a series of fines and penalties of arrest for people promoting these sort of 
gatherings of taking part in them. Finally, the order established that political rallies and 
meetings had to request a previous authorization from the local police chief to take place. 
 
Public Order and Emergency Powers: Redrawing the Limits of State Power in times of 
War 
Separation and independence of public power represented one of the foundational premises 
of modern Constitutionalism in Mexico and Colombia, and both the 1857 Constitution and 
the 1886 charter aligned with this principle respectively. Constitutional provisions in this 
regard not only aimed to prevent extreme presidentialism, but also were meant to avoid, at 
                                                
94 Ley 61 de 1888 (Mayo 25): “Por la cual se conceden al presidente de la república algunas facultades 
extraordinarias,” Diario Oficial 7399, May 29, 1888. 
 
95 Decreto 845 de 1904 (18 de Octubre): “Por el cual se reglamenta la inspección de ciertas juntas y 
sociedades,” in: Actos oficiales de la Actual Administración Ejecutiva durante las sesiones ordinarias del 
congreso de 1904 (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1904).  
 71 
least theoretically, the politicization of the legislative and judicial functions. Article 50 of 
the Mexican Constitution and 75 of its Colombian counterpart implicitly or explicitly 
prohibited the fusion or reunion of two or more powers into a single individual or 
corporation. In addition, the Mexican Charter forbade that a single individual concentrated 
the nation’s legislative power. 
 The separation and limitation of public powers, nonetheless, were conditional. As 
constitutional principles, their existence remained limited to times of peace and normality. 
Disorder, war, and internal turmoil represented conditions of exception that, according to 
both charters, made possible their redefinition. In times of severe disruption of public 
peace, these Constitutions authorized their respective governments to grant the Executive 
“extraordinary faculties” or “emergency powers,” a measure that allowed presidents to 
legislate without the intervention of the Congress. The concession of extraordinary powers 
implied a temporal and partial interruption of the constitutional regime, allowing not only 
an appropriation of legislative functions by the Executive, but also eventual suspensions of 
constitutional guarantees.  
 Constitutional states of emergency in Mexico and Colombia did not necessarily 
coincide. The Mexican Charter, in Article 29, established that during moments of foreign 
invasion, severe disturbance of public peace, or any other situation that “put society in great 
danger or conflict,” the president could suspend the individual liberties and guarantees 
granted in the Constitution. The suspension, which also granted the Executive legislative 
powers in matters of constitutional liberties, did not include those guarantees that protected 
people’s lives. In the Colombian case, two articles established complementary dispositions 
on disorder and emergency powers.  Article 61 of the 1886 Charter established that, in 
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times of peace, no person or corporation could simultaneously exercise civic, military, or 
judicial authority. This implied that, in cases of a major disruption of public peace, the 
seizure of judicial functions by non-judicial authorities emerged as a possible and 
legitimate option. Additionally, Article 121 prescribed that, in cases of “disruption of 
public order,” this is, in circumstances of “external or internal commotion,” the president 
could establish the state of siege all over the republic or in parts of it. According to the 
article, the declaration of the state of siege invested the Executive will all the powers 
“granted by the national law and the law of nations” to “defend the nation’s prerogatives 
or to prevent the uprising.” As in the Mexican case, these powers included the faculty to 
legislate without the interference of the Congress. 
 Provisions on states of emergency in Mexico and Colombia had at least three major 
points in common. First, they made the Executive the central figure in the management of 
public order, strengthening its faculties to the point of granting it true legislative powers. 
States of emergency were, therefore, junctures of strong presidentialism. Second, an urgent 
sense of “social danger” legitimized this extraordinary concentration of public powers. 
Society was “in great danger” when public order was disrupted and public peace ceased to 
exist. The source could be an external threat, but also, and predominantly, a plausible 
internal menace: an “internal conflict,” like the Mexican Charter implied, or an “internal 
commotion” or an “uprising,” as stated in the Colombian Constitution. Third, these 
situations of danger, conflict, or commotion were rather abstract and imprecise. Besides a 
“foreign invasion” or an “uprising,” there were no major indications in the Constitutions 
regarding which circumstances in particular made a state of emergency possible or 
demanded a state of siege. In both cases, the vagueness of these dispositions shaped a sort 
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of “constitutional grey area” that governments during the Porfiriato and the Regeneration 
used to their advantage on more than one occasion.  
In Mexico, the administrations of Juárez, Lerdo, and Díaz constantly resorted to 
these prerogatives in order to enact special laws against bandits and salteadores, and even 
against insurrectional and rebellious groups.96 By the turn of the century, the constitutional 
suspension of individual rights allowed president Díaz to strengthen his legal responses to 
the emerging forces of anarchism, socialism, and labor unionism.97 Similarly, between 
1857 and the final days of the Porfiriato, the Mexican Congress granted the federal 
Executive extraordinary powers on a number of occasions.98 During the last two decades 
of the nineteenth century, President Díaz used these powers to create special military units 
and extend the power and jurisdiction of military tribunals in the prosecution of 
“dangerous” civilians. A law from December 12, 1884, for instance, gave Díaz special 
power (“las facultades necesarias”) to reorganize the national army and navy, as well as 
to reform the administration of military justice.99 Although the law established that these 
powers were valid only until November 1885, Díaz managed to invoke this law in order to 
legitimize “special” legislation even by the turn of the century. That was, for instance, the 
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case of the law that created, on October 1900, the infamous Segunda Reserva,100 an army 
unit commonly used for political purposes during the early 20th century. A decree from 
May 1901 would grant Díaz similar legislative powers that he would use for erecting new 
military tribunals and reforming the current penal and procedural laws concerning military 
justice and its jurisdiction.101 
 In the Colombian case, these “grey areas” gave Regenerationist authorities plenty 
of room for legal reinvention in matters of public order and political repression. A law from 
May 1888 that partially regulated the exercise of extraordinary powers, for instance, 
authorized the president to administratively prevent and repress all crimes and offenses 
against the State that impacted public order.102 Offenses included “conspiracies against 
public order,” as well as attacks against private or public property that involved, to the 
president’s eyes, threats of perturbation of public peace. Penalties for such offenses 
included temporal loss of political rights, confinement, and even expatriation. Colombian 
authorities declared the state of siege at least twice before the turn of the century, and in 
both cases used the state of constitutional emergency as a vehicle for passing laws and 
decrees against political opponents. A riot in Bogotá in early 1893 led President Caro to 
establish the state of siege in the city for 40 days. During that period, authorities shut down 
several liberal newspapers and ordered the confinement of several rioters, many of them 
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members of the Liberal party and journalists from the opposition.103 In 1899, four months 
before the outbreak of the War of the Thousand Days, President Sanclemente established 
the state of siege in a portion of the country fearing an internal uprising sparked by a recent 
revolution in Venezuela.104 Again, the state of siege allowed conservative authorities to 
arrest and imprison several members of and journalists from the liberal party, accused of 
conspiring against public peace.105  
 The constitutional experiences of Colombia and Mexico regarding states of 
emergency and extraordinary powers did not represent an anomaly or a rarity in the Latin 
American context of the time. Nineteenth-century Latin American nations enacted about a 
hundred different constitutions, and only a couple of them –curiously, the Colombian 
constitutions of 1853 and 1863- did not include provisions for regimes of emergency.106 
Provisions of emergency included, sometimes individually, sometimes together, 
suspension of individual rights, voiding of specific rights and liberties, as well as 
significant expansion of the government’s authority through extraordinary powers.107 On 
the whole, constitutional regimes of exception in Latin America stemmed from the 
combination of a variety of factors including militaristic tendencies within the ruling 
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parties; contexts of entrenched internal strife or civil warfare; deep-rooted legacies of 
authoritarianism; and even conversations with constitutional developments from the 
United States and, specially, Europe. Problems of order, internal conflict, and state making 
were not exclusive to Latin American nations in the nineteenth century. In Europe, Spain, 
France, Prussia and others were also dealing with extremely high levels of political 
upheaval, and experimenting with different constitutional solutions merging remnants of 
traditional absolutism with modern constitutionalism.108 Emergency powers became, in 
such context, a recurrent resource for European constitution makers. The French 
Constitution of 1814, as well as the Spanish Charters of 1837, 1845, and 1848, for instance, 
played a major role in shaping Latin American constitutional regimes of exception.109 
The inclination of Latin America’s nineteenth-century constitutionalism towards 
states of emergency and extraordinary powers was not simply the result of automatic 
authoritarian trends, desires for a “constitutional dictatorship,” mimicry of foreign 
constitutional developments, or mere fears of political opposition. Neither was it a “natural 
solution” to counter-balance the generally wide individual liberties and guarantees 
established in the Constitutions of the time, as Loveman seems to suggest in his book on 
states of emergency in Latin American constitutionalism. Constitutional exceptions were, 
above all, preventive provisions aiming to provide governments with additional legal 
resources to protect and restore public order and peace in nations plagued by conflict and 
division. Nineteenth-century Latin American governments had to deal with racially and 
culturally heterogeneous societies, political divisions, conflicting political cultures, 
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regional rivalries of all sorts, significant degrees of political exclusion, commonly violent 
partisan rivalries, territorial conflicts with neighboring nations, and even threats of foreign 
invasion. Order, in such convoluted contexts, was a complex and difficult to achieve goal; 
one that required significant degrees of legal intervention and political meddling. Mexico 
and Colombia were not exceptions to that trend. 
 
A Demanding Regeneration: Other Constitutional Prescriptions on Public Order in 
Colombia 
The Colombian Delegates of 1885 did not reduce their search for order to the previous set 
of common constitutional provisions. Besides its restriction to press and associationism, 
and its mandates on states of siege, the 1886 charter contained a few other dispositions on 
matters of public order, internal threats to public peace, and political criminality. They 
included limitations to procedural guarantees against potential subversives, selective 
suspensions of the right to property, and dispositions on state leniency vis-à-vis political 
crimes. 
 Procedural guarantees in the 1886 Charter did not greatly differ from other Latin 
American constitutions of the period. Both this constitution and its Mexican counterpart, 
for instance, recognized the principles of due process, nullum crime sine lege –no crime 
exists without a previous formal law–, and no retroactivity of law.110 Articles 27 and 28 of 
the Colombian Constitution, nonetheless, established important limits to these guarantees. 
Article 27 prescribed that they did not prevent, at any point, public authorities from 
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arresting or fining people that “slandered” or “offended them” in matters concerning their 
job and functions. In such cases, a quick, efficient punishment seemed to be more important 
than any legal or judicial formality. This prescription would have a significant effect on 
the way in which Colombian authorities attempted to control the exercise of political 
opposition, and particularly the actions of dissident journalists. As for article 28, it 
established a second and more serious exception. It stated that in times of tranquility, if the 
government had serious reasons for fearing a sudden alteration of public peace, state 
authorities were able to arrest and detain people suspected of infringing or conspiring 
against public order and peace. These arrests had a preventive nature and did not have to 
follow usual legal or judicial formalities. Neither did they have they to correspond to a 
specific or pre-established crime. To the Regenerationist constitution makers, the need for 
protecting order was above the need of protecting Colombians against eventual acts of state 
arbitrariness.  
 The suspension of constitutional protections also affected the right to property. 
Although the Colombian charter did not prescribe the suspension of individual rights in 
times of emergency, it still contained a subtle but important exception: in times of turmoil, 
property rights of internal enemies partially ceased to exist. Article 32 dictated that, in 
times of peace, nobody could be deprived of their property unless there were formal and 
previously established judicial reasons. Article 33, nonetheless, established that in times of 
war, and only for the purpose of “helping the reestablishment of order,” authorities outside 
the Judicial power were allowed to decree expropriations with no previous compensation. 
It also allowed authorities to temporarily occupy properties as a selective pecuniary 
penalty. In the context of an internal conflict, this penalty would logically fall on the 
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government’s adversaries. The prescription, as arbitrary as it sounds, was nonetheless a 
less drastic version of what some of the 1885 constitution makers originally wanted. At the 
Constituent Assembly, several delegates had proposed that the charter allowed legislators 
to impose penalties of confiscation –otherwise banned by the Constitution– against rebel 
ringleaders. Such confiscations were meant to cover war expenses with the enemy’s 
property and money. Delegates backed up the idea with the argument that, during a war, 
the adversary was always accountable for the conflict’s costs.111 Although their proposition 
did not succeed, this argument would loom large in the minds of Regenerationist 
authorities, especially in the context of the Thousand Days War.112 
 The third additional feature in these matters, one that unlike the others mentioned 
above Colombia’s Constitution did not share with Mexico’s, was its explicit reference to 
political crimes in the definition of the faculties of both the President and Congress to grant 
indultos and amnesties. Both charters determined that the administration of state mercy 
corresponded to the Executive and the Legislative at different levels. While the Congress 
was in charge of declaring general amnesties, the President could grant individual 
indultos.113 Up to that point, there was no difference at all between the two Constitutions. 
Yet, the scope of these official acts of mercy differed between one Charter and another: in 
Mexico, amnesties and indultos had a general, comprehensive nature; in Colombia, on the 
                                                
111 Antecedentes de la Constitución, 127. See especially the intervention of Delegate Ospina Camacho. 
 
112 See for instance: Aguilera Peña, Mario. “Canje o fusilamiento: los presos políticos en las guerras del siglo 
XIX,” Análisis Político 58 (2006), 41. 
 
113 For the Mexican case, see Articles 72 (XXV) and 85 (XV) of the 1857 Constitution. 
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contrary, they were mostly limited to political crimes.114 Article 119 of the 1886 
Constitution prescribed that the president could commute death sentences, concede 
reductions of sentence for common offenses, and grant indultos for political crimes. In the 
same light, Article 76 dictated that the Congress could issue amnesties for political 
offenses, but only in response to “serious motives of public convenience.” Specific 
references to political crimes in these prescriptions can be interpreted as yet another sign 
of the fact that, to a great extent, the 1885 delegates crafted a Constitution that foresaw 
more moments of internal conflict than of actual peace. 
 
Conclusions: Constitutions, Order, and Political Crimes 
The 1857 Mexican Constitution and the 1886 Colombian charter set up the basic legal 
framework for the development of conceptions of and responses to political crimes during 
the Porfiriato and the Regeneration. Such framework essentially consisted of a series of 
provisions that, without generally talking about political criminality in explicit terms, 
referred in different indirect ways to questions concerning political crimes and offenders. 
Prescriptions on individual liberties, procedural guarantees, punishment and pardon, and 
even the division and limitation of public powers, shaped constitutional references to 
political criminality in both Constitutions.  
Most of these provisions had to do with the maintenance of public order and the 
protection of public peace. These were not only major premises in the two Charters, but 
also had represented part of the principal aims of the people that, during the 1850s and 
                                                
114 The Mexican Criminal Code of 1871, nonetheless, did involve some prescriptions authorizing the 
government to grant indultos to political offenders. See in particular Articles 288 and 289. 
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1880s, crafted new constitutional regimes for Mexico and Colombia. In both cases, the 
conservation of order through the Constitution played, as a premise and a goal, a dual role. 
On the one hand, it represented a reaction against a past of anarchy and internal conflict, 
represented in Mexico by the Santa Anna era and in Colombia by the federative period and 
the 1863 Constitution. The Ayutla generation and the first Regenerationists conceived 
constitutional reform as the ultimate tool for breaking away from a legacy of arbitrariness 
and personalism, in Mexico, and from the devastating effects of “chimerical” and ill-
designed political institutions, in Colombia. On the other hand, the premise of order 
involved a pledge for the future: a future in which strong governments, respectful of the 
rule of law and the Constitution, were able to maintain national unity and peace. Here, 
maintaining peace meant keeping it safe not only from external enemies, but also, and more 
importantly, from internal threats. 
 It is in relation with these “internal threats” that constitutional references to political 
criminality emerge. Always imprecise, vaguely defined, and scarcely mentioned, political 
offenses were nonetheless everywhere, implicitly so. They were present, of course, in the 
prescriptions banning death penalty and extradition to political offenders, and in the 
provisions establishing conditions for the administration of state leniency. But they were 
also present in other places: in the abuses that required the limitation of freedoms of speech, 
press, and association, for instance, and in the multiple sorts of “press crimes” against 
society. They also appear in the actions against the government and public peace that 
demanded the suspension of guarantees and rights, and in the “uprisings,” “commotions,” 
and other attacks against order that legitimized the reorganization and concentration of 
public powers.  
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Considering this subtle but somehow constant presence, what were exactly political 
crimes to these Constitutions? More than specific, well-determined offenses, they were a 
relatively abstract and generic set of crimes that shared a few common features. They were 
attacks against order and peace, and against the government, the authorities, and the 
nation’s institutions. Here, “respect for public order” and “respect for the government” 
tended to become equivalent premises. On the one hand, attacks against public order were 
at the same time attacks against the authorities that were supposed to protect and maintain 
it. On the other hand, challenges against the government implied, in themselves, challenges 
to public peace. These simultaneous challenges and offenses against order and the 
government had another important feature: they were attacks from within. They were 
always linked to internal conflicts; local turmoil, uprisings, and rebellions; and even 
“abusive,” “offensive” or “subversive” manifestations of political dissidence.  
 Both the Mexican and the Colombian constitutions framed political crimes as 
“special offenses” that required extraordinary legal responses. A first signal of this lays in 
the distinction between “common” and “political” offenses present in some of the 
provisions reviewed throughout the chapter. The establishment of differentiated penalties 
for political offenders reinforced this separation. It created a regime of criminal 
exceptionality in which penalties, procedural rules, and other constitutional precepts no 
longer applied in their original form. It was a regime that exempted political offenders from 
some penalties but at the same time punished them with a series of constitutional 
exceptions. There was no death penalty and no extradition for political crimes. Yet, 
simultaneously, their control, repression, and prosecution did not depend anymore on the 
regular course of ordinary justice: the government, and more precisely the Executive 
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power, was the one in charge of legally dealing with them. This was not the only 
exceptionality in this regard. The legal treatment of political crimes according to these 
Constitutions also implied the suspension of certain rights, the dodging of procedural 
guarantees, and the use of indeterminate emergency powers. These exceptionalities were 
in tune with the larger constitutional aim of protecting society against the abuses of the 
individual, something clearly manifested in the 1886 Colombian Constitution –an aim that, 
in the mind of Mexican and Colombian constitution makers, demanded the prevalence of 
society’s rights over those of individuals.  
 The vagueness in the constitutional definition of political crimes would left its 
imprint on the framework of exceptionality in which responses to political criminality 
emerged and operated. Neither of the two charters clearly defined what political crimes 
were. Additionally, neither of them established which concrete faculties comprised the 
sphere of extraordinary powers, or what the government could or could not do during states 
of emergency. This gave authorities in Mexico and Colombia a great discretion over legal 
and constitutional interpretation, which in turn allowed them to invent and reinvent 
political offenses, as well as to draw and redraw the line between common and political 
crimes. Such reinventions would be especially recurrent in times of high political and 
partisan conflict, as the following chapters will demonstrate. Furthermore, the fact that 
governments could deal with these offenses in an administrative fashion –at least in 
Colombia after 1888– gave authorities even more room and freedom to respond to political 
criminality. The administrative alternative allowed governments to manage the repression 
of political offenders without depending on laws passed by the Congress or on the 
formalities of the Judicial power and the ordinary justice system. Even without this 
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“administrative turn,” the obscure nature of these constitutional prescriptions ended up 
shaping, in both countries, a series of “grey areas” in which authorities could dodge or 
avoid constitutional prescriptions without violating the Constitution.115  
 Constitutional “grey areas” concerning the management of public order and peace 
in Mexico and Colombia would play a critical role in the ways in which governments in 
both countries reacted to political crimes during the period. Periods of commotion and 
states of siege would become spaces for the reinvention of crimes and penalties against 
rebels, “dangerous” dissidents and other internal enemies. Many of these reinventions 
would end up contravening constitutional mandates and prohibitions –i.e. the application 
of death penalty for political crimes. Yet, such contraventions would still maintain a 
constitutional nature and thus legitimacy: after all, they all stemmed from constitutional 
precepts. Uses and abuses of these “grey areas” would allow authorities in the Porfiriato 
and the Regeneration to treat political crimes with a combination of harsh, borderline 
unconstitutional authoritarianism, and formal adherence to constitutional rule. 
Constitutional precepts on matters of public order in Mexico and Colombia shared 
a relatively common ground. Despite their different origins, both charters drew heavily on 
the premise of maintaining and protecting order and peace, as well as governmental and 
institutional stability. These Constitutions coincided in the outlining of three different yet 
complementary mechanisms for ensuring order: protections against eventual abuses of 
individual liberties; selective suspensions of constitutional guarantees; and extraordinary 
Executive powers in cases of emergency. Direct and indirect concerns about political 
                                                
115 On “grey areas” and criminal justice systems, see: Luigi Lacche and Monica Stronatti, “Beyond the Statute 
Law: An Introduction,” in Beyond the Statute Law: The “Grey” Government of Criminal Justice Systems. 
History and Theory in the Modern Age, ed. Luigi Lacce and Monica Stronatti (Macerata: EUM, 2011).  
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crimes and criminality were present in almost all the constitutional provisions that turned 
such mechanisms into reality. Most of these prescriptions maintained a vague nature that 
allowed authorities to take the legal treatment of political crimes beyond the reach of the 
Legislative and Judicial powers, and even to the frontier between the constitutional and the 
unconstitutional. In both cases, criminal codification was supposed to bring clarity, 
precision, and some degree of predictability to these abstract prescriptions. The next 
chapter examines how and in which terms Criminal Codes in Colombia and Mexico 
managed to establish more precise definitions and penalties for political crimes.  
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III. CHAPTER 2.  POLITICAL CRIMINALITY AND CRIMINAL LAW IN 
MEXICO AND COLOMBIA: TOWARDS THE CONSTRUCTION OF A 
CRIMINAL REGIME FOR THE PROSECUTION OF  
POLITICAL CRIMES 
 
Constitutional provisions on matters of public order and individual liberties do not 
completely explain why people like Ricardo Flores Magón or Rafael Uribe Uribe faced 
such hard times as political dissenters. Why did they experience prison and exile? How did 
Mexican and Colombian authorities manage to label their actions criminal, and what were 
the legal grounds for this criminalization? What were the rules that both in Mexico and 
Colombia established how governments could punish “troublesome” dissidents like them, 
and even dissidents that posed more serious threats? Did the way in which governments 
treated Flores Magón and many other rebels and agitators in Mexico and Colombia 
correspond to what these rules dictated? Tackling these sort of questions requires delving 
into matters of criminal law and paying close attention to what criminal codes in both 
countries said regarding the criminalization and punishment of political offenses. The spirit 
and content of these codes had a crucial influence on the experiences of rebels and political 
dissenters in both countries, defining much of their fate as targets of state repression. 
 
Criminal Codes complemented Constitutions in shaping the overall standard framework 
for the legal definition and treatment of political crimes and criminals in Mexico and 
Colombia during the late 19th century and beyond. While Constitutions only outlined the 
basic foundations for this treatment, criminal codifications set up the parameters for the 
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definition, criminalization, and punishment of political offenses. This chapter reconstructs 
these parameters, and analyzes their impact on the configuration of a criminal regime for 
the definition and punishment of political offenses during the Porfiriato and the 
Regeneration. It also reflects on the characteristics of the resulting regime, as well as on its 
impact on the ways in which Mexican and Colombian authorities criminalized and 
prosecuted internal enemies during the period. What were political crimes, according to 
these Codes? How many modalities of political criminality and internal enmity did these 
Codes recognize? Which actions of internal enmity were formally recognized as political 
offenses? These are some of the central questions that this chapter addresses.  
 The Chapter focuses on the Criminal Codes of 1871 in Mexico and 1890 in 
Colombia. Part one offers a general and introductory approach to the doctrinal and 
philosophical foundations of criminal law in nineteenth-century Latin America, and pays 
special attention to the influences shaping criminal legislation in Mexico and Colombia. 
Part two briefly reconstructs the history of the Criminal Codes of the Porfiriato and the 
Regeneration, and places both codifications in their corresponding doctrinal and 
intellectual frameworks. Part three studies the multiple prescriptions through which both 
Codes defined, classified, and penalized political crimes and other acts of internal enmity. 
It offers a comparative exploration of criminal categories, typologies of offenders, and sets 
of penalties for political crimes. The section includes a supplementary portion about the 
way in which Military Codes understood and penalized some of these offenses. Part four, 
finally, reflects on the criminal regimes for political criminality and internal enmity that 
emerged out of these various criminal law provisions.  
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 The chapter develops three main arguments. First, it claims that the Criminal Codes 
of the Porfiriato and the Regeneration, despite being enacted during the last decade of the 
nineteenth century, still shared the basic philosophical and doctrinal bases of Latin 
America’s criminal law from the post-independence period and the mid-century. In 
Mexico, this was due to a slow process of modernization of national criminal legislation. 
In Colombia, it had to do with failed attempts at reform, and to the urgency of updating 
criminal codification after the constitutional reform of 1886. Second, the chapter argues 
that Mexico’s and Colombia’s criminal codes addressed political criminality and internal 
enmity in relatively similar ways. They relied on analogous criminal definitions and 
equivalent sets of penalties. There were some important differences, though. Both codes 
classified political offenders and other internal enemies using different criminal typologies. 
Moreover, the repertoire of criminal manifestations of internal enmity tended to be larger 
and more complex in one case than in the other. A third argument maintains that these 
codifications produced a double regime of crimes and penalties for actions of internal 
enmity, in which political crimes and offenses such as rebellion and sedition existed 
separately. The resulting ambiguity would give governments of the Porfiriato and the 
Regeneration a wide room for legal interpretation and reinvention regarding the treatment 
of “dangerous” political dissidents.  
 
Codes and Criminal Law in Nineteenth-Century Latin America 
Enacted between the 1870s and the 1890s, Mexico’s and Colombia’s Criminal Codes still 
shared the spirit that prevailed in Latin American criminal law for most of the nineteenth 
century. After independence, legal thinkers and lawmakers in the region infused their 
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nations’ criminal law with a combination of principles from enlightened natural law, 
utilitarianism, and political liberalism. They would complement this set of inspirations by 
mid-century, with the introduction of the premises of the European classical school of 
criminal law.116 Up until the turn of the century, all these influences remained prevalent in 
the continent, at least in its criminal codes. Criminology, criminal anthropology and other 
currents of positivistic criminal law found during the late-nineteenth century a relatively 
good reception among Latin American legal thinkers. The embrace of these new trends 
was nonetheless disparate among nations –it was very wide in Mexico, but almost 
nonexistent in Colombia– and did not have enough force to pervade the fields of legislation 
and lawmaking. Actual positivistic Criminal Codes will not appear in Latin America until 
well into the twentieth century.117 
 Enlightened discourses of natural law offered Latin American post-independent 
elites a means to “modernize” their legislation in a way that fitted their purposes of building 
rational and efficient states. Inspired by the rationalist iusnaturalism of Locke and 
Rousseau, these elites believed that social life should be subject to laws that were inherent 
to human nature, and that legislation should identify and reflect those principles.118 The 
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reflections on the Mexican legal thinker José M. Lozano illustrate this belief, still in place 
in Mexico during the 1870s. Lozano maintained, among other things, that “the elementary 
principles of [modern] criminal law are all the same for all peoples and nations, for reason 
and morals are the same for them all.” To him, Basic notions of criminal law were inscribed 
in the nature of human societies, and linked to humankind’s fate.119 Notions of “right” and 
“justice” were therefore universal, and should represent the main subject of law and 
legislation. Bentham’s utilitarianism added to these conceptions the ideas that laws should 
be simple, and that legislation should depend on the organization of a rational, 
straightforward system of laws.120 Latin American lawmakers also borrowed the 
Benthamist notion that criminal laws should find “the absolute minimum level of 
punishment that would deter criminal behavior.”121 
 Liberal perspectives on criminal law were somewhat in tune with these notions of 
natural law. Laws were inscribed in society and they emanated from it, not from the simple 
will of a sovereign or a ruler. Legislation, therefore, reflected –or should reflect– people’s 
will. As an interpretation of society’s nature and will, laws had the primary goal of 
defending and maintaining the social contract, in correspondence to universal feelings of 
social conservation. Crimes and penalties had a social nature: crimes were actions that 
broke this contract up, while penalties were defensive social responses tending to restore 
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it. This implied a departure from more traditional ways of conceiving crime and 
punishment: in Colonial times, for instance, crimes represented direct attacks against the 
sovereign, while penalties were acts of royal vengeance as well as displays of state 
sovereignty.122 The liberal perspective also infused criminal law with the same principles 
shaping constitutions like the Mexican 1857 charter, including separation of powers, legal 
equality, and protection of individual rights. Such principles would shape a criminal 
legislation revolving around at least five major principles: a) the independence of the 
judicial power; b) the idea that all citizens should be judged by the same tribunals and the 
same laws; c) the notion that judgments should be based on the crimes themselves and not 
on the criminals; d) the premise that penalties should be proportional to their correspondent 
crimes; and, e) the protection of the procedural guarantees of suspects, defendants, and 
convicts alike.123  
 Influences from the classical school of criminal law combined multiple authors 
from different parts of Europe, and specially from Italy and Spain. The theories of the 
Italian Cesare Beccaria played a major role in shaping Mexico’s and Colombia’s criminal 
legislation, for instance. Beccaria’s vision of crimes and penalties matched the above 
mentioned liberal and contractualist principles, and was in tune with the enlightened goal 
of crafting a more lenient and humanitarian criminal law. His ideas on the “preventive” 
and “deterrent” nature of penalties would shape in both nations criminal codes that made 
more emphasis on issues of “prevention” than on matters of “retribution” or 
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“vengeance.”124 Other influences behind criminal legislation in Mexico and Colombia 
include include the works by the Spanish Joaquín F. Pacheco and Pedro Gómez de la Serna, 
by the French Joseph L. Ortolan, and by the Italians Francesco Carrara, Giovanni 
Carmignani, and Pellegrino Rossi –these three of special importance in the Colombian 
case.125 Most of these works emphasized on matters regarding the social nature and purpose 
of punishment, the preventive character of penalties, the ways of defending society against 
criminality, and the rational nature of both crime and punishment.  
 The classical school influenced Latin American criminal law in multiple ways, but 
its most important legacy had to do with its understandings of “crime.” Partially inspired 
on the ideas of natural law, classical legal thinkers perceived criminality through the 
perspective of free will: as part of a universal society, all men shared the same ideas of 
good and evil, and could rationally and willingly choose between one and another. 
Therefore, they had the possibility, the freedom, and the capacity for deciding about their 
actions. Crimes, in this light, were free and voluntary infractions of a penal law; rational 
actions willingly committed by a free individual conscious of the criminal nature of such 
act. Criminals, then, were those individuals that, in a voluntary, free, and conscious fashion, 
acted against society’s order, morals, and rights.126 It was this action against society’s rights 
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–whether individual or collective– what gave crimes their criminal nature. Since laws and 
norms protected such rights, crimes represented, at their most basic level, infractions to 
these norms –hence the principle that no action could be considered criminal unless a legal 
act had previously typified it as such.127 These notions differed significantly from previous, 
more traditional understandings of crime as “sin,” typical of colonial times. They would 
also differ from those interpretations of crime that would become popular by the turn of 
the century, including the perspective of criminal anthropology according to which crimes 
were symptoms of physical and mental dysfunctionality.128  
Definitions of “crime” in the 1871 Mexican Code and its 1890 Colombia 
counterpart condensed the basic precepts of the classical school. Article 1 of Mexico’s 
Code defined crime as “the voluntary infraction of a criminal law, by doing what it forbids 
or not doing what it orders.” The Colombian version was no different. Article 1 of the 1890 
Code established that crime was the “voluntary and malicious violation of the law, for 
which a penalty is incurred.” Both definitions were in tune with other contemporary codes 
across the Atlantic. For instance, in his comments to the Mexican Code, José M. Lozano 
noted that its opening article paralleled the 1850 Spanish Code in the idea that crime was 
a voluntary action or omission penalized by law; the most recent 1870 Spanish Code, in 
the notion that crimes were voluntary actions or omissions; and, their Bavarian counterpart 
in the statement that crimes were voluntary infractions of the law.129 
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Understandings of “penalty” and “punishment” in Colombia and Mexico were also 
in tune with liberal and classical ideas. Punishment was not a simple automatic retribution 
or vengeance on society’s part. It was, above all, a tool for correction, regeneration, and 
deterrence in the name of society.130 In correspondence with the classical perspective, 
criminal legislations in both countries gave penalties a double purpose. On the one hand, 
they had to be exemplary and discourage society from criminal impulses. On the other 
hand, they had to be afflictive and correctional, in order to prevent recidivism. That 
deterrence and correction, nonetheless, had to be “reasonable and proportioned,” as well 
as in benefit of prisoners, tending always to their “moral reformation,” as the Colombian 
jurist Demetrio Porras wrote in 1889. Unnecessary severities, he pointed out, not only were 
prejudicial to prisoners and defendants, but also led to discontent and rebellion against the 
law.131  
These were, in general terms, the basic doctrinal and philosophical foundations of 
the Criminal Codes in force in Mexico and Colombia during the Porfiriato and the 
Regeneration. The next section offers a brief summary of the history of these codes, as a 
way to contextualize their prescriptions and penalties on matters of public order and 
political criminality. 
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The Criminal Codes of the Porfiriato and the Regeneration 
The Mexican 1871 Code: A Belated First Attempt at Modernization of Criminal Law 
In the context of Latin American modern criminal codifications, Mexico’s first national 
Criminal Code came to life somewhat belatedly. While countries like Bolivia, Colombia, 
and Ecuador enacted their first national codes before the 1840s, and Venezuela decreed 
theirs in the 1860s, Mexico had to wait until 1871.132 A protracted independence war 
(1810-1821), together with Santa Anna’s dictatorship (1858-1861), the Reform War (1858-
1861), and the French intervention (1862-1867), severely hampered efforts to design 
modern codifications of a national scope, not only in criminal matters but also in civil 
affairs. It was only until the early 1870s that Mexico could count with actual national Civil 
and Criminal codes.133 This does not mean that up until the 1870s Mexico lacked modern 
criminal codes. The State of Mexico, for instance, drafted a code in 1831, and the State of 
Veracruz counted with one since 1835.134 Modern criminal legislation at the federal level, 
nonetheless, remained undeveloped under well into the century.  
Prior to the 1870s, national criminal legislation combined laws both from the 
colonial period and the post-independence era –mainly sporadic laws on criminal matters 
and constitutional mandates on criminal law. This legislation did not exist as a unified and 
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134 Uribe-Urán, “The Great Transformation,” 91. Technically speaking, the Criminal Code of the State of 
Veracruz was the nation’s first modern Criminal Code. 
 96 
systematic body of laws, but as disperse sets of rules and prescriptions. Colonial legal 
sources, including the Novisima Recopilación (1805), the Real Ordenanza de Intendentes 
(1786), the Recopilación de Leyes de Indias (1680), and even the Siete Partidas, remained 
relatively in place until the late 1860s. A decree from 1838 declared them valid for the 
Mexican nation as long as they were compatible with the new system of government, its 
institutions, and their legislation. A first effort to create a proper national codification took 
place in 1862, but it was hampered by the French Intervention. A second, more successful 
effort followed in 1868. Led by Antonio Martínez de Castro, José María Lafragua, Manuel 
O. de Montellano y Manuel M. de Zamacona, it would become the basis for the 1871 
Code.135 
At least two major goals inspired the efforts towards crafting and enacting a modern 
national Criminal Code in Mexico. There was a need for replacing an “outdated” legislation 
that had little to do with the current forms of government, in first place. To some 
contemporary legal thinkers, surviving colonial laws and sources were not only disused, 
but also rejected by public sentiment, by the customs and ideas of the time, and even by 
the spirit of the nation’s new institutions. These laws were also a major source of 
arbitrariness: arbitrariness of the legislators, who monopolized “the terrible right to punish 
and repress offenses,” and arbitrariness of the judges, who imposed penalties obeying to 
nothing but their own discretion.136  
                                                
135 Código Penal Mexicano: Sus motivos, concordancias y leyes complementarias, obra dispuesta por el 
Licenciado Antonio A. De Medina y Ormaechea, Tomo I (México: Imprenta del Gobierno, 1880), iv-v; see 
also: Speckman Guerra, Crimen y Castigo, 23. 
 
136 Lozano, Derecho penal, 5 and 8. 
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There also was an urgency to “modernize” national legislation, in second place. 
This implied not only crafting new laws, but also –and primarily– creating a legal system 
in which law corresponded to the principles of “reason” and “science.” Inspired by liberal 
and classical ideas on criminal law, Mexican lawmakers believed that criminal laws should 
no longer emanate from the arbitrary will of a monarch or any other authority. On the 
contrary, they should correspond to “principles stemming from reason, morals, [and] men’s 
nature,” as José M. Lozano pointed out in 1874.137 Likewise, national criminal laws should 
not exist anymore as a disperse and unsystematic collection of mandates enacted by 
different authorities at different times. Legal modernization also meant systematization, 
predictability, and, above all, codification. It was thus necessary to produce an actual, all-
encompassing code; homogeneous codification that, as a single and definitive legislative 
act, organized in a logical, methodical, and articulate fashion all aspects and possibilities 
of a particular legal field.138 
These principles and influences, combined with the same liberal spirit that inspired 
the Ayutla revolution and the 1857 Constitution, shaped the overall goals of the 1871 Code. 
Like the Charter, the Criminal Code and its subsidiary codifications –like the Code of 
Criminal Procedures, enacted in 1880– aimed to develop the principles of separation of 
powers, independence of the judiciary, legal equality, and defense of individual 
guarantees.139 The Code conceived of individual guarantees as the manifestation of natural 
rights whose respect and protection should represent the primary goal of social institutions. 
                                                
137 Lozano, Derecho penal, 6. 
 
138 Speckman Guerra, Crimen y Castigo, 27-28. 
 
139 Speckman Guerra, “Derecho penal,” 202. 
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In consequence, it established that criminals were subject of juridical protection and their 
judgement should follow standard and homogeneous procedural rules. It also stated that 
individual rights limited the reach of state’s retribution, and provided a series of 
prescriptions for preventing unfair or arbitrary arrests and imprisonments. Arrests, for 
example, should not extend for more than three days without a formal judicial order 
following the verification of an actual crime. Likewise, in correspondence with the 
Constitution, the Code reinforced the suppression of the plurality of legal subjects and 
special tribunals that characterized Mexico’s colonial and early republican law –remaining 
only the fuero militar and related tribunals of military justice. All criminals, regardless 
their condition, should be subject to the same tribunals and prosecuted by the same laws.140 
Similar principles would inspire the crafting of the 1890 Colombian Criminal Code, 
although its story was far less lineal and straightforward than that of its Mexican 
counterpart. 
 
The 1890 Colombian Code: Between Attempts at Reform and Continuities 
The criminal code of the Regeneration has a very different story than its Porfirian 
counterpart. The 1890 Colombian Criminal Code, unlike the 1871 Mexican Code, did not 
entail a significant rupture with previous forms of and sources of criminal legislation. The 
1837 Code had marked for Colombians the departure from colonial criminal legislation 
and the first major step towards the modernization of national criminal law. Further reforms 
to this initial codification, including the Criminal Codes of 1873 and 1890, basically 
                                                
140 Speckman Guerra, Crimen y Castigo, 28, 47, and 51; see also: Speckman Guerra, “La justicia penal,” 424. 
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reproduced its central principles and prescriptions, while introducing slight changes in the 
definition and classification of some crimes and the duration of some penalties. The 
trajectory of Colombian criminal codification between the statutes of 1837 and 1890 was 
not straightforward, though. Regime changes, failed attempts at reform, and disagreements 
among contemporary codifiers and lawmakers marked the evolution of this legislation, 
particularly the making of the 1890 Code. 
 The creation of a modern criminal codification in Colombia responded to similar 
needs than in the Mexican case. There was a need for replacing dispersed, unsystematic 
and outdated colonial legislation with unified, comprehensive, and methodical codes. 
Likewise, there was a need for new legislation in tune with the political institutions and 
forms of government that emerged after independence. First attempts at modernization of 
Colombian legislation date back to the late 1820s and were inspired, like in Mexico, by the 
works of Bentham. The goal, at that moment, was substituting the “barbarity,” “disorder,” 
and “obscurity” of Spanish legislation with a uniform and simple system of rules and norms 
–a rational system of legislation able to foster state’s efficiency. “Well written Codes that 
make the chaos of the Laws of Indies disappear,” claimed the Conservative writer Juan 
García del Río, “are the most beautiful present that we could give Colombia.”141 
 The 1837 Code was the model for the subsequent Codes of 1873 and 1890, as well 
as the basis for all Colombian criminal legislation throughout the rest of the century. 
Between this first codification and the 1873 Code there were no major transformations. 
The establishment of a federative regime between 1863 and 1886 brought a multiplication 
                                                
141 Jaramillo Uribe, El Pensamiento, 153-154. 
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of criminal codes at the regional level that did not differ too much from one another. The 
most important changes between the 1837 statute and the criminal codes of the federative 
period had to do with the incorporation of the constitutional abolition of the death penalty, 
the reduction and humanization of penalties, and the suppression of infamy-driven 
punishments.142 The enactment of the 1886 Constitution would demand further changes, 
mostly in terms of re-unification and centralization of both civil and criminal law. The 
1885 Constitutional Assembly established that, until the enactment of a new codification, 
the nation would adopt as its criminal code the 1858 Criminal Code of the State of 
Cundinamarca, also a “readapted copy” of the 1837 codification. Later on, the early 
Regenerationist administrations ordered the drafting of a new criminal code and appointed 
a commission for this purpose. The task fell on four members of the Council of State: 
Demetrio Porras, Clodomiro Tejada, Luis Carlos Rico, and Juan Pablo Restrepo.143 
The Commission had the task to prepare a project of criminal code that, instead of 
reproducing former codifications, corrected their errors, filled their gaps, and incorporated 
contemporary developments in legal doctrine. Porras drafted the bulk of the project, which 
drew heavily on foreign codification. Two recent projects of criminal codification 
concentrated Porras’s attention: the one presented by Francisco Silvela to the Spanish 
Courts in 1884, and the one presented around the same time by Giuseppe Zardanelli to the 
Italian parliament.144 These were not the only codifications that inspired the project. Codes 
                                                
142 Adarve Calle, “Gobernar, reformar y encarcelar,” 193-194. 
 
143 Adarve Calle, “Gobernar, reformar y encarcelar,” 195. 
 
144 Porras, Proyecto de Código Penal, viii. 
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from Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Hungary also served as major 
sources on inspiration. Even Latin American codifications from Chile, Brazil, and Mexico 
helped shape Porras’s work.145 Unlike previous criminal codes in Colombia, Porras’s draft 
gave wide legal and doctrinal development to procedural matters including the regulation 
of preventive imprisonments, judicial cautions, and penalties of “subjection to the 
authorities’ surveillance.” Such developments were also internationally inspired, and drew 
upon the works of Ortolan and Gómez de la Serna.146 Another mayor novelty had to do 
with the incorporation of the figure of “preparatory liberty,” a type of probation or 
conditional release previously adopted in the 1871 Mexican Criminal Code and also 
present in European contemporary codifications such as Portugal’s.147 As the same Porras 
declared, the project’s prescriptions of preparatory liberty were almost literally copied from 
the Mexican code.148 
Porras’s project never came to fruition. Porras died before finishing the second part 
of his work, and soon after his death the rest of the commission members discarded his 
draft. To the Council of State, the project was extremely long, complex and detailed, and 
relied exaggeratedly on foreign models. The draft proposed an overall extension of the 
nation’s criminal laws, and that, to the Commission, was “the best means to make them 
                                                
145 Bernate Ochoa, “El Código Penal,” 540. 
 
146 Porras, Proyecto de Código Penal, xcviii, xcix, and ciii. 
 
147 Lozano, Derecho penal, 400 and 462. 
 
148 Porras, Proyecto de Código Penal, clv and clxiv. See in particular Articles 83, 84, and 90 of Porra’s 
project. Additional borrowings from the Mexican legislation included a series of articles regarding the 
imposition of fines for certain minor crimes. See Articles 106, 107, and 108. 
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ineffective.”149 The Council, then, commissioned Juan Pablo Restrepo to design a simpler 
draft. Restrepo would present a new draft compiling dispositions from Cundinamarca’s 
1858 Code and the 1837 Criminal Code. The idea, in Restrepo’s words, was to “quickly 
review what already exists and reunite it in a single code, harmonizing their different parts, 
filling the resulting gaps, and making partial or secondary adjustments […] without altering 
the general plan of what today exists.” Once that compilation was in place, it could be 
possible then to study foreign codifications and see whether or not their reforms could be 
progressively applied to the local circumstances.150 Restrepo’s project, which finally 
became the 1890 Criminal Code, did not involve significant changes in comparison with 
the original 1837 codification. It was basically a reproduction of it without the penalties 
that, throughout the century, had been progressively suppressed –penalties of infamy, 
forced labor, and public infamy, for instance.151 
 
Enacted during the last third of the century, Mexico’s and Colombia’s criminal codes still 
maintained the spirit of the first modern codifications in post-independent Latin America. 
It was something natural, considering that the Mexican Code was Mexico’s first modern 
national criminal code, and that its 1890 Colombian counterpart was a readapted 
reproduction of the first modern code enacted in the nation. It is time now to see if the 
                                                
149 Adarve Calle, “Gobernar, reformar y encarcelar,” 196-197. 
 
150 Salazar-Cáceres, “Breve historia,” 45; and Bernate Ochoa, “El Código Penal,” 541. 
 
151 Altought it was finally approved and enacted as the nation’s criminal code, Restrepo’s project was subject 
of criticism by its contemporaries. José Vicente Concha, for instance, claimed that the Code “lacked 
harmony” and had several “incongruences and even serious contradictions that, in the judicial practice, lead 
to authentic injustices.” These incongruences, to Concha, were not surprising at all, for Restrepo’s code was 
only a legislative recopilation and not a scientific work. See: Salazar-Cáceres, “Breve historia,” 45. 
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common foundations of both Codes shaped similar definitions of and penalties for political 
crimes in the two nations.  
 
Political Crimes in Mexican and Colombian Codes 
How did Criminal Codes in Colombia and Mexico addressed political criminality? Did 
they define a precise set of offenses clearly typified as “political”? Did they reproduce the 
abstract and vague notions of their correspondent Constitutions? This section shows that 
the 1871 Mexican Code and its 1890 Counterpart did little towards advancing more precise 
definitions of what political crimes were. Their multiple criminal typologies included 
different sorts of offenses against public order, public peace, and the government, but no a 
specific and well-defined category of “political crimes.”  
 Political crimes, nonetheless, were present everywhere in these Criminal Codes, as 
they were in the Constitutions. They materialized in the different criminal categories that 
defined and penalized treason, rebellion, sedition, and other offenses against public order 
and peace. They also surfaced in additional prescriptions concerning the classification of 
crimes and criminals, the administration of certain penalties, the dispensation of state 
leniency, and other procedural matters. These categories, definitions, penalties, and 
supplementary prescriptions made up the standard legal framework for the governmental 
responses to political criminality during the Porfiriato and the Regeneration.  
  
Defining Criminal Categories 
The definition and differentiation of criminal categories offer a first clue about how these 
Codes understood and addressed political crimes. Both the 1871 Mexican Criminal Code 
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and its 1890 Colombian counterpart defined these crimes in a relatively similar way, but 
arranged them as part of different criminal categories (see Table 1). While the Mexican 
Code organized the bulk of these offenses in two major categories, the Colombian 
codification distinguished among three different typologies. The Mexican Code only 
distinguished between crimes “against the nation’s external security,” which basically 
included treason, and offenses “against nation’s internal security,” comprising the crimes 
of rebellion and sedition. The Colombian Code distinguished among crimes “against the 
nation,” including treason; offenses “against internal peace, the current government, and 
the Constitution,” comprising different modalities and degrees of rebellion; and “crimes 
against peace and public order,” including sedition, riot (motín o tumulto), and uprising 
(asonada). In the Mexican case, riot and uprising were part of a different category and 
involved definitions that, as we will see, differentiated them completely from sedition and 
rebellion.  
 
Table 1.  
Criminal Categories and their Corresponding Crimes 
 
Mexican Criminal Code (1871) Colombian Criminal Code (1890) 
Crimes against the nation’s 
external security -Treason Crimes against the nation -Treason 
Crimes against the nation’s 
internal security 
-Rebellion 
-Sedition 
Crimes against internal peace, the 
current government, and the 
Constitution 
-Rebellion 
Crimes against public order -Riot -Uprising 
Crimes against peace and public 
order 
-Sedition 
-Riot 
-Uprising 
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Despite such differences in terms of classification, both codes conceived treason, 
rebellion, and sedition in analogous ways. They were crimes against the nation, against 
peace and order, and against the government and its constitutional foundations. Taken 
together, these categories signaled different expressions and gradations of a same 
phenomenon: a series of actions that not only disturbed “public peace” but also 
compromised the existence of the government and even, in the worst cases, of the nation 
itself. The political character of these criminal categories lay, primarily, in the nature of 
what was at stake: the legitimate government, the Constitution, and the existence of society 
as a political community. 
 One of the major differences regarding these categories has to do with the way in 
which both codes understood and classified crimes against “public order.” In the Mexican 
case, these offenses comprised about a dozen crimes including vagrancy and mendicancy; 
raffles, lotteries and other “prohibited games;” tombs desecration; disobedience and 
resistance to the authorities; riot and uprising (motín and asonada); and recurrent 
inebriation (embriaguez habitual).152 It was thus a wide category that combined individual 
and collective offenses against “public tranquility,” “public morality,” or “public civility,” 
with certain non-political modalities of “illegal” collective action, as well as some form of 
“civil resistance” or disobedience. These forms of resistance, nevertheless, did not seem to 
involve a major political nature, judging from the way in which the Code defined such 
crimes. Article 919 of the Mexican Code, for instance, defined riot and uprising as a 
“tumultuous meeting for the commission of a crime other than treason, rebellion, or 
                                                
152 See: Código Penal Mexicano, Libro tercero, Título octavo: “Delitos contra el orden público,” 559-613. 
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sedition.” Crimes of disobedience and resistance, according to Article 904, basically 
referred to acts in which people refused to obey an order or a mandate by any public 
authority. None of these acts involved a questioning of these authorities’ legitimacy, let 
alone endangered their existence. 
 Crimes against “peace and public order” in Colombia had a clearer political content 
and involved a more direct challenge to public authorities.153 Besides sedition, riot, and 
uprising, these offenses also included illegal raising of troops, resistance to law 
enforcement and disobedience to the authorities’ orders, and cuadrillas de malhechores –
groups of people collectively organized to commit crimes against people and properties.154 
This last offense also existed in the Mexican code (Art. 951), but as a crime against “public 
safety.155 Riot and uprising had more complex definitions in the Colombian Code. Article 
217 defined riot (motín o tumulto) as “the insubordinate movement and the illegal and 
turbulent meeting of a portion of people… joined together in order to demand, by force, 
cries, insults, or threats, that authorities perform or stop performing a fair or unfair act.” 
Article 219 conceived of uprising (asonada) as “the illegal movement and reunion of 
people… organized with the goals of disturbing a public act or celebration; taking justice 
into their own hands; abusing or intimidating other people, or forcing them to make a fair 
or unfair thing; or provoking in any way a public scandal or disturbance…” Unlike its 
                                                
153 Unlike its Mexican counterpart, the Colombian Code did not include a category encompassing crimes 
such as vagrancy, “prohibited games,” inhebriation, and other conducts considered crimes against public 
order in Mexico. Tomb desecration existed as an offense, but the Colombian Code classified it as a crime 
against individuals, not as a matter of public order (Arts. 709-711).  
 
154 Código Penal de la República de Colombia, edición oficial (Bogotá: Imprenta de La Nación, 1890). See 
especially: Libro segundo, Título tercero: “Delitos contra la tranquilidad y el orden público,” pages 36-41. 
 
155 According to the Mexican Code, crimes against public safety (delitos contra la seguridad pública) also 
included jailbreaks (evasión de presos) and possession and carying of forbidden weapons. 
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Mexican counterpart, which grouped both crimes as part of the same offense, the 
Colombian Code conceived them as different modalities of illegal collective action, with 
diverse levels of political engagement and political consequences. While the Mexican 
codification conceived “public order” in terms of public tranquility and civility, the 
Colombian Code interpreted it, at least partially, as a matter of political obedience and 
compliance.  
 
Defining and Penalizing Crimes 
The way in which both Codes defined, ranked, and penalized the major crimes of treason, 
rebellion, and sedition offers even more clues about their conceptions of political 
criminality. Which action represented the most serious political offense and why? Which 
criteria defined and separated the levels of “dangerousness” of these crimes? The different 
criminal categories through which both codes organized these offenses offer a first answer. 
Treason was the most severe offense, for it involved a harm against the nation itself and its 
existence as a community. Rebellion was the most serious crime against the government 
and the constitution in Colombia and against internal security in Mexico. Sedition, in both 
cases, represented a less drastic expression of rebellion (see Table 2). These typologies, 
nevertheless, conceal significant differences between one crime and another, and even 
important differences in the ways in which the two codes defined and penalized these 
offenses. It is necessary, then, to pay closer attention to the precise definitions and penalties 
that these crimes had in the referred codifications. 
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Table 2.  
Key Definitions of Treason, Rebellion, and Sedition 
 
Treason To take up arms against the nation. Collaborating with external enemies or foreign invaders. Commonly applicable in cases of international war.  
Rebellion To attack the nation’s form of government, its political organization, and its public powers and their functions. Also includes offenses against the Constitution.  
Sedition To engage public authorities in violent ways. Includes minor insurrections and other episodes of collective violence that do not escalate to the levels of a rebellion.  
 
 Treason, according to the Mexican Code (Art. 1017) was an attack “against the 
independence of the Mexican republic, its sovereignty, its freedom and its territorial 
integrity […] in case of a foreign war.” This attack could manifest in different ways, ones 
more serious than others: it could be an actual, direct attack, by taking up arms against the 
nation and joining active enemy troops (Art. 1080). It could also be a formal, serious and 
direct invitation to commit it; a conspiracy among multiple people to do it; or even an 
“indirect” treason consisting of “deliberately concealing or helping enemy scouts or spies.” 
(Arts. 1072-1075). Other modalities of treason, according to the Mexican code, included 
espionage for the enemy, collaboration with the enemy in the execution of invasion plans, 
and even the recruitment of troops for the enemy side (Art. 1081). All these acts 
represented, to the Code, parts of the same crime. The Colombian code, on the contrary, 
distinguished between two modalities of treason. Acts of treason could be either “serious” 
or “minor,” both of them referring to circumstances of external or international war. 
Serious cases of treason included taking up arms against the nation, changing sides during 
military actions, working as a spy for the enemy or helping enemy spies, helping the enemy 
with resources and other aids, and even facilitating a foreign invasion (Art. 151). Minor 
acts of treason involved exciting a foreign nation to invade Colombian territory, changing 
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sides outside military operations, and sharing classified information with the enemy, 
among other actions (Art. 153). 
Death was an usual punishment for cases of treason, although not the only possible 
one. Mexico prescribed capital punishment to nationals that worked as spies, helped the 
enemy carry out an invasion, or helped it with troops (Art. 1081). People changing sides 
and taking up arms against the nation received a differentiated treatment depending on their 
ranks and roles. Generals of regular troops, as well as leaders of irregular bands were 
punished with death. Colonels and other lower officers were exempt from death and faced 
twelve years of prison (Art. 1080). Past experiences regarding international war and loss 
of territory to its northern neighbor, as well as invasion by and partial submission to a 
foreign power could have influenced the severity of these penalties against traitors in 
Mexico. The Colombian code was slightly more lenient, or at least prescribed the death 
penalty for a more reduced number of offenders. In cases of “severe” treason, capital 
punishment was reserved only to public officers and employees, because their quality of 
public servants aggravated their treason. Other nationals, instead, faced between ten and 
twenty years of prison (Art. 152). “Minor” cases of treason received between three and five 
years of prison, with three additional years in the case of public servants (Art. 155) (see 
Table 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 110 
Table 3.  
Crimes, Criminal Gradations, and Punishments 
 
Crime Mexico Colombia 
Treason 
-Generals and Ringleaders: Death. 
-Other officers: Up to 12 years of 
prison. 
-Public officers and employees: Death. 
-For “Severe or High Treason:” Between 10 
and 20 years of prison. 
-For “Minor Treason:” Between 3 and 5 
years of prison. 
Rebellion 
-Directors, Chiefs, and Ringleaders: 6 
years of prison. 
-Other High-Rank Officers: 5 years of 
prison.  
-Low-Rank Officers, up to captains: 4 
years of prison. 
-Corporals and Sergeants: 3 years of 
prison. 
-Rank-and-File Soldiers: 1 year of 
prison. 
-Indirect supporters: Up to 2 years of 
prison. 
-For encouraging rebellion: Up to 2 
year of prison. 
-Promoters and Ringleaders: Between 8 and 
10 years of prison. 
-Other Leaders: Between 6 and 8 years of 
prison. 
-Other Participants: Between 4 and 6 years 
of prison. 
-Rank-and-File Soldiers: No penalty, unless 
they were responsible for common crimes.  
-People charged with other attacks against 
the Constitution and the government: 
Between 6 months and 4 years of prison.  
-Minor attacks against the Constitution and 
the government: A fine. 
Sedition 
-Involving consummated acts of 
violence: 5 years of prison. 
-With arms, but no consummated acts 
of violence: 3 years of prison. 
-Conspiring to commit sedition: 
Between 6 months and 1 year of 
prison. 
-Chiefs od armed seditions: Between 7 and 9 
years of prison. 
-Other leaders: Between 5 and 7 years of 
prison. 
-Other participants: Between 2 and 4 years of 
prison. 
-For encouraging sedition: Up to 8 months of 
prison. 
*Plus additional economic penalties against 
the inhabitants of insurrectionist towns. 
  
Rebellion comprised a more diverse series of acts. Article 1095 of the Mexican 
code defined it as a “public and overtly hostile” uprising pursuing at least one of six 
different goals. Goals included changing the nation’s form of government; abolishing or 
reforming its Constitution; blocking the election of any of the nation’s supreme powers, 
the reunion of any of these corporations, or their liberty to deliberate; removing the 
president or his ministers from office; raising a portion or the totality of either the nation 
or the army against the government; and usurping the faculties and attributions of any of 
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the nation’s supreme powers. Acts of rebellion included not only leading or being directly 
involved in the uprising. They also comprised planning and plotting it, inviting people to 
rebel, conspiring with others with the same aim, and voluntarily providing rebels or 
conspirators with men, weapons, ammunition, or money. Giving rebels provisions, food or 
means of transportation also fell under this category of offenses (Arts. 1066-1101). A final 
type of rebel referred to people that directly excited or promoted rebellion through 
telegrams, messengers, printed media, and others. The Code treated them as “authors” in 
case that the rebellion erupted, and as reos de conato (culprits of an attempt) if that was 
not the case (Art. 1110). To the Mexican code, rebels were not only those who directly 
organized, promoted, and participated in the uprising, but also all those who, directly or 
indirectly, and always willingly, had taken part of or collaborated with the movement.  
 The Colombian Code also comprised different actions under the notion of rebellion. 
Article 169 defined rebels in terms of a series of offenses that had in common the goal of 
“changing substantially the nation’s overall organization.” These offenses included taking 
up arms against the government, whether to overthrow it or to change the Constitution; 
attempting to alter, by force, the constitutional separation of public powers, or the people 
or corporations in charge of them; blocking or impeding the reunion of the Congress or one 
of its chambers; or trying to dissolve it by force. Additionally, the Code included a series 
of actions that, without being formal and direct acts of rebellion, also counted as crimes 
against internal peace, the government, and the Constitution. These supplementary 
prescriptions (Arts. 187-190) criminalized acts such as attempting to persuade others to 
neglect or disobey the Constitution; propagating “maxims or doctrines directly tending to 
destroy or disturb the Constitution;” giving “seditious speeches” against the Charter; and 
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“provoking, through satires, jokes, or invectives, the breach of the Constitution.” All these 
“subversive” acts could take the form of speeches or written pieces, involving from a 
simple remark in public to a leaflet or a newspaper article. Although these offenses were 
certainly distant from the crime of rebellion, they were still linked to it. To the Code, they 
were also acts of hostility towards the government, as well as dangerous manifestations of 
discontent that could spark major offenses against the institutions.  
In addition to these prescriptions delimiting and defining the crime of rebellion, 
both Codes included supplementary articles specifying which actions should –and should 
not– be considered as a “natural” accessory to events of rebellion. The consummation of a 
rebellion implied necessarily the commission of other offenses –related crimes or delitos 
conexos. It was necessary, then, to distinguish between those “related” actions that were 
“logical” and “inevitable” parts or ingredients of a rebellion, and those that were not and, 
in consequence, represented additional crimes. Article 1113 of the Mexican Code, for 
instance, established that rebels were not responsible for any death or injury caused in 
combat. Nonetheless, homicides or injuries caused outside the battlefield were still 
considered crimes and made their authors accountable for them. The same applied to 
common crimes committed during the rebel movement, according to Article 1114. The 
Colombian code was more detailed in its differentiation between what could be included 
and what could not. Seizing of weapons, recruitment, removal of public servants, 
replacement of public authorities and appropriation of public functions, resistance to public 
and military authorities, deaths in combat, and even the collection of contributions and 
“war taxes” made up the offenses that the Code considered “innate” to rebellion. Actions 
against people’s lives and properties were still criminal and penalized, as were pillage, 
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arson, homicides outside the battlefield, the freeing of common prisoners, and assaults to 
rural properties without a formal order of a rebel leader (Article 177). 
Punishments for rebellion in Mexico and Colombia were as diverse as the 
modalities of the crime, and followed a scale of penalties corresponding to a parallel 
hierarchy of offenders (see Table 3). The Colombian Code distinguished among four levels 
of involvement in a consummated rebellion: promoters and ringleaders; participants with 
some degree of power, leadership, or jurisdiction in the movement; “other” participants; 
and mere soldiers (Arts. 170 and 171). The first category of rebels faced between eight and 
ten years of prison. The second, between six and eight years of the same penalty. The third, 
between four and six years. Soldiers, as long as they had not received any sort of promotion 
and had not committed any common offense, were exempt from any penalty. 
Outside this classification, the Code also distinguished among different levels of 
responsibility concerning people that, in times of peace, attacked the Constitution and the 
government by written word of speech. People encouraging the neglecting of the 
constitution, and therefore its partial or total suspension, faced between one and four years 
of prison. People propagating “subversive maxims” received between six months and two 
years of the same penalty. Finally, people “insulting” the Constitution through satires and 
similar ways, received only a fine. Additionally, they all lost their political rights (Arts. 
187-190). This supplementary classification of crimes and criminals traced a link between 
“actual” rebels, who waged war against the government, and “subversive” dissidents, 
whose attacks were perhaps subtler but no less hostile. Such link set them apart in terms of 
the nature of their crime –attacks in the battlefield and attacks in the arena of public 
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opinion–, but at the same time made them all responsible for a similar set of offenses. They 
were, after all, offenses against internal peace, the government, and the Constitution. 
The Mexican Code, in its administration of penalties for rebellion, involved a more 
complex grouping of criminals. Rather than establishing a single, straightforward 
classification of offenders, it delimited two main criteria of categorization. A first criterion 
had to do with matters of responsibility and authorship. Article 111 distinguished between 
“leading authors” and “accomplices.” The first term included people who promoted, led, 
or conducted a consummated rebellion. It also comprised people who collaborated in the 
conception, planning, and execution of the movement; individuals that while having the 
power to prevent or stop it let it occur; and people who publicly excited the rebellion 
whether by speeches or by printed publications. In the case of a failed rebellion, and 
according to Article 112, the Code penalized as “leading authors” all those who had 
claimed the voice of the movement and appeared as writers of publications inciting the 
uprising. All participants whose involvement in the rebellion did not match these criteria 
were considered simple “accomplices.” This differentiation between “authors” and 
“accomplices” did not have effects in itself, but rather functioned as a guiding principle for 
the gradation of the penalties corresponding to the different typologies of rebels established 
by the second criterion. 
The second criterion paralleled the way in which the Colombian Code classified 
rebels, but included a larger number of categories. Article 1102 of the Mexican codification 
arranged offenders according to their degree of involvement in the movement. Directors, 
chiefs, and ringleaders were at the top of this criminal hierarchy. Superior or high-rank 
officials followed. A third level corresponded to low-rank officials up to Captains. A fourth 
 115 
level was composed of corporal and sergeants, while the lowest rank corresponded to 
soldiers. Offenders at the highest level received six years of prison, that became five for 
second-level criminals, four for the next category, and three for the four levels. Unlike the 
Colombian case, the Mexican Code did punish soldiers, and gave them up to a year of 
prison. The Code authorized judges to raise these penalties up to a third of the 
corresponding punishments in case that the rebellion became an armed movement waging 
actual acts of war (Art. 1103).  
A supplementary categorization put together two different types of “indirect” rebels 
(Arts. 1096-1101). The first type included people who, without taking part in a rebellion, 
supported rebels directly and willingly. This support could take the form of men, weapons, 
ammunition and money, or of provisions and means of transportation. The Code considered 
this support an indirect involvement with the movement, and therefore penalized it with 
prison up to two years. The second category comprised people who helped prepare a rebel 
movement independently of its outcomes, whether conspiring with aims of rebellion or 
inviting other people to rebel. These other criminals faced up to one year of prison. A 
comparison between the penalties established for both types of rebels shows that, for the 
Mexican code, supporting a rebellion after it started was a more serious offense that 
attempting to start one. 
 The potential commission of common crimes opened another front for the 
criminalization and punishment of rebels. The Mexican Code established additional 
penalties for rebels any time they executed war prisoners; incorporated bandits and 
filibusters to their ranks; committed attacks against private property; and kidnapped people 
for economic purposes (Arts. 1104-1109). The first aggravating condition turned charges 
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of rebellion into charges of homicide; and, it authorized judges to impose the death penalty. 
The second condition added to the rebel’s punishment up to ten additional years of prison, 
if it was followed by the perpetration of acts of violence. The third circumstance turned 
rebellion into “robbery with violence,” and the last one turned rebels into mere plagiarios 
or kidnappers. These two final conversions also allowed judges, in correspondence with 
the Constitution and the Criminal Code, to punish rebels with death. A final condition 
established the time of involvement of the rebel in the movement as an additional 
aggravating circumstance.  
The Colombian Code was less specific than its Mexican counterpart in this point, 
but it also established that rebels should face any additional charges and penalties for 
common crimes that they had committed during their insurrection (Article 179). The most 
important provision in this regard had to do with the conversion of rebels into bandits or 
reos en cuadrilla de malhechores. According to Article 178, anytime rebels collectively 
performed acts of “ferocity and barbarism” condemned by the Law of Nations, such as 
cruelty towards war prisoners, tactics of torture and starvation, or violence against women, 
children and other harmless people, they became a cuadrilla de malhechores. The 
Colombian Military Code of 1881, still effective during the Regeneration, prescribed an 
analogous treatment in cases of internal conflict. Article 1099 of this codification 
established that rebel or insurrectionist armies that committed crimes against people or 
properties, and whose acts of hostility remained outside the dynamics of formal and 
permanent armies, should be punished as thieves or bandits. Like the legal conversions 
allowed in the Mexican case, these conversions had major legal implications, for they made 
 117 
rebels subject to the death penalty, as established in the Constitution and in Article 252 of 
the Criminal Code.156 
 Sedition, according to both codes, was a minor insurrection that challenged public 
authorities without the goals of attacking, overthrowing, or replacing them. As an event of 
violent collective action, it was politically oriented and motivated. At the most basic level, 
it supposed a collective effort to hinder, on purpose, the actions of public authorities. Under 
a more elaborated perspective, it represented an excessive collective demand against a 
given authority in order to request something of common interest. The criminal nature of 
sedition did not stem from the demands at stake, but from the act of engaging authorities 
in violent and tumultuous fashion. The Mexican Code understood sedition in its most 
simpler connotation. Its Article 1123 defined the crime as the reunion of at least 10 people 
that resisted or attacked authorities with either of two goals: impeding the promulgation or 
execution of a law, or the celebration of a popular election; or hindering the exercise of the 
functions of a given authority. The Colombian codification, instead, leaned towards the 
second, more complex interpretation of the offense. Article 210 defined sedition as “the 
tumultuous uprising of people with the aim, not of disobeying the nation’s government, but 
of opposing, with or without weapons, the execution of any law, any constitutional, legal, 
or judicial act, or any legitimate service […] by the authorities.” Violent collective acts of 
                                                
156 Article 248 of the Colombian Criminal Code defined as cuadrilla de malhechores “all meeting or 
association of four or more people, gathered together with the purpose of committing, together or separately, 
but in concert, any crime or crimes against people or properties, whether they are public or private.” Article 
252 prescribed that “the most serious case of asalto en cuadrilla de malhechores takes place when it involves 
voluntary manslaughter, raping of a woman, or deliberated injury or mutilation that leave the victim blind or 
disabled. This crime will be punished with death penalty." 
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resistance against authorities also counted as sedition, as long as they involved more than 
40 people.  
 Penalties for sedition usually were less drastic than those corresponding to the crime 
of rebellion (see Table 3). The Mexican Code prescribed three years of prison if the sedition 
included the use of arms, and five if the movement actually performed acts of violence or 
achieved their goal (Art. 1125). People conspiring with seditious purposes faced between 
six months and one year of the same penalty (1124). Like in the case of rebellion, judges 
could strengthen the corresponding penalties in the case that the sedition involved the 
commission of common crimes, and especially of offenses against individuals, their lives, 
and their properties (Arts. 1124 and 1126). The Colombian codification included a more 
diverse and harsher set of penalties. Chiefs of armed seditions faced between seven and 
nine years of prison, while other leaders received between five and seven years of the same 
penalty. The rest of participants in the movement were punished with prison between two 
and four years (Arts. 211 and 212). People charged with promoting a sedition or inviting 
others to that end, regardless their success, faced prison up to eight months, and remained 
subject to the authorities’ surveillance for up to two years (Art. 215). Individuals that 
publicly promoted a sedition through speeches or printed publications also fell into the 
category of sedition and would be prosecuted as fautores or helpers of the crime. (Art. 
230).  
 The Colombian codification took penalties for sedition even further. Given the 
political nature of the crime, and the caliber of the challenges to authorities that it involved, 
it was natural that the Code prescribed for it more drastic penalties. Articles 231, 232, and 
233 extended the responsibility in events of seditions from the actual seditious to the rest 
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of the population in which the movement had taken place. To the Code, anytime a sedition 
or a riot required the mobilization of armed forces to repress it, it was necessary to charge 
the offenders for the expenses of the operation. These expenses, nonetheless, did not 
exclusively fall on the movement’s leaders and participants, but also on “all the inhabitants 
of the district or districts in which the insurrection occurred, who could have opposed it” 
(Article 231). The monetary penalty should take the form of “forced contributions” whose 
amounts depended on each one’s economic capacity. The only people that were exempt 
from the contribution were those who had actively resisted the movement once it started. 
 
Additional Provisions and the Notion of Political Crimes 
Whether directly or indirectly, all of the aforementioned crimes had a political nature, 
evident in most cases in the very definition of the offenses and the offenders. Nevertheless, 
neither of the two Codes defined or classified them explicitly as “political crimes.” This 
does not mean that this notion was completely absent from the codifications. Both in 
Mexico and Colombia, Criminal Codes involved additional provisions directly concerned 
with the concept of political crimes –as a general criminal category, not as a concrete set 
of offenses. The Colombian Code, for instance, prohibited extradition for political crimes 
in its Article 18. Provisions in this regard were much wider in the Mexican case. Article 
93 delimited the number of possible penalties for political crimes: a series of 13 options 
including, among many others, fines; light penalties of incarceration or reclusión simple; 
suspension of civil and political rights; confinement; and different levels of exile –ranging 
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from estrangement from a city or a state to expatriation. This list of penalties excluded 
others such as minor and major arrests, ordinary prison, and judicial cautions.157  
Other provisions from the Mexican code regulated the imposition of some of these 
specific penalties. Article 139, for instance, dictated that confinement was an exclusive 
penalty for political offenders. The government was in charge of deciding the defendant’s 
destination taking into consideration “both the exigencies of public peace and the 
prisoner’s needs.” Article 141 clarified the difference between reclusion simple and 
ordinary prison. Reclusión simple only existed for political crimes, and consisted of 
detention in an establishment where no other types of criminals were allowed. This penalty 
corresponded to the ideas that common and political prisoners should remain separated, 
and that the prison regime for the latter should be “highly humanitarian.”158 Article 142 
established that expatriation could replace detention or reclusion simple for treason or other 
political crimes, but only in two circumstances: in the case that the permanence of the 
defendant in the nation put public tranquility and risk, or in the case that the defendant in 
question was a chief or ringleader. Finally, Article 172 dictated that political offenders, 
once they had finished their respective sentences, had to remain subject to the authorities’ 
surveillance for an additional period. None of these supplementary articles specified, 
beyond the offense of treason, which crimes classified as political.  
 
 
                                                
157 See Libro Primero, Título 4 of the 1871 Mexican Code: “Exposición de las penas y de las medidas 
preventivas.” 
 
158 Antonio de Medina y Ormaechea, Proyecto para el establecimiento del régimen penitenciario en la 
República Mexicana (México: Imprenta del gobierno, 1881). See especially Article 8 and page 80. 
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Political Crimes and the Military Jurisdiction 
The previous rulings on matters of treason, rebellion, sedition, and others were not the only 
prescriptions that formally delimited the legal definition and punishment of political crimes 
in Colombia and Mexico at the time. Outside the jurisdiction of the regular Criminal Codes 
and ordinary justice, there was the legal and jurisdictional domain of the military. Both 
Constitutions recognized the independence and autonomy of military tribunals, as long as 
their jurisdiction remained exclusively focused on military matters –this is, those involving 
military personnel and crimes.159 Civilians were subject to the military tribunals only as 
long as they were involved as accomplices and co-authors in military crimes. Even in these 
cases, their prosecution followed the proceedings and prescriptions of the ordinary 
justice.160 Military justice and tribunals commonly functioned in times of war, whether 
during an international conflict or in the context of an internal confrontation like a civil 
war or a major rebellion. The 1881 Colombian Military Code and its 1892 Mexican 
counterpart contained the basic principles for the application and function of military 
justice in both countries during the Regeneration and the Porfiriato.  
 Like ordinary Criminal Codes, these Military Codes also contained their own 
criminal categories, with their own definitions of crime and criminality and the 
corresponding penalties for each case. Criminal typologies and definitions in Military 
Codes did not necessarily paralleled those in the ordinary codifications, for both kinds of 
                                                
159 See Article 170 of the 1886 Colombian Constitution, as well as Article 13 of the 1857 Mexican Charter.  
 
160 See additionally: Código Militar Expedido por el Congreso de los Estados Unidos de Colombia de 1881 
(Bogotá: Imprenta de T. Uribe Zapata, 1881), especially its “Libro Quinto: Justicia Militar.” For Mexico, 
see: Código de Justicia Militar de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, expedido el 16 de Septiembre de 1892 
(México: Miguel Macedo, 1893), in particular Articles 1-5 and 114-118. 
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codes dealt with different actors, actions, and circumstances. Such differences are 
particularly evident in the ways in which Military Codes in Mexico and Colombia defined 
and classified the crimes of treason, rebellion, and sedition. Out of these three offenses, 
only treason was subject to a definition relatively similar than in the ordinary codes. 
Rebellion and sedition, on the contrary, involved a marked military tone that, in most cases, 
had little to do with the political offenses reviewed above. 
 The Mexican Military Code understood treason exclusively under the perspective 
of a foreign or international war. Article 1048 defined as traitors all members of the military 
that supported in any way the nation’s external enemy. This support could consist on 
changing sides; surrendering fortresses, military posts, ships, and weapons to the enemy; 
destroying roads and telegraphic lines in order to favor the invader; spying; and guiding 
foreign expeditions in national territory; releasing war prisoners; and even inviting others 
to commit the crime. Death was the penalty for all cases of military treason, with no 
exceptions or mitigating conditions of rank and degree of involvement.  
 Colombia’s military justice, on the contrary, conceived military treason under two 
different yet complementary perspectives. To the Code, treason could take place whether 
in an international war or during an internal rebellion against the nation’s government. In 
either of these cases, according to Article 1645, traitors were all members of the military 
that switched allegiance, maintained correspondence with the enemy –external or internal–
, helped their military operations, and protected them during actions of war. Additionally, 
Article 25 defined a supplementary series of acts of “high treason,” all of them referring to 
circumstances of internal conflict. Such actions included attempting to overthrow the 
legitimate government; trying to dissolve the Congress or block their meetings; attacking 
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public officers and employees, and even hindering the performance of their constitutional 
functions. To the Colombian Criminal Code, these offenses represented, basically, acts of 
rebellion. Nevertheless, under the perspective of military justice, they had more serious 
implications –they were acts of treason. Although the Code, enacted in 1881, prescribed 
for traitors up to ten years of prison or exile, the later Constitution of 1886 established the 
death penalty as a possible punishment for serious cases of treason during foreign war (Art. 
29). 
 Both in Mexico and Colombia, military definitions of rebellion and sedition tended 
to be less political than in the ordinary Criminal Codes. This de-politicization was 
particularly marked in the Colombian case, where treason already represented the ultimate 
political crime for members of the military. Rebellion and sedition made part of a same 
criminal category, and only described different degrees of a same offense: military 
insubordination. To the Code, sedition was a military uprising with the aim of demanding 
anything or rejecting an order by using threats and manifestations of resistance (Article 
1638). Rebellion merely implied not following orders, or taking up arms without 
authorization, or executing acts of violence against a superior’s command (Art. 1639). As 
acts of insubordination, both crimes received penalties of ten years of prison for chiefs and 
leaders, and up to five years of the same penalty for their main accomplices (Art. 1640). 
 The Mexican case was slightly different. While the definition of sedition in 
Mexico’s Military Code (Art. 879) pretty much paralleled Colombian prescriptions on the 
matter, the notion of military rebellion still entailed some degree of political content. 
Article 1040 of the Code defined it as a subtraction from obedience to the government and 
a hostile uprising with the aim of opposing a Constitutional precept or mandate, punishing 
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it with the death penalty. The code prescribed less drastic penalties, which were harsh 
nonetheless, for rebel rank-and-file soldiers, as well as for servicemen that merely invited 
others to rebel. In these cases, defendants could face up to ten years of prison (Arts. 1041 
and 1042). 
 These prescriptions delimited the legal framework for the definition and 
punishment of treason, rebellion, and sedition as military crimes –or as crimes subject to 
the military jurisdiction. This does not mean, however, that they were the only definitions 
available in the military legislation for cases of international war, internal conflict, or 
military insurrection. At least in the Colombian case, the Military Code contained an 
additional series of articles elaborating on the notions of rebellion, insurrection, and civil 
war. These articles did not have the purpose of adding extra punishments to the penalties 
already reviewed. They only offered wider definitions of these concepts based on notions 
from the Law of Nations, with the intention of clarifying in which precise circumstances 
this extraordinary law could and should apply. The definitions were, to a certain extent, a 
legal development of the polemical Article 91 of the 1863 Constitution, under whose 
regime the 1881 Military Code came to life.  
 Drawing on the definition of the Law of Nations, Article 1335 of the Colombian 
Code understood “civil war” as the war that two or more parties, within the same nation, 
fought for the control of “supreme” (state) power. Each one of these parties, additionally, 
claimed for itself the exclusive right to rule the nation. It was, in short, an internal war 
between at least two enemies claiming sovereignty for themselves and denying it to the 
other. Rebellion, according to Article 1334, was another form of internal war, but one that 
did not imply a conflict for sovereignty.  It was, instead, an insurrection that broke out in a 
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large portion of the nation and became a declared war against the legitimate government 
with the aim of subtracting from its authority and establishing an independent government. 
This notion of rebellion combined a war against governmental institutions with a 
secessionist conflict, and presupposed a major rupture in terms of territory and sense of 
nationality. The Article also ordered military officers in a war of rebellion to differentiate, 
in the rebel territories of the nation, between “loyal” and “disloyal” citizens. “Disloyal” 
citizens should be divided, at the same time, between citizens that, despite being 
“notoriously addicted to the rebellion,” did not actively supported it, and citizens that, 
without taking up arms, voluntarily supported and helped rebels (Art. 1344). Rebellions, 
in this light, were also a matter of loyalty, not simply a matter of political or partisan 
rivalries or disagreements.  
 Insurrection, finally, was a less serious political movement that, nonetheless, 
involved the risk of becoming a more serious movement. Article 1333 defined the notion 
as “the uprising or armed people against the established government, a part of it, one or 
several laws, or one or several of its employees.” The Article also specified that 
insurrections could be limited to mere episodes or armed resistance, or could lead to more 
threatening manifestations of collective political violence such as revolution. One way or 
another, they represented actions that were not only criminal in military terms, but also 
primordially political.  
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Conclusions: Criminal Regimes of Internal Enmity in Mexico and Colombia 
The Criminal Codes of the Porfiriato and the Regeneration had several common points. 
They both responded to similar doctrinal and philosophical influences, understood crimes 
and penalties in a parallel fashion, and classified offenses in different but still relatively 
analogous ways. They also addressed political criminality and internal enmity through a 
common perspective. Crimes of a political nature represented serious attacks against 
society as a whole. Here, the nation, the state, the government, the Constitution, and the 
public order took the place of the “society” that these crimes put at risk. Offenses against 
it ranked from simple episodes of collective violence directed against public authorities to 
major acts of rebellion against the constitutional government, and even included attempts 
at cooperation with a foreign power to harm the nation’s very existence. According to the 
principle of free will, political offenders and other internal enemies were rational subjects 
that freely and voluntarily acted against their own society. Their voluntariness, and 
therefore their attributes of criminality, could be measured and graded in correspondence 
with their degree of involvement in such attacks.  
 Penalties against internal enemies followed a similar gradation, corresponding not 
only to degrees of involvement and voluntariness, but also to levels of political threat 
associated to the attacks in question. It was a double hierarchy involving crimes and 
criminals alike. Penalties for treason (an attack against the nation) were harsher than 
penalties for rebellion (an offense against the government and the constitution); and these 
in turn were harsher than penalties for sedition, riot, or asonada (attacks against public 
authorities). Chiefs, ringleaders, plotters, and even conspirators were also at the top of this 
criminal hierarchy and, in consequence, faced the most severe penalties. High- and 
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medium-rank leaders or officers followed, conceived more as accomplices than actual 
authors. Supporters or collaborators were also penalized as active and voluntary enemies. 
Finally, at the bottom of this hierarchy, rank-and-file soldiers embodied the lowest degree 
of involvement and compromise, and therefore the minimum possible level of political 
threat. This is why, at least in the Colombian Code, simple soldiers were not considered 
accountable for purely political crimes. In all these cases, penalties served at least two 
different yet complementary purposes. On the one hand, they involved an element of 
vengeance and retribution, manifested in the imposition of death penalty or in the 
establishment of pecuniary penalties in cases of sedition. On the other hand, they 
encompassed a component of prevention and deterrence, evident in the penalty of prison 
as well as in the supplementary penalties of confinement, expatriation, or subjection to the 
authorities’ surveillance.  
Beyond these basic conceptions, the Mexican and the Colombian Codes defined 
and understood political crimes in a way that paralleled their respective constitutional 
prescriptions on the matter. Both Codes and Constitutions in Mexico and Colombia defined 
political offenses as actions that simultaneously attacked the government and the public 
order, performed and committed by enemies of the nation and the authorities. They also 
conceived them as actions that required an exceptional, if not extraordinary, legal 
treatment. Exceptionalities, according to the Codes, included the establishment of 
exclusive penalties and the prohibition of others, the notion that political crimes, even if 
designated otherwise, existed separately from ordinary offenses, and the premise that 
political offenders required their own carceral spaces.  
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The legal treatment of political criminals according to these codifications went 
beyond these commonalities. Both in Mexico and Colombia, criminal codes reflected a 
universe of crimes and criminals much richer than the one described in the previous 
chapter. Episodes of “internal commotion” and other alterations of internal order and peace 
materialized in concrete offenses clearly differentiated and hierarchized: treason, rebellion, 
sedition, riot, and asonada. Additionally, each of these crimes encompassed a wide variety 
of possibilities that accounted for the myriad of ways in which criminal law in Colombia 
and Mexico conceived internal enmity. To the Codes, internal enemies were not “rebels” 
or “seditious” in abstract. Modalities of internal enmity were much larger and full of small 
divisions and differentiations. An internal enemy could be a rebel ringleader, an officer in 
a rebel army, an insurrectional leader, or the head of a riot. Authors and instigators of 
consummated rebellions were also internal enemies, in the same way that plotters, 
conspirators, and supporters of failed or dissolved movements were. Somebody that, 
without being an actual or active rebel or insurrectionist, showed some degree of sympathy 
for “more active” internal enemies became an internal enemy too. Helping rebels with men, 
weapons, money, supplies or means of transportation represented therefore acts of internal 
enmity as well. The same applied to those that, independently of their involvement with 
other political enemies, propagated “subversive maxims,” gave seditious speeches, or 
attacked through written publications the government and the Constitution.  
There was a subtle but important difference in the ways in which the two codes 
conceived internal enmity, nonetheless. The repertoire of possible actions defining internal 
enemies tended to be more diverse in Colombia than in Mexico. While crimes against 
“public order” in Mexico did not properly entail acts of internal enmity, in Colombia these 
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offenses involved a first –yet minimal– degree of challenge to public authorities. Sedition 
and military treason also comprised clearer and more evident acts of internal enmity than 
in the Mexican case. In addition, the Colombian code indirectly extended the crime of 
rebellion to a series of subsidiary offenses penalizing seditious speeches, “subversive” 
publications, and even pieces of political satire. This particular extension of the notion of 
political enmity involved major legal and political implications in the Colombian case, for 
it drew a very tenuous line between dissident journalists and rebels. The treatment of liberal 
writers and newspapers during the 1880s and the 1890s would offer a myriad of examples 
about the consequences of such parallelism. All in all, Colombia’s 1890 Criminal Code, 
like its 1886 Constitution, seemed much more concerned than their Mexican counterparts 
with possible future scenarios of political conflict and internal turmoil. 
Both Codes, finally, provided governments with a wide array of options for 
responding to episodes and manifestations of political enmity. Although at first glance 
these possible responses seemed clear, systematic, and carefully graded, they were actually 
marked by ambiguity, overlaps, and grey areas. Much of this ambiguity stemmed from the 
existence of two simultaneous regimes for the definition and punishment of internal 
enmity. Like their respective Constitutions, Colombia’s and Mexico’s criminal codes 
referred to conducts –conceptually– equivalent to political crimes in an abstract way, with 
no precise reference to a specific series of well-determined offenses. The parallelism 
between dispositions on political crimes and prescriptions on offenses such as treason, 
rebellion, and sedition, led to the configuration of two separate regimes of crimes and 
penalties for the prosecution and punishment of internal enemies. On the one hand, there 
was the special regime that both Codes outlined for political crimes, containing penalties 
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and proceedings but no specific offenses –or formal, explicit criminal categories. On the 
other hand, there was the ordinary regime of those concrete crimes like rebellion, sedition, 
and others that, despite their evident political nature, did not formally represent political 
offenses. Connections, differences, and boundaries between one regime and another were 
unclear, and the Codes established nothing in this regard. What mediated between these 
two regimes was yet another grey area for legal interpretation. It was an obscure sphere in 
which internal enemies could be either common or political criminals depending on the 
circumstances, and where the application of the extraordinary regime of political offenses 
depended exclusively on discretion.  
Additional sources of ambiguity had to do with the criminalization of non-violent 
acts of political dissent, like in the Colombian case, and with the often tenuous 
differentiation among “purely political crimes,” “related” crimes or delitos conexos, and 
“purely common offenses.” While the distinction seemed clear on paper, in practice it was 
almost impossible to trace a formal line between political and non-political crimes, as the 
next chapters will show. With no precise indications for solving this confusion, the 
Colombian and Mexican Codes ended up charging governments and other political, 
judicial, and administrative authorities with the responsibility of deciding which crimes 
were political and which not. During the Porfiriato and the Regeneration, these 
uncertainties would work as a gray area that allowed authorities to shape and reshape the 
sphere of political crimes at their convenience, without contradicting legal or constitutional 
prescriptions on the matter. The practice of processing and punishing rebels as common 
criminals, bandits, and malhechores, common in both countries during the period, would 
be one of the most striking outcomes of such reshaping.  
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Drawing on similar philosophical and doctrinal influences, the Criminal Codes of the 
Porfiriato and the Regeneration understood political criminality and internal enmity in a 
relatively similar manner. There were differences, of course, especially in the ways in 
which they classified and criminalized actions of internal enmity and other offenses of a 
political nature. Beyond these basic similarities and differences, both codifications ended 
up producing a common outcome of great importance for this study: the production of 
simultaneous regimes for the definition and treatment of political enmity. These regimes 
coexisted in a parallel fashion, but their connections and boundaries were never clear. This 
unclear parallelism shaped a framework of legal responses to political criminality in which 
governments and public authorities, not criminal codes, had the last word regarding what 
political offenses were and what kind of punishments they deserved. When it came to acts 
of internal enmity, the theoretical consistency and predictability of these codes gave way 
to the uncertainty of discretion. As the next chapter illustrates, these ambiguities, as well 
as their legal effects, were the center of multiple debates and doctrinal developments during 
the period. 
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IV. CHAPTER 3. DEFINING AND PUNISHING POLITICAL CRIMES: LEGAL, 
DOCTRINAL, AND LEGISLATIVE CONVERSATIONS 
 
The legal experiences of rebels and other political dissidents in Mexico and Colombia were 
not exclusively the result of constitutional and criminal law prescriptions. They were also 
indirect, remote products of a series of legal conversations concerning the nature of 
political crimes and the most appropriate ways to treat them. These conversations were 
much more than simple theoretical or doctrinal elaborations disconnected from the legal 
and political lives of individual and governments. Many of them influenced legislation and 
legal change, and therefore played a role in the shaping of the relationships between 
citizens and state as well as in people’s experiences as legal and political actors. Broadly 
speaking, the stories of Flores Magón and many others, their interactions with Mexican 
and Colombian authorities, and their fate as political criminals also carried the imprint of 
these conversations and their impact on legislation.  
 
Constitutional and criminal law prescriptions on political criminality illustrate only a 
fraction of the overall framework for the definition and treatment of political offenses in 
Mexico and Colombia during the period under study. The conversations that accompanied 
the making and enactment of such prescriptions are equally important for understanding 
how governments during the Porfiriato and the Regeneration responded to political crimes 
and why they reacted the way they did. This chapter reconstructs and analyzes some of 
these conversations, with the aim of illustrating the panoply of legal and doctrinal 
arguments, positions, and perspectives that helped shape, in both countries, the framework 
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in question. It shows that many of the norms reviewed in previous chapters were the 
product of multiple reflections about the criminal nature of these offenses, the distinction 
between political and ordinary crimes, and the best ways of punishing political offenders. 
What were the major legal and political concerns behind these reflections? What sorts of 
legal and doctrinal inspirations or influences did they involve? What do these conversations 
reveal about the ways in which Mexican and Colombian jurists and lawmakers understood 
the limits of state power, the boundaries of “legal” political dissidence, and the legitimacy 
of specific modalities of political dissent? These are some of the main questions that this 
chapter aims to answer. 
 A series of legal essays, studies of legislation, and constitutional and legislative 
debates between the 1850s and the 1910s comprise the main sources of this chapter. Section 
one explores how these reflections and discussions understood political criminality, 
defined political crimes, and differentiated them from common offenses. Section two 
analyzes how jurists and lawmakers argued about the need for defining a special, separate 
regime of penalties for political crimes and criminals. Section three analyzes how 
constitutional debates on extraordinary powers in Mexico and Colombia addressed and 
perceived the nature, criminality, and punishment of political offenses. Section four offers, 
by way of conclusion, a general perspective of the multiple ways in which these debates 
and conversations assessed the nature of political crimes and its legal treatment throughout 
the period. 
 Overall, the chapter argues that conversations and reflections about the legal and 
constitutional treatment of political offenses encompassed in Colombia and Mexico a wide 
variety of positions and perspectives about what political crimes were, what made them 
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criminal, and what made them political. Not all these understandings agreed on the attribute 
of criminality attached to these offenses, or on the sort of legal responses they demanded 
from governments, constitutions, and criminal laws. While some jurists and lawmakers 
conceived of rebels, revolutionaries and other “dangerous” dissidents as enemies of society 
and the nation as a whole, others merely perceived them as political fanatics led by 
misguided notions of “justice” or “patriotism.” There were also all sorts of alternative 
interpretations in between both extremes. Many of these discussions revolved around the 
differences between common and political crimes and the distinctions between “harmless” 
and “dangerous” political dissidence. The lack of clarity –and consensus– about the limits 
between these categories would give way to a lack of certainty with serious political and 
legal consequences during the Porfiriato and the Regeneration.  
 
Defining and Differentiating Political Criminality: Assessing the Nature of Political 
Offenses 
The vague nature of political crimes in Mexican and Colombian legislation did not go 
unnoticed among legislators and other legal experts throughout the period. Aware of the 
legal and political consequences of an imprecise definition of political criminality, some 
experts and lawmakers would make the effort to propose clearer answers to the question 
about what political crimes were. Similarly, the outbreak and proliferation of internal 
conflict in both nations would force legislators and others to reflect more thoroughly about 
the limits between common and political offenses, as well as about the conditions under 
which political crimes remained strictly political. Legal essays and journals, studies of 
current legislation, and even congressional initiatives became spaces of reflection and 
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debate about these matters. Such reflections shed light on the different ways in which legal 
experts tried to solve the ambiguities explored in the previous chapters. More importantly, 
they illustrate the ways in which these legal actors conceived and understood political 
crimes, not only as criminal constructs but also as political acts. They show as well the 
doctrinal and intellectual foundations of their conceptions. 
  
The Mexican Experience: From 1874 to 1912 
Three basic preoccupations stimulated these reflections in the Mexican case. The first one 
had to do with the penalties that the Constitution and the Criminal Code prohibited for 
political crimes. The second referred to the separation between common and political 
offenses. The third one, finally, linked itself to a question about the criminal nature and 
punishment of delitos conexos. A first position in this regard comes from a study on the 
1871 Criminal Code by the jurist José María Lozano, published in 1874. Reflecting about 
the article that forbade capital punishment for political crimes, Lozano pointed out that, 
since the Code did not clarify which crimes were properly political, the precise definition 
of these offenses should be subject to further legislation. This future legislation had to be 
very cautious at excluding those common offenses committed “under the shadow of a 
political plan or idea.” Neither robbery, assassination, kidnapping, arson, or rape had to do 
“with a political plan aiming to change either current institutions or the prevailing legal 
order,” Lozano maintained.161 
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 The distinction between political and “other” crimes was complicated, especially in 
times of turmoil and war, the author acknowledged. In such moments, he explained, people 
resorted without discernment to all elements that could further the victory of their cause. 
In a revolution, for instance, the necessity of maintaining such elements forced chiefs and 
ringleaders to tolerate all sorts of crimes and abuses. In such circumstances, it was also 
common that “lost people,” following “their criminal instincts,” plunged franticly into all 
classes of disorders and crime, considering the revolution “a license of impunity for all 
their excesses.” Using revolution as an excuse for crime was inadmissible, Lozano argued. 
Any political banner, he concluded, “could not conceal under its cover such debauchery,” 
and justice had always the faculty to make those responsible accountable for such criminal 
conducts.162 To the author, the distinction between common and political crimes was 
basically a differentiation between illegitimate and legitimate acts of internal war. Political 
crimes were violent acts of internal enmity directed against the government or the legal 
order. They always entailed a clear political purpose, and were in tune with the purposes 
of the conflagration. Common crimes, on the contrary, were simple acts of violence that, 
despite taking place during the conflict, at no point entailed a legitimate political end or a 
goal actually linked with what was a stake in war.  
 A second, somewhat different position dates from 1880. In his study of the same 
Code, the jurist Antonio De Medina y Ormaechea justified the application of more lenient 
penalties to political offenders on the grounds that political crimes were, somehow, “less 
criminal.” Certainly, he acknowledged, sometimes political criminals acted out of “greed 
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for power,” “personal hatred,” “humiliated self-love,” “a desire for prosperity,” or “any 
other debased opinion.” Nonetheless, there were other times in which they sacrificed 
themselves “for their convictions, a blind political fanaticism [or] mere fidelity to the 
principles in which they believe.” They could also act on the grounds of “a misunderstood 
notion of public wellbeing or a misconception on matters in which public opinion 
hesitates.”163 Such considerations were reasons enough for separating political criminals 
from the rest of offenders, and for penalizing them with more “humanitarian” penalties 
than in other cases, the author affirmed. Unlike Lozano, who understood political 
criminality from a war-centered perspective, Medina y Ormaechea conceived these 
offenses mostly as “crimes of opinion.” Political crimes were different –or “less criminal”– 
not because they represented legitimate acts of internal warfare, but because they 
represented extreme, ill-fated manifestations of political beliefs and convictions. 
 The “nobility” of political crimes, nonetheless, did not cover the bulk of the actions 
that political offenders could commit. Like Lozano, Medina y Ormaechea believed that 
acts of robbery, plundering, arson, and other common crimes perpetrated by political 
criminals still deserved punishment as common offenses. An episode of rebellion or a 
sedition could involve both political and common crimes, but this did not mean that they 
belonged to a similar sphere of criminality, the author claimed. Paraphrasing renown 
French jurist and legal historian Joseph Ortolan, Medina y Ormaechea argued that although 
common crimes were natural outcomes in a political struggle, they were different from it. 
Their nature, in consequence, remained unaltered, and they were still subject to prosecution 
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like any other common crime. They were, no matter what, separate crimes (“delitos 
aparte”), ordinary offenses whose perpetration in political conflicts should be condemned 
by all political parties. There was no other possibility, the Mexican jurist explained: leaving 
unpunished common crimes associated to political offenses would encourage fascinerosos 
(rogues, bandits) to proclaim a political principle anytime they wanted to get reduced 
sentences or lenient penalties for their crimes.164 
 The revision of the 1871 Criminal Code after the fall of the Porfiriato gave Mexican 
lawmakers another chance of discussing the question. It was 1912, Díaz had fled to exile, 
and Mexico was in the early stages of a decade-long civil war. Within such a context, it 
was natural that questions about the criminalization of rebellion and civil warfare 
resurfaced and called the attention of revolutionary legislators. Revising the 1871 
prescriptions on rebellion and its delitos conexos, Roberto Esteva Ruiz offered an 
interpretation of the relationship between common and political crimes that somehow 
differed from earlier understandings. Esteva Ruiz, unlike Lozano and Medina y 
Ormaechea, did not insist on a clear-cut separation between the two types of criminality. 
To him, the problem did not lie in the criminalization of all non-political offenses, but in 
the identification of specific ordinary crimes that were actually inadmissible as part of a 
rebellion. To him, it was impossible to establish, in practice, a precise and comprehensive 
separation between political and non-political actions. Rebellions were similar to episodes 
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of international war: they always implied an element of violence. Violence was, in fact, 
essential to the purposes of a rebellion, and therefore could not be separated from it.165 
 There were other acts inseparable from rebellion, in Esteva Ruiz’s perspective. 
Besides interpersonal violence, a rebellion almost always involved actions commonly 
considered as political offenses: looting, arson, murder, and other “extreme” acts. To him, 
it seemed that there had been, for years, an agreement about what to do with these “other” 
actions: they were offenses that increased penalties for rebellion and counted as cumulative 
offenses. The problem with this traditional perspective, Esteva Ruiz pointed out, was that 
there was no rebellion in which these “other” actions were merely optional. In such 
circumstance, what was the point of re-criminalizing rebels for acts that were innate to a 
rebellion? The only solution in this regard, he maintained, was to make the same distinction 
that International Law made in cases of international war: one between violent acts 
demanded by the very needs of the war, and simple actions of vandalism.166 The core 
problem, then, was identifying in which circumstances these acts could and could not be 
considered as “aggravating situations.”  
How to trace a line, then, between “connatural” and “aggravating” acts of rebellion? 
To Esteva Ruiz, the solution was, again, in the adoption of prescriptions from International 
Law. Mexican legislation should treat rebellions like international wars and, in 
consequence, submit rebels to the laws of war, adopting its distinctions between 
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“legitimate” and “illegitimate” acts of warfare. The works of the Italian jurist Pascual Fiore 
offered useful clues about what international legislation permitted and forbade in those 
circumstances, Esteva Ruiz argued. Fiore proposed, simply,  to criminalize all acts of 
violence “that increased for no reason the enemy’s suffering,” including the use of weapons 
forbidden by the Law of Nations and war tactics that needlessly aggravated the suffering 
of non-combatants.167 Like Lozano in 1874, Esteva Ruiz problematized political 
criminality from a war-focused perspective and underscored the problem of distinguishing 
between legitimate and illegitimate acts of war. This distinction, nonetheless, did not point 
to an overall criminalization of all “non-political” acts of warfare, but to a more selective 
illegalization of “extreme” war actions. The return of the war-focused perspective can be 
interpreted as a natural outcome of the generalized civil war raging in Mexico since 
November 1910. 
 
The Colombian Case: Between 1885 and the Post-Thousand Days Era. 
Reflections in the Colombian case were less concerned with the limits between common 
and political crimes, and more linked to questions regarding the legal existence of political 
offenses and the entities in charge of defining them. Colombian jurist Demetrio Porras’s 
essay De la Extradición y los Delitos Políticos, published in 1885, illustrates some of the 
questions and arguments surrounding these matters during the early years of the 
Regeneration. Writing about what “political crimes” meant for extradition purposes, Porras 
claimed that it was impossible to define political offenses through legislation. Laws were 
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meant to be fixed and stable, while political crimes were mutable by nature –their nature 
was always variable, depending on time and place. Certainly, it was possible to say what 
they were and represented as a criminal category, he explained. European legal thinking 
provided several examples of these definitions. To J. Stuart Mill, for instance, political 
crimes were the ones committed during an internal or external war, or during an 
insurrection or political commotion. To the Belgian Jacques J. Haus, they represented 
attacks against public order. Likewise, to the Spanish Joaquín Escriche, they entailed 
crimes against the Constitution, conspiracies against the nation’s institutions, and 
rebellions against its legitimate powers.168 The problem, thus, was not in the definition of 
the criminal category, but in its translation to concrete legislation and specific sets of crimes 
and penalties.  
 To Porras, the major difficulty for defining political crimes through legislation –
especially in cases of extradition– lays on the question about who should determine the 
“political” nature of these offenses. It could not be the Executive power, for it was not in a 
position of deciding if rebels acted in accordance with an alleged “right” or, on the contrary, 
were simple disturbers of public peace. The Legislative was similarly unable to decide on 
the nature of these crimes, given their mutable nature. The Judicial power was, then, the 
one in charge of deciding on the matter, not through general rulings but deciding case by 
case, as suggested by the Italian jurist R. Fiori.169 Judicial decisions in this regard still had 
to take into account the principle that common crimes did not represent political offenses 
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despite their connections with political actions, warned Porras. No political principle could 
excuse or legitimate the commission of common offenses. “The influence of a political 
passion,” the author pointed out, “cannot modify the nature of the punishable act, because 
this political passion does not exclude it from the overall rule: the [criminal] fact will 
always remain the same.”170 This notion was in tune with the most recent doctrinal 
developments in England, France, Belgium, and Switzerland, Porras pointed out, and had 
the support of jurists such as the Italian Emilio Brusa.171  
 The distinction between common and political crimes in a rebellion, an insurrection 
or a similar movement was not always easy to establish, recognized Porras. Political 
criminality was, in its pure state, a reflection of the “hallucinations of a sincere and ardent 
patriotism,” a manifestation of an “outraged public consciousness” turned against 
tyrannical governments. Yet, in practice, it was almost impossible to find these “pure” 
expressions of political crimes. Frequently, the author wrote, “we see [rebels] carried away 
by unbridled ambitions […] or feelings of hate and revenge.” This was particularly true in 
the Colombian case, where most revolts were the making of a few ambitious rogues and a 
number of “wayward, malcontent, and unruly” individuals, exclusively interested in 
exploiting working and peaceful people.172 In such circumstances, a distinction with legal 
effects between common crimes and political offenses was more than necessary. 
 Further reflections and debates on the nature and definition of political crimes took 
place right after the end of the Thousand Days. The legal dilemmas brought about by the 
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reactions of President Sanclemente and Vice-President Marroquín to the Liberal rebellion 
encouraged not only discussions on the matter, but also attempts at reforms of the Criminal 
Code. A first example of these post-civil war discussions comes precisely from these 
attempts. In October 1903, former President and now Senator, Conservative Miguel A. 
Caro, presented a draft bill reforming the 1890 Criminal Code. His proposal focused on a 
specific point: the lack of clarity regarding the definition of political crimes, and the alleged 
“voids” existing in both Constitutional and Criminal prescriptions concerning these 
offenses. To Caro, the idea that these voids actually existed, as well as their acceptance as 
a natural element in Colombian legislation, had proven wrong and dangerous. It was on the 
grounds of such voids that the Executive, during the war, had seized the power to decide 
about the criminal nature of the rebellion and opted for treating rebels as common 
criminals. To the Senator, the Executive had acted on the basis of a false assumption, for 
political crimes did actually exist in the legislation. The fact that there were no special law 
defining what political crimes were did not mean that the government had the faculty to 
arbitrarily define them or to treat them as common offenses.173 
 To Caro, it was indeed false that Colombian legislation had not defined political 
crimes. The Constitution mentioned political offenses at least three times: in the prohibition 
of death penalty for political criminals, and in the two articles regulating the administration 
of indultos and amnesties for –and exclusively for– these crimes. That was also the case of 
the Criminal Code, particularly in its prescriptions about the granting of state mercy for 
“offenses against public order” (Arts 110-116). In consequence, Caro concluded “political 
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crimes” and “offenses against public order” were synonyms. The 1890 Code, thus, did 
define political crimes.174 The problem, to the Senator, was not one of definition, but of 
lack of clarity in the legislation. His draft bill, partially based on the works of Ortolan, 
proposed that the Criminal Code formally established as political offenses the crimes of 
rebellion and sedition, as well as the “minor” acts of treason established in Articles 153 
and 156. Along the same lines, the Code also should consider “political” any other crime 
that directly harmed the state’s rights regarding its social and political organization.175 
 Caro’s proposal went even further, in a clear response to the government’s legal 
maneuvers during the Thousand Days. The bill also established that the Executive, even in 
use of extraordinary powers, did not have the faculty to reform the existing criminal 
legislation, define crimes, or decide on the criminality of offenders. Finally, it proposed 
that, in cases of rebellion, sedition, or civil war, the law should treat delitos conexos as 
political crimes as well, as long as they did not represented violations to the “civilized 
practices” of war. Violations included execution of parliamentarians and war prisoners, 
assassinations motivated by hatred or personal vengeance, and pillage for mere monetary 
reasons. The assassination of the President, even if it responded to political goals, should 
also be considered an ordinary offense.176 Caro, like the rest of the legal thinkers considered 
in this section, understood rebellions and other episodes of internal conflict as events 
involving both political and non-political crimes. Yet, like the Mexican lawmakers of 1912, 
he did not call for the outright criminalization of the latter. 
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 The interpretation by Caro was by no means the only perspective circulating among 
Colombian legal experts on this sensitive matter. A debate taking place in the legal 
newspaper Anales de Jurisprudencia between July and October 1903 illustrates two other 
“alternative” positions on the question of whether or not political crimes existed in the 
legislation. The debate revolved around an essay by Eduardo Rodríguez Piñerez, 
“Facultades del gobierno en tiempo de guerra.” A study of emergency powers in Colombia 
since the 1830s, Rodríguez Piñerez’s work examined the government’s response to the 
Thousand Days and came up with a conclusion that contrasted with Caro’s arguments. 
Since there were no laws defining political crimes before the outbreak of the war, the 
Executive had all the power to decide if the rebellion was a political crime or not. It was a 
principle proclaimed by the Constitution in its Article 121. In this light, Rodríguez Piñeres 
emphasized, the punishment of the Liberal rebellion as a common crime had not been an 
arbitrary act but merely the exercise of a formal constitutional provision. There was no 
previous law that forced the government to treat rebels as political offenders, for there were 
no laws defining what political crimes were. There was no obligation to consider as 
“political” crimes that the law had not previously defined as such. The Executive power, 
in consequence, was free to treat those crimes as common if it wanted to.177 
 The editors of the journal did not share Rodríguez Piñerez’s position. One of them, 
Vicente Olarte Camacho, reviewed the essay and concluded that its author was wrong. To 
Olarte, Rodríguez Piñerez relied on the false assumption that there were political crimes in 
the Colombian legislation. Crime was “a voluntary and malicious violation of a law,” 
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reminded Olarte. If there was no law to violate, therefore there could not be a crime. That 
was precisely what happened to political crimes in Colombia: there were no political crimes 
because there was no legislation on them. Without a previous legal definition and 
classification of political offenses, then, it was impossible to talk about actual political 
crimes.178 This did not mean, as Rodriguez Piñerez wanted to believe, that the Executive 
could issue norms in the absence of formal legislation on the matter. Neither was it 
authorized to simply define rebellion as a common offense and therefore punish rebels with 
the death penalty. This represented not only an erroneous interpretation of the nation’s 
legislation, but also a contravention of the basic principles of the ius gentium regarding the 
treatment of combatants in a civil war, Olarte concluded.179 His was an “essentialist” 
position that denied from the beginning any legal elaboration on the base of the grey areas 
of legislation on political crimes. On the contrary, Porras, Caro, and even Rodríguez 
Piñerez maintained a more “interpretive” perspective, aiming to circumscribe and delineate 
political offenses on the grounds of the existing legislation, its voids, and its ambiguities.  
 
Reflections and debates on the nature of political criminality and the definition of political 
offenses shed light on at least three crucial aspects of criminal law and doctrine in Mexico 
and Colombia during the period. First, they show that the ambiguity of constitutional and 
criminal prescriptions on political crimes did not go unnoticed. Such ambiguity, in fact, 
became the center of a series of discussions about the possible meanings of Constitutions 
and Criminal Codes, as well as about the limits of state authority in matters of legislation. 
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Second, they illustrate the different legal and political concerns shaping reflections on civil 
warfare, rebellion, and political criminality. Preoccupations about the limits of state power, 
“legitimate” and “illegitimate” acts of war, judgement and punishment of ordinary 
offenses, and even the legitimacy of rebellion as a political act, played a major role in 
structuring these discussions. Finally, they evidence the extent to which the experience of 
civil warfare impacted legal and doctrinal developments in both countries, as illustrated by 
the tone and contents of these reflections after the Thousand Days and during the Mexican 
revolution. Certainly linked to national circumstances and concerns, these discussions took 
place within a broader, Atlantic doctrinal framework, involving constant allusions to 
International Law as well as references to recent and contemporary European legal 
thinkers. Such broader framework will also be present in the reflections about penalties 
that the next section addresses.  
 
Towards an Exceptional Regime of Penalties for Political Crimes 
The regime of penalties for political offenders represented a second front of legal and 
doctrinal reflection regarding constitutional and criminal prescriptions on political 
criminality. Whether in academic essays, legislative sessions, or constituent assemblies, 
legal experts and lawmakers in Mexico and Colombia widely discussed how criminal laws 
should punish political offenders and which penalties were better suited to the nature of 
political crimes. Taken together, these reflections by both Mexican and Colombian jurists 
and legal thinkers hint at their agreement not only on the “special” character of political 
criminality, but also on the fact that it deserved a separate and “exceptional” regime of 
punishment. Although many of these discussions revolved around an analogous set of 
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penalties, reflections in each country tended to focus on different punishments and legal 
responses. Such differences not only corresponded to the particularities of constitutional 
and criminal law in each nation, but also involved specific reactions to concrete political 
conjunctures.  
 
Common Preoccupations: From Capital Punishment to Exile 
Death penalty, as well as punishments involving exile, confinement, and other similar 
sanctions, called simultaneously the attention of Mexican and Colombian legal experts and 
lawmakers. In both cases, reflection on these matters involved relatively similar arguments: 
Capital punishment for political crimes was a barbaric penalty that deserved to disappear. 
In contrast, penalties such as expatriation, confinement, and relegation were less severe 
sanctions that actually fit the nature of political crime and effectively neutralized the threats 
that political criminals posed.  
 Both Colombian and Mexican legal thinkers drew on similar arguments for 
supporting the constitutional abolition of the death penalty for political crimes. For 
instance, they surfaced during the intervention of Mexican Alberto Vieytez before the 
legislature of Querétaro in 1868. As part of the discussions of a draft bill that eliminated 
the death penalty for political crimes in the state, Vieytez argued against such penalty. 
“Death penalty for political offenses,” Vieytez affirmed, “is the coldest and less noble 
revenge of the victor over the vanquished, the legalized aggression of brothers against 
brothers […], the funerary limit that prevents the union of all Mexicans.”180 Supporting 
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Vieytez’s arguments, provincial congressmen Angel M. Domínguez y José Bocanegra 
maintained that punishing political offenders with the death penalty “made us judges of 
our own causes.” It was “the abuse of the right of the strongest,” and a penalty that did 
nothing for convincing rebels that the state was right. Additionally, the congressmen 
pointed out, political criminality was a variable phenomenon, since public opinion was 
always changing: “yesterday’s executed is today’s hero; today’s hero might be tomorrow’s 
executed […]. In this permanent change of opinions, who is actually right? Those who 
execute? Those that decree an ovation? Perhaps nobody is right, but with no doubt the ones 
that executed have no way of redressing their work.”181 Constitutional assemblies in 
Colombia and Mexico also involved deliberations on the matter. In Colombia, the 1885 
delegates would reformulate the terms of the original article prescribing the abolition of 
capital punishment for political offenses. The article’s original version stated that the law 
would not recognize as “political” the crimes of treason, murder, arson, and plundering, 
even if they had political aims.182 The final version of the article would maintain the 
restriction for political crimes without including the original exceptions. Discussions were 
more complex in the Mexican case. Some delegates were particularly concerned with the 
possible effects of an unclear distinction between political crimes and some of the other 
offenses that remained subject to the penalty. That was the case, for instance, of Delegates 
Francisco Zarco and Ponciano Arriaga. 
Zarco’s and Arriaga’s preoccupations had to do with the risk that future 
governments applied the notions of “traitor” and “salteador” to prosecute political 
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offenders and thus legitimize their execution. Zarco, for instance, stated that the principle 
that death penalty applied only to traitors was problematically vague, especially 
considering that, in the nation’s history, “traitor” was a common epithet often used in 
political and partisan recriminations. It was necessary, thus, to clearly define what treason 
was, and to limit the concept to cases of foreign invasion. Otherwise, “partisan hatred 
would make illusory the abolition of the death penalty for political crimes.”183 The notion 
of “bandit” entailed a similar problem. To Santa Anna, Zarco reminded, the Ayutla 
revolutionaries were bandits. Had they lost, they would have been hanged under such a 
misleading charge. 184 Arriaga also feared that the term “traitor” could be subject to further 
political instrumentalization by the government, and considered that nothing prevented 
authorities from abusing the term “bandit” in times of civil war. To him, the Constitution 
required more precise terms, like “treason in foreign war” instead of simple “treason,” or 
another, “less inconvenient” term than “bandit.”185 Arriaga’s arguments would finally find 
echo in the Assembly, and his clarification concerning the crime of treason made it to the 
final version of the Constitution. 
The aforementioned views remained around for decades. In 1897, for instance, 
Colombian law professor Antonio J. Iregui explained that capital punishment for political 
offenses was a particularly nefarious penalty, for it represented more an action of political 
vengeance than an actual act of justice. To him, it was nothing but a “weapon of 
extermination” that only benefitted the “despotism and intransigence of the party in power 
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against its defeated adversary.”186 That same year, the provincial legislature of Nuevo 
León, Mexico, revising the terms of Article 23 of the 1857 Constitution, considered that, 
although the article required some modifications, its prescription about political crimes 
should remain intact. Political criminality involved acts whose criminal nature escaped “the 
ordinary rules of criminology,” members of the Constitutional Commission in the 
legislature’s high chamber (Senado) argued. The criminality of political offenders was also 
especial, for it depended on the observer’s point of view: for some people, they were 
“execrable villains;” for others, “heroes or martyrs.” In addition, as per members of the 
Commission, granting the government the right to punish political offenders with the death 
penalty meant “turning justice into a partisan weapon” and an “instrument of terror and 
personal vengeance.”187  
Taken together, the legislators of Queretaro in 1868, their peers from Nuevo León 
in 1897, and the Colombian Iregui, based their arguments on three essential points: first, 
the “special” character of political crimes; second: the “relative” criminality of political 
offenders; and third: an accepted need for limiting the state’s power of retribution against 
dissidents.  
On the whole, constitutional preoccupations with the death penalty and political 
crimes in Colombia and Mexico were linked to a fundamental concern about the 
connections between common and political offenses. This time, it was not a question 
concerning the criteria separating the two criminal categories. It was, rather, apprehension 
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over the legal and political consequences of merging common and political crimes at the 
time of administering capital punishment. This unease entailed two completely different 
preoccupations. In Colombia, it was a concern about common crimes being exempt from 
the death penalty on account of their political façade. In Mexico, on the contrary, it was an 
anxiety linked to the use of notions of common criminality for legitimizing the use of “non-
legitimate” penalties for political offenders. Such concerns evidence the fact that the 
separation between common and political offenses was not only a matter of conceptual 
differentiation, but also a distinction with crucial legal effects.  
Less discussed in the legal literature than capital punishment, penalties of exile, 
expatriation and the like also represented a common concern in Colombia’s and Mexico’s 
legal thinking. Discussions about these penalties would entail additional conversations 
about the nature of political crimes, the limits of state retribution vis-à-vis internal enmity, 
and the best ways of dealing with “illegal” political dissidence. Both Colombian and 
Mexican legal thinkers considered these penalties the most appropriate and effective 
responses to political criminality. As the Colombian Demetrio Porras wrote in 1889, they 
were punishments that “alienated culprits from the theater of their intrigues and made them 
incapable, as much as possible, to bring to fruition their fratricide projects.”188 
On the whole, the penalties in question included expatriation in its different 
meanings –extrañamiento, expatriación, exilio, or destierro–, confinement 
(confinamiento), and relegation (relegación) or subjection to the authorities’ surveillance. 
Expatriation was the most serious penalty of this group, and it implied the offender’s 
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removal from the nation’s territory. According to Porras, this was a common penalty 
against “disobedient ecclesiastics” and major enemies of public order and peace. In the 
latter case, he explained, the penalty was meant to fall primarily on rebel or revolutionary 
ringleaders, punishing them with removal from their milieus as a means to neutralize the 
political threats they posed.189 Mexican legal thinkers seemed less enthusiastic regarding 
the effects of this penalty. According to the drafters of the 1871 Criminal Code, 
expatriation as a penalty was neither egalitarian not exemplary: not only did the experience 
of exile vary from person to person, but also people could not witness the expatriate’s 
suffering and thus were unlikely to learn anything from it. It was, thus, an inconvenient 
penalty that could only work on rare occasions, mostly in cases of treason or rebellion, in 
which it represented the only way of maintaining public peace. Even in that rare and 
extreme case, the drafters maintained, this penalty should fall only on rebel chiefs and 
ringleaders.190 That was also the opinion of the Mexican José María Lozano, who argued 
that exile only should apply to political criminals whose political prestige or military glory 
posed a serious risk to public peace.191  
Confinement was a less drastic and, to some, more convenient way of dealing with 
political offenders. According to Lozano, confinement was a penalty that perfectly fitted 
the purposes of punishment regarding political criminality.  Political crimes, to the 
Mexican jurist, required political penalties, and these, unlike ordinary punishments, did not 
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have an expiatory purpose. The main goal of political penalties consisted merely in “putting 
offenders in a circumstance that made impossible for them to alter public order, by 
depriving them of their natural means and resources for action.” That was, precisely, what 
confinement made possible, the author pointed out. It took culprits “away from their places 
or residence in which their presence was dangerous given their relationships, friendships, 
knowledge, and resources.”192 Confinement, in short, served the same purposes of 
expatriation, but in a less costly and more efficient way.  
Relegation, finally, was a lesser version of confinement, as Demetrio Porras 
asserted. Those dealing with this penalty, the Colombian jurist explained, enjoyed a degree 
of liberty that was compatible with the government’s need for ensuring their custody, hence 
their subjection to the authorities’ surveillance.193 The demise of Porras’s project of 
codification hindered the adoption, in Colombia’s criminal legislation, of the penalty of 
relegation for political crimes. That was not the case of Mexico. The makers of the 1871 
Code established relegation not as a punishment in itself but as a subsidiary penalty for all 
political criminals. According to the Code, political offenders should remain subject to the 
authorities’ surveillance right after the end of their corresponding sentences. This 
additional supervision, according to Lozano, responded simply to the nature of political 
criminality as a political phenomenon. “Political passions tend to be more obstinate and 
stubborn than others […] Born out of a conviction that often develops into true fanaticism, 
they are difficult to silence, those embracing them endure all sorts of difficulties, and offer 
as their only outcomes whether the glory of triumph or the glory of martyrdom.” In such 
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circumstances, Lozano argued, common penalties were unable to produce any sort of 
repentance or correction. Resistant to the regenerative effects of punishment, political 
offenders should then remain under the authorities’ radar, “in order to prevent in a timely 
manner the realization of new plans and conspiracies.”194 
Reflections and concerns about expatriation, confinement, and relegation reveal an 
understanding of political criminality that previous discussions reviewed in this section 
have already suggested. The major criminal attribute of political offenses lay in the political 
threats they embodied, this is, in their potential to alter order, disrupt peace, and put 
government’s stability at risk. It was a criminality whose threats were somehow resilient 
to ordinary repression; one that could be partially neutralized but never corrected. This 
characteristic partially explains the “special” character that legal thinkers of the period 
attributed to political crimes, and therefore the “extraordinary” regime of penalties that in 
their view they deserved. 
 
Outlining a Lenient Regime of Penalties for Political Crimes and other Mexican Concerns 
Discussions in Mexico about the legal treatment of political criminals according to the 
1871 Code and the Constitution were not limited to these “common” considerations. They 
also involved conversations about the lenient treatment that political crimes deserved, and 
the convenience –or inconvenience– of using extraordinary powers as a response to attacks 
against public order. When reflecting on the provisions of the Criminal Code, Mexican 
legal thinkers like Lozano and Medina y Ormaechea tended to underscore the 
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correspondence between their codification and the principle that political crimes deserved, 
above all, a lenient treatment. Lozano, convinced that penalties for political crimes should 
only turn offenders politically harmless, believed that the standard penalties included in the 
Code properly responded to the nature of political criminality. Formal prison, for instance, 
did nothing to neutralize the offender’s political threats. On the contrary, sufferings linked 
to prison reinforced the criminal’s aura of expiation, which in turn strengthened his 
political determination and prestige. Suspensions of civil rights did nothing to contribute 
to the ultimate goal of political penalties. Political crimes, after all, had a “sphere of 
penalidad completely different, in its nature and purpose, from the one that the law 
establishes for the punishment of common crimes.”195 This is why penalties such as 
expatriation and confinement, and even incarceration (reclusion) and deprivation of 
political rights, worked better in this case.196 
 These principles found wide reception among the authors of the 1871 Code. Medina 
y Ormaechea, who had participated in the drafting of the codification, explained that one 
of the purposes of the new Code had been to establish a series of “exclusive penalties” for 
political crimes. Besides implementing the constitutional mandate prohibiting the 
application of capital punishment to political offenders, the Code’s drafters also created the 
penalty of reclusión, eliminated restrictions to indultos for political crimes, and even 
limited the application of the penalty of expatriation. The Codification, which required all 
prisoners to work during their time of incarceration, also released political prisoners from 
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this obligation.197 Reclusión, according to Medina y Ormaechea, allowed political 
criminals to experience prison in a separate space or establishment. Such a seclusion aimed, 
among other things, to prevent common criminals from “besmirching” (envilecer) political 
offenders. There was, again, the idea that political criminals were “less criminal” than 
others. The Code’s authors had adopted this penalty following “the opinion of modern 
criminalists,” as well as the model of the Belgian Criminal Code.198 
 Reflections on expatriation, confinement, relegation, and reclusión revolved around 
penalties that jurists and lawmakers deemed “convenient” and “acceptable” for political 
crimes. This does not mean that there were no discussions about current or established 
penalties whose application to political criminals was, to the opinion of jurists and 
legislators, “inappropriate” and even “dangerous” or “harmful.” That was the case, for 
instance, of the suspension of constitutional guarantees for salteadores and plagiarios, a 
penalty that provincial and federal authorities commonly applied to political criminals and 
other “dangerous” dissidents. The debates of the 1880 Mexican Congress illustrate the 
concern of some legislators about the consequences of using this penalty against internal 
enemies.199 An alleged increase of episodes of banditry and rural criminality during the 
first months of that year led the Executive to request, from a portion of the Congress, the 
suspension of constitutional guarantees for bandits, salteadores, and other rural criminals. 
The Law that made the suspension official, enacted in March 1880, triggered a long debate 
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in Congress about its constitutionality. Such debates also tackled the apparently 
“customary” practice of applying this same treatment to political dissidents. 
 Most of the opponents to the Law argued, among other things, that the government 
had enacted it without the avail of the whole Congress and on the grounds of false alarms 
and events whose gravity had been exaggerated. There were, nonetheless, two 
Congressmen who criticized the Law not only because it was unnecessary, but also because 
it continued a long tradition of political abuses committed under this constitutional figure: 
deputies Obregón González and Collantes. Obregón González pointed out that, considering 
the levels of “political passion” that characterized Mexico’s local and provincial politics, 
this Law would easily become a carte blanche for all sorts of abuses. If the Law remained 
in place, the Deputy explained, “nobody’s life would be safe.” Its procedural prescriptions, 
which required only the declaration of two witnesses and a 24-hour term for sentencing 
any individual, proved particularly dangerous. There was nothing in the Law that prevented 
local political chiefs and state governors from abusing these conditions, which made such 
officials free to unleash political vengeances and get rid of “cumbersome” political 
opponents.200  
 Deputy Collantes held a relatively similar position. In his opinion, Mexican 
governments throughout the years had used these extraordinary faculties to seize the power 
of the Legislative and Judicial branches, “turning therefore the Constitution into 
dictatorship.” Under the shadow of these emergency powers, local and national authorities 
had compromised the nation’s interests, dilapidated public funds, and harassed and 
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assassinated “citizens discontented with their administrations or that have protested against 
their abuses.”201 Those acts, to the Deputy, had no justification at all. Even in the case that 
these “malcontents” represented an actual threat to public order, the Deputy maintained, 
there was no need for replacing the Constitution’s regime with one of authoritarianism by 
granting the Executive extraordinary powers. This, nonetheless, did not mean that 
Collantes considered emergency faculties an “inconvenient” measure against political 
criminality. To him, they were a fair, legitimate, and necessary response, but only in cases 
of “actual” political crimes –this is, in cases of severe perturbation of public peace. These 
kinds of measures were indeed indispensable in nations that suffered from criminal 
organizations dedicated to attack and destabilize their institutions, as it was the case of 
Prussia, Germany, Italy, or Spain,  a clear reference to European anarchism. Those were, 
to Collantes, real cases of political criminality.202  
 To the Deputy, the Mexican situation had nothing to do with what happened in 
Europe. There was no “real” political criminality in Mexico. Mexican agitators, 
conspirators, and other “dangerous” political dissidents were not as “important” and 
“audacious” as European anarchists. No one, for instance, had attempted to assassinate the 
President, Collantes remarked. The ones in Mexico were nothing but small problems of 
“violent” dissidence that at no point required a response that included the suspension of 
constitutional guarantees. That would be dictatorial and unconceivable. They deserved a 
legal response, of course, but one within the limits of ordinary law –this is, nothing beyond 
what already existed. Responses against rebellion only required soldiers and money. 
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Actions against conspirators simply demanded a good police force. Episodes of sedition, 
riot, and others could be easily suffocated through the intervention of the military. 
Authorities could successfully face all these treats without suspending the normal 
functioning of justice, the Deputy affirmed. All they needed to do was “to scrupulously 
adhere to the prevailing legal forms and constitutional guarantees,” he concluded.203 
 Reflections in the Mexican case highlight a series of points regarding the treatment 
of political criminals in correspondence with Constitutional mandates and prescriptions 
from Criminal Law. First, they reveal that conversations about the regime of penalties for 
political crimes involved both an interest about finding the most appropriate punishments 
and different preoccupations about the limits of state retribution. Second, they show that 
Mexican jurists and lawmakers conceived political crimes as offenses whose criminality 
belonged to a different order than that of ordinary crimes. This other, “alternative” 
criminality required a more lenient treatment involving not only exclusive penalties but 
also a special regime of incarceration. Third, they make evident concerns about the ways 
in which Mexican governments had historically responded to political criminality through 
the use and abuse of Constitutional prescriptions. Finally, they suggest that Mexican law 
experts considered and magnified political criminality and internal enmity in their country 
viewing them against a European backdrop marked by political instability and organized 
anarchism. Anxieties about the influences of European anarchism would loom large in the 
ways in which authorities deal with political criminals during the late stages of the 
Porfiriato. 
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Extradition and Confiscation: The Limits of Punishment for Political Crimes in Colombia 
Like in the Mexican case, reflections on Constitutional and Criminal prescriptions 
regarding the treatment of political criminality in Colombia were not limited to 
conversations about the death penalty and expatriation. They also involved discussions 
about the convenience and necessity of certain other penalties for political offenses, as well 
as about the general limits of the state’s power of retribution against internal enemies. 
Reflections on the “inconvenience” of extradition for political crimes and the “fairness” of 
punishing rebels with confiscation illustrate the nature of these additional conversations.  
 Issues of extradition and political crimes appear repeatedly in the works of 
Demetrio Porras. His first essay on the matter dates from 1885, in the middle of a 
controversy about the fate of a rebel from the most recent war who had fled to Jamaica and 
was requested on extradition by the Colombian government. To Porras, the principle of no 
extradition for political crimes represented a widespread premise implemented in many 
European legislations as well as in several international treaties in Latin America. Italy, 
Spain, and the states Helvetic Confederation had different laws and treaties prohibiting the 
extradition of political exiles and refugees, for instance.204 In Colombia, although there 
were no constitutional developments on matters of extradition and political criminality, 
different international treaties tackled the question. A treaty with France in 1850 excluded 
political criminals from extradition, Porras explained. Another one, signed in 1870 with 
Peru, established the same provision but included delitos conexos as well. Additional 
treaties of “friendship, navigation and commerce” with Venezuela, Ecuador, and Costa 
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Rica prescribed the internment of political criminals within a given distance from their 
international borders, under each nation’s request.205 They made no reference to matters of 
extradition, but their intention was to prevent exiled political agitators from returning to 
their home countries. 
The protection of political criminals from extradition was also, to Porras, one of the 
most important conquests of modern criminal Law. European jurists like the German 
August Geyer, for instance, maintained that the right of asylum for political criminals was 
sacred, because there was no way of judging the illegitimacy of their actions. Following 
the German author, Porras explained that if a nation wanted to give a political criminal in 
extradition, it had to decide first whether or not the government and the institutions that the 
offender had attacked were legitimate. It was a question that no tribunal could solve, 
lacking the necessary elements for making a fair decision. France’s legal thinking was also 
in tune with these considerations, Porras suggested. Those had been, in fact, the arguments 
with which the French Minister of Justice defended in 1841 his nation’s adherence to the 
principle in question. To the French Minister, political crimes occurred in circumstances 
that were extremely difficult to evaluate, often emerging out of “ardent passions” whose 
justification was never clear. French historian and statesman Francois Guizot’s works 
offered Porras an additional perspective. Political offenders, according to Guizot, 
commonly acted on the grounds of amor patrio and “an admirable feeling of abnegation.” 
Their acts did not have the “perversity and immorality” commonly associated to ordinary 
crimes. Their immorality, in fact, was always relative and impossible to judge in a clear 
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and impartial way. This is why, Porras concluded, governments were always unable to 
fairly decide on matters of extradition of political refugees.206   
 These considerations, to Porras, were ultimately extralegal. According to him, the 
principle in question did not obey clear legal or political reasons. Legal protection of 
foreign political criminals, political refugees and exiles, and people defeated in civil wars 
of other nations was more an issue of “nobility” and “magnanimity” than of actual justice. 
That was, basically, the principal reason why nations protected foreign offenders. This 
“noble” need for protecting political refugees was particularly important at the time, Porras 
affirmed. The entire world was going through a moment in which societies “are intoxicated 
with idealism, inebriated with the liquor of the seductive sophism of absolute freedoms, 
those that subvert all orders and all principles.” It was a time in which people fell victim 
of a “terrible vertigo that led them through the terrifying path of demagogical debauchery, 
making them sacrifice the forces of social life, increasingly wasted in senseless and bloody 
conflicts.” In such turbulent times, the Colombian jurist remarked, it was impossible to 
deny foreign political offenders asylum and protection from extradition.207 
 Debates about confiscation and political crimes took place during the 1885 
Constitutional Assembly. While the 1886 Constitution prohibited the imposition of 
confiscation penalties (Art. 34), the original draft of this charter still allowed legislators to 
establish them as a punishment for revolutionary ringleaders. In this particular case, 
confiscations had the purpose of covering or compensating war expenses with the enemy’s 
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property –a provision that followed the principle that, during a war, the adversary was 
always accountable for the conflict’s costs.208 
Three positions clashed in the Assembly regarding this peculiar exception 
concerning ringleaders. One was represented by Miguel Antonio Caro, author of the 
original article. In defense of it, Caro explained that the article did not consider the seizing 
of the rebels’ property a formal act of confiscation. It was, rather, a simple act of 
accountability for the expenses that their rebellion had caused. In any case, the delegate 
explained, it was a limited penalty that only applied to ringleaders, not to rebels in 
general.209 A second, intermediate position somehow accepted the possibility of imposing 
the penalty to rebel ringleaders, but with a few precisions and clarifications concerning 
what counted as confiscation and what did not. Delegate Calderón, in this light, proposed 
to modify the article by stating that, while confiscation was prohibited as a punishment, 
pecuniary penalties against ringleaders did not represented acts of confiscation. His 
clarification was aimed to solve the “contradictory nature” of a prohibition that involved 
in itself the conditions for its exception.210  
This desire for clarification did not make Calderón less critical of the provision’s 
spirit. To him, the concealed confiscations stipulated in the Article entailed two major 
complications. On the one hand, it was a measure doomed to meet resistance and 
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discontent, for it had a selective –and arbitrary– application and a clear purpose of political 
retribution. On the other hand, considering the changing tides of Colombian politics, it 
might at some point bounce back against conservatives and other regenerationists. In sum, 
concluded Calderón, confiscation for political purposes did little to prevent public disorder 
and rebellion and a lot to foster partisan hatred and future political conflicts.211 
 The third and final position straightforwardly claimed that the Constitution should 
ban all sorts of confiscation penalties. As exposed by Delegate Casas Rojas, confiscation 
was “a barbaric and cruel penalty currently abolished in all civilized nations.” As such, it 
entailed many inconveniences including the fact that, as a general rule, it affected innocents 
more than culprits, depriving the defendant’s family from their rightful property.212 Its 
potential political effects were, therefore, almost null and clearly unfair. Confiscations, in 
this light, should never exist, not even for political purposes. Based on these considerations, 
Casas Rojas proposed a further modification to the Article, excluding the exceptions in 
cases of rebellion and leaving only the general banning of confiscation. That was the 
version of the Article that finally made it to the new charter. 
 Reflections about extradition and confiscation for political crimes involved in 
Colombia at least two major legal and political concerns. First, there was in the mind of 
the most progressive members of the constitutional convention a preoccupation about the 
convenience or inconvenience of these penalties considering the particular nature of 
political criminality. The preoccupation entailed deeper considerations about what made 
political crimes “special,” or what made governments repress their own internal enemies 
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while protecting those of other countries. It also involved a question about whether or not 
it was plausible to reach solid conclusions about the legitimacy or illegitimacy of political 
offenses. Second, there was a concern about how far could a government go when 
punishing rebels and other internal enemies. Here, there was fear that an excessive exercise 
of state retribution could not only lead to overt acts of arbitrariness and authoritarianism, 
but also provoke resistance, discontent, and further political conflict. The instability and 
bellicosity of Colombian politics made both options look completely plausible. 
 
The question about a “special” regime of penalties for political offenders was central to the 
conversations that, during the period, took place in Colombia and Mexico regarding the 
treatment of political criminality in Constitutional and Criminal Law. On the whole, jurists 
and lawmakers in both countries agreed that political offenses had a complicated criminal 
nature. They were crimes, of course, but for different reasons than ordinary offenses were. 
Theirs was a criminality imagined and measured in levels of political dangerousness and 
potential to alter public peace. It was also a criminality whose attributes of “illegitimacy” 
and “immorality” were always relative and impossible to grasp in an objective manner. All 
these reasons justified –if not demanded– the existence of an “exceptional,” “separate” 
regime of penalties for political offenders. The crafting of this regime involved discussions 
about the nature and effects of “political penalties,” the dangers of treating rebels with 
penalties designed for ordinary offenders, and the need of limiting state’s power of 
retribution against internal enemies. In both countries, these discussions involved common 
concerns and inspirations, reactions to specific events and conjunctures, and even 
references to European legal thinking.  Here, Europe offered Colombian and Mexican 
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jurists more than doctrinal inspiration: it provided them with additional sources of concern, 
related to the spreading of “new” modalities of organized political criminality such as 
anarchism. Fears of anarchism would be especially visible in the Mexican case after the 
turn of the century. 
 
Protecting Society from the Revolutionary Tide: Reflections on Emergency Powers 
and Political Criminals 
Constitutional debates on emergency powers represented in both countries another 
important arena of reflection about what political crimes were and what kind of treatment 
they deserved. Mexican and Colombian constitution makers addressed such issues, directly 
and indirectly, in their different efforts to define extraordinary faculties, outline conditions 
for the establishment of state of siege, and set up limits for the use of these powers. Two 
major concerns related to political criminality and its constitutional treatment emerged and 
clashed in these debates. On the one hand, there was an interest of protecting society and 
public order from the attacks of subversives, rebels, and revolutionaries. On the other hand, 
there was a preoccupation about what governments could –and could not– do when 
responding to threats posed by their internal enemies. It was, in short, a conflict between 
the need to defend society and the need to protect individuals against possible abuses by 
the authorities. As the first chapter demonstrates, the Constitutions and prescriptions that 
emerged from these debates would privilege the former order of needs over the latter.  
 Discussions on emergency powers revolved around rather different preoccupations 
in Mexico and Colombia. In the Mexican Constitutional Assembly, debates on the matter 
revolved primarily around the suspension of constitutional guarantees in cases of 
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emergency, its justification, and its legal and political consequences. In Colombia, 
Delegates to the Assembly were predominantly concerned with the crafting of a “war 
legislation” meant to rule predominantly during times of internal turmoil. Beyond these 
differences, debates in both nations equally involved issues concerning the limits of state 
power in times of emergency and the maintenance of constitutional rule during moments 
of war. They also revolved around the balance between the maintenance of society’s order 
and the respect for individuals’ liberties –equilibrium that a Colombian Delegate 
considered the quintessential problem of politics.213 
 
Of Crimes Against Society and Constitutional Guarantees: The Case of Mexico 
Judging from the debates surrounding the contents of Article 29, many of the supporters of 
the suspension of individual guarantees in cases of emergency considered this provision a 
necessary deterrent for futures episodes of violent internal enmity. It was, in their opinion, 
a strong but efficient measure to neutralize the actions of subversives, revolutionaries, 
conspirators, and other “adversaries” of society and public order. Delegate Cerqueda, for 
instance, claimed that the Article’s prescriptions were the only possible way to preserve 
the “general interests of society” protecting it from the constant threat of “mobs or rogues.” 
Endangered by forces that disturbed public peace and “compromised the existence of every 
sort of order,” Mexican society had no option but to strengthen the government’s power at 
any possible cost. Those were turbulent times that required a severe, inflexible, and 
energetic authority able to reestablish order, even if that meant neglecting the individual 
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rights and lives of society’s enemies. After all, he concluded, the nation’s welfare 
demanded their sacrifice. It could sound dictatorial and authoritative, the Delegate 
maintained, but it was a demand consistent with society’s right to self-conservation. 214 
Like Cerqueda, Delegate Mata considered that future Article 29, as authoritarian as 
it sounded, simply followed the principle that society’s general welfare demanded the 
sacrifice of individual interests. The suspension of constitutional rights in cases of 
emergency was, in this light, merely a defensive means to “save” society anytime it faced 
serious threats. It had the immediate and exclusive goal of preventing public order’s 
enemies from harming society. Like his colleague, Mata understood “states of emergency” 
primarily as circumstances of domestic turmoil linked to the actions of internal enemies of 
society.215 Delegates Arriaga and Olvera also agreed on these points. The Article and its 
prescriptions were necessary for the sake of society’s conservation, especially in moments 
of great hardships that required swift and vigorous actions. Arriaga justified the existence 
of emergency powers by explaining that there would always be extraordinary and 
unforeseen circumstances that, unpredicted by the laws, demanded the immediate reaction 
of authorities. Such a reaction, he pointed out, was particularly necessary in cases of 
unexpected threats to social order by conspirators –understanding “conspirators” as people 
responsible for crimes against society.216 Delegate Olvera was a bit more moderate in this 
regard, and aimed to restrict situations of “emergency” to cases of “great conflict” that, like 
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an international war or a “formidable uprising,” seriously threatened either the nation’s 
independence or its legitimate of government.217 The idea of extraordinary powers as a 
plausible and necessary response to some manifestations of internal enmity was, 
nonetheless, still present in his arguments.  
 Positions against the terms of Article 29 revolved around the fear that an 
exaggerated emphasis on the conservation of society could lead to future episodes of 
authoritarianism and unnecessary violence against political dissidents. Delegate Moreno, 
to whom the suspension of constitutional guarantees implied the suspension of life in 
society, maintained that the Article set the conditions for the re-emergence of dictatorship. 
218 His colleague Zarco reminded the Assembly that the nation’s past provided sufficient 
examples of governments abusing their extraordinary powers, and added that Article 29 
did not include the necessary provisions for preventing these abuses from happening again. 
To him, the main problem lay in the vague conditions that allowed the establishment of a 
state of emergency. They were not limited to specific circumstances of foreign invasion or 
severe perturbation of public order, but also made reference to any other situation that 
endangered or could endanger society. These other “eventualities,” in the delegate’s 
opinion, could lead to several political abuses, as governments and authorities could use 
them anytime in order to foster legislation benefitting their parties or to legitimate the 
extermination of their enemies.219 Regarding this second scenario, Zarco argued, the 
Article practically gave governments freedom to do what they wanted with political 
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dissenters, including repressing them with “massive proscriptions, perverse prosecutions, 
and attacks against property that ruined [their] families.”220 
 Even Olvera agreed with some of these objections, and conditioned his support for 
the Article to the incorporation of some modifications. To the Delegate, it was necessary 
for instance that the Constitution specified under which circumstances emergency powers 
became necessary, for how long the government could retain those extraordinary faculties, 
and which circumstances truly represented states of emergency. The point, to him, was 
avoiding that those extraordinary powers ended up extending to the point of subverting or 
destroying the nation’s constitutional form of government.221 His suggestions somehow 
paralleled the recommendations that Delegates Zarco and Moreno made to the Article. 
Zarco requested that the article stated “individual liberties” instead of “constitutional 
guarantees,” in order to maintain some restrictions to the government’s use of these 
faculties. Moreno, in a final act of resignation, suggested that if the article was as 
indispensable as their supporters claimed, it could at least limit the suspension of these 
guarantees only to those suspicious of causing the state of emergency.222 Even the critics 
of the Article implicitly availed the possibility that the government targeted internal 
enemies and “dangerous” dissidents with the suspension of their individual rights.  
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Crafting a Legal Regime for Internal Warfare in Colombia 
Debates about emergency powers at the Colombian 1885 Assembly also paid a great deal 
of attention to the actions of subversive, rebels, and other internal enemies. Delegate 
Miguel A. Caro drafted the initial version of Article 121 with the goal of setting the 
constitutional foundations of a regime of “martial legality” in Colombia. To him, the 
country lacked a clear and well-defined set of rules and principles on how to proceed in 
case of a serious disturbance of public order. Article 121 did not establish a “war 
legislation” in itself, but declared that the Executive was the primary power in charge of 
enacting this legislation, by defining crimes and penalties for times of war. After all, the 
Delegate pointed out, the Executive was the one responsible for “saving society from 
anarchy and revolution.”223 
 The “martial legality” of Caro was, predominantly, a regime for circumstances of 
internal warfare –of rebellion, revolution, sedition, and political turmoil in general. His 
arguments at no point contemplated the possibility of a foreign invasion or an international 
war. Article 121 intended to, first and foremost, give the Executive powers to act against 
internal enemies and other “dangerous” dissidents. It was a defensive act that developed in 
its own terms, since the government was able to punish its criminal adversaries with its 
own series of  penalties. The goal, in the delegate’s words, was to allow the government to 
react against a revolutionary treat by designating as criminal “all acts that it considered 
disturbing.” This did not imply a de facto suspension of the Constitution, the delegate 
remarked. This government-made, extraordinary legislation was only part of a 
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constitutional mechanism that combined “two orders of legality,” one for times of peace 
and another for times of war. In cases of emergency, he explained, the latter would simply 
“replace constitutionally” the former. The purpose of this double legality, Caro 
summarized, was to give the government all the necessary powers for “saving society from 
the revolutionary tide” and “repressing revolutionary violence.”224 
 Delegates Ospina Camacho and Samper led the opposition against Caro and the 
original version of Article 121. The Article’s draft contained a clause authorizing the 
Executive to establish the state of siege not only in cases of war or internal commotion, but 
also anytime the government perceived that “peace or public security were endangered.” 
While Caro described this prescription as “fair” and “benevolent,” for it allowed the 
government to take preventive measures in an opportune fashion, Ospina Camacho 
perceived it as a source of future and unjustified acts of authoritarianism.225 In his opinion, 
the clause was dangerously vague. Based on it, a “fearful” or “susceptible” president could, 
“for mere ill-founded reasons, […] declare public order disrupted and establish the state of 
siege all over the republic, therefore replacing the quiet regime of peace with the state of 
atrocity and violence typical of war time.” Ospina Camacho certainly agreed that the 
government should have the necessary constitutional means to maintain public peace and 
security. Yet, these special faculties should correspond to actual circumstances of 
emergency, not to simple perceptions or opinions.226 Simple states of alarm only required 
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the government to order recruitments, request loans for military improvements, suspend 
the freedom of press, and order preventive imprisonments of potentially dangerous 
dissidents. There was no reason for treating circumstances of alarm like if they were actual 
states of war, the delegate concluded.227 
Samper’s arguments revolved around the need for finding an equilibrium between 
the need for preserving public order from internal enemies and the goal of preventing a 
dictatorship against “harmless” dissidents and other citizens. The maintenance of this 
equilibrium during states of emergency was critical, Samper maintained, for extraordinary 
powers were always dangerous, regardless the nature of the emergency. They proved 
especially harmful in cases of internal conflict, the Delegate explained. Since not all 
citizens took part in a civil war, the government’s actions against its own people should 
meet strict limits. During an internal conflict, “the nation became divided into three groups: 
rebels or enemies of the government and the prevailing order; the government and its allies; 
and a great mass of peaceful individuals.” While it was understandable that the two first 
groups exercised violence and vengeance against one another, it was completely unfair that 
the government also harassed neutral, innocent citizens, Samper commented. Why, in a 
civil war, should it be permitted that peaceful, non-belligerent people were also subject to 
the government’s arbitrariness? Why should the government ruin them as well, through 
expropriations and war taxes, under the excuse of protecting or reestablishing public order? 
“I am not asking for guarantees for the rebels’ property […] but I do believe that they are 
necessary for the innocent, and therefore I demand them,” he concluded. It was necessary, 
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then, to specify and clarify who should constitutionally be subject to state retribution and 
which particular constitutional guarantees should be suspended in that case.228 
 
Constitutional debates on extraordinary powers offer a different set of understandings of 
and reflections about political crimes and internal enmity in Mexico and Colombia. Unlike 
the doctrinal arguments previously reviewed in the chapter, these reflections underscore 
the dangerous nature of political criminals and highlight their condition of enemies of the 
nation as a whole. Here, political criminality and internal enmity were matters of “rogues,” 
“anarchists,” “revolutionaries,” “conspirators,” “forces that disturbed peace,” and 
“criminals against society.” Their actions put society’s existence at risk, and therefore 
required “swift and vigorous actions” –ranging from the suspension of their constitutional 
rights to the discretional re-criminalization of all their acts. Even the critics of the 
functioning of extraordinary powers implicitly agreed on that. Beyond this basic 
agreement, these debates reveal nonetheless that, at least to some delegates, not all forms 
of dissidence were dangerous and not all the manifestations of internal enemy required 
such strong measures. Some “harmless” or “pacific” forms of political opposition should 
still remain under constitutional protection, as long as they stayed “legal” or “legitimate.” 
The maintenance of this protection should keep in place the line between the fair and 
necessary repression of internal enemies and the straightforward –and unnecessary– 
authoritarianism and arbitrariness against every form of dissidence. As the next chapters 
will show, this line was never clear neither was it unmovable. 
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Conclusions: Assessing the Nature of Political Crimes and Their Legal Treatment 
The legal and constitutional foundations of governmental responses to political offenses 
during the Porfiriato and the Regeneration involved much more than provisions defining 
crimes and punishments. They also entailed multiple conversations and debates concerning 
the meaning, legitimacy, reach, and consequences of such provisions. Legislating on 
matters of political criminality went far beyond the crafting of dispositions for the 
criminalization and repression of a series of offenses against public order, the Constitution, 
and the legitimate government. It implied, as well, reflecting on what political criminality 
was, what its criminal attributes were, what made it different from other modalities of 
crime, and what sort of legal treatment it deserved. Legislators and legal experts in Mexico 
and Colombia paid close attention to these questions at multiple times and venues: during 
the making of Constitutions and Criminal Codes, in studies of current legislation, and in 
the defense of legal initiatives of different sorts. Jurists and lawmakers seldom tackled 
these issues in a direct way; they commonly did it in relationship with larger legal and 
political matters. Some of these “major” issues included questions about the limits of state 
power and state retribution or the balance between “social order” and “individual liberties.” 
Discussions about the definition and punishment of “illegitimate” acts of war; the design 
of legal orders for times of warfare; and even the existence and legitimacy of “alternative” 
constitutional regimes were also part of this set of larger matters.  
What do these reflections show? In general terms, these conversations reveal a 
panoply of understandings of and concerns about political criminality, its nature, and its 
effects. There were no single or uniform ways of defining what a political crime was, what 
made it political, what made it a crime, and what differentiated it from other offenses. For 
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some jurists, political crimes were offenses against public order, the government, the 
constitution, and the society in general. For others, they were acts of war –of internal 
warfare, more precisely– with some degree of political inspiration or motivation. For a few 
more, they were just exaggerated, unfortunate manifestations of patriotism or political 
fanaticism. Under some perspectives, they represented one of the most serious and harmful 
offenses against the society and the nation, completely “illegitimate” and “immoral.” From 
other points of view, they were actions of simple political malcontents, extreme acts of 
political dissidence whose legitimacy or illegitimacy was always relative. To others, they 
were merely common crimes in disguise. All these understandings accompanied the 
crafting –or at least the proposal– of specific legal responses to political criminals. 
Responses ranked from vigorous reactions in the name of society’s right of self-
conservation, involving selective suspensions of constitutional rule, to mild and lenient 
“political penalties” tending exclusively to neutralize their political dangerousness. 
Penalties in between shaped a sort of grey zone in which punishments for common and 
criminal crimes converged and foreign political criminals enjoyed a greater deal of 
protection than domestic rebels.  
Some of these conversations tended to address the constitutional and legal treatment 
of political offenders from a perspective that conceived political criminality in terms of 
“absolutes.” On the one hand, there was society, protected by the government and the 
Constitution. On the other hand, there were its enemies: subversive, revolutionaries, 
conspirators and the like. Other reflections, nonetheless, tended to present more nuanced 
and complex overviews. These “relativist” interpretations invited to differentiate between 
“warlike,” “dangerous” or “violent” forms of dissidence, and “harmless” and “pacific” 
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modalities of political opposition and dissent. Here, not all forms of dissent entailed the 
same degree of political enmity, and not all manifestations of political enmity involved the 
same level of dangerousness or criminality. Furthermore, not all participants in acts of 
internal enmity were strictly political criminals, since their motivations were not “purely” 
or “exclusively” political. Legal and constitutional responses to political criminality, then, 
had to pay attention to these subtle, sometimes unnoticeable differences. The prevention of 
“dictatorship” or sheer authoritarianism, as well as the maintenance of formal 
constitutional rule, lay precisely in the clear identification of and respect for those multiple 
variations of political dissent.  
A relatively similar set of doctrinal, legal, and philosophical inspirations helped 
shape this common array or arguments and concerns. Both Mexican and Colombian jurists 
and lawmakers looked to Europe in search of legislative models, legal developments, and 
doctrinal reflections on the matter, translated and incorporated them as part of their 
arguments, positions, and legal initiatives. European influences were particularly notable 
on issues such as the criminal nature of political offenses, the differences and connections 
between common and political criminality, or the distinction between legitimate and 
illegitimate acts of internal warfare. Inspirations were also significant in relation to the 
establishment of a separate punitive and penitentiary regime for political offenders, the 
prohibition of extradition for political crimes, and the legal and constitutional protection of 
foreign political offenders. European influences in this regard went even further, 
nonetheless. When looking across the Atlantic, Mexican and Colombian legal thinkers also 
translated a feeling of overall political turmoil and instability, as well as a fear of anarchism 
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and anarchist movements. Such additional concerns would also play a role in shaping the 
discussions in question.  
The importance of this trans-Atlantic intellectual framework does not mean that 
these debates and conversations developed in isolation from local and domestic 
circumstances. The Mexican and Colombian experiences differed from one another in the 
kind of questions and problems around which these discussions revolved. The different 
emphases in the two countries responded to diverse domestic concerns and junctures. 
Episodes of revolution and civil warfare in each country, local perceptions and anxieties 
about criminality and public disorder, and even the need to replace or complement previous 
national legislation represented some of these domestic preoccupations. Such a variety of 
local conditions made reflections and translations in each country different despite the wide 
framework of commonalities within which they emerged and developed. 
 
Conversations and debates about the legal and constitutional treatment of political 
offenders involved in both countries a wide variety of understandings about what political 
crimes were and what sorts of penalties they deserved. Not all these understandings were 
necessarily in tune, and some of them reflected very different positions about the nature of 
political criminality and the reasons why it, after all, must be deemed criminal. Inspired by 
European legal thinking and shaped by local and domestic concerns, these reflections paid 
a great deal of attention to what made political offenses singular, their differences with 
ordinary crimes, and the distinctions between “harmless” and “dangerous” political 
dissidence. As some of the conversations reviewed in this chapter suggest, such distinctions 
were neither clear nor absolute. The remaining chapters of the dissertation will demonstrate 
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not only that there was never an agreement on the matter, but also that the drawing and 
redrawing of such various differences had major legal and political consequences in both 
cases. 
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V. CHAPTER 4. BETWEEN THE LEGAL AND THE EXTRALEGAL: 
GOVERNMENTAL STRATEGIES FOR PREVENTING REBELLION AND 
INTERNAL WARFARE IN MEXICO AND COLOMBIA 
 
The discovery by Colombian authorities of the revolutionary plot of August 1893 had 
serious consequences for the Liberal Party. Governmental reactions to the plot involved 
the confiscation of the Party’s funds, the shutting down of at least four Liberal newspapers, 
and the apprehension of several partisan leaders both in Bogotá and in other parts of the 
country. Liberal Santiago Pérez, president between 1874 and 1876 and current editor of the 
paper El Relator, was one of the many victims of these reactions. After accusing Pérez of 
conspiring against public order and promoting rebellion through his “subversive” 
newspaper, authorities suspended the publication and sent him into exile.229 His forced 
departure paralleled the experiences of Felipe Pérez, Modesto Garcés, Alfredo Greñas and 
other fellow liberals that, between the late 1880s and the early 1890s, paid with 
imprisonment and exile their activities as political dissenters and opposition writers. They 
all faced similar charges: conspiring against public order and encouraging rebellion.  
 Certainly, none of these accusations had links with actual episodes of rebellion or 
consummated subversive movements. If anything, the charges in question made reference 
to alleged and unaccomplished threats against public order. The penalties that they made 
possible had no other goal than preventing possible or potential outbreaks of rebellion and 
insurrection. The imprisonments and exiles that Pérez and his fellows faced were, in this 
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light, the result of a series of “preventive” endeavors that Regenerationist authorities 
carried out in order to prevent rebellion and keep “potentially subversive” dissidents in 
check. These cases exemplify the experiences of dozens of “troublesome” dissenters in 
Mexico and Colombia that, during the period, faced prison and other penalties only for 
“preventive purposes.” Preventive campaigns against subversion in both countries 
facilitated the persecution and repression not only of presumed conspirators and rebellion 
suspects but also of many political writers and opposition journalists. They also played a 
crucial role in the criminalization of dissent in the Porfiriato and the Regeneration. This 
chapter reconstructs and analyzes the experiences of several Mexican and Colombian 
dissidents that, either as potential rebels, rebellion plotters, or simple writers, suffered the 
consequences of this criminalization. 
 
The Constitutional and legal prescriptions examined in the previous chapters provided 
Mexican and Colombian governments with a diverse set of resources for responding to 
threats against public order, revolutionary alarms, and similar states of political or military 
tension. These resources included both faculties and limits, which somehow traced a line 
between what governments and authorities could do in this regard and what they could not.  
This chapter explores and analyses how governments in both countries used this wide legal 
and constitutional framework for preventing civil war, containing revolutionary waves, and 
neutralizing “dangerous” internal enemies as well as potentially subversive political 
dissidents. How did Mexican and Colombian authorities apply these laws and 
prescriptions? How did they use them to enact preventive legislation on matters of public 
order? What were the characteristics of this other, complementary legislation? How did 
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these new laws and their application transformed and re-interpreted previous prescriptions 
regarding the treatment of political crimes and the scope and limitations of state power? 
By tackling these questions, the chapter delves into the legal and judicial logics of political 
repression vis-à-vis actual or potential threats against public order in the Regeneration and 
the Porfiriato. It also sheds lights on the multiple ways in which governments in both 
countries understood “prevention” and defined what a “threat against public order” was.  
 The chapter draws on a wide array of sources including memoires; newspapers; 
laws, decrees, and executive orders; court-cases, criminal expedients, and judicial archival 
sources; legislative debates; and legal essays. Section one studies the laws, decrees, and 
legal developments that, in addition to the constitutional and criminal law precepts studied 
in Chapter 2, made up the legal backbone of governmental efforts for preventing rebellion 
and internal turmoil in Mexico and Colombia. Section two explores how the “preemptive 
endeavors” of the Porfiriato and the Regeneration combined the purpose of safeguarding 
public order from actual or potential threats with an interest on repressing political 
dissidence. Section three analyzes how governments in both countries used and applied 
this “preventive” legislation in order to control, regulate, and repress “subversive,” and 
“criminal” journalism. It also shows how the prevention of internal disorder in both 
countries led to the criminalization, as political offenders, or actual rebels and opposition 
journalists alike. Finally, section four offers a brief reflection on the multiple meanings that 
“prevention” and “preventive repression” had in Colombia and Mexico during the period.  
 The chapter argues that governmental efforts for preventing rebellion and internal 
turmoil were grounded on a series of laws and decrees that shaped, in both countries, 
alternative regimes of legality. Revolving around issues of press freedom and maintenance 
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of public order, these “parallel legalities” put the prosecution and judgement of threats 
against the government and the public peace outside the reach of the formal laws and 
ordinary justice. The application of this “other” legislation by local and national authorities 
had a twofold purpose: protecting public order and governmental stability, and keeping 
political opposition under strict control and surveillance. This double purpose made 
possible a practical equivalence between “prevention” and “repression” that led to the 
“preventive criminalization” of political opposition and its multiple manifestations of 
dissent and protest. Such criminalization relied on the assumption that there were no major 
boundaries between “opposition” and “subversion,” and therefore all manifestations of 
dissent could be potentially criminal –at least to the eyes of authorities. This assumption 
would legitimize intense and persistent campaigns of “preventive repression” in Colombia 
and Mexico throughout the entire period.  
 
Preventing Internal Conflict Through Legislation: Press and Public Order 
Preventing internal turmoil during the Porfiriato and the Regeneration represented, first 
and foremost, a matter of legislation. Governments in both countries heavily relied on law 
and lawmaking as the most appropriate ways of containing the outbreak of civil warfare, 
maintaining the stability of their regimes, and keeping “dangerous” or “subversive” 
political dissidence in check. Preventive legislation had a more intense development in 
Colombia than in Mexico. Such difference, nonetheless, does not mean that law and 
legislation were more important in one nation than in the other. Both countries counted 
with a relatively similar set of rules that, regardless their different nature, aimed to the same 
goals, responded to similar motivations, and defined analogous ways of criminalizing and 
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treating potential political criminals. This section analyzes and compares these legislative 
efforts, paying attention to their implications on the management and control of political 
dissent in the two nations.  
 
The Mexican Legal Setting: The Multiple Meanings of “Public Order.” 
The prevention of internal turmoil in Porfirian Mexico relied primarily on legislative 
developments on public order and the press. It was a preventive legislation that involved 
two major characteristics. On the one hand, it relied on a series of laws and decrees on the 
press and public order that involved abstract and vague criminal definitions. On the other 
hand, it attempted to outline “special” and “alternative” ways of treating and punishing 
rebels and potential subversives. Although these laws and decrees entailed their own sets 
of offenses and penalties, they maintained a great degree of correspondence with the 
dispositions and classifications of the Mexican Criminal Code. It was also a legislation 
that, in correspondence with the constitutional division of public powers, subjected most 
modalities of “subversion” to the ordinary judicial authorities. Only rebels and other 
insurgents captured and judged as “bandits” would remain outside the reach of the judicial 
power, judged instead by administrative authorities like the police.  
 Preventive legislation in Mexico experienced a relatively timid development during 
the Porfiriato. Many of the regulations on the matter in fact pre-dated the Tuxtepec 
revolution, had their roots in legislative acts from the Lerdo and Juárez administrations, or 
simply relied on the prescriptions of the 1857 Constitution. They also comprised, at least 
at the federal level, a smaller set of laws, decrees, and legal reforms. A few constitutional 
regulations, two laws about press, and some regulations on individual guarantees that the 
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Congress re-enacted time and again with almost no variation comprised the bulk of this 
legislation. Regulations from the Constitution refer to articles 6 and 7 on freedom of speech 
and press; articles 15 and 23 on extradition and death penalty for political crimes; and 
Article 29 on the emergency suspension of individual rights. Press laws included the 
Organic Print Law from February 1868, together with the reform to constitutional Article 
7 in May 1883. Other norms included the several laws or decrees ordering the temporary 
suspension of constitutional guarantees for salteadores and bandits, that the Congress 
enacted almost every year. 
 All these regulations, despite their diverse nature and origin, involved similar 
characteristics. They aimed to prevent internal conflict and political turmoil through the 
criminalization of a series of actions that “attacked” or “threatened” public order and peace. 
Many of these “threatening” actions involved acts of political dissidence that authorities 
might interpret as “subversive,” as “invitations to rebellion or disobedience,” or simply as 
attacks against the Constitution, the laws, and the legitimate authorities. Other criminalized 
actions were less political, as in the case of the different manifestations of rural banditry. 
This did not prevent authorities from considering them threats against public order as well, 
and to use them for launching “preemptive” campaigns against dangerous or potentially 
subversive political dissidents. The next pages review the legislation that made possible 
both kinds of criminalization. They also examine some contemporary reactions regarding 
the impacts of these regulations on the way in which Mexican governments could treat –or 
actually treated– potential rebels, dissidents, and political adversaries in general. 
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Among the constitutional prescriptions on public order, already reviewed in chapters 1 and 
3, regulations on freedoms of speech and press deserve special attention. They were the 
basis for the preventive regulation of “subversive” and “dangerous” press during the 
Porfiriato. Articles 6 and 7 from the Constitution guaranteed those freedoms as long as they 
did not attack people’s private life, public morality, or public order. None of the articles 
established what those notions meant or what represented an attack against them, leaving 
considerable room for interpretation. Lawmakers and journalists criticized such vagueness 
for almost the rest of the century, pointing out that it could lead –or actually led– to political 
instrumentalization and abuses of power against political dissidents. In the late 1850s, for 
instance, several members of the Constitutional Assembly manifested their fears about the 
possible political misuses of these provisions. Recalling Mexico’s history, Delegate 
Francisco Zarco argued that almost all Mexican constitutions had included analogous 
restrictions to the freedom of press, and every single time such limitations had given way 
to a myriad of “scandalous abuses” on the government’s part. An authoritarian, vengeful, 
and partisan government could see a publication criticizing an authority or official as an 
attack against his private life, and therefore prosecute it and its author. A political 
statement, a satirical text, an innocent joke, could be interpreted as an attack against public 
morality or public order. Often, he asserted, “public order is nothing but the peaceful reign 
of all tyrannies.”230 
 To some Delegates, constitutional understandings of public order, at least in the 
case of the press and press crimes, proved dangerously abstract. Going back to Mexico’s 
                                                
230 Francisco Zarco, Historia del Congreso Extraordinario Constituyente de 1856 y 1857 – Tomo II (México: 
Talleres de la Ciencia Jurídica, 1899), 551-552. 
 188 
history, Delegate Díaz González maintained that, anytime the government feared a 
conspiracy, it invoked the protection of “public order” and satisfied, in its name, “ignoble 
vengeances.”231 That was also the opinion of Zarco. A government fearful of discussion 
and dissent, he argued, saw attacks against public order and peace almost everywhere in 
the press: in the disapproval of the acts of public officials, in the thorough examination of 
a law, in the claim for social reforms, and in the petition for legal or constitutional reforms. 
Under such restrictions, then, there would be no freedom or the press at all, he concluded.232 
Delegate Cendejas went even further, and claimed that these prescriptions would make it 
impossible to write about anything at all. Everything could be an attack against public order 
because nobody knew what “public order” was, he pointed out. “What is order?” The 
Delegate asked. Who could explain and dictate that order was? “The answer is clear,” he 
responded: “it is the triumphant party, which tells the defeated one: ‘order’ is what I 
establish; ‘order’ consists on me being on the top and you staying below me.” “These are 
times of political passions,” Cendejas reminded, and within such a context the Article 
would be nothing but a partisan weapon –a weapon of the government in its efforts to 
neutralize their opponents.233 
 Further legislation on the press and press crimes helped delimit what “attacks 
against public order” were. The 1868 Organic Print Law considered as such all publications 
that encouraged citizens to disobey the law and the legitimate authorities, or to use force 
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against them (Art. 5). Press offenses against public order received penalties of confinement 
between one month and a year, and could include the removal of the defendant from the 
state’s territory (Art. 8). In correspondence with the original version of Article 7 of the 
constitution, the 1868 Law left the prosecution and punishment of all press offenses to a 
special jury, putting the press relatively outside the formal justice system.234 This 
parallelism in matters of justice administration came to an end in 1883, during the 
administration of the Porfirista Manuel González. His reform of Article 7 in May that year 
established that, from then on, the prosecution of all press crimes corresponded to ordinary 
justice. The reform dissolved the press juries that existed since 1857, and put the legal 
management of the press on the hands of both state and federal tribunals.235 
During the Porfiriato, many dissident journalists complained that these reforms had 
done little to create an actual legislation on the press involving well-defined crimes and 
rules. In January 1895, for instance, the opposition newspaper El Demócrata maintained 
that Mexico still lacked clear laws in matters of the press. Assassins, arsonists, and even 
salteadores enjoyed a greater degree of legal security than journalists and writers. All of 
them counted with actual laws that clearly defined their crimes and punishments, even 
providing them with formalities for their defense. That was not the case of journalists, 
“commonly subject to the whims of a vague, indeterminate will; one that works in the 
shadows and that nobody knows who it belongs to.” The newspaper concluded with a 
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calling for a more detailed legislation, a law “wisely done” and shaped on the grounds of 
always consistent and predictable juridical decisions. To El Demócrata, it did not matter 
how severe or strict this law might be, as long as it provided journalists with what they 
lacked: legal and judicial security.236 Independent journalists would still voice this kind of 
complaints during the 1900s. “One does not know then and how one transgresses the law,” 
a writer complained at the end of the Porfirian period. “The government preferred not to 
legislate about [the press] so as to be able to oppress all the better,” he maintained.237 
 
Outside the sphere of the press, preventive legislation on public order relied on laws and 
decrees regulating the suspension of constitutional guarantees for bandits, kidnappers, and 
salteadores. These laws were not exclusive of the Porfiriato: the administrations of Lerdo 
and Juárez had enacted similar acts in six different opportunities.238 Porfirian legislators 
would enact –or propose– similar acts at least four times between 1880 and 1895, often in 
response to alleged increases in rural criminality and “heinous crimes” –including murder, 
robbery with violence, and kidnapping.239 The terms and conditions of these laws did not 
differ substantially from one occasion to another. On the whole, they outlined vague 
definitions of what a bandit or a salteador was, and established a gradation of penalties in 
correspondence with the multiple crimes and levels of criminality involved. In addition, 
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they prescribed some judicial formalities for the prosecution and judgment of this kind of 
offenders. One of these decrees, from 1895, distinguished for instance between criminals 
responsible for murders, serious injuries, or robbery with violence, and offenders 
responsible for other, lesser crimes. The decree prescribed the death penalty for the first 
group of criminals, and established prison penalties between 5 and 12 years for the others. 
Authorities that captured criminals in flagrante could sentence them to death with no 
previous trial and no other judicial formality than the preparation of a minute. In other 
cases, they should process criminals through verbal summary trials, conducted whether by 
political or military authorities.240 
 Variations between the 1895 Decree and previous legislation on the matter were 
minimal. A similar Decree, from May 1886, had established the same treatment for bandits 
and salteadores, but included more limitations for the application of death sentences –
available only for cases of murder and serious injuries. It also prescribed a maximum of 10 
years of prison for those salteadores that dodged the death penalty.241 A project of decree 
from 1880 prescribed similar penalties, and added up to five years of prison for abettors or 
encubridores. Unlike the examples from 1886 and 1895, this project did not put all bandits 
completely outside the reach of ordinary justice. While criminals captured in flagrante were 
subject to an administrative treatment, other offenders still could appear before a local 
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judge. Judges, nevertheless, had to solve their cases through verbal summary trials. To 
Mexico’s lawmakers, these quick trials, devoid of the formalities and terms of ordinary 
processes, had the goal of making the judicial treatment of bandits more efficient and 
exemplary. The 1880 project, explained a Congressman, “aims to simplify the action of the 
tribunals by shortening their terms and procedures.” The goal, in this regard, was to avoid 
delays in the administration of justice that undermined both the credibility of the justice 
system and the effect of its judicial decisions.242  
 Initially conceived as preemptive and repressive responses to rural common 
criminality, these “anti-banditry” laws were abstract and comprehensive enough to allow 
authorities to apply them in other circumstances. Actions of banditry did not differ 
significantly from the acts of hostility commonly carried out in a rebellion or an uprising, 
and judges or military authorities could easily charge a rebel with any of the charges 
included in the decrees. Furthermore, authorities could simply treat rebels or dangerous 
dissidents as bandits and subject them to the special regime created by this legislation. One 
way or another, this legislation allowed the government and its representatives to treat 
actual, potential, or alleged political criminals as salteadores, and to prosecute them outside 
the formalities and guarantees of ordinary justice.  
 This possibility is what concerned the most contemporary critics of these decrees. 
In their opinion, the suspension of constitutional and procedural guarantees in cases of 
banditry would cause –or actually caused– the unfair punishment of lots of innocent 
Mexicans, especially within contexts of electoral struggle or intense partisan conflict. In 
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1880, for instance, the jurist Rafael Herrera claimed that the legislation “sacrificed the 
presumption of innocence to the shortness of procedural forms,” which represented a 
straightforward violation of the Constitution.243 It was also a legislation that basically left 
people unprotected against the will of a despotic authority, one that from then on was 
authorized to “shoot us five times whenever it wanted to.”244 That was also the opinion of 
the journalist Adolfo-Duclós Salinas, an inveterate critic of Díaz and his administration in 
the early 1900s. To Duclós-Salinas, the legislation in question elevated the discretional 
power of the tyrant and the executioner to the category of law. Such decrees, he contended, 
did not have the purpose of “appeasing, through an exemplary punishment, restless spirits, 
[let alone of] subduing armed men that […] attacked the established social order.” They 
merely had the purpose of allowing authorities to “perpetrate detrimental violence against 
the lives of citizens.”245 
 
In general terms, preventive legislation in Porfirian Mexico responded to concrete 
questions about the most appropriate legal means for avoiding rebellion and civil war, 
preventing the spread of “subversive” messages, and containing and repressing 
“dangerous” political dissidence. Questions about the management of “subversion” and 
political opposition through press legislation were also linked to concerns about the logics 
and boundaries of state power and the need for limiting state authoritarianism. 
Preoccupations about issues of jurisdiction and justice administration also played a part 
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here. It is possible to perceive certain tendency to turn the legal treatment of public order 
into an administrative matter, at least in the case of banditry. It is also possible to identify 
some degree of mistrust towards the effectiveness of the processes and formalities of the 
ordinary justice system regarding the management of this kind of crimes. Such mistrust, 
nonetheless, did not make Mexican lawmakers advocate for a complete break up with 
ordinary justice in the prosecution of crimes against public order –unlike what would 
happen in the Colombian case.  
 
Press and Public Order in Colombia: A Legislation in Constant Reinvention 
Preventive legislation on public order in Colombia partially paralleled the Mexican 
experience. As in Mexico, it was a legislation that combined concerns about the protection 
of public order with preoccupations about the limits of the press. It was also a legislation 
that involved vague criminal definitions and aimed to create an alternative legal and 
judicial sphere for the treatment and neutralization of potential political criminals. 
Differences between the two experiences were, nonetheless, significant. Preventive 
legislation in Colombia was much more extraordinary in its nature. A big portion of it was 
a direct product of states of emergency and owed its existence to executive decrees. 
Similarly, and unlike the Mexican case, it established an overly-parallel legal regime for 
the definition and punishment of the crimes in question, independent from the provisions 
and punishments that the Criminal Code established on the matter. In addition, it was a 
legislation that practically put all internal enemies outside the sphere and reach of the 
ordinary justice system. Compared to the Mexican experience, the Colombian case offers 
a more complex picture that deserves a more detailed examination.  
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Preventive legislation in the Colombian Regeneration experienced a more intense 
development than in Porfirian Mexico. Between the mid-1880s and the late 1900s, the 
Colombian government issued a significant collection of decrees and laws on the matter 
that exploited and built on the gray areas left by the Constitution on issues of public order. 
Their dispositions would shape a legal regime that, like the “martial legality” defended by 
Caro, paralleled the “normality” of the Constitution. Involving its own set of crimes, 
penalties, faculties, and exceptions, this “alternative legislation” supplemented and made 
more complex the repertoire of penalties and criminal categories contemplated in the 
Criminal Code for cases of internal enmity. Most of this “alternative legality” remained in 
place almost until the end of the period, turning the “exceptionality” of emergency decrees 
into formal and permanent legislation.246  
 The decades in question witnessed the enactment of at least twelve laws and decrees 
on matters of press and public order. Legislation on press was particularly dynamic 
between the expedition of the 1886 Constitution and the Thousand Days, encompassing at 
least 5 different executive decrees. The first of them dates from 1886 (Decree 635), 
followed by another one in 1888 (Decree 151), and two more in 1889 (Decrees 286 and 
910). A final one in 1896, took the form of law (Law 157). The Reyes administration (1904-
1909) only issued a major press act in 1905 (Decree 4). Legislation on public order shows 
an inverse development, with only one Law enacted before the Thousand Days (Law 61, 
1888). Laws and decrees on public order had a more intense development during Reyes’s 
five-year rule or quinquenio, with at least three decrees enacted in the last moths of 1904 
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(Decrees 750, 845, and 948), another one in 1906 (Decree 11). The final was a law enacted 
in 1908 (Law 13). The need for expanding and concretizing the Constitution’s vague 
prescriptions on freedom of press in a context of intense partisan conflict helps explain the 
rapid development of press legislation before the turn of the century. The proliferation of 
public order decrees in the first years of the Reyes era, to a great extent, responded to the 
urgent necessity of pacifying the country after the Thousand Days and preventing further 
outbursts.  
 Overall, these decrees and laws encompassed a series of characteristics that 
remained more or less stable throughout the decades in question. It was a body of norms 
that depended almost exclusively on provisions of the Executive power, barely relied on 
the authorities and processes or the ordinary judicial system, and revolved around 
dispositions that did not correspond to those from the Constitutions and the Criminal Codes 
reviewed earlier in this study. Additional characteristics included the management of 
threats against public order as administrative matters under the control of the police; a 
strong limitation of the freedom of press; a vague typification of the offenses against public 
order; and the multiplication and intensification of existing penalties for potentially 
dangerous dissidents and other internal enemies.247 The next pages explore and analyze 
these characteristics through a revision of some of the most important and representative 
pieces from this collection. 
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Before the Thousand Days, the preventive management of public order in Colombia drew 
on the dispositions of Law 61, 1888, best known as Ley de los Caballos (Law of Horses). 
The Law was the reaction of President Núñez to an alleged state of emergency concerning 
the mutilation of a few horses somewhere in the Department of Cauca, in May that year. 
Interpreting the episode as the prologue of an upcoming uprising, Núñez convinced the 
Congress to grant him legislative powers in order to suppress the movement before it 
started.248 The resulting law gave the President wide and undefined faculties for 
administratively preventing and repressing “offenses against the state affecting public 
order” and “conspiracies against public order.” It also gave him powers to respond to any 
attack against public or private property that, to the President’s judgement, represented “a 
threat against public order.”249 Law 61 also established a series of penalties for those 
incurring any of the mentioned offenses, including confinement, expatriation, and prison. 
There was no fixed limit for such penalties, for they could be as severe and lengthy as the 
President deemed necessary (Art. 1). 
These punishments were as imprecise as the offenses that the Law created. The Ley 
de los caballos did not define what “offenses” or “conspiracies” against public order were. 
It all depended on whatever the President wanted those actions to be. Discretion and 
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unpredictability surrounding both crimes and penalties were, thus, the major markers of 
this legislation. It allowed the government to react and punish on the basis of mere 
suspicions, and granted defendants no formal procedural guarantee. The administrative 
treatment of these offenses meant that the Police was the one in charge of prosecuting 
offenders, according to summary processes and without following the formalities of the 
ordinary justice system.250 Conservatives widely supported the Law as a “wise prevision” 
against revolts and an “effective remedy” against rebels and conspirators.251 Liberals, on 
the contrary, perceived it as a major violation of the Constitution, for it allowed authorities 
to punish people for crimes that had not been previously established in the legislation 
current at the time.252 It was also law so wide and vague that practically entitled the 
Executive to commit all sort of abuses, as pointed out by the Liberal Congressman Luis A. 
Robles.253 Initially conceived as a transitory legislative act, Law 61 remained in force for 
a decade, until May 1898.254 
The Ley de los caballos operated in tandem with a contemporary decree on the 
press: Decree 151. Enacted in February 1888, this piece of legislation represented the most 
important and influential norm on press and journalism during the late 1880s and early 
1900s. A central consideration inspired the Decree: press abuses deserved a differential 
treatment depending of the offenses involved. The judgment of offenses against civilians 
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and private individuals should correspond to ordinary justice, while the prosecution of 
crimes against public order and peace fell into the government’s hands.255 In 
correspondence with such principle, Article 1 of the Decree divided press crimes into 
offenses against society, materialized through “subversive publications,” and attacks 
against private individuals, realized through “offensive publications.” Article 2 put the 
treatment of subversive publications in the hands of the Executive. 
The Decree distinguished among ten different modalities of press offenses against 
society (Articles 4 and 7). They included attacking the law and the government’s 
institutions, encouraging people to disobey them, or justifying actions that the laws 
considered criminal. Other offenses of a relatively similar nature involved attacking the 
military; assuming the voice and representation of the people; promoting conflicts among 
social classes; and spreading fake news that could cause either alarm or disruptions of 
public order. Other modalities of “subversion” encompassed attacks against the Catholic 
Church and the Catholic authorities; protests against judicial decisions; insults and threats 
against judges; the revealing of official secrets; and even the impugnation of the recently 
reformed monetary system. Penalties against subversive publications ranked from simple 
warnings and demands for rectification to temporary restrictions to the promotion and sale 
of the sanctioned newspapers. In the worst cases, authorities could suspend the publication 
for a period between fifteen days and six months. A complementary decree from March 
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1889 established additional fines for subversive newspapers, and made their public vendors 
(voceadores) subject to penalties of arrest up to ten days.256 
Conservatives defended with political and legal arguments the “alternative” legality 
that Decree 151 created for the press. “All the newspapers from the opposition that had 
circulated in the last years,” complained Minister Ospina Camacho in 1889, “have been 
characterized by the short-sightedness of their writers, their bold and aggressive language, 
and their tendency to dodge the dispositions regulating the press.”257 A year before, Miguel 
A. Caro had insisted on the necessity of the Decree on the basis of the “special nature” of 
press crimes against society. Caro considered that these offenses were elastic and mutable, 
and therefore escaped the rigid stability of the prescriptions from the Criminal Code. The 
criminality of subversive publications was always subject to changing social and political 
conjunctures. Press offenses were “elastic” crimes that required similarly “elastic” laws, 
maintained Caro. They required special prescriptions that, like the Decree in question, were 
always susceptible of reform.258 
The Ley de los Caballos and Decree 151 had several features in common. They 
outlined a parallel regime of crimes and penalties for potential rebels, conspirators, and 
“dangerous” dissidents. They also shared the premises that internal enemies had to remain 
outside the jurisdiction of the formal justice system and that their prosecution, carried out 
through administrative means, should be exclusively under the Executive’s control. These 
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assumptions also implied that the government and its authorities were the ones in charge 
of deciding over the criminality and punishment of the offenses in question. All these 
considerations were grounded on the belief that the justice system was slow, cumbersome, 
and inefficient. Such situation proved particularly counterproductive when it came to the 
prevention of crimes against public order, for they required immediate and efficient 
responses. This was why, Caro explained, “the timely suspension of a seditious newspaper, 
carried out as a matter of Police, produces better results than a long trial.”259 
There were additional reasons for leaving the repression of these crimes to the 
Executive and the Police, in Caro’s opinion. The importance and repercussions of press 
offenses against society made their prosecution by the ordinary justice untenable. 
“Sedition, subversion, everything that disturbs public order and tranquility cannot be left, 
without great inconveniences, to the examination and correction of ordinary tribunals,” he 
wrote in 1888. This was particularly clear in the case of subversive newspapers, in his view: 
“the more irresponsible the political press is, the less convenient the intervention of the 
judicial power becomes.”260 Subversive publications demanded the direct intervention of 
the government because they put at stake interests that were above the reach of common 
judges: society’s feelings, public peace, and even the dignity of the nation’s highest 
political authorities. In these cases, the government should intervene not only as a judge, 
but also as a representative of society and ultimate guardian of social interests.261 
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The dispositions of Decree 151 remained unchanged until December 1896, with the 
expedition of Law 157.262 This law gave a new development to the repertoire of press 
crimes against society delimited in 1888. While Decree 151 only distinguished among a 
dozen crimes against society, Law 157 defined 17 offenses. Besides the offenses already 
included in the 1888 Decree, the new law also considered subversive all publications that 
“encouraged the nation’s dismemberment or the secession of a portion of its territory” and 
“promoted uprisings and incited civil war.” New subversive acts also involved 
“encouraging members of the military to perform acts of disobedience or rebellion,” and 
even “insulting or slandering the person in charge of the Executive power and the nation’s 
bishops.” (Art. 32). These changes in the repertoire of crimes against society were not 
surprising, considering that only a year earlier a liberal uprising, in part fueled through 
opposition newspapers, had escalated into a nation-wide civil war. Penalties for press 
crimes also became more diverse and stricter. New penalties included fines and the 
temporary closing of printing presses, as well as several prohibitions for editors and 
printers. The law, for instance, forbade proprietors and directors of subversive newspapers 
from performing those roles in any other publication for a period up to six months (Art. 
36). Law 157 set the stage for an even more intense control of dissident and subversive 
newspapers. 
The end of the Thousand Days’ War in 1902 and the later secession of Panamá the 
following year made the maintenance of peace a top priority for the Reyes administration. 
This is why the first months of the quinquenio were particularly prolific in measures on 
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public order, with the enactment of acts such as Decrees 750 and 948 from September and 
November 1904 respectively. Both decrees aimed to prevent further episodes of internal 
warfare by “disarming” the nation and containing the spirit of rebellion. Decree 750 
ordered the collection of all war weapons and ammunitions that remained by the time in 
hands of civilians. It gave Colombians a sixty-days term to turn in all weapons to the 
authorities, and ordered the latter to treat as conspirators all citizens that, after the deadline, 
were still in possession of such materials.263 The Decree formalized a modality of internal 
enmity that did not exist before: the possession of war weapons that could be used to disturb 
public order. Reyes believed that since after the war many civilians remained heavily 
armed there was a serious threat against public peace, and ensured “enemies of the 
constitutional order” the means for carrying out future rebellions. The measure, in this 
light, represented an important step towards the consolidation of internal peace after three 
years of civil war, as the President explained in a circular from November 1904. 264  
 The enactment of Decree 948 responded to the supposed circulation of rumors 
predicting the outbreak of a new insurrection. It had, in Reyes’s words, the goal of 
preventing “belligerent” people from putting at risk the rights of the rest of the nation.265 
The Decree ordered the arrest, for up to ten days, of every individual that, whether in public 
or in private, spread false rumors about the alleged upcoming revolt (Art. 1). It also 
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established that all citizens that obstructed the authorities’ efforts to collect war weapons 
from civilians should face fines and could be subject to any other penalty that the 
government deemed convenient (Art. 3). Apparently, the weapon collection decree had not 
been well received in many parts of the country, facing resistance specially from people 
believing that the government’s plan was to re-arm Liberals.266 In 1905, the Congress 
turned this presidential decree into a formal and conventional law: the Ley de Alta Policía, 
the legal backbone of the Reyes administration in matters of public order.267 Decree 11, 
from February 1906, turned these prescriptions into a more comprehensive and detailed 
legislation. 
 The most important reform that Decree 11 brought on matters of Alta policía was 
the definition and penalization of a specific set of political crimes. Political offenses 
included in first place the crimes of rebellion, sedition, riot, and asonada, in the terms in 
which they appeared in the Criminal Code. Hindering the gathering of war weapons by the 
correspondent authorities and spreading fake news that caused alarm or fomented internal 
turmoil were also political crimes. So were insulting or slandering high-rank public officers 
and attempting to discredit the government and the authorities through speeches or 
publications. Finally, the Decree considered a political crime the public resistance to the 
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introduction and collection of taxes.268 The decree recognized 9 different modalities of 
political criminality in total. In terms of penalties, the Decree allowed the President to 
administratively punish offenders with reclusión up to one year, prison up to six months, 
arrest up to one month, confinement up to two years, or expatriation up to four years (Art. 
2).269  
A final modification of this legislation would take place in August 1908, with the 
expedition of Law 13.270 The Law would transform even more the previous repertoire of 
criminal actions against public order, with the identification and punishment of six different 
criminal modalities. New crimes included acts such as attacking the freedom or the life of 
the President or any of his ministers, punished with the death penalty (Arts. 1 and 3). Other 
criminal actions included in the law were, attempting to “overthrow legitimate authorities 
or disobeying the nation’s Constitution and laws;” spreading fake news that disrupted 
public peace; “discrediting” the government through speeches and publications. Two more 
included the rebellion of public servants against the Constitution; and, the intervention of 
foreigners in “political endeavors against public order” (Art. 1). 
 
Preventive legislation on public order before and after the Thousand Days entailed both 
continuities and changes. From the Ley de los Caballos to Law 13, 1908, the basic 
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characteristics of these legal strategies remained almost unchanged. They all proclaimed 
the seizing of the prosecution and judgment of internal enemies by the Executive power, 
together with the almost complete inattention to the formalities of the ordinary justice 
system. Similarly, they all turned the management of public order into an administrative 
matter in the hands of the government and the police, and made the Executive an alternative 
yet legitimate judicial and legislative organism. Developments and changes between one 
law and another had to do, primarily, with the progressive transformation of the actions 
considered “attacks against public order” and their corresponding punishments. By the end 
of the quinquenio, the reasons according to which authorities could call somebody an 
internal enemy were certainly more diverse than they were back in the 1880s. So was the 
repertoire of penalties that the legislation allowed for those crimes, which from the 
beginning included penalties that neither the Criminal Code nor the Constitution 
established for political offenses –confinement, expatriation, and, later on, capital 
punishment. Such legal developments represented systematic governmental responses to a 
series of events and circumstances that gave authorities the impression of an apparently 
growing state of political unrest. It was, on the whole, a dynamic legislation that evolved 
together with the turbulent development of Colombia’s political life throughout the period. 
How did Mexican and Colombian governments apply this legislation? How did 
they enforce it, and what does its enforcement reveal about the ways in which authorities 
in both countries tried to prevent rebellion and maintain “dangerous” political dissidence 
in check? The next sections address these questions in an effort to uncover and analyze the 
logics of state power vis-à-vis actual or potential threats against public order in the 
Regeneration and the Porfriato.  
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Fighting Rebellious Plots and Potential Rebels: The Legal and Judicial Logics of State 
Repression 
Governmental efforts to prevent rebellion and neutralize potentially subversive dissidence 
in Colombia and Mexico fell primarily on partisan leaders, political malcontents, electoral 
rivals, and even military adversaries. Drawing on the reviewed preventive legislation, these 
efforts conditioned a repression of “dangerous” dissenters that, despite its undeniable legal 
grounds, involved different decrees of “alternative legality” and extra-judicial activity. 
This section reviews and analyzes some of the principal measures in which these preventive 
efforts materialized, paying special attention to their legal implications and the ways in 
which dissidents in both countries experienced them.  
 
 Between “the Judicial” and “the Extrajudicial”: Governmental Responses to Dangerous 
Dissidence in Porfirian Mexico. 
The preventive treatment of rebellion and subversion in Porfirian Mexico relied on a varied 
set of legal, judicial, and extrajudicial strategies. A first strategy consisted in formally 
arresting and processing potential subversives and “dangerous” internal enemies in 
correspondence with the Criminal Code and under the jurisdiction of ordinary justice. A 
second strategy involved the prosecution and treatment of “targeted” revolutionaries in 
correspondence with the several laws ordering the suspension of constitutional rights for 
bandits and salteadores. Here, the discretion of political and military authorities and the 
scarce guarantees under summary trials replaced the formalities and protections available 
under ordinary justice. A final strategy, barely founded upon legal or judicial formalities, 
had to do with the discretionary and informal administration of punishments such as the 
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death penalty for “dangerous” dissidents or potential revolutionaries. Extrajudicial 
executions and selective political assassinations were frequently part of this third set of 
practices.  
 The coexistence of the three strategies throughout most of the Díaz regime reveals 
a parallelism between “formal” and “informal,” “legal” and “extralegal,” “judicial” and 
“extrajudicial” modalities of preventive responses to political criminality. Such 
simultaneity of strategies provided Porfirian authorities with wide legal –and extralegal– 
resources for treating and neutralizing “dangerous” or merely “uncomfortable” dissidents. 
Their implementation represented not only a resource for dismantling conspiracies against 
public order, detaining conspirators, and suffocating attempts at rebellion or sedition. It 
was also a tool for neutralizing political or electoral rivals, putting dissidents out of 
circulation, and hindering the political activities of the opposition.  
 The “formal” strategy of prosecuting “dangerous” dissidents according to the 
criminal code materialized, primarily, in the denunciation and arrest of dissenters for 
“conspiring against public order” or “preparing subversive acts” against local or state 
authorities. It did not matter that the alleged conspiracies never took place or were only the 
result of exaggerated rumors. In 1886, for instance, fears of a potential rebellion led by 
General Trinidad García de la Cadena put the state of Zacatecas in a state of alarm. 
According to a contemporary writer, authorities arrested about a hundred people accused 
of being part of the alleged revolutionary plot. According to the antiporfirista Adolfo 
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Duclós-Salinas, the feared rebellion never took place, for it was nothing but a small, weak 
uprising that did not last long and left no serious consequences.271  
Analogous concerns between late 1890 and early 1891 led the government of 
Nuevo León to request the United States the arrest and imprisoned of a group of Mexican 
exiles. The targeted expats were apparently responsible for preparing a revolution against 
Díaz’s and plotting against the life of General Bernardo Reyes. Authorities from Texas 
arrested the suspects and presented them before an American court, which acquitted them 
after the prosecution proved incapable of proving the actual existence of such plans.272 In 
Monterrey, the preparation of a Liberal demonstration in support of Bernardo Reyes’s rival 
to the upcoming state election provoked, between March and April 1903, the arrest of about 
a dozen people under charges of conspiring against public order. Pro-government 
newspapers backed the preemptive arrests, arguing that liberals “[invoked] rebellion, 
promoted asonada, threatened [the City] with disorder, [and] made the establishment of 
the state of siege an urgent necessity.”273 
 Another common practice in this regard was labelling opponents as “suspects of 
rebellion,” which allowed authorities to arrest and imprison them for “preventive” 
purposes. In March 1880, for instance, the Supreme Court conceded Amado Triviño an 
amparo against the acts of the political chief of Baja California. According to the case’sfile, 
the political chief had ordered Triviño’s prison after considering him a rebellion suspect. 
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A military court had put the defendant in prison without a formal order of imprisonment, 
an act that, according to the high court, violated basic procedural and constitutional 
guarantees.274 Earlier that year, the Supreme Court had confirmed the sentence, dictated by 
a judge from Michoacán, that absolved Jesús Odariza and others from imprisonment under 
suspicions of rebellion. Apparently, the state authorities, wanting the defendants to remain 
in prison, rejected the judicial decision and brought it before the high tribunal, whose 
decision benefitted the prisoners.275 Years later, in May 1887, the paper El Tiempo 
denounced that, as a consequence of the supposed revolutionary threat in the state of 
Zacatecas 1886, authorities had sent several people to a state prison. Suspects of 
participating in the alleged subversive plot, the prisoners had spent months in jail waiting 
for a court to prove their crimes. The victims, according to the newspaper, were “expiatory 
victims of an imaginary revolution.”276 
 “Preemptive strikes” of this nature seemed to intensify after the reorganization of 
the Liberal Party and in the midst of the revolutionary wave of the late years of the first 
decade in the twentieth century. In September 1906, authorities from Aguascalientes 
arrested Félix Rubalcaba as a rebellion suspect. Weeks before, Rubalcaba had left Morenci, 
Arizona, with the mission of distributing proclaims for the Liberal Party across northern 
Mexico and organizing in the region a political club in its support. Authorities arrested 
Rubalcaba as a rebellion suspect not only because of his political activities down the 
border, but also for being member of a political association from Arizona that, in May that 
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year, had delivered insulting speeches against Porfirio Díaz. The events from May had led 
Mexico’s government to request the Governor of Arizona the permanent surveillance of 
Rubalcaba, as well as his arrest at the slightest sign of a criminal or subversive activity. In 
a telegram from September 24, a judge from San Luis Potosí requested the authorities in 
charge of Rubalcaba to proceed with all the effectiveness and severity of the law. It is 
possible to imagine the judge’s frustration when, a few days later, authorities reported that 
the alleged revolutionary had ran away by jumping off a train’s window.277 
 Rubalcaba’s was just one of the many cases of arrest under suspicions of rebellion 
between 1906 and 1907. In November 1906, for instance, the newspaper La Opinión 
denounced that the law students Eugenio Méndez y Teodoro Hernández, together with a 
lawyer from Veracruz, were in prison facing similar charges. Authorities accused Méndez, 
an author of satirical articles, of maintaining correspondence with revolutionaries from 
northern Mexico. The lawyer from Veracruz, on the other hand, was a suspect of 
participating in a rebellious plot in the town of Acayucán. None of these accusations had 
solid grounds, the paper maintained, and the arrests seemed to respond to “hidden 
intrigues” and personal vengeances.278 Similar arguments used El Diario del Hogar, in 
August 1907, to criticize the arrest of Leopoldo Álvarez and other people in Coahuila, all 
of them accused of provoking a rebellion. A local judge processed Mayor Álvarez and 
acquitted him due to lack of evidence. To El Diario, the case of Álvarez was representative 
of what currently happened with many other people. “[Authorities] arrest them, imprison 
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them for a relatively long time, and then have to release them because there is no evidence 
that can prove their condition of agitators or revoltosos.”279 
During the conflictive years of 1906 and 1907, suspicions of rebellion, rumors of 
uprisings and conspiracies against public order, and even “imaginary revolutions” 
provoked waves of preventive arrests, not only in México but also north of the border. 
Right before the failed rebel movement of September 1906, a series of rumors about an 
upcoming revolt of Mexicans in the American south raised the alarm in the United States. 
As a result, American authorities arrested and sent back to Mexico 150 “pacific citizens 
accused of the terrible crime of rebellion,” as informed by El Diario del Hogar. “Nothing 
was true, well-grounded, or acceptable,” the paper remarked. The rumors proved 
exaggerated, the feared rebellion never took place, and the tribunals in charge of judging 
the deportees had already acquitted many of them by November 1907.280 Massive 
imprisonments like the one denounced by El Diario seemed to have become common at 
the time. Earlier in 1907, the paper Revolución complained that, since the start of the 
revolutionary threats by the Liberal Party in 1906, the government of Díaz had been 
persecuting “all those that the dictatorship considers rebellion suspects.” According to the 
newspaper, persecutions equally included men, women, seniors, and even children, all of 
them imprisoned without the minimal evidence or justification. “The jail of Orizaba 
[Veracruz] hosts a multitude of women and children, eight and nine years old, accused of 
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rebellion […] Ulúa also accommodates a great number of children accused of being 
revolutionaries, whose ages rank between 8 and 11 years old,” the paper denounced.281  
 
The strategy of persecuting, judging, and punishing “dangerous” dissidents as bandits or 
salteadores also had a legal foundation –at least partially. Although there were no laws 
authorizing this proceeding, some local and provincial authorities used the legislation 
suspending the constitutional guarantees of bandits and salteadores for neutralizing or 
getting rid of dissidents and political rivals. Under the pretext of fighting and preventing 
rural banditry, several regional and local political bosses unleashed campaigns of political 
repression that led to the summary judgement and extrajudicial execution of dozens of 
dissidents. Implicated authorities put these executions in the hands of the Rurales or, more 
frequently, the Acordadas, small private armies at the service of a local political boss that 
carried the name of the judicial institution created in the early 18th century, in particular to 
fight brigandage.282 
The use of legislation against banditry for the persecution and punishment of 
“potentially dangerous” dissidents was particularly common in northern Mexico during the 
1890s and 1900s. That was precisely what, according to Duclós-Salinas, Bernardo Reyes 
did in Nuevo León after the expedition of the aforementioned Decree from May 1886. 
Reyes initially used the law to get rid of rural bandits, kidnappers, and assassins, 
manufacturing long lists of names that he would later deliver to the chiefs of the Acordadas. 
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According to the author, Reyes elaborated such lists on the basis of denunciations that no 
authority cared inquire about much less prove. Lists in hand, the Acordadas would find the 
targeted individuals, arrest them, and then applied them the popular ley de fuga or 
“runaway law.” Troops would take one or several prisoners to a desolate place, shoot them 
in the back, and then present them as “hunted” runaways. Over time, Duclós Salinas 
maintained, Reyes would start adding to these lists the names of several dissidents and 
political rivals.283 
Judging from Duclós-Salinas’s account, by the early 1900s, the politization of the 
Acordadas in Nuevo León had already reached dramatic levels. “The Acordada is not only 
for criminals, and its acts rarely follow the commission of a crime,” he denounced in 1904. 
“In general, the victims of the Acordada are opponents to the government. [Its goal] is 
merely to disappear fearful  people, whether bandits or political dissidents.”284 “The 
Acordada is usually in charge of the personal enemies of the governor and the local 
political bosses,” wrote in 1909 John K. Turner also on the case of Nuevo León.285 Almost 
all of their victims were “political suspects,” Turner commented: “[people] that dared to 
pronounce a single world against the governor […] I personally know a Mexican whose 
brother was shot down by the Acordada only for yelling ‘long live Ricardo Flores Magón.’” 
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286 According to both Turner and Duclós-Salinas, these scenes of clandestine executions 
occurred not only all across Nuevo León but also in other northern states including 
Coahuila and Tamaulipas.287 In Coahuila, Turner wrote, authorities gave an Acordada 
leader orders of “discreetly executing all people along the [Mexican-American] border that 
he suspected were in contact with the Liberal Party.”288 The victims of the Acordada 
commonly exceed a hundred people every year, Duclós-Salinas maintained. “The Mexican 
government is always whether author or accomplice of these acts,” he denounced.289 
Political prisoners were particularly aware of these practices, and some of them 
even publicly manifested their fears of falling victim of an extrajudicial execution. In May 
1894, El Tiempo published the letters of two prisoners that, days before their referral to 
other carceral institutions, wanted to put on record that they were not planning to run away. 
One of the letters stated, among other things, that “since it is common that the escort parties, 
with or without instructions, commit attacks against the people they are supposed to watch 
[…], I beg you to publish in your popular newspaper that I will not try to run away for any 
reason whatsoever.” “It is very important to make this clarification,” the letter continued, 
“so people know that any attack against me would be highly unjustifiable.”290 These 
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“clarifications” still seemed habitual by the mid 1900s. In February 1905, the paper 
Regeneración published two telegrams from the wives of two political prisoners that 
apparently were awaiting an extrajudicial execution. “Fearing his assassination by the 
Acordada,” one of the telegrams said, “I ask for guarantees for my husband Toribio de los 
Santos, made political prisoner by the municipal president Adalberto Viesca.”291 Fear of 
the Acordada seemed to go beyond the denunciations of a couple antiporfirista writers.  
The works of the Acordadas linked the still legal strategy of punishing “potential 
rebels” as bandits with the sheer extra-legal practice of assassinating dangerous dissidents 
and other political rivals. Outside the domains of the para-institutionality of the Acordada, 
this third practice materialized in the selective assassination of dissidents, opposition 
journalists, and “likely revolutionary” military leaders. Duclós-Salinas, for instance, 
denounced the “strategic assassination” in 1886 of several military caudillos accused of 
plotting rebellions against Díaz. The denunciations  included the cases of Trinidad García 
de la Cadena in Zacatecas, Donato Guerra, and General Ramón Corona in Guadalajara.292 
General Ignacio Martínez suffered the same fate in February 1891, while allegedly plotting 
an insurrection against Bernardo Reyes from Laredo, Texas.293 In his book De la dictatura 
a la anarquía (1914), Ramón Prida denounced the assassinations of several opposition 
journalists in mid-1895: one in Hidalgo, another in Puebla, one more in Tampico, and a 
fourth one in Mexico City.294 During the early 1900s, according to Prida, Reyes’s 
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“preemptive strikes” against potential revolutionaries in the north caused the disappearance 
of at least 80 people “without the instauration of a process or the intervention of any 
judge.”295 These preventive measures would parallel the reaction of Díaz and his governors 
against the many uprisings that shook Mexico during the last years of the Porfiriato. 
 
Preventive measures against rebellion during the Porfiriato were, to a certain point, 
properly founded in the rule of law and the Constitution. They maintained some degree of 
correspondence with the prescriptions of the Criminal Code and the formalities and 
protections of the judicial system. Preventive imprisonments of conspirators against public 
order and arrests under suspicions of rebellion somehow relied on these formalities, and 
defendants could find some kind of redress by ordinary justice. This treatment, 
nevertheless, represented just one of many other possible ways of preventing rebellion and 
repressing “dangerous” dissidents during the Porfiriato. Porfirian authorities commonly 
dealt with potential rebels and “uncomfortable” political opponents by criminalizing them 
in a “preventive” way, and such criminalization, in order to work, required most of the time 
alternative resources. A “preventive criminalization” could not have its desired effects if 
ordinary tribunals had the option of protecting or acquitting criminals. It was necessary to 
treat them, then, in a way that guaranteed their ideal punishment, whether it was through 
summary trials, extrajudicial executions, or straightforward assassination. 
 The extrajudicial nature of many of these “alternative” methods allowed Mexican 
authorities to act against dangerous or rebellious dissidents outside the formalities and 
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protections of the justice system and the reach of state institutions like the police and the 
military. As the reviewed cases exemplify, many political opponents in Porfirian Mexico 
were subject to a vague, discretional, and often arbitrary criminalization and punishment. 
The surprisingly scarce development of the legislation on public order in the Porfiriato 
conditioned particularly high degrees of discretion in the acts and decisions of political and 
military authorities, especially at the local and regional levels. The wide discretion that 
governors, local political bosses, and leaders of Acordadas enjoyed for deciding who was 
criminal and who deserved punishment is more than illustrative in this regard. Authorities’ 
reliance on the Acordadas for the purposes of intimidating and neutralizing potential rebels 
and other “uncomfortable” opponents partially put the administration of state punishment 
in the hands of private institutions. This partial privatization of repression turned the 
treatment of political criminals in the Porfiriato into a matter that escaped the sphere of the 
state and went beyond the action and intervention of state agents. State repression in 
Porfirian Mexico, at least in its more extra-legal and extra-judicial expressions, was not a 
monopoly of the state. Many of these attributes would also characterize the ways in which 
Mexican authorities treated rebels and subversives during and after actual episodes of 
internal warfare.  
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The Criminal Faces of Dissent: Preemptive Strikes Against Dangerous Dissidents in 
Colombia. 
As in the Mexican case, preemptive campaigns against dangerous dissidence in Colombia 
targeted partisan leaders, critics of the government, and other political malcontents. Before 
the Thousand Days, governments primarily targeted national and regional Liberal leads, 
arresting and punishing them as conspirators. During the quinquenio, state repression 
focused on neutralizing people that refused to adhere to the policies and spirit of the new 
regime. The Ley de los Caballos and the legislation of alta policía made up the legal 
foundations of these preventive endeavors against political dissent. 
 From 1886 to 1899, “preemptive” campaigns against the Liberal party focused on 
the uncovering and dismantling of alleged conspiracies against the Conservative 
government and public order. Such efforts often led to the arrest and expatriation of key 
Liberal writers, candidates, and leaders. The repressive cycles commonly coincided with 
moments of regrouping and reorganization of the Liberal Party as a political and electoral 
force. In 1887, for instance, a Liberal meeting aiming to reorganize the party after their 
military defeat in 1885 alarmed President Núñez and provoked a first repressive wave. 
Nuñez considered the meeting “a subversive reunion” and a “conspiracy” against the new 
political regime, and ordered the arrest and exile of several Liberal leaders including Daniel 
Aldana, Carlos Martín, and the former president Aquileo Parra.296 A year later, in the 
context of the elections that brought Carlos Holguín to the presidency, the paper El 
Espectador would denounce the imprisonment of  the Liberal candidate Felipe Pérez. The 
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denunciation also reported the arrest and expatriation of all the members of Panama’s 
Directorio Liberal that were in charge of coordinating the Deparment’s electoral 
activities.297 
 From 1891 on, Regenerationist campaigns against Liberal conspirators counted on 
the support of a “secret” or “political” police, created that year with the primary intention 
of “uncovering plans from the government’s enemies” through surveillance and 
espionage.298 The activities of this “secret” organization were particularly intense after the 
Bogotá riots in 1893. Soon after the events of January that year, the “political” police 
installed permanent spies in several points of the city. The measure responded to “well-
founded suspicions that in those places many persons formed meetings with subversive 
purposes and with the aim of plotting conspiracies against the government.” Spies 
inspected stores (tiendas) and taverns (chicherías) in search of “suspicious attitudes” and 
“subversive conversations,” and reported their infiltration in at least two reunions in which 
they had allegedly discovered several revolutionary plots against the government.299  
Reports of alleged conspiracies and revolutionary plots by the secret police proved 
fatal to many Liberal leaders. The discovery of the revolutionary plot of August 1893, 
presumably headed by the Liberal leader Avelino Rosas, provoked the shutting down of 
the newspapers El Relator, El Espectador, El Contemporáneo, and El 93, together with the 
confiscation of the Liberal Party’s funds. The government also ordered the apprehension 
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of the leaders Santos Acosta, Modesto Garcés, and Santiago Pérez. Authorities decreed the 
exile of Pérez and Garcés almost immediately.  Several liberals in many parts of the country 
ended up in jail as well, some of them just for having brief conversations with the alleged 
conspirators. Other “renowned bellicose” liberals like Javier Vergara, Abraham Acevedo, 
and Juan de Dios Uribe received penalties of confinement, and the government sent them 
to the island of San Andrés, off the Caribbean. The wave of arrests also affected two foreign 
citizens from Spain and Italy, one as suspect of smuggling war material from Peru and 
another accused of signing a political manifesto published in El Relator.300 This 
“preventive” strike dissolved almost completely the national leadership of the Liberal 
Party, and left it without a formal structure almost until the end of the war of 1895.301 
 Authorities applied similar preventive measures during the months previous to the 
outbreak of the Thousand Days. The eruption of a revolution in Venezuela, together with 
the circulation of rumors about an upcoming liberal uprising forced the government to 
decree the state of siege in Cundinamarca and Santander on July 28.302 That same day, the 
Minister of Government ordered the arrest of 13 liberal leaders in Bogotá, Cali, Palmira, 
and Cartago. Authorities justified the arrests on the grounds that the implicated Liberals 
plotted a revolution supported by Venezuelan rebels. The defendants spent only a few days 
in prison, apparently because the government was incapable of linking them to the 
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commission or plotting of any actual crime.303 The reaction of the liberal press was 
energetic. “Nowadays, the pretext [of the conspiracy against public order] lacks originality 
and is worn out,” wrote El Criterio in August 10. “The nation knows now what those 
conspiracies mean […] People know that, lacking resources and the opinion’s support, the 
government finds it convenient to create fictitious states of abnormality, inventing uprising 
plots that it blames on the defeated party,” the paper maintained.304 
 Liberal newspapers considered both the imprisonments in question and the 
declaration of the state of siege completely unjustified. In October 1899, El Ferrocarril 
argued that the government’s legal motivations for enacting such measures were never 
clear, if they ever existed.305 To El Espectador, the fact that the state of siege only covered 
two departments was a proof that it was nothing but an imaginary conspiracy. Another 
proof in this regard was the fact that the number of “preventive” imprisonments, compared 
to previous states of alarm –like the one from August 1893, for instance–, was significantly 
low. Additionally, the paper remarked, “the precedents of the current regime make us 
doubtful [of the actual proximity of a revolution].” The Regeneration “has been extremely 
suspicious since its beginnings, and more than once has filled the jails with prisoners [and] 
the roads with outcasts, without being able to justify […] such serious and detrimental 
measures.”306 That was also the opinion of El Criterio, which maintained that the alleged 
plot “only existed in the sick imagination of some senile individuals […] and in the 
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Machiavellian will of others [official instigators].” To the paper, the government had no 
evidence at all of the existence of the alleged revolutionary plans. It had merely acted on 
the grounds of “gossips invented by secret agents whose remuneration increases with the 
seriousness of what they report.”307 
 Regenerationist campaigns against Liberal conspiracies left behind a wave of 
repression that alarmed not only liberals but also some conservatives. In a letter to Carlos 
Holguín in 1888, Conservative Marceliano Vélez commented: “There is something 
alarming going on in the government […] These are times of peace […] Nonetheless, the 
government keeps carrying out acts with all the characteristics of violations against 
individual guarantees.” The imprisonment and exile of people like César Conto and many 
others, maintained Vélez, “are delicate acts whose motivation and legality still await 
proofs.”308 Years later, in 1896, Liberal Rafael Uribe Uribe commented that the 
Regeneration had achieved peace on the grounds of sheer authoritarianism and fear. Armed 
with the perennial pretext of preventing and neutralizing conspiracies, Conservative 
authorities had destroyed any notion of security among Colombian citizens. Yet, the author 
underscored, the government had remained unable to present clear proofs of at least one 
single actual conspiracy.309 Writing in the 1930s about the situation of liberals in the 1890s, 
Lucas Caballero recalled: “many of the most glorious men of the Liberal Party were exiled, 
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[and] the secret police, together with the tyranny of local authorities, made life 
insufferable.”310 
 
Legal prevention of rebellion during the Reyes administration did not involve the extreme 
traces of repression that characterized the Regeneration before the Thousand Days. The 
partial incorporation of major liberal leaders into the new administration helped de-escalate 
the hostilities between the two parties. Political rivalries, nonetheless, did not disappear 
during Reyes’s regime of concord. The new administration would meet strong opposition 
from hardcore Conservatives and other groups that resisted its government’s political and 
administrative measures. During the quinquenio, then, “preemptive” campaigns against 
potential rebels did not have the primary goal of hindering the activities of a particular 
political party, but of preventing the appearance of any foci of subversion among the 
emerging dissident factions regardless of party origin. Ultimately, the repertoire of 
responses to potential subversives did not experience major changes between the two 
periods. Reyes’s insistence in a regime of concord devoid of partisan hatred, together with 
the fears of a new civil war like the Thousand Days, once more gave shape to a relative 
equivalence between “dissidents” and “internal enemies.” The quinquenio’s set of 
preventive measures also paralleled to a certain point those of the first decades of the 
Regeneration: imprisonment of journalists, and arrest and confinement of alleged 
subversives. There were important differences, nonetheless. Expatriations were 
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uncommon, confinements became more recurrent, and there was a clearer willingness to 
use the military against “stubborn” opponents.  
 The first manifestations of Reyes’s “preventive” style emerged in December 1904, 
with the President’s reaction to a group of 14 congressmen that publicly manifested their 
opposition to the new regime and its policies. Reyes considered the congressmen’s attitude 
“rebellious” and ordered the confinement of those implicated. This “internal purge” also 
included the removal of his vice-president, General Ramón González Valencia, under 
charges of conspiracy.311 Later in 1905, Reyes would give the same treatment to Supreme 
Court magistrates that dared to question the legitimacy of his electoral triumph in 1903.312 
Reyes would in fact strengthen his control of “rebellious” opposition during the first 
semester of 1905, through a series of orders and communiqués  encouraging the 
enforcements of his legislation of alta policía.  
Reyes issued the first of these communiqués on January the 2nd. The document 
urged governors to punish all citizens suspect of violating the decree of alta policía. “It is 
necessary that, at the same time [we] give our peaceful citizens all sorts of guarantees […] 
[we] take preventive measures against agitators (revoltosos) in order to incapacitate them,” 
Reyes remarked in the circular.313 Days later, on January 7, the president ordered a General 
in Barranquilla to suffocate “any movement attempting to challenge the authority of both 
the local and the national government.” “I trust you will be a jealous and relentless 
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[defender] of the maintenance of peace and the [protection] of the guarantees of our 
peaceful citizens,” Reyes told the General. The nation was “thirsty for peace and 
tranquility,” the President maintained, and it was thus necessary to achieve these needs 
“through an energetic and strict application” of the decrees on weapon collection and alta 
policía. The circular also put the national army at the General’s entire disposal if he needed 
to suffocate any movement against the government. “If it is necessary,” Reyes added, “I 
will go by myself and subdue and punish the revoltosos.” “Make everybody feel that the 
government is [respecting] the truce in matters of partisan hatreds […] so we can finally 
focus on healing our patria’s wounds,” the instruction concluded.314  
 A final note, from April that year, offers additional details regarding the application 
of Reyes’s preventive legislation. The note ordered another General from Barranquilla to 
arrest several members of Cartagena’s local government for signing a letter of protest 
against the presidential current project of territorial division. Reyes considered the letter an 
act of rebellion, and its authors and supporters a group of revoltosos that pretended to 
outsmart the government’s authority. “The entire country has applauded the project of 
territorial division, with the exception of Cartagena’s Municipality, which has declared 
itself in state of rebellion,” stated the note. The order instructed the General to capture those 
responsible for the letter and send them back to Bogotá “strongly escorted.” Upon their 
arrival to the capital, the government would decide on their place of confinement. Like in 
previous situations, Reyes put the military at the service of the General, and even ordered 
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him to mobilize to this end all the forces available in Barranquilla. Such a display of power 
was necessary in order to “demonstrate the revoltosos that the orders from the national 
government are not empty words, and that it would fulfill its duty of maintaining peace 
[and] public tranquility.”315 A few days earlier, Reyes had issued similar orders against a 
prefect from Antioquia who attempted to organize a movement  to challenge the same 
territorial division project. The President sent a hundred soldiers to capture the prefect and 
his supporters, and later decreed their confinement.316 
 The enforcement of the legislation of alta policía at the beginning of 1905 did little 
for neutralizing the opposition. In December that year, the government discovered a plan 
to overthrow Reyes, plotted by an alliance of malcontent liberals and conservatives. The 
discovery of the conspiracy provoked the arrest of over twenty people and their trial by a 
court martial. Charges included rebellion, sedition, mutiny, and conspiracy against public 
order. A presidential decree established the proceeding and conditions for the judging of 
the conspirators: the court’s sentence would be indisputable (inapelable), and the President 
had the faculty to modify it according to his own will. The military tribunal sentenced the 
defendants to confinement between one and two years.317 Reyes’s reaction to this plot 
would prove particularly lenient in comparison to the measures he would take months later, 
after the attempt against his life in February 1906. 
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The application of preventive legislation on public order during the Reyes era did not differ 
significantly from what it had been before the Thousand Days. In both periods, authorities 
accused dissidents of plotting rebellion and fostering civil warfare as a legal way of 
neutralizing their actions and putting them out of circulation. It was an instrumental 
criminalization whose recurrent use by authorities blurred the political distinction between 
“opponent” and “enemy”, as well as the legal difference between “dissenter” and 
“criminal.” Similarly, both before and after the war, the preventive repression of dangerous 
dissidents depended on the application of an “alternative” legal regime mostly grounded 
on extraordinary legislation and extrajudicial proceedings. If something changed in this 
regard after the Thousand Days, it was the active role that Reyes gave to the military in the 
enforcement of his preventive legislation. While the first Regenerationist governments 
made public order a matter for the police, Reyes made it a military issue. Reyes’s tendency 
to resort to the military for capturing potentially dangerous dissidents or eradicating 
possible foci of subversion clearly paralleled the style of Porfirio Díaz in his campaign 
against internal enmity in Mexico. 
 
Campaigning Against Subversive Journalism: The Legal and Judicial Control of 
Opposition Press in Mexico and Colombia 
Governmental efforts to neutralize “dangerous” dissidence in Colombia and Mexico not 
only targeted rebels and conspirators but also writers and journalists. The application of 
press legislation to prevent internal conflict gave governments in both countries more than 
a chance to hinder and punish the promotion and encouragement of rebellion through the 
press. It also gave them an opportunity to legally repress opposition press through its 
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criminalization. This final section reviews the ways in which authorities in both nations 
applied these laws and gave them a political use. It also analyzes how this application 
shaped a series of political, legal, and judicial practices whose primordial objective were 
the subjugation of political dissent and the neutralization of opposition journalism.  
 
 Journalists on Trial: The Political and Judicial Treatment of Subversive Press in Mexico. 
Preventive legislation in Mexico did much more than allowing authorities to act against 
rebel suspects, potential subversives, and other dangerous dissidents that threatened public 
order and peace. It also provided the Porfirian regime with legal tools for limiting the 
exercise of political opposition, silencing “subversive” or “offensive” manifestations of 
political dissent, and hindering the activities of dissident parties and factions. Legislation 
on press and press crimes became a powerful legal weapon against the enemies of the 
Porfiriato, allowing authorities of different sorts to criminalize opposition journalists as 
both common and political criminals. The instrumentalization of this legislation by the 
Mexican government provoked the shutdown of dozens of opposition newspapers and the 
arrest of hundreds of dissident journalists under the pretexts of safeguarding public order, 
protecting public authorities, and neutralizing potential acts of subversion. The repertoire 
of criminal charges underpinning such repressive measures commonly involved “inciting 
rebellion or sedition” and “defaming public authorities.” In the Mexico of Porfirio Díaz, 
press offenses against “public order” and attacks against the “private life” of public officers 
became practically equivalent to political crimes. While the law distinguished both kinds 
of attacks as offenses of a different nature, in practice they tended to be part of the same 
crime: offenses against the government and its representatives. 
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Journalism remained under strict control during the Porfiriato. Díaz controlled 
many of the major newspapers of Mexico City, ensuring their loyalty through constant 
subventions. As a result, some of Mexico’s most notable newspapers, including El 
Universal, El Partido Liberal, El Nacional, and El Siglo Diecinueve, were overtly 
Porfiristas.318 Sponsored newspapers returned the favor by widely supporting the 
government in its campaign against opposition press. In February 1893, for instance, El 
Siglo Diecinueve defended the official persecution of the paper El Demócrata by declaring 
it a dangerous publication driven by “a savage intolerance.” “El Demócrata has no 
principles, no program, no ideas, nothing. Absolutely nothing. It only has the goal of 
overthrowing the government,” the paper maintained. Its ways reminded El Siglo of the 
position of another newspaper, La Voz de México, which once had said “if our words could 
kill our enemies, much better!” To the porfirista newspaper, those were all symptoms of a 
mental disease called “political crime:” “A sort of craziness drives El Demócrata to deem 
everything as wrong, to attack everything, to bite everything, to destroy everything.” “That 
is what we call a severely sick opposition,” the paper concluded.319 The words of El Siglo 
Diecinueve comprise many of the arguments under which Porfirian authorities persecuted 
and repressed dissident newspapers between the 1880s and the 1900s. 
The preventive control of “dangerous” or “subversive” press in Mexico went far 
beyond the suspension of newspapers or the arrests of writers and editors. The Porfiriato 
extended its repression to printers, managers, sellers, newsboys, and even people that 
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maintained indirect relationships with the sanctioned publications.320 In the late 1870s, for 
example, a tribunal accused a group of printers of supporting the rebel Miguel Negrete 
after printing a “subversive” proclaim with his program. Further inquiries demonstrated 
that there was no relationship between the printers and the rebellion, and that their only 
fault was to reproduce the document in their shop.321 Decades later, in 1905, two people 
from San Pedro, Coahuila, went to prison for allegedly providing a newspaper with news 
concerning the arbitrary acts of governor Miguel Cárdenas.322 That same year, an article 
listing the many newspapers that authorities had punished throughout the last ten years 
included the names of 76 people associated to all sorts of roles. The list included owners 
and directors of opposition newspapers, writers, printers, proofreaders, and even paper 
distributors.323 
 The prosecution and judgement of all press crimes corresponded during most of the 
Porfiriato to the ordinary justice. Given the lack of precision in the legislation about the 
specific circumstances that made a publication a “crime,” judges had a great deal of 
discretion to decide whether or not a writing was criminal. Sometimes, it was not necessary 
that the publication in question directly encouraged rebellion or insulted a particular 
authority. Judges could convict writers only on the grounds of the assumption that their 
intention, at the moment of writing, publishing, or circulating the publication, was criminal. 
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Many contemporary journalists criticized this practice and considered it a “deviation” of 
the justice system, for it allowed judges to decide, not on the basis  of solid evidence but 
of mere “psychological” considerations.324 Opponents of the Porfiriato called this practice 
“judicial psychology” or the “psychological method,” and blamed it for the high and 
constant number of convictions of dissident journalists during the period. 
 As a judicial practice, the “psychological method” originated in 1885. It was the 
result of a judicial decision in a trial against a group of journalists and printers from Mexico 
City accused of “attempted sedition through the press.” The case included about 15 people, 
associated to the newspapers El Monitor Republicano and El Correo del Lunes, as well as 
to a leaflet titled “Al pueblo: protesta.” Charges included different modalities of sedition 
as well as insults and slander against public authorities. A first instance judge sentenced 
the defendants to prison between three and seven months, and ordered them to pay fines 
between 300 and 100 pesos. Although the defense appealed and a second judge revised the 
sentence, the results of the revision, ratified by the Supreme Court, did not benefit the 
defendants.325 The details of the trial illustrate many aspects of the ways in which judges, 
prosecutors, and lawyers in Porfirian Mexico understood press offenses against public 
order and debated about their alleged criminality. 
 The trial responded to a series of “subversive” writings that had circulated between 
June and July that year. The process, initially, hat to do with the publication in El Monitor 
of a collection of articles criticizing Díaz’s recent law on the payment of Mexico’s foreign 
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debt.326 Their author, Enrique Chavarri, accused the president of being more arbitrary than 
his predecessors Lerdo and Juárez, and considered the law in question the government’s 
ultimate act of authoritarianism. The articles also included a few “incendiary” sentences 
such as “we don’t believe revolution is either unlikely or impossible.”327 A few days later, 
a group of students, apparently inspired by El Monitor, published the protest “Al pueblo.” 
In the leaflet, the students called Díaz’s government “tyrannical” and “arbitrary,” and 
manifested their wish that the Mexican people joined the protest “with energy and 
patriotism.”328 Later on, the newspaper El Correo reproduced the protest, together with an 
article, written by Adolfo Carrillo, that invited Mexicans “to organize clubs so they could 
discuss, in every place or reunion, any issue in which the nation’s honor is at stake.” In the 
article, Carrillo also called the government “autocratic” and “plunderer.”329  
 To the prosecution, all these publications insulted Díaz and his government and 
represented clear and intentional attempts at encouraging people to commit sedition. The 
defense claimed that there was no crime in any of the publications. Both Chavarri and 
Carrillo pleaded innocent, and claimed that their writings neither insulted the authorities 
nor had a subversive or seditious nature. The defense also maintained that the defendants 
had done nothing but exercising their constitutional rights to voice their opinions and 
protest against the authorities. “Looking at the articles,” the defense pointed out, “it is 
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impossible to see where the crime is.” “There could be an offense, morally speaking, but 
under the law there is no way of establishing whether or not there was a crime,” it 
concluded.330 
The tribunal’s response to this last argument set the foundations for the so-called 
“psychological method.” Certainly, the tribunal admitted, the law did not provide means 
for telling whether or not the articles and contents in question were criminal. Nevertheless, 
judging from the context in which these writings had appeared, it was possible to attribute 
the writers a criminal intention. Carrillo, Chavarri, and the students knew that the 
circumstances were tense and even so voiced their seditious proclaims, calling people to 
organize and protest. Their intention, concluded the judge, was clear: they wanted provoke 
a sedition.331 The alleged “psychological” nature of this proceeding lay in two central 
beliefs. There was, in the first place, the assumption that it was possible to presuppose a 
criminal intention in the defendant’s action, regardless the probative material available. 
There was, secondly, the idea that it was legitimate for a judge, based on his “legal 
consciousness,” to decide in a subjective way about the criminality of an act, even in the 
absence of formal proofs.332 This “method” accounts for the high degrees of discretion that 
judges enjoyed during the period when dealing with press crimes against the government 
and the public order. As a judicial practice, it represented a way of dodging basic 
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procedural guarantees in order to ensure the sentencing and punishment of dissident 
writers. 
  The “psychological method” would become common all over Mexico, shaping a 
sort of “judicial habit” in the treatment of these offenses that would prevail during the rest 
of the Porfiriato.333 In 1904, the journalist Adolfo Duclós-Salinas blamed the 
intensification of judicial persecution against opposition press, from 1885 onwards, on the 
rapid extension of this “habit” from Mexico City’s tribunals to the rest of the states.334 The 
already mentioned list from 1905, with its 76 names, illustrates the extent of this 
persecution in the years following the trial in question. All people from the list had faced 
charges at least once for allegedly encouraging sedition, attacking public order, or 
slandering political authorities. Many of the people had appeared before a tribunal more 
than once. Some counted several processes but no sentences at all. Several more had been 
in prison on repeated occasions. Yet others had remained imprisoned for several moths 
awaiting trial and sentencing.335 There were cases in which journalists spent in jail longer 
periods than the maximum time prescribed by the law for their crimes, awaiting a judicial 
decision. Sometimes the decision came after a period that duplicated the duration of the 
penalty imposed.336 
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People from El Diario del Hogar, El Hijo del Ahuizote, and El Demócrata made up 
some of the most extreme cases, according to the list. During these ten years, El Diario had 
received 42 denunciations from public servants of all sort. El Hijo del Ahuizote had 
published 468 issues in the last 9 years, and its director had spent in jail an almost 
equivalent number of days. People from El Demócrata served prison terms of up to 15 
months, the highest in the list; and, all their new journalistic endeavors –El Hijo del 
Demócrata and El Nieto del Demócrata–  similarly suffered from the state’s persecution. 
Not even foreign journalists escaped judicial repression: a certain Mr. Henriot, director of 
the Lanterne de Cocorico, ended up in jail three or four times.337 Persecution against 
opposition journalists and newspapers after 1895 was similarly intense. Between 1896 and 
1897, for instance, El Universal, once a Porfirista newspaper, faced more than a dozen 
criminal accusations. One of its owners ended up in jail three times before fleeing the 
country. His replacement also faced imprisonment, together with the owner of the printing 
press, its manager, its employees, and even some of the people who defended them in 
court.338 In 1902 alone, authorities from a dozen states including Mexico City ordered the 
prosecution of 39 papers.339 It was a repressive wave that, in the words of El Hijo del 
Ahuizote, pretended nothing but to punish a “new” political crime that had emerged in the 
midst of Díaz’s regime: antiporfirismo.340 
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The “psychological method” was not the only judicial practice responsible for the 
intense persecution of the opposition press during the Porfiriato. The customary 
intervention of the government in the administration of justice in these cases represented 
another major feature in this regard. Although the law gave ordinary tribunals jurisdiction 
over press crimes, the President, his governors, and other public authorities often managed 
to control the functioning and decisions of these organisms. The Executive had the 
authority to freely appoint and remove federal and provincial judges; and, regional and 
local authorities could always appoint specific judges to particular cases. In consequence, 
anytime an authority wanted to neutralize a newspaper, it only had to find a judge willing 
to declare its content “subversive” or “slandering.”341 That was precisely the strategy that 
General Bernardo Reyes used in 1901 to shut down the paper Regeneración, written and 
directed by the brothers Ricardo and Enrique Flores Magón. Irritated by the newspaper’s 
criticisms of his political maneuvers in northern Mexico, Reyes convinced a former 
minister of justice to help him shut it down. Reyes and the former minister convinced a 
local political chief from Oaxaca to bring a suit for defamation against the paper, and then 
put the case under the jurisdiction of an allied judge. The judge put the brothers in prison 
for a few months and ordered the suspension of the paper.342 
Bernardo Reyes would use the same strategy against the brothers Flores Magón a 
year later, this time through a judicial campaign against El Hijo del Ahuizote. Reyes 
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declared war on the newspaper after it published a series of articles criticizing his political 
use of the “Segunda Reserva.”343 The General ordered a subaltern to denounce the paper 
before the military authorities for “insulting the Mexican army.”344 According to El Hijo, 
the denunciation did not convince any current military judge, which forced Reyes to find a 
new, more manipulable judge. He found a Mr. Telésforo Ocampo, a plain citizen with 
judicial aspirations, invested him with a middle-rank military position, and made him a 
military judge.345 Judge Ocampo ordered the arrest of the brothers Flores Magón and all 
the employees of the newspaper. He also shut down and confiscated the corresponding 
printing press. The defense, carried out by the lawyer Francisco Serralde, appealed the 
judge’s decision before the Supreme Court and managed to get them a protective judicial 
injunction or amparo.346 Serralde’s appeal maintained that that the brothers Flores Magón 
had not committed any sort of military crime, and therefore their imprisonment and 
judgement by a military court was unconstitutional.347 
The granting of the amparo did not bring the case to an end. Although the Supreme 
Court suspended the process and ordered the immediate freedom of the brothers Flores 
Magón, a local judge jeopardized their release by charging them with the additional crime 
of insulting the government. Apparently, after their first arrest, the brothers had yelled 
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“death to tyranny” in several occasions on their way to the prison. Once again, Serralde 
had to resort to the Supreme Court, arguing this time that yelling those kinds of words did 
not fulfill the legal requirements of a criminal action –let alone being a crime of insult or 
slander.348 The high tribunal backed the lawyer’s arguments, conceded a second amparo, 
and the brothers Flores Magón could finally leave prison. 34 days had gone by since their 
arrest. Their case was not unique. In the early 1900s, the authorities of Lampazos, Nuevo 
León, imprisoned the journalist Felipe Naranjo, a collaborator of the newspaper Redención. 
After over a month in prison, Naranjo managed to obtain an amparo. Nonetheless, as soon 
as authorities in Lampazos heard of the decision, a local judge issued a new order of arrest 
and sent the journalist to a penitentiary in Monterrey.349 That was also the case of Duclós-
Salinas, who, right after spending some time in a jail in Nuevo León, received another 
prison sentence with no clear justification. Once he regained his freedom, authorities 
threatened him with a third imprisonment if he continued publishing his newspaper La 
Democracia Latina.350 
The justice system not always worked against the interests of antiporifista 
journalists. Judicial amparos were always an option that could eventually yield positive 
results, as illustrated by the cases of the brothers Flores Magón and Felipe Naranjo.351 
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Defendants could also appeal their sentences before an appeals or second instance tribunal 
and, if needed, request the Supreme Court to revise the decision. In December 1894, for 
instance, a second instance tribunal reduced the sentences of five people that worked for 
the newspaper La República. Six months earlier, a first instance court had convicted them 
for “provoking rebellion and slandering public servants.” The sentence had imposed on 
them between 9 and 19 months of prison, and ordered, in addition, the confiscation of all 
materials and equipment from their printing press. The defense appealed. A second 
instance tribunal gave each defendant a reduction of between 3 and 6 months, and even 
ordered the release of three of them. Although the prosecutor rejected the decision, the 
defense took the case to the Supreme Court and obtained its ultimate confirmation.352 
Not all journalists had to go to the extreme of filing a claim before the Supreme 
Court. In some lucky cases, defendants could find judges that dismissed the accusations 
for lack of evidence or because the publications in question were not, in their opinion, 
criminal enough. In August 1902, authorities from San Luis Potosí arrested the director 
and printer of El Demófilo, and confiscated their printing press, on charges of falseness and 
slander against a local public officer. A lower court quickly disqualified the first charge 
after considering it ill-founded and ordered the return of the confiscated materials. El Hijo 
del Ahuizote, which reported the case, was confident that the judge would also dismiss the 
second charge, considering that he “was an exception within this corrupt environment of 
judicial prostitution.”353 A relatively similar case occurred in 1906, when an official from 
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Mexico City’s Police denounced the papers El colmillo público and La revolución social 
for their “subversive” content. In the official’s opinion, both newspapers “provoked the 
crimes of rebellion and attacks against industry.”354 The tribunal disqualified the 
accusations from the beginning, considering them exaggerated and, since there was no 
crime to prosecute, put the officer’s claim on hold. A judge reopened the case in March 
1911, only to declare that, by then, it was already statute-barred.355 
  
What were the central characteristics that defined the “preventive” control of press in 
Porfirian Mexico? It was, first and foremost, a control that authorities used as a political 
tool against dissidents, repressing opposition journalists under the pretext of protecting 
public order. This repression was legally grounded and operated on the basis of 
criminalizing dissident writers as internal enemies. It was a notion of internal enmity in 
which society’s adversaries were not only those who conspired against public order and 
peace, but also those who attacked the dignity of public authorities. The relative 
equivalence between slander and rebellion gave governments a particularly wide frame of 
action against dissident writers. It extended the circumstances according to which a 
journalist could commit a crime, and ensured the possibility of punishment even in the case 
that authorities decided to pardon or disregard his charges as a political offender.  
                                                
354 AGNM, Tribunal superior de justicia del distrito federal, Caja 443, Folio 78748: “Denuncia que hace el 
jefe de policía por provocación de un delito.” According to the denunciation, El Colmillo’s “calls to rebellion” 
consisted on a reproduction of the program of the Liberal Party and its lists of proposed reforms; an article 
on the elections in San Luis Potosí; and a list of opposition journalists that were currently in jail. The oficial 
denounced La Revolución for an article that exposed the miseries of the working class in Río Blanco, 
Veracruz, and encouraged the organization of the region’s workers. 
 
355 “Denuncia que hace el jefe de policía.” 
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Additional characteristics concern the functioning of Mexico’s justice system in 
cases of press crimes against the government and the public order. It was a system that 
relied on high degrees of judicial discretion, even against the procedural guarantees of the 
Mexican law. It was also a system that did not operate independently from the Executive 
power, and therefore was highly politicized. As a result of this, Mexico’s justice system 
operated with almost the same degrees of discretion and legal insecurity that would 
characterize the administrative prosecution of subversive journalists in Colombia. 
Nonetheless, it was a system that, despite their arbitrariness and lack of guarantees, still 
offered processed journalists some degree of judicial protection or redress, a possibility 
that did not exist for Colombian Liberals during the Regeneration. 
 
Responding to Subversive Journalism in Colombia: The Case of the Liberal Press Before 
the Thousand Days. 
The governmental treatment of subversive journalism in Colombia partially resembles the 
Porfirian experience. Like their Mexican counterparts, regenerationist governments turned 
legislation on the press into a legal tool against the opposition. There were some important 
differences between both cases, though. While the criminalization of opposition journalism 
in Mexico relied on a combination of political and non-political accusations, in Colombia 
it depended almost exclusively on political charges. By labelling opposition newspapers as 
“subversive publications,” Colombian authorities were able to shut down papers, fine 
publications and writers, and arrest and even exile journalists. As in Mexico, the treatment 
of opposition journalism involved high degrees of judicial discretion and legal insecurity. 
Yet, in the Colombian case, discretion and insecurity were even higher, for the judgement 
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and prosecution of “criminal” publications corresponded almost entirely to the Executive 
power and unfolded completely outside the reach and guarantees of the judicial system.  
The next pages analyze how authorities in Colombia applied and instrumentalized 
this legislation on the press between the 1880s and the 1890s, a moment in which state’s 
persecution against dissident journalism was particularly intense. During the decades 
preceding the Thousand Days, Conservative authorities used this legislation to criminalize 
many of the reorganization efforts of the Liberal Party after the war of 1885. This 
“preventive” criminalization of the press would revolve around a series of criminal actions 
that, despite not being related to political crimes such as rebellion and sedition, had a clear 
political nature as well –they were criminal acts of political dissent. Their treatment as 
“subversive acts” and their criminalization as threats against public order put them at the 
same level with other, major political offenses. This would trace a link between the figures 
of the subversive journalist, the “conspirator against public order,” and the actual rebel. 
The practical parallelism among these three notions would allow authorities to treat 
dissident writers as particularly dangerous internal enemies.  
 Repression against subversive press during this period relied on both the Ley de los 
caballos and Decree 151. Governments made a wide use of both pieces of legislation to 
keep dissident newspapers under a strict control and take Liberal journalists out of 
circulation. Under the pretexts that their publications encouraged rebellion, and that their 
leaders plotted conspiracies against the government every now and then, authorities 
managed to neutralize almost all efforts of Liberalism to survive as a political party. 
Arguments involving conspiracies and subversive plots loomed large in these reactions 
against Liberal journalism. In the majority of cases, authorities penalized newspapers and 
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writers on the grounds of charges of “conspiracy against public order,” and justified their 
actions against papers and writers as “preemptive strikes” against “uncovered 
conspiracies.”356  
 The Regenerationist campaign against “subversive” Liberal press involved, among 
other measures, the suspension of at least 36 newspapers between 1886 and 1898. The list 
included prestigious titles such as Santiago Pérez’s El Relator; La Crónica, directed by the 
also former president Aquileo Parra; and El Espectador, directed by Fidel Cano, one of the 
fiercest critics of the Ley de los Caballos. Many other newspapers received expensive fines 
on more than one occasion, as happened to notable titles such as the Diario de 
Cundinamarca, perhaps the most important Liberal newspaper in the late-nineteenth 
century, and La Estrella de Panamá, one of the region’s most important newspapers.357 
Repression against Liberal writers also fell on cartoonists like David Granados and Alfredo 
Greñas, best known for his newspapers El Barbero and El Zancudo, and even on poets and 
playwrights  such as Adolfo León Gómez.358 Repression of liberal newspapers right after 
the expedition of both laws seemed to be so intense that, in October 1888, El Espectador 
complained that the government had managed to achieve “the almost complete suppression 
of the oppositionist press.”359  
                                                
356 See: “Sofismas políticos: las conspiraciones,” El Relator, June 15, 1889. 
 
357 Aguilera Peña, Insurgencia, 70. Other titles in this list included the papers El Progreso, La Siesta, El 
Comercio, El Renacimiento, El Semanario, El Cronicón, El Partido Nacional, La Prensa, El Liberal, El 
Empecinado, La Libertad, La Reivindicación, El Zancudo, El Repiublicano, El Sufragio, El Mago, El 
Telegrama and El Debate. 
 
358 Aguilera Peña, Insurgencia, 60-61. 
 
359 “Ventajas del silencio,” El Espectador, October 13, 1888. 
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 Penalties of expatriation followed the closing or suspension of newspapers in more 
than one occasion. That was the case, for instance, of the paper El Liberal in 1888. The 
government suspended the publication and imprisoned its director, the renowned Liberal 
leader César Conto. Soon after his arrest, Conto abandoned the country “voluntarily” and 
moved to Guatemala, where he died in 1892. Nicolás Esguerra, who tried to reopen El 
Liberal after Conto’s arrest, suffered the same punishment. He got to bring out only one 
issue of the newspaper before authorities suspended it again for six months and sent 
Esguerra into exile. The exile of Santiago Pérez followed the suspension of El Relator in 
August 1893. Authorities penalized the publication for considering it part of a 
revolutionary conspiracy discovered that month.360 Earlier that year, Alfredo Greñas had 
suffered the same fate. The Police of Bogotá arrested the author right after the January riots 
in the city. Authorities sent Greñas to prison and later expelled him from the country 
“without the mediation of a trial or a defense, not even a public sentence,” as denounced 
by El Espectador. Authorities also suspended his newspaper El Barbero and shut down his 
printing press.361 Conservative press defended such measures on the grounds that the 
penalized newspapers were nothing but “publications of fanatic and revolutionary 
propaganda that, instead of enlightening their readers, [aimed] to heighten their spirits,” as 
El Orden remarked in June 1892.362 
                                                
360 Aguilera Peña, Insurgencia, 313; and Delpar, Red Against Blue, 143.  
 
361 “Las dos prensas,” El Espectador, February 25, 1893. 
 
362 “Interpretaciones malignas,” El Orden, June 4, 1892. To El Orden, El Relator was perhaps one of the 
most dangerous publications in this regard. Its articles not only insulted the president but also attempted to 
spread alarm and resentment both within and outside the national territory. See: “La traición de El Relator,” 
El Orden, June 11, 1892. 
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Liberal newspapers reacted to and campaigned against these measures in different 
ways. Many papers periodically published lists of suspended or fined publications, as well 
as of arrested journalists and printers. A list from October 1890, published simultaneously 
by El Combate and La Estrella de Panamá, informed for instance that their fellow papers 
El Vigilante and El Demócrata had fallen victim of the government’s persecution. While 
the former newspaper had received a fine, the later had its editor in prison. The list also 
informed that a conservative printer from Medellín had received a fine after publishing an 
apparently subversive leaflet for some liberals. “Acts like these,” El Combate denounced, 
“happen time and again in Colombia by orders of the President, his minister, and his 
governors.” “There are no abuses here,” the paper pointed out. “Everything is very legal, 
in correspondence with the current legislation on the press.” Authorities “apply the law to 
all those who still have the habit of saying what they think, regardless the existing 
prohibitions.” “The ones that do wrong,” remarked El Combate in a satirical tone, “are the 
journalists who say what it is forbidden […] It is a stupidity to write just to get beaten up 
later.”363  
 Liberal newspapers also criticized the current press legislation and its enforcement. 
In February 1899, El Carnaval from Bogotá mocked a recent wave of fines against several 
satirical newspapers by saying “today, everything has a price, even laughter.”364 Later that 
year, El Demócrata, also from Bogotá, argued that the current press legislation “depressed 
and humiliated the Colombian press” by allowing the government to discretionally decide 
what and who was criminal. This legislation, the paper maintained, consisted basically of 
                                                
363 “La obra de la regeneración,” El Combate, October 10, 1890.1 
 
364 “De la prensa,” El Carnaval, February 9, 1899. 
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an Executive decree “that tells the citizen: ‘you go on and publish, that I, a posteriori, will 
declare you innocent or guilty [….] And if I decide to find you guilty, I will punish you 
[…] according to my will.’” This, according to El Demócrata, was “a trait of audacity that 
goes way beyond the limits of the believable in matters of arbitrariness.”365 Writing on the 
legal insecurity stemming from the government’s excessive discretion, El Relator claimed 
for a clearer and more precise press law. “Let the prior censorship come; let the fine come; 
let whatever other measure come. Everything is better than the insecurity and the doubt,” 
maintained the paper in March 1890. “No matter how rigid the [new] law could be, it will 
guide the judgement of the public writer, so that if he breaks it, he will do it deliberately 
[…] That is not what happens nowadays,” the paper concluded.366 
Liberals denounced time and again the many governmental efforts for shutting their 
newspapers down. In 1938, the veteran of the Thousand Days Lucas Caballero remembered 
the 1890s as a terrible decade for Liberal journalism. “Our newspapers were all suspended 
and fined, and their directors sent to prison and even exiled for the slightest critique,” he 
wrote.367 During that same decade, Santiago Pérez claimed multiple times that the 
“independent press” was the victim of innumerable acts of oppression. In an article from 
1889, for instance, Pérez maintained that liberal newspapers and journalists suffered from 
the worst and most lethal kind of calumny: “state calumny.” It was a calumny that had no 
other purpose than “subordinating [the government’s] enemies and dominating through 
terror.” State calumny went beyond the simplicity of words and materialized in “fines, 
                                                
365 “La lección. Libertad de prensa,” El Demócrata, December 14, 1889. 
 
366 “Nuevos peligros para la prensa,” El Relator, March 1, 1890. 
 
367 Caballero, Memorias, 22. 
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confinements, imprisonments and expatriation, most of the time without any legal or 
judicial formality.” “Anytime the government feels that the opposition harms it,” Pérez 
explained, “it simply declares: ‘you all conspire.’ And on such grounds it sends its 
opponents to confinement and jail; sometimes even leading them to their very death.” 
Calling Liberal writers “conspirators” was, then, more of a political calumny than an actual 
criminal accusation. It was, nonetheless, a calumny with serious legal consequences, for it 
materialized in arrests, imprisonments, and exile.368 
 Liberal newspapers also underscored the multiple abuses stemming from the 
government’s way of defining and judging press crimes against society. In March 1888, 
for instance, El Relator denounced that the government’s persecution of liberal newspapers 
entailed a crucial injustice: it relied on “the assumption of the commission of a crime” 
instead of relying on the commission of an actual offense. This made no sense at all to the 
newspaper, for according to the law, criminal responsibility stemmed from a crime, not 
from simple “suspicions of a crime.” That was also the case with the “innocent action [that 
the state] turned into a crime.” To the paper, it was yet another illegal measure since the 
decision of whether or not an act was criminal corresponded to the ordinary justice, not to 
the government. What was happening in Colombia, then, was not a legal campaign against 
criminal publications, but merely an illegitimate, extrajudicial demonstration of state 
retaliation disguised as “official punishment.”369  
The customary treatment of journalists as conspirators also received harsh critics. 
“Is there any actual conspiracy [involving the press]?” wondered El Relator. “No. There is 
                                                
368 “Sofismas políticos;” and Adarve Calle, “La ley,” 158 and 160. 
 
369 “E pur si mouve,” El Relator, March 5, 1888. 
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discussion. A discussion allowed by the law, accepted by civilization under the form of 
custom, and sometimes provoked by the government.” To the newspaper, the government 
was unable –or simply unwilling– to take part in this discussion, and only responded to it 
by “pushing laws aside.” Anytime a newspaper confronted the government, authorities 
“requested the barracks a ‘constitutional help’ consisting of a corporal and four soldiers.” 
All it took was a verbal order to make these “representantes del derecho social” put the 
challenging journalists in prison or on their way to exile. The government celebrated the 
strike and presented it as an unveiled conspiracy. Yet, El Relator insisted, there was no 
conspiracy involving the press. Even further, the acts of a newspaper at no point could 
entail a single trace of conspiracy. “To conspire means to secretly get together to overthrow 
the government. Newspapers are public by nature […] therefore there is nothing more 
unfair than accusing a paper of conspiring.” A newspaper can be “revolutionary, seditious, 
immoral, deceitful, exaggerated, ardent, etc., but never conspirator, because nothing that is 
published in a paper […] can be secret,” El Relator stressed. Accusing writers of 
conspiracy then, meant shrouding them “with atrocities, delusions, [and] crimes, and 
justifying a priori all measures, all proceedings applied against them.”370  
 Conservative leaders did not hesitate in discrediting Liberal complains on the 
matter. Carlos Holguín, president between 1888 and 1892, maintained for instance that 
Liberal denunciations were unfair and exaggerated. During his administration, he recalled 
in 1893, arrests of journalists had been minimal, involving just four or five individuals that 
had refused to pay their corresponding fines. Their arrests indeed had concluded as soon 
                                                
370 “Sofismas políticos” 
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as they decided to pay. It was also false that, during his administration, the press had 
remained muzzled. During this time, he pointed out, liberals had in fact flooded the nation 
with newspapers, leaflets, and other publications “in which they said whatever they wanted 
with no respect for truth or decency.” After all, they only wanted “to maintain the nation 
in constant agitation, […] fostering unrest and mistrust.”371 There were suspensions of 
newspapers and fines, of course, but many of them responded to the insistence of Liberals 
in re-opening papers as soon as the authorities ordered their shut down. His alleged abuses 
had only consisted in “seven temporary suspensions and twelve fines in a period of four 
years in which newspapers from the opposition had multiplied by the dozen.”372 Many of 
these punished publications were, in Holguín’s account, “nothing but hideous pamphlets 
(pasquines inmundos).” The former president also denied that his government had sent 
Conto and Esguerra into exile. While it was true that they had left the country, they had 
done so voluntarily. “Mr. Conto […] left [Colombia] so exiled that he even came to my 
house and said good bye.”373 
 Repression against subversive journalism after the Thousand Days revolved 
primarily around the prescriptions and penalties of the legislation of alta policía. A circular 
                                                
371 “Carta Décimasexta. Bogotá, Junio 3 de 1893,” in Holguín, Cartas, 274, 277, and 279. 
 
372 In Holguín’s account, the list of papers fined or temporarily suspended between 1888 and 1892 included 
one suspension in 1888; three suspensions and one fine in 1889; one suspension and three fines in 1890; two 
suspensions and 8 fines in 1891, including two fines against the same newspaper; and two fines in 1892. The 
newspapers in question included titles such as La Libertad, El Sagitario, El Precursor, El Amigo del Pueblo, 
El Eco Liberal, El Demócrata, El Gladiador, El Zancudo, La Nación, El Sufragio, El Relator and El Diario 
de Cundinamarca. From all these papers, El Diario de Cundinamarca experienced the greatest number of 
sanctions, with a fine in 1890, two more in 1891, and another one in 1892. See: “Carta Décimasexta,” 298-
300.  
 
373 “Carta Décimaséptima. Bogotá, Junio 10 de 1893,” in Holguín, Cartas, 298, 302, and 303-304. 
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from January 1905 illustrates the influence of these laws and decrees on the control and 
repression of “dangerous” press outlets. In the document, Reyes recommended all his 
governors, prefects, and military chiefs to ensure strict compliance with the prescriptions 
of the decree of alta policía, “especially in all matters regarding the press.” The circular 
ordered to punish with prison all individuals –journalists– that violated the regulations of 
alta policía  in that particular point.374  
 In correspondence with the spirit of this legislation, persecution of “subversive” 
press during the quinquenio primarily targeted newspapers that, in the view of the 
government, encouraged “resistance to the law” and fostered hatred among social classes. 
Those were, precisely, the arguments under which the government declared the newspaper 
El Faro “a publication highly dangerous for peace and public tranquility,” in June 1906.375 
The government had used similar pretexts in February 1905 to order the capture and 
confinement of six people, including the writers of the newspapers El Santo y Seña and 
Ensayos Republicanos. All of them had violated, “with subversive manifestations,” the 
decree of alta policía. The order underscored that the government could make no 
exceptions in this regard. Otherwise, “it would put at risk the nation’s reorganization and 
encourage tumultuous and “demagogical” scenes fostering civil war.”376 
 
                                                
374 “Circular de enero 2 de 1905 a gobernadores, jefes militares y prefectos,” in Constitución política de 
Colombia. 
 
375 Adarve Calle, “Gobernar, reformar y encarcelar,” 177. 
 
376 “Circular de febrero 15 de 1905 a gobernadores,” in Constitución política de Colombia. 
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The preventive control of subversive press during the Regeneration constantly swung 
between the legal domain of current normativity and the extrajudicial sphere of state 
retribution. There was a legislation on the press, and legal developments were more or less 
constant. Yet, the contents and prescriptions of this legislation still allowed a great degree 
of discretion in the definition and punishment of press crimes against society. A lack of 
formal judicial and procedural parameters for the prosecution and judgement of these 
offenses reinforced the legal insecurity ensuing. It was a legislation whose vagueness and 
grey areas could easily turn its enforcement into a sheer exercise of state power, as it 
happened many times before the Thousand Days –at least in the view of Liberal journalists. 
Legally entitled to define who and what was “subversive,” the governments of the period 
turned these laws into a political weapon for neutralizing and terrorizing their rivals. 
Opposition journalism became thus a modality of internal enmity, one according to which 
criticizing the government in a public manner was a political crime almost equivalent to 
rebellion or conspiracy. The close relationship among these three crimes emerges clearly 
out of the fact that state repression against journalists operated under the guise of a 
preventive struggle against rebellion and internal turmoil. Both in the Regeneration and the 
Porfiriato, the “preventive” criminalization of the press on the grounds of the defense or 
public order fostered a legal and practical identification between “the rebel” and the 
“opposition journalist.”  
 
Conclusions: The Many Faces of Prevention 
Preventing rebellion and internal turmoil in Colombia and Mexico was a complex and 
challenging endeavor that shaped diverse legal and judicial strategies. Those strategies 
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responded in each country to particular circumstances including political conflicts, partisan 
rivalries, reactions to specific measures and policies, and even legal and constitutional 
backgrounds. Different in their origins, preventive strategies in both cases had nonetheless 
several features in common.  
A first feature in this regard has to do with the fact that all these strategies had a 
legal nature, no matter how “informal” or “extraordinary” they were. They were the result 
of multiple acts of legislation: constitutional precepts, prescriptions from the criminal 
codes, formal legislative acts, executive orders, and emergency decrees. Although some of 
these acts could seem more “formal” and “constitutional” than others, they all represented, 
ultimately, manifestations of the same law-making will –the state’s law-making will.  
A second, more complex, feature is that these strategies configured in both 
countries regimes of “alternative legality” for the legal and judicial treatment of actual or 
potential threats against public order. These parallel regal regimes had their own sets of 
crimes and penalties, often independent from the prescriptions, limits, exceptions, and 
guarantees established in codes and constitutions. Overall, both countries seemed to share 
the conviction that the prevention of internal conflict was an objective whose importance 
and urgency was worth dodging the prescriptions, actors, and formalities of normal laws, 
tribunals, and authorities. Such conviction encouraged the creation of alternative 
jurisdictional spheres that put defendants outside the reach of formal law and the ordinary 
justice system. This plurality of jurisdictions for the management of public order and the 
“preventive” treatment of political criminality reveals that state’s legal logics for the 
prevention and repression of political offenders were neither monolithic nor a monopoly 
of a single institution or authority. Even when these logics seemed to be almost completely 
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subordinated to the Executive power, no single power, authority, or jurisdiction could claim 
an absolute monopoly over them. Problems concerning the monopoly of the functions of 
state repression were particularly drastic in the Mexican case, in which state authorities 
partially handed the administration of repression to private armies.  
 A third feature of these strategies refers to the characteristics of the “alternative 
legalities” they shaped. Their conditions of criminalization were most of the time vague, 
as were their criminal categories and the conditions for the administration and gradation of 
penalties. The legislation backing these regimes was full of abstract notions and grey areas 
that allowed for great degrees of discretion in the interpretation and application of the law. 
They were also legal regimes that relied heavily on the decisions and initiatives of the 
Executive power, even against the principle of independence of the judicial branch. 
Whether through direct, sanctioned intervention (Colombia) or through indirect 
manipulation (Mexico), the criminalization, prosecution, and judgement of threats against 
public order became primarily a political matter in the hands of the government and its 
agents. This political “twist” helps explain the fourth characteristic of the strategies in 
question: the political instrumentalization that these “alternative legalities” experienced in 
both countries. Governments in Colombia and Mexico applied this legislation not only to 
contain the outbreak of civil warfare and extinguish real threats against public order, but 
also to keep political dissidence in check through the criminalization of its actions, even 
manufacturing artificial political plots if needed.  
 The twofold use of this legality had major political and legal consequences in both 
countries. It dissolved in practice the distinctions among “preventing civil warfare,” 
“protecting a regime’s stability,” and “repressing political opposition.” Practices such as 
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charging dissidents with “conspiracy against public order” and treating them as “rebellion 
suspects” made possible the practical identification between one purpose and the others. 
Criminalizing opponents on the grounds of political charges –this is, treating dissenters as 
potential political criminals– allowed governments to legitimate political repression under 
the pretexts of safeguarding public order, preventing civil war, and protecting public 
authorities. It was a legal way of legitimizing not only the penalization of dissent, but also 
the application of a series of repressive and punitive practices that drifted away from what 
constitutions and codes prescribed regarding the limits of state power and state retribution. 
These practices furthered a systematic transformation of prevailing legal notions of internal 
enmity and political criminality, and extended the repertoire of possibilities according to 
which authorities could consider a dissident an “internal enemy.” Legal, judicial, and 
administrative responses to “dangerous” dissidence and threats against public order 
reinvented time and again the sphere of political crimes. Reinventions included the 
politicization of common offenses like slander, the treatment of “conspiracy” as a political 
crime in itself, and the conversion of a long series of acts of dissent and protest into crimes 
against public order and the government.  
 Beyond these similarities, preventive strategies in Colombia and Mexico had their 
own particularities. In Colombia, for instance, they were subject of multiple and constant 
legal developments. Developments in Mexico had less to do with matters of legislation 
than with issues of judicial practice and habits. The legal and judicial monopoly of public 
order issues by the Executive in Colombia deprived dissidents from legal and judicial 
protections that their Mexican counterparts could still enjoy. Despite their manipulation by 
the government, Mexico’s justice system still offered defendants ways of finding 
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protection against state vengeance. This does not mean that “preventive” repression in 
Mexico was less intense, more legalistic, or more constitutional than it was in Colombia. 
The Mexican case, in fact, involved significant displays of illegality, extrajudiciality, and 
unconstitutionality, and was marked by displays of state retribution that, in more than one 
occasion, went way beyond the limits of the rule of law. Preventive acts and displays of 
state power were mutable, involving different legal and judicial responses in different 
moments. The workings of repression in Colombia during the quinquenio were different 
from what they were before the Thousand Days, for the end of the war brought important 
transformations on the nature and dynamics of political conflict. In Mexico, state 
repression became more intense, informal, and less law-bounded in the first decade of the 
1900s, with the reorganization of the Liberal party and the wave of uprisings that predated 
the Mexican revolution. 
 What do these strategies, measures, and displays of state power reveal about the 
legal prevention of internal warfare in the Regeneration and the Porfiriato? The Colombian 
and Mexican experiences show that “prevention” was a complex notion, linked to different 
yet interconnected objectives. It could mean prevention of rebellion, civil warfare, and 
internal conflict. It could also mean control of a subversive or incendiary press, as well as 
neutralization of criminal or potentially criminal political dissidence. It could equally mean 
deterrence of threats and attacks against public order and the government; surveillance of 
the legality of the acts of the opposition; and even restriction to its capacity of hurting 
established governments by military or electoral means. Here, the prevention of internal 
warfare, the protection of public order, and the preservation of governments and regimes 
seemed to be equivalent concerns –if not interchangeable. Within such a context, was there 
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a “pure,” non-instrumental, non-politicized notion of prevention? Judging from the 
Colombian and Mexican cases, it is difficult to imagine such a notion outside the purely 
theoretical sphere of the law. What both countries had, in practice, was a series of strategies 
of “preventive” political repression, and sometimes sheer displays of state power disguised 
as “preemptive” measures. Legal and judicial campaigns against plots and conspiracies –
real or imaginary– easily turned into offensives against “dangerous” and uncomfortable 
dissidents –sometimes against entire rival parties. Often, “prevention” and “repression” 
simply operated like two sides of the same legal and political endeavor.  
 At least two factors contributed to this practical equivalence between prevention 
and repression. The first, most obvious one, refers to the political instrumentalization of 
these preventive strategies, evidenced for instance in the political uses of press legislation 
and the imprisonment, as conspirators, of opposition journalists. The second one has to do 
with the many grey areas that legislation on public order entailed. The lack of clear 
parameters to define what “public order” was, what “subversive acts” were, and what 
represented “crimes against authorities and the public order,” made this legislation a carte 
blanche for the criminalization of everybody the government wanted to target. Such 
criminalization came particularly in handy within contexts of revolutionary alarm, high 
political tension, or strong electoral competition. These responses and strategies closely 
paralleled the repertoire of legal and judicial measures with which governments in 
Colombia and Mexico reacted to actual episodes of rebellion and civil warfare, as the next 
chapter illustrates. 
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VI. CHAPTER 5. THE MANY FACES OF STATE RETRIBUTION: 
GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES TO POLITICAL CRIMINALITY IN TIMES 
OF REBELLION AND CIVIL WAR 
 
Perhaps no other Colombian liberal in the 1890s had a career remotely similar to that of 
Rafael Uribe Uribe.377 One of the most prominent leaders of the Liberal Party throughout 
the decade, Uribe Uribe was a Congressman, a journalist, a political agitator, and a rebel 
leader during the wars of 1895 and 1899-1902. All these roles granted him multiple 
opportunities to speak out against the Regeneration, the policies of the Nationalist 
administrations, and the political exclusion that his party had suffered since the mid-1880s. 
His multiple actions as a dissident leader, together with his constant attacks against the 
Conservative regime, earned him an official persecution that extended from the office of 
his newspaper, El Autonomista, to the battlefields during the Thousand Days. As political 
agitator and opposition journalist, Uribe Uribe experienced the consequences of the 
regime’s “preventive endeavors,” which for him included a short prison term and the 
shutting down of his paper, right before the events of October 1899. As one of the three 
major rebel generals during the Thousand Days, he became a high-priority military target. 
Political and military authorities alike made him subject not only to the customary penalties 
that Colombian laws established for rebellion and other political crimes, but also to 
additional punishments including the death penalty. Uribe Uribe, nonetheless, managed to 
                                                
377 On Rafael Uribe Uribe’s career, see Bergquist, Café y conflicto, 84-92. 
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survive the conflict. His negotiated rendition in October 1902 represented the first step 
towards the peace treaties that, a month later, put an end to the Thousand Days. 
As one of the most versatile dissident leaders of his time, Uribe Uribe had to 
experience both the effects of the “preventive” ventures of the Regeneration and the force 
of the government’s repressive responses to the 1899 movement. His case, although 
special, was not exceptional. Many other dissidents in Colombia and Mexico –included 
Ricardo Flores Magón– also fell victim of this double logic of criminalization, either 
because they switched from unarmed to armed modalities of dissidence or because their 
governments simply believed they had. How different were those two experiences? What 
differences separated the regime’s legal efforts to prevent rebellion from its legal strategies 
to repress and neutralize actual rebel movements? Were there any substantial distinctions 
between the logics of “prevention” and those of “repression”? Moreover, what did 
“repression” mean? What characterized its logics? Addressing these questions requires 
complementing the previous reflections on the dynamics of prevention with a closer look 
to the logics of repression both in the Mexican Porfiriato and the Colombian regeneration. 
 
Many of the initiatives that characterized the prevention of rebellion in Mexico and 
Colombia were also present in their respective responses to actual episodes of insurrection 
and civil warfare. Reactions to rebellion shared with these preventive measures their 
reliance on legislation, their tendency towards the construction of alternative legalities, 
their realignment of jurisdictional spheres, and their propensity to criminalize political 
dissent. This chapter reconstructs and analyzes the various repressive responses that 
Mexican and Colombian authorities gave to rebellion and revolutionary movements during 
 260 
the period. How much did these responses rely on legislation and justice administration? 
How did governments use the law and the justice system as mechanisms of punishment 
against rebels and revolutionaries? How “legal” and “judicial” were these responses, and 
to what extent did they combine both legal and extra-legal punitive practices? What do 
these practices reveal about the nature and workings of state retribution against internal 
enmity both during the Regeneration and the Porfiriato? Drawing on these questions, the 
chapter reflects on the ways in which these governments treated rebels and other political 
criminals, the punitive practices through which state retribution unfolded, and the multiple 
meanings that internal enmity acquired in this context.  
 The chapter draws on a variety of materials. Primary sources include court-cases 
and judicial archival sources; laws and decrees; legal and political essays; memoires and 
correspondence; political manifestos; legal and political essays; and, newspapers. 
Secondary sources include studies on rebellions in Mexico and Colombia during the period. 
Section one explores the Mexican experience through an analysis of the role of ordinary 
courts, national and trans-national strategies of law enforcement, and extra-legal 
punishment practices in the Porfirian responses to a series of rebellions occurred between 
the late-1870s and the mid-1900s. Section two looks at Colombia and offers an analysis of 
governmental responses to rebellion during the Thousand Days War. It pays attention to 
the roles of executive legislation, the justice system, international law, and a series of 
extrajudicial repression practices in the shaping of logics of state retribution in the late-
nineteenth century. Section three offers some concluding remarks concerning the roles of 
“legality” and “extra-legality” in the logics of state repression in Mexico and Colombia, 
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and about the nature of political offenses as criminal categories during the Porfiriato and 
the Regeneration.  
Governmental responses to rebellion in Mexico and Colombia encompassed a 
variety of legal, political, and military purposes that demanded a combination of both 
“legal” and “non-legal” measures. State retribution, in consequence, was as formal and 
legalistic as it was informal and extralegal. In times of internal turmoil, it unfolded 
simultaneously in the legislation, in the justice system, in the courts, and both within and 
outside battlefields. It involved not only actual rebels and active combatants but also 
internal enemies of all sorts –armed or not. Differences in the nature of political conflict 
and the evolution of revolutionary movements shaped important distinctions between the 
Colombian and the Mexican experiences. Although repression in both cases was strongly 
legalistic, the “legality of retribution” in Colombia involved greater degrees of 
exceptionality than in the Mexican case, for instance. Regardless these differences, 
responses to rebellion in both countries turned political offenses into a flexible criminal 
category in which crimes and punishments were mutable and subject to constant 
redefinitions.  
 
Responding to Rebellion in Mexico: Justice, Retribution, and Sovereignty during the 
Porfiriato 
Governmental responses to rebellion and internal turmoil in Porfirian Mexico involved a 
set of strategies of state punishment and retribution that combined legal and judicial 
practices with extralegal and extrajudicial means. These practices not only extended 
throughout the Mexican territory but also beyond. The particularities of political conflict 
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during the late Porfiriato would turn the regime’s legal war against insurrection into a trans-
border endeavor tending to ensure the punishment of antiporfirista rebels both in Mexico 
and the United States. This singularity made the legal treatment of political criminality in 
Mexico not only a matter of law enforcement and justice administration, but also an issue 
of international diplomacy and bilateral relationships. This “trans-nationality” not only 
involved Díaz’s “formal” and judicial responses to rebellion: it extended as well to his 
regime’s extralegal and extrajudicial practices of punishment and repression. This section 
examines and analyzes the diversity of governmental responses to rebellion during the 
Porfiriato by grouping them into three categories: justice administration, trans-national law 
enforcement strategies, and extralegal practices of state retribution.  
 
Rebellion and Justice Administration in Porfirian Mexico. 
Justice administration in cases of rebellion and insurrection during the Porfiriato 
corresponded predominantly to ordinary courts and relied on the prescriptions of the 
Criminal Code. The judgement of rebels and other political criminals commonly fell on 
federal judges or Jueces de distrito, in accordance with the assumption that crimes against 
public order always represented federal offenses. This position, grounded on a law from 
1856 that turned all acts of rebellion and sedition into federal crimes, maintaining that all 
disturbances of public order, regardless their scope, always affected general interests that 
concerned the whole nation.378 Trials against rebels and other armed antiporfiristas often 
                                                
378 The state or provincial counterparts of the jueces de distrito were the jueces de letras. For an example of 
a conflict of jurisdiction between jueces de distrito and jueces de letras concerning the judgement of rebels, 
see: SCJ, 1885, Expediente sin número: “Problema de competencia en la causa contra Teodoro Real y 
Eutimio García,” which makes reference to the mentioned law from 1856.  
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involved processes combining both common and political crimes, although cases 
exclusively dealing with political charges were not uncommon. Political offenses included 
rebellion, sedition, conspiracy, and “attacks against public order.” Common crimes 
involved, primarily, homicide and different forms of robbery.  
 Judicial decisions tended to vary depending on the type of crime in question and 
the nature of the people involved. Direct, first-instance acquittals were scarce, and seemed 
to be reserved for light modalities of political criminality and low-profile political 
offenders. That was the case, for instance, of Ramón Granados, processed in 1879 for 
“insurrection and attacks against public order.” The prosecution accused Granados of being 
part of a recent insurrectionist movement, a charge that in the judge’s opinion was not 
“criminal” enough to earn him a prison sentence. The trial ended with Granados’s acquittal. 
Although the prosecution appealed, a second-instance judge confirmed the decision, with 
the subsequent support of the Supreme Court.379 That was also the case of a small group of 
people involved in the failed insurrectionist movement of mid-1908. Despite being part of 
a larger process for conspiracy and rebellion against important members of the Liberal 
Party in Oaxaca, they managed to obtain a first-instance acquittal due to their lack of 
political value.380 Sometimes a defendant had to wait for a second-instance judicial 
decision, as happened to Sabas Lomelí in the late 1870s. Facing an initial sentence of five 
                                                
379 SCJ, 1879, Expediente 0: “Toca a la causa contra Ramón Granados o Polanco por rebelión.” 
 
380 SCJ, 1908, Expediente 37: “Toca a la causa e incidente de libertad en la averiguación contra Plutarco 
Gallegos.”	
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years in prison for conspiracy, Lomelí appealed the decision and an appealsjudge granted 
him conditional release under the authorities’ surveillance.381 
 High-profile rebels, even if they only faced charges for political crimes, faced a 
more complicated situation. In 1901, a process against the rebel Colonel Donaciano 
González and his fellows in arms ended up in irrevocable prison sentences. González had 
been on the authorities’ radar since 1897, when he took part in the rebellion of Canuto Neri 
in the state of Guerrero, and was finally captured in November 1899.382 A judge sentenced 
him to six years in prison as “principal responsible for the crime of rebellion,” and gave 
ten of his people a couple years of the same penalty as accomplices. Although González 
appealed and tried to obtain a shorter prison sentence, a second-instance judge ratified the 
initial decision. He would die in prison before his process came to a definitive 
conclusion.383 Something similar happened in 1908 to Plutarco Gallegos, Miguel Maraver, 
and Gaspar Allende, arrested in 1906 under charges of rebellion and conspiracy and 
processed in 1908 by a tribunal in Oaxaca. Active antiporfirista journalists and agitators,384 
Gallegos and Maraver received, together with Allende, prison penalties of over a year plus 
fines ranging from 800 to 1,000 pesos. Although the three of them appealed the decision 
and obtained a sentence revision, the new sentence introduced insignificant modifications 
                                                
381 AGNM, Secretaría de Justicia, Caja 93, Expediente 54: “Causa contra Sabas Lomelí.” 
 
382 “Un mesías de nuevo cuño,” El Xinantecatl, October 10, 1897; and “El levantamiento en el estado de 
Guerrero,” El Chisme, November 30, 1899. 
 
383 SCJ, 1901, Expediente 165: “Causa contra el coronel Donaciano González, Manuel Soto, Manuel 
Pastrana, Manuel Salinas, Isidro Valladares y socios acusados del delito de rebelión ;” and “Muerte del 
Coronel Donaciano González,” La Voz de México, May 19, 1901.  
 
384 On Gallegos and Maraver, see: “Persecuciones cobardes,” Regeneración, July 1, 1906; “El 18 de julio en 
Oaxaca,” Regeneración, August 5, 1905; and “Oaxaca,” El Diario del Hogar, March 20, 1908. 
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to the original penalties.385 Ángel Barrios, another agitator from Oaxaca who faced charges 
of conspiracy in 1907, would receive a similar sentence. Barrios would not succeed either 
in obtaining a significant sentence reduction after his appeal in 1908.386  
 Rebels facing trials for both political and common crimes would face even more 
complicated situations. Combined charges often hindered acquittals, gave judges 
additional reasons to punish rebels, and, like in Colombia, allowed tribunals to sentence 
political offenders to death. The cases of Tomás Sánchez in 1886, and Pascual Reyes and 
his fellows in arms in 1906, exemplify the first situation. Tomás Sánchez, together with 11 
more people, appeared before a federal judge in Guadalajara under charges of conspiracy, 
robbery, and homicide. The judge dismissed the conspiracy charges in all the cases, which 
made possible the acquittal of eight of the defendants. Sánchez, nonetheless, also faced 
charges for stealing a horse, and he and two more people charged with homicide had to 
remain linked to the process and wait for their sentencing as common criminals.387 Pascual 
Reyes’s case illustrates an opposite situation. Reyes, together with eight more people, 
appeared before a tribunal in San Luis Potosí under charges of rebellion and “association 
to commit attacks against property.” Unlike the previous case, a judge declared them 
innocent of the common crime charge and issued sentence exclusively on the grounds of 
their political crime. The sentence gave Reyes eight years of prison as “author” or leader, 
gave other four people prison terms of over a year, and punished two “accomplices” with 
                                                
385 SCJ, 1908, Expediente 37: “Toca a la causa e incidente” 
 
386 SCJ, 1908, Expediente 115: “Toca a la causa seguida contra el ingeniero Ángel Barrios.” 
 
387 SCJ, 1886, Expediente 152: “Toca a la causa contra Tomás Sánchez y socios por rebelión.” 
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eight months of the same penalty. Reyes would appeal the decision and obtain a substantive 
sentence reduction that would set him free in 1910.388 
 The trials against some of the antiporfiristas arrested after the failed insurrection of 
September 1906 offer additional details of how judges administered justice when dealing 
with both common and political crimes. The process against Juan Sarabia and other 15 
people in January 1907 offers a first example in this regard. Sarabia was the director of the 
oppositionist newspaper Regeneración, and had entered the state of Chihuahua from the 
United States with a group of Liberal agitators exiled north of the border. Once in México, 
the party tried to raid Ciudad Juarez’ custom house, with no success.389 Authorities from 
the state charged the party with rebellion and other federal crimes of a common nature. A 
judge declared Sarabia, together with Cesar E. Canales and Vicente de la Torre, guilty of 
the crimes of attempted homicide, attempted robbery of federal funds, and attempted 
destruction of public buildings. Each received between five and seven years of prison. In 
addition, the judge sentenced Sarabia, Canales, and de la Torre on “conspiracy for 
rebellion” and gave them an extra penalty consisting of a fine of 500 pesos. As an 
opposition journalist, Sarabia would also receive a third penalty for slandering President 
Díaz, and had to pay a second, much larger fine.390 
                                                
388 SCJ, 1908, Expediente 776: “Toca a la causa contra Pascual Reyes y Vicente Cedillo por el delito de 
rebelión.” 
 
389 “El proceso instruido a Sarabia y socios,” La Patria, January 5, 1907; and “Captura de bandidos en la 
frontera,” El Contemporáneo, October 25, 1906. 
 
390 AGNM, Secretaría de Justicia, Caja 593, Expediente 76: “Sobre Juan Sarabia y socios procesados por 
rebelión y otros delitos.” 
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 The rest of the defendants included in the process would face more lenient penalties. 
Some of them received prison penalties over a year, as responsible in a lower degree of the 
mentioned crime of conspiracy. The judge would even acquit six people for lack of 
evidence. The sentence concluded with the petition requesting the extradition of the exiled 
Liberal leaders Ricardo Flores Magón and Antonio Villareal. By March 1907, authorities 
had sent all defendants to the infamous prison of San Juan de Ulúa, where one of them, 
Francisco Guevarra, would die of tuberculosis. Although all defendants appealed the 
decision, a second-instance judge confirmed the sentence in October that year.391 
 The second example from the events of 1906 has to do with the trial of Abraham 
Salcedo and Bruno Triviño, members of a Liberal club in Metcalf, Arizona, and leaders of 
a raid against the custom house of Nogales, Sonora.392 The process against them included 
a total of 18 people, all of them charged with crimes of conspiracy and robbery. In May 
1907, a judge from Querétaro sentenced Salcedo and Triviño as recidivist conspirators, and 
gave them both 8 years in prison and a costly fine of 2000 pesos. Triviño, additionally 
charged with property damage, would receive an additional penalty of seven months in 
prison. Lázaro Puente, whom authorities accused of “formally inviting several people to 
commit conspiracy,” would receive over seven years in prison plus an even larger fine. 
Eight more people, processed as co-authors of the same crime, would face prison sentences 
between five and six years, with additional fines ranging from 500 to 1800 pesos. Some of 
the defendants appealed, and by December 1907 obtained important sentence reductions. 
                                                
391 AGNM, Secretaría de Justicia, Caja 593, Expediente 76: “Sobre Juan Sarabia.” 
 
392 “Arresto de malhechores mexicanos,” El Tiempo, September 7, 1906. Additional references to Salcido 
and Triviño appear in the documents regarding the capture of Félix Rubalcaba: AGNM, Secretaría de Justicia, 
Caja 552, Expediente A: “Sobre causa de Félix Rubalcaba y socios.” 
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A second-instance judge took two years off Salcedo’s and Triviño’s sentences and reduced 
the amount of their fines. Other petitioners would receive reductions of a year and 
equivalent discounts in their corresponding fines.393 
 The combination of common and political crimes in a process for rebellion could 
lead to particular penalties like the one that authorities from Veracruz tried to impose on 
Palemón Riveroll in December 1906. Riveroll was the alleged ringleader of a Liberal 
uprising that had taken place in Ixhuatlán in October that year. During the uprising, 
Riveroll and his people stole the funds of the town’s city hall and ordered the forced 
collection of a sum of money among the inhabitants. Soon after the raid, the town’s 
authorities requested the tribunal in charge of judging Riveroll for rebellion and robbery to 
open a parallel process against him, this time for civil responsibility regarding his illegal 
“collection” of money. The request included a list of 41 vecinos that claimed for 
compensation, each claim ranging from two to two thousand pesos. The total of 
reclamations amounted to 7,358 pesos. They all manifested their wish for Riveroll to 
“return” all the money he had stolen.394 The incident with the people from Ixhuatlán did 
not mark the end of Riveroll’s career as a rebel. By the outbreak of the Mexican revolution, 
he had become a well-known “magonista” with some influence in Veracruz. Authorities 
would capture him again in September 1911 under charges of rebellion.395 
                                                
393 SCJ, 1908, Expediente 757: “Toca a la causa contra Ricardo Flóres Magón, Epifanio Vieira y Abraham 
Salcedo.” 
 
394 AGNM, Secretaría de Justicia, Caja 596, Expediente 446: “Incidente del movimiento revolucionario 
iniciado en Ixhuatlán.” 
 
395 “Continúan las persecuciones contra los presuntos magonistas,” El Diario del Hogar, September 19, 1911. 
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 Combined charges of political and common nature could also lead to death 
sentences, as illustrated by the case of the half-bandit, half-rebel Juan Galeana. Galeana 
had started his criminal career as a low-profile bandit in the state of Guerrero, somewhere 
in the 1880s. In April 1899, his participation in a couple of bandit rides in the district of 
Tecoanapa put him on the radar of Ayutla’s political chief, José Pandal. Pandal started an 
intense but unsuccessful persecution against Galeana, who reacted by attempting twice 
against the chief’s life, once in December 1889 and again in February 1890. The second 
attack included a raid on Ayutla that ended up with a series of robberies and the 
assassination of Pandal. In a letter to the state governor, Galeana and his people presented 
the raid as an act of “popular justice,” by claiming that all they wanted was to liberate the 
town from the chief’s iron fist. The events of February 1890 made Galeana a primary target 
of the federal army. Feeling cornered, Galeana joined the forces of the rebel Cornelio 
Álvarez, and together they launched a frustrated rebellion whose first and only episode was 
an attack in April that year against the town of Cautepec. The rebels executed the local 
judge, ransacked a few houses, and kidnapped a couple people. Díaz’s aggressive response 
to the rebellion forced the rebel movement to disband, and after a few months the federal 
army had either shot down or arrested the bulk of its members.396 
 The process against Galeana, Álvarez, and their people would extend for almost 
two years, involving more than 120 people and encompassing all the events from April 
1899 to April 1890. On May 31, 1899, a first-instance judge sentenced Galeana and 
                                                
396 Pedimento y réplica del promotor fiscal del tribunal de circuito… en la causa instruida contra Juan 
Galeana y socios por los delitos de asonada, rebelión, sedición y otros cometidos en varios distritos del 
Estado de Guerrero (México: Secretaría de Fomento, 1892), 3-14; and Salazar Adame, “Movimientos,” 113-
115. 
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Álvarez to death as principal authors of a series of crimes that included rebellion, sedition, 
asonada, injuries, and homicide. Four more defendants also received death sentences for 
their participation in the executions of Pandal and Cautepec’s judge. About 30 people 
received prison sentences between 10 and 20 years, whether as authors or accomplices of 
the multiple attacks addressed in the process. Five additional people, accused of hiding and 
protecting Galeana, received 22 months in prison. The judge acquitted the rest of the 
defendants.397 Galeana’s defense appealed the sentence by criticizing the way in which the 
prosecutor had classified the crimes. To the prosecutor, Galeana and his people were 
responsible for both political and common crimes. Political crimes included sedition, 
related to the attack on February 1890, and rebellion, related to the events in Cautepec. All 
the previous incidents represented nothing but acts of common criminality, with no 
political meaning whatsoever. The defense, on the contrary, claimed that all the offenses 
in question were part of a single, encompassing political crime. To them, all the events 
between April 1889 and February 1890 had been “preparatory steps” towards the major act 
of rebellion of April 1890. The robberies, murders, and kidnappings in questions 
represented simple connected crimes (delitos conexos) through which the major and 
continuous political crime had materialized.398 
 The defense’s argument did not convince the court, which insisted on processing 
Galeana, Álvarez, and their people for both political and common crimes. The second-
instance tribunal, nonetheless, did not ratify their death sentences, for it found several 
procedural irregularities in the initial organization of the process. There were no autopsies 
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398 Pedimento y réplica, 81-83. 
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on the people that the rebels murdered during their incursions, and therefore there were no 
formal proofs of the victims’ assassination. According to Mexican law, a judge could not 
sentence a murder suspect to death if there were no sufficient proofs of the crime. The 
tribunal, then, had no option but commuting the sentence in all cases. It was already 
December 1892 when the court finished the revision of the original sentence and agreed to 
modify the bulk of the initial penalties. The new judge gave Galeana 20 years of prison. 
Álvarez and the rest of the defendants sentenced to death received between nine and ten 
years of the same penalty. Many of the people that initially received 10 years now faced 
between two and six years. The judge also acquitted about a dozen more people.399 
Although Galeana’s life was spared, he would die in San Juan de Ulúa when a high tide 
conveniently flooded his underground cell and drowned him.400 
 Galeana’s story deserves special attention because it comprises some of the most 
important features that characterized the administration of justice in cases of rebellion 
during the Porfiriato. First, it illustrates how judges dosed the application of state 
punishment in correspondence with the crimes in question, the kind of criminals involved, 
and their high- or low-profiles as internal enemies or disturbers of public order. Second, it 
sheds light on how the justice system understood political and common crimes, and used 
the combination of both kinds of offenses as a judicial tool for re-criminalizing rebels and 
ensuring their effective and exemplary punishment. Finally, it reveals that, regardless of 
the functioning of the justice system as enforcer of state retribution, tribunals and courts 
still offered defendants some guarantees and protections in correspondence with the 
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Constitution and the law. As in the Colombian case, legal and procedural formalities 
mattered, and rebels could find in them a way to protect themselves against unbridled 
displays of state retribution. The workings of second-instance tribunals and the Supreme 
Court of Justice would prove crucial in this regard.  
 When it came to requests of protection of constitutional and procedural guarantees 
in cases of rebellion, Mexico’s Supreme Court dealt with much more than appeals and 
sentence revisions. Petitions before the high tribunal could also make reference to conflicts 
of jurisdiction, for instance. In October 1885, the rebels Teodoro Roel and Eutimio García 
requested the Supreme Court to solve a jurisdictional dispute between Monterrey’s juzgado 
de letras and Nuevo Leon’s juzgado de distrito about the management of their case. The 
tribunal would solve the dispute in favor of the latter institution, as the petitioners wanted, 
for it was a federal tribunal and rebellions were federal crimes.401 Later on, in January 
1886, Roel and García would address the Supreme Court once more, this time requesting 
an amparo on the grounds that the authority that had ordered their apprehension was not 
legally competent to do it. This time, nonetheless, the high tribunal would not favor them 
and defended the legality of the proceeding.402 A petition from March 1899 by Ignacio 
Brito would address analogous concerns. Brito, an alleged member of Donaciano 
González’s army, claimed that his process had been deadlocked for three months because 
no authority knew which jurisdiction should take care of his case. He would also maintain 
that his imprisonment was illegal, since the authorities that put him in prison had apparently 
violated several procedural rules. While the Supreme Court helped the petitioner regarding 
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402 “Jurisprudencia federal – Juzgado de distrito de Nuevo León,” El Foro, January 20, 1886. 
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his jurisdictional problem, it decided that there was no procedural irregularity in his 
imprisonment and ordered to keep him in jail.403 
 Other petitions involved complains about the slow development of judicial 
processes, as the case of Rafael Mosqueda illustrates.404 In 1890, Mosqueda took part in a 
frustrated rebellion in Guanajuato, and a result of this paid three years of prison in the town 
of Celaya. His freedom did not last much, for he still had an ongoing process for rebellion 
and robbery in the same state. In September 1896, authorities imprisoned Mosqueda once 
again while this second process concluded and a judge dictated the corresponding sentence. 
In January 1899, still in prison, Mosqueda decided to file a claim before the Supreme Court 
in order to speed up the long-awaited judicial decision. According to the petitioner, nine 
years had passed since his first imprisonment, and his judicial situation was still unclear. 
The tribunal declared itself unable to help Mosqueda with his request. All he obtained was 
an explanation as to why his process was taking that long. Apparently, the process in 
question involved a large number of people responsible for the events in Guanajuato, many 
of them current fugitives. Anytime authorities made a new arrest, they had to stop the 
process and add new material to the file, already consisting of 941 pages. The fact that the 
records had to go from one town to another anytime a new arrest was made compounded 
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404 Apparently, judicial processes in cases of rebellion were commonly slow and cumbersone. Both trials and 
sentence revisions would take several years. The process against Pablo Mandujano and other 11 rebel supects 
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the situation. The explanation, in short, gave Mosqueda no hopes of a prompt solution to 
his prolonged imprisonment.405 
 A final example sheds additional light on the variety of claims that political 
prisoners would file before the Supreme Court in alleged defense of their constitutional 
guarantees. In June 1894, Aniceto Villareal, a participant in Catarino Garza’s armed 
expedition, wrote the high tribunal a letter denouncing a juez de distrito from Nuevo Laredo 
for violating his right to a defense. According to Villareal, the judge had refused to accept 
the lawyer he had appointed, Antonio Martínez Cáceres. The refusal was grounded on the 
fact that Martínez Cáceres was under preventive imprisonment in the same town since May 
that year, facing charges for rebellion as well. The judge maintained that he had not violated 
Villareal’s right to a defense. The defendant had always been able to present all the 
evidence he wanted, and had complete freedom to appoint any other lawyer as long as he 
did not have any sort of legal impediment. Ultimately, despite the judge’s opposition, 
Villareal would be finally able to appoint his fellow rebel as his lawyer. Martínez Cáceres 
was still awaiting sentence, and therefore was able to exercise his civil rights.406 Villareal’s 
defense, nonetheless, would prove incapable to save him from the severity of state 
retribution. The tribunal in charge of his case sentenced him to death in August 1898, on 
charges of rebellion, robbery, homicide, kidnapping, and arson. Villareal remained in 
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prison until 1901. In May that year, after filing a petition of amparo, he decided to stop 
waiting for the Supreme Court’s intervention and escaped from prison.407 
On the whole, the administration of justice in cases of rebellion during the Porfiriato 
reveals a dynamic of state punishment that relied heavily on the logics of the ordinary 
justice system.408 It was also a dynamic that, instead of transforming current legislation and 
attempting to craft its own –like in the Colombian case–, maintained a great degree of 
correspondence with the existing legislation. From this perspective, and compared with 
what would happen in Colombia, the Porfirian experience entailed a legal regime of 
punishment that had no extraordinary nature and involved higher degrees of stability and 
predictability. Regardless of their outcomes and the severity of their sentences, ordinary 
trials against rebels in the Porfiriato ensured a relatively consistent administration of state 
retribution, subject to clear laws and limited by concrete rules and guarantees. The regular 
administration of justice against rebels in Porfirian Mexico worked in two ways. First, it 
was a standard, formal practice for the application of state punishment in cases of internal 
enmity. Second, it represented a ritualized display of state retribution aiming to accentuate 
and reinforce state sovereignty over the nation’s internal enemies. Mexico’s justice system, 
nonetheless, did not exclusively work as a theater and instrument of state retribution. It 
also functioned as a mechanism through which rebels could find some sort of legal 
protection against state retribution. As the reviewed stories of appeals, sentence revisions, 
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and other claims before the Supreme Court illustrate, procedural formalities and 
constitutional guarantees mattered, and defendants used them strategically in their benefit, 
often with some degree of success. 
 
Extending Law Enforcement and Retribution Beyond the Mexican Territory. 
Diaz’s responses against Liberal rebels would extend state logics of justice, punishment, 
and repression beyond the territorial limits of the Mexican nation. The flight of many 
antiporfirista leaders and journalists in the early 1900 to the United States would make the 
northern country an important center of political agitation against the Porfiriato in the 
decade prior to the Mexican Revolution. This agitation would take different forms, 
including aggressive press campaigns directed at both American and Mexican publics, 
alliances with socialist and anarchist organizations north of the border, and even 
revolutionary conspiracies and armed incursions into Mexican territory.409 The trans-
nationalization of antiporfirismo would lead Díaz to, in turn, resort to additional strategies 
in order to hinder and neutralize the workings of opposition beyond the Mexican border 
and repress and prosecute trans-national rebel conspiracies and expeditions. Strategies 
would include requests for extradition and deportation of alleged rebels before American 
authorities, negotiations with American judges and prosecutors in order to ensure the 
criminalization and imprisonment of “dangerous” Mexican exiles, and even “forced 
deportations” of antiporfiristas. These responses would turn Diaz’s struggle against 
internal enmity into a trans-national campaign of law enforcement involving not only 
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Mexican authorities and diplomats but also American judges, prosecutors, and police 
forces. Such a combination of actors, strategies, and jurisdictions would provoke multiple 
clashes between Díaz’s strategies of legal and judicial repression and American practices 
of justice administration.  
 Governmental efforts for repressing Mexican rebels beyond the Mexican border 
preceded in fact the rise of trans-national antiporfirismo in the 1900s. The practice of 
requesting American authorities the extradition of political criminals exiled north of the 
border was already common in the early 1880s, as the case of Clodomiro Cota illustrates. 
The Mexican government requested the extradition of Cota and other two rebels in late 
1880. The way in which Mexican authorities made the request and tried to make their 
extradition possible provides a first example of Díaz’s most recurrent strategy for ensuring 
the return of political exiles to Mexico. A treaty from December 1861 regulated the practice 
of extradition between Mexico and the United States. Like many extradition treaties of the 
time, the 1861 treaty prohibited the extradition of political criminals and political refugees, 
restricting this practice only to common offenders. Mexican authorities, in consequence, 
faced the challenge of convincing their American counterparts that the people they 
requested were common criminals and not political offenders. Unable to request the 
extradition of Cota and his fellows on political grounds, Mexico’s government requested 
them on charges of robbery and kidnapping. The request took effect. The governor of 
California ordered the arrest of the three individuals and their delivery to Mexico’s consul 
in San Francisco. American authorities could only arrest Costa, who managed to file a writ 
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of habeas corpus right before his extradition to Mexico. The petition put Costa back under 
the protection of the American justice system and ultimately frustrated Mexico’s plan.410 
 The revolutionary expeditions of Francisco Ruiz Sandoval and Catarino Garza in 
the early 1890s would force Díaz to refine and strengthen his strategies for prosecuting 
rebels north of the border. Bernardo Reyes requested Laredo’s police the arrest of Ruiz 
Sandoval’s people right after their retreat to American territory in June 1890. Laredo’s 
forces captured and imprisoned them under charges of violation of neutrality laws, and 
prepared their prompt extradition to Mexico. After knowing that Reyes and Díaz planned 
on executing Ruiz Sandoval and his fellow rebels once they were in Mexican territory, an 
American prosecutor halted the process and handed the prisoners over to a tribunal in San 
Antonio, Texas. Although Ruiz Sandoval would be released on bail, Mexican authorities 
urged their American counterparts to put him back in jail. This time, the rebel leader would 
face a trial not only for violation of neutrality laws but also for common crimes including 
cattle rustling.411 The Mexican government would pay off a group of false witnesses whose 
testimonies were supposed to incriminate Ruiz Sandoval in all the crimes he was charged 
with. The court in charge of the case discovered the ruse and jailed many of the made-up 
witnesses for perjury. By the end of the trial, charges against Ruiz Sandoval had become 
completely political. The prosecution accused him of “[raising] a revolution and [plunging] 
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the people of Mexico into a horrid war.” The jury, nonetheless, found him not guilty, 
perhaps in consideration of the timid dimensions of his frustrated movement.412 
 Catarino Garza and his people faced a relatively similar experience after their 
insurrection in September 1891. Soon after Mexican and American troops disbanded the 
rebel movement on both sides of the border, Porfirian newspapers demanded the 
extradition of the rebels captured in the United States as common criminals.413 Claims for 
extradition did not find an echo, and the prosecution of the rebels in question remained in 
the hands of a tribunal in Texas. Between 1891 and 1892, about a hundred Garzistas would 
appear before a tribunal in San Antonio, after a federal grand jury accused them of violating 
neutrality laws. Throughout the process, the prosecution succeeded in proving that Garza 
and his people had organized a revolution against Mexico on Texas territory. The 
prosecutor tried to convince the jury to declare the defendants guilty with the argument that 
if American authorities did not restrain Garzista rebels, they would continue to organize 
similar armed incursions until unleashing a war between Mexico and the United States. 
The process against Garza’s people would extend until 1893, and conclude with prison 
sentences for all the rebels that authorities had captured by then. Sentences varied 
according to the involvement of the rebels in the movement, their degrees of criminal 
responsibility, and their chances of appointing and being able to afford American lawyers. 
Although prison terms ranged from one days to three years in jail, the average time of 
conviction for all Garzistas was between five and six months.414 
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 Compared to other past and future experiences, Garzista rebels faced a relatively 
less complicated situation. Mexican authorities did not formally push for extradition, and 
their trials only involved political charges. From the early twentieth century on, that would 
not be the case any longer. In 1905, Francisco de Paula Araujo experienced a situation that 
resembled the case of Ruiz Sandoval and his people. According a note El Colmillo Público 
published in May that year, Araujo was a political prisoner in the United States that 
Mexico’s government had recently targeted for extradition. The Mexican consul in 
Douglas, Arizona, had filed a first extradition request not long ago, but American 
authorities had refused to authorize the proceeding by arguing that Araujo was a political 
offender. Unable to have him back in Mexico on political charges, the Mexican government 
would come up with a new strategy. This time, they would press charges against Araujo 
for allegedly scamming a woman from Cananea, Sonora. To El Colmillo, this was a second 
and totally illegal attempt to obtain Araujo’s extradition, grounded on trumped up charges 
aiming to dodge his rights as a political criminal.415 A year later, Juan Arredondo, a prisoner 
in Texas involved in the events of September 1906, would face an analogous experience. 
The Mexican government requested Arredondo’s extradition in October that year on 
charges of murder, robbery, and arson. Aware of his status as a political prisoner, Texas’s 
governor delayed the authorization of the request until a court decided whether or not the 
offenses in question had a political nature.416 
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 The events of September 1906 and the strengthening of U.S.-based antiporfirismo 
during the second half of the decade forced Díaz and his diplomatic agents to strengthen 
their strategies of trans-national repression. From then on, the central goal of these 
strategies would be crushing, by all means possible, the leadership Mexican Liberal Party 
north of the border. The prosecution, extradition, and punishment of low-profile rebels and 
simple rebellious expeditioners would give way to the persecution and imprisonment of 
major antiporfirista figures including Ricardo Flores Magón, Antonio Villareal, Manuel 
Sarabia, and Lázaro Gutiérrez de Lara. In correspondence with such goals, the Mexican 
government would organize an elaborate strategy of information gathering by extending 
its networks of consulates in the United States. Mexican consuls would lead intelligence 
and espionage operations against renowned opposition journalists and agitators, often with 
the help of specialized private services like the Thomas Furlong Detective Company –a 
close ally of Mexico’s consul in St. Louis, Missouri. Consulates would report regularly to 
Mexico’s embassy in Washington and the Minister of Foreign Affairs back in Mexico 
City.417 
 Intense legal and judicial campaigns to obtain either the extradition or deportation 
of journalists and agitators or their sentencing and conviction in the United States 
complemented these intelligence strategies. Díaz and his agents would double their efforts 
to extradite high-profile dissidents under common charges such as robbery and homicide. 
That would be the case, among many others, of Ricardo Flores Magón, Manuel Sarabia, 
Antonio Villareal, Libardo Rivera, Trinidad García, and five other people. The Mexican 
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government would link them to the uprising of a liberal club in Jiménez, Chihuahua, that 
had ended up with one murder and the robbery of some funds from the local post office. 
The timely intervention of American judges that declared the actions in question political 
crimes would ultimately prevent their extradition.418 Mexican authorities would also try to 
convince their American counterparts to deport “dangerous dissidents” to Mexico on 
charges of being “undesirable immigrants” –a category that involved immigrants linked to 
anarchist organizations or other criminal activities in the United States. According to the 
U.S. law, deportations on these grounds were indisputable and only required the approval 
of an immigration officer. Free from the intervention of American courts and judges, 
Mexican authorities managed to obtain in late-1906 the deportation of several rebels 
captured in Arizona, including the already mentioned Lázaro Puente, Abraham Salcedo, 
and Bruno Triviño.419 
 When neither extradition nor deportation were possible, Mexico’s government 
would push American courts to sentence Mexican rebels to long prison sentences, 
commonly on charges of violation of neutrality laws. More than two dozen antiporfiristas 
would experience at least one prison sentence in the United States on these charges, 
including, unsurprisingly, Ricardo Flores Magón, Antonio Villareal, Libardo Rivera, and 
Manuel Sarabia. Persecution against these “violators of neutrality” concentrated on the 
cities of San Antonio, Del Rio, and El Paso, Texas; Douglas, Arizona; and, Los Angeles 
California. Although many of these arrests ended up in acquittals by U.S. courts, Flores 
Magón, Rivera, and Villareal, together with other six people, would receive prison 
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sentences between 18- and 30-months-long.420 Reflecting in 1909 on the impact of all these 
legal strategies, John K. Turner would maintain that, for the last years, the only law 
applicable to Mexicans living in bordering states had been, not the U.S. law, but Diaz’s 
one. As a result of this, the author complained, American authorities had taken away from 
Mexican citizens not only their right to asylum but also the basic protections they should 
enjoy under the nation’s laws.421 
 The persecution, arrest, and trial of Ricardo Flores Magón in California offers an 
illustrative example of how Díaz’s government deployed and combined these legal 
strategies. Flores Magón arrived to Los Angeles in 1907, after fleeing from St. Louis and 
clandestinely roaming the country for a few months. In Missouri, the Liberal leader and his 
paper Regeneración had fallen victim of the harassment of the Furlong agency and its 
people, a persecution that ended up with the shutting down of the publication and the 
temporary imprisonment of its editors, Flores Magón included. Years earlier, he had fled 
San Antonio, Texas, for analogous reasons. Once in Los Angeles, with the collaboration 
of Libardo Rivera and Antonio Villareal, Flores Magón reopened his newspaper, this time 
with the title of Revolución. By then, American authorities had offered a great reward for 
his capture (20 thousand dollars, according to Turner), so Flores Magón and his people 
opted to resume their journalistic activities in the underground. By August 1907, 
nonetheless, members of the Furlong agency succeeded in tracking the journalists down 
and proceeded to their arrest. As the same Thomas Furlong would declare before a L.A. 
tribunal, he and his people carried out the arrest with no judicial order or formal warrant, 
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acting under the orders –and payment– of the Mexican government. Right after the arrest, 
Mexico’s ambassador in Washington, Enrique Creel, travelled to Los Angeles in order to 
secure the extradition of Flores Magón.422  
 The trial against Flores Magón would be an exemplary display of Díaz’s multiple 
efforts to manipulate the American justice system in order to achieve the punishment of his 
adversaries. Charges against the three journalists involved resistance to authority, robbery, 
homicide, criminal libel, and conspiracy for violating neutrality laws. In the case of Flores 
Magón, these charges made reference to his journalistic activities, his alleged role in the 
planning of the 1906 rebel expedition, and his presumed links with a recent Liberal uprising 
in Jiménez, Coahuila. This last incident included the robbery of the city’s treasury and the 
homicide of a person. By linking the Liberal leader with the events in Coahuila, the 
Mexican government wanted to make a solid case for his extradition. The plan backfired. 
A federal commissioner in San Antonio, Texas, had previously refused to extradite a group 
of prisoners involved in the Jiménez uprising based on the fact that they were political 
criminals. Thus, by involving Flores Magón in the incident, Mexican authorities achieved 
nothing but ruining their chances of extraditing him.423 
 The failure of its extradition plans forced the Mexican government to resign itself 
to indict Flores Magón and his people for crimes that could earn them a prison sentence in 
the United States. After reviewing the available evidence, the Mexican government, in 
partnership with a judge from Texas and a U.S. attorney from California, decided to link 
the defendants with an ongoing case in Arizona. It was a process against two Mexicans 
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indicted for violation of neutrality laws in Douglas, in December 1906. The alleged 
connection of the California defendants with the Arizona rebels rested on the accusation 
that the latter had acted with the encouragement of the former. This new accusation would 
represent for Flores Magón, Rivera, and Villareal a new charge, this time for conspiracy to 
initiate a military expedition against Mexico from Arizona. After a first hearing, American 
authorities ordered their transportation from California to Arizona so they could stand a 
new trial. It was already March 1909 when a United States marshal delivered the 
defendants to Arizona. Jurors would reach a guilty verdict by May that year, and the judge 
in charge of the case sentenced them all to 18 months in prison. The decision pleased the 
Mexican government, which was ready to indict Flores Magón and the others under a 
similar charge in Texas, in case they ended up being acquitted. The defendants would 
remain in an Arizona prison until their release in August 1910.424 
 After the capture of Ricardo Flores Magón, the leadership of the Liberal party in 
the United States and the publication of Revolución remained in the hands of Lázaro 
Gutiérrez de Lara. It was not long before U.S. and Mexican authorities targeted the new 
leader and pressed charges against him. Under instructions of Mexico’s Attorney General, 
the Police of Los Angeles arrested Gutiérrez de Lara in September 1907 and charged him 
with robbery, crime that subjected him to an imminent extradition. The charges in question 
were full of inconsistencies that ended up benefiting the defendant. Initially, Mexican 
authorities claimed that he was responsible for a vague, mysterious, and undocumented 
robbery committed in 1906 somewhere in Mexico, and on these grounds requested his 
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extradition. Unable to present solid evidence on this case, the Mexican government had to 
come up with a new, slightly more precise denunciation for robbery, this time in the state 
of Sonora. Although this accusation would not have any effect either, it was effective 
enough to extend Gutiérrez de Lara’s imprisonment for over a month. In the meantime, the 
defendant would file a writ of habeas corpus to no avail.425 
 Authorities in Mexico would not cease in their effort to keep Gutiérrez de Lara out 
of circulation. By December 1907, they came up with a third accusation regarding the 
robbery of some firewood in Sonora in August 1903. As in previous cases, the accusation 
presented serious inconsistencies that made the plan backfire. According to Turner, 
American authorities soon realized that the defendant had already been processed and 
acquitted for the crime in question. There were other, more absurd inconsistencies in the 
case. Back in 1903, a report in Mexico had valued the stolen firewood in an amount 
equivalent to 8 dollars. Yet, in the 1907 accusation, the sum had experienced a mysterious 
increase amounting now to 28 dollars. Mexican authorities had inflated the sum to make it 
fulfill the minimum of $25 that the legislation required for the extradition of a thief. A 
mistake in the calculation of the exchange value between the Mexican and the American 
currencies would nonetheless render the accusation useless for extradition purposes. 
Apparently, authorities in Mexico calculated the sum by using an exchange rate higher than 
the official, which ultimately made the sum inferior to the minimum prescribed in the 
legislation. The mistake costed Díaz and his people the freedom of Gutiérrez de Lara, who 
was able to walk away from prison after 104 days.426 
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 Porfirian authorities did not limit their trans-national repressive strategies to these 
practices of judicial and diplomatic lobbying. When neither formal deportation, 
extradition, nor imprisonment in the United States were plausible options, Díaz and his 
agents still had the option of directly kidnapping their adversaries and shipping them back 
to Mexico. The “forced deportation” of Manuel Sarabia in June 1907 represents perhaps 
the most popular example of this alternative practice –it was one of the few kidnapping 
cases that became public in the U.S. and drew the attention of the nation’s authorities. 
Sarabia worked as a clandestine printer in Douglas, Arizona, until the Mexican consul 
Antonio Maza discovered him and requested the police his arrest. The police put him in 
the city prison without having the support of a warrant or any other judicial order. The first 
night of his imprisonment, a group of American agents working for the Mexican 
government took him out of his cell, put him in a car, and brought him before a company 
of Rurales south of the border. The Rurales delivered Sarabia to a prison in Hermosillo, 
Sonora, where he  remained awaiting trial.427 Díaz had been planning these procedures 
since the early 1890s, when he manifested his desire of kidnapping Ruiz Sandoval in case 
his trial did not come to a satisfactory conclusion. Another Mexican exile, Ignacio 
Martínez, also made part of Díaz’s list of possible victims of kidnapping.428 
 Díaz’s trans-national strategies of repression reveal another facet of the dynamics 
of state retribution in Mexico during the Porfiriato. The regime extended beyond the limits 
of the Mexican nation its customary use of the judicial system as a mechanism for 
criminalizing and punishing internal enemies. In doing so, it engaged other, non-Mexican 
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jurisdictions and legal regimes, interacting with them in both collaborative and conflictive 
ways. Rules for extradition between México and the U.S. gave the two nations a common 
legal ground for joining efforts concerning the legal and judicial treatment of “dangerous” 
or “undesirable” exiles. Yet, the same prescriptions that made this collaboration possible 
also marked the limits of what both governments could and could not do with the targeted 
expats. Such limitations would often prove detrimental to Díaz’s strategies of trans-
national retribution, and force him to devise alternative approaches in order to ensure the 
punishment of his adversaries north of the border.  
 These alternative strategies involved different degrees of compliance with the 
dynamics of American justice system and entailed diverse degrees of legality. Some of 
them played straightforwardly by the logics of the U.S. justice, as in the multiple cases in 
which Porfirian authorities helped American courts to indict actual or alleged Mexican 
rebels. Other strategies, still within the institutional and normative framework of American 
justice, entailed illegal practices that dodged basic procedural rules, like the arrests by 
public or private agents with no previous warrant. There were also additional strategies that 
involved direct actions of extralegal and extrajudicial retribution, like the attempts at 
kidnapping or the “forced deportations” of Mexican exiles. These strategies, formal and 
alternative, often clashed with the decisions of American judges, and even with guarantees 
and prohibitions from U.S. law. This clash, nonetheless, did not prevent them from 
ultimately pushing the legal limits of what the American justice could do with exiles and 
political refugees. Pressed by the Mexican government, U.S. authorities denied petitions 
of habeas corpus, authorized the extradition and deportation of political criminals, and 
suspended legal protections that refugees were supposed to enjoy. 
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 On the whole, all these practices show that Díaz’s trans-national responses to 
rebellion did not differ greatly from his reactions to political criminality within the Mexican 
territory. Both within and outside Mexico, the Porfiriato tried to repress its internal enemies 
primarily by resorting to judicial mechanisms of criminalization and punishment. The 
premise in both situations seemed to be the same: ensuring punishment through the control, 
or at least the manipulation, of the process of justice administration. Strategies of 
criminalization both at the national and the trans-national level were also analogous. They 
involved the combination of both common and political charges, as well as the de-
politicization of political offenders and their acts, in order to ensure conviction and secure 
exceptional punishments for political crimes such as extradition or the death penalty. 
Extralegal and extrajudicial practices of state retribution would also be common in the two 
cases. The combination of legality and illegality in the repression of “dangerous” dissidents 
was at no point exclusive of Diaz’s trans-national strategies. 
 
Punishment and Retribution Outside the Judicial Sphere 
Governmental responses to political criminality within Mexican territory went way beyond 
the logics of judicial punishment against rebels. Like Díaz’s strategies against his internal 
enemies north of the border, Porfirian repressive tactics in Mexico also combined the use 
of law with the use of force. Mexican authorities combined judicial resources against the 
regime’s enemies with indiscriminate use of military power, extrajudicial and summary 
executions, and other sorts of extralegal practices of retribution. As strategies of repression 
and state retribution, these “other” practices involved diverse political and military 
purposes. They were means for suffocating and neutralizing potentially dangerous 
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insurrections, and “exemplary” punishments aiming to terrorize and intimidate internal 
enemies. Similarly, they represented ways of repressing rebels without the formalities, 
guarantees, and delays of the justice system, as well as displays of state sovereignty aiming 
to underscore Díaz’s power vis-à-vis his political and armed contenders. Extrajudicial 
practices of punishment and retribution accompanied the Porfiriato since its early stages 
and extended all the way into the 1900s.  
 The Veracruz Massacre, in Late-June 1879, was perhaps the most dramatic 
manifestation of these extrajudicial practices during the early Porfiriato. The massacre put 
a quick and abrupt end to a military insurrection plotted and led by former supporters of 
the overthrown Sebastián Lerdo. Lerdista rebels declared their disobedience to Díaz’s 
regime and seized two warships in the port city of Veracruz. Díaz, who apparently had 
previous knowledge about the revolutionary plot, ordered the state governor, General Luis 
Mier y Terán, to capture all insurrectionists and execute their leaders as offenders caught 
in flagrante –“aprehendidos infraganti, mátelos en caliente,” said Díaz’s order to the 
governor. Mier y Terán’s forces shot nine people before the rebel ships went back to the 
government’s obedience. The victims included two medium-rank officers and seven 
civilians. The main leaders of the movement, a small group of generals and high-rank 
officers from the Mexican army, managed to flee.429 According to some denunciations, 
none of the people shot had direct and proven links to the insurrectionist movement, let 
alone were part of its ringleaders. In the words of the antiporfirista Ramón Prida, the 
execution of the two officers had no other purpose than intimidating the rest of the troops 
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stationed in the city, while the seven civilians were merely distant supporters of the plot. 
Other reports would point out that no actual inquiries on the victim’s culpability preceded 
their execution and that authorities had denied their request for a formal trial.430 
 Not all authorities in Veracruz agreed with Díaz’s proceedings. A few days after 
the executions, Federal Judge Rafael Zayas Enríquez requested the Supreme Court to 
intervene on behalf of the remaining prisoners. According to Zayas’s request, it was 
imperative that Mier y Terán’s people submitted all the rebels before the ordinary justice 
so they could stand a regular trial. The idea was not only to avoid a second wave of 
shootings, but also to act in correspondence with the ius gentium, the Federal Constitution, 
and the “basic humanitarian principles.” Zayas had decided to resort to the high tribunal 
after failing at negotiating the prisoner’s judgement with different state authorities. Neither 
the state governor nor the Navy’s main commander had been willing to assist him in his 
recurrent requests, the judge complained. The reluctance of the authorities of Veracruz to 
help Zayas Enríquez went to the point of prohibiting him from practicing an autopsy on 
the nine victims.431 
Zayas’s request would end up provoking a clash between the Executive and the 
Judicial powers in early July. Alarmed by the judge’s complains, the Supreme Court 
exhorted President Díaz to order the governor and his people to cooperate with Zayas and 
stop hindering his constitutional functions. The exhortation did not please Díaz, who 
                                                
430 Prida, De la dictadura, 64-65; and Di Fornaro, Díaz, 44-46. Di Fornaro’s account includes an excerpt 
from a newspaper in Guadalajara that summarized the incident in an article entiled “A bacchanalia of blood. 
Murders committed by Terán. Nine assasinations. Eight widows. Thirty-seven orphans.” 
 
431 AGNM, Secretaría de Justicia, Caja 83, Expediente 95: “Informe a propósito del pronunciamiento de dos 
vapores de guerra.” See especially the correspondence from June 30 and July 1st between Zayas and the 
Supreme Court.  
 292 
responded to the Court by arguing that it had no faculty or authorization whatsoever to give 
the Executive that kind of orders. The high tribunal would respond Díaz that they both 
represented equal powers before the Constitution, and berated him for not following the  
constitutional charter’s prescriptions regarding the Executive’s duty to assist the Judicial 
branch in its functions. The argument between the two powers did nothing for furthering 
Zayas’s cause. Three weeks after the executions, the juez de distrito still reported that state 
authorities were reluctant to let him proceed with the autopsies.432 Apparently, Mier y 
Terán’s orders to his people included maintaining both prisoners and corpses outside the 
reach of the justice system for as long as possible.  
The early 1890s would give Díaz and his representatives at the regional and local 
levels several opportunities to execute new acts of punishment and retribution outside the 
legal and judicial spheres. The hunt and subsequent arrest of Juan Galeana in late 1890 
offers a first example in this regard. Both federal and state troops participated in his chase, 
which by November that year was coming to an end. By the end of the month, an army 
officer informed Acapulco’s political chief that his men were close to finding Galeana’s 
hideout and requested instructions. Instructions, in this case, were simple: they should 
arrest Galeana and apply him the ley de fuga.433 Weeks later, nonetheless, authorities had 
not been able to find the rebel leader. On December 27, Prefect Francisco Leyva wrote the 
governor of Guerrero requesting his authorization to execute some of Galeana’s 
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accomplices as a way of forcing them to reveal the exact location of his hideout.434 There 
is no record of the governor’s response, but by the next day Galeana was already in the 
hands of the federal army, who sent him to a military barrack in San Diego.  
Following the orders from Acapulco, authorities from Guerrero immediately tried 
to subtract Galeana from federal custody and take him to a local prison. None of their 
efforts succeeded. Apparently, the federal forces in charge of the rebel had orders to deliver 
him before the ordinary justice and were aware of the intentions of Guerrero’s prefects and 
local political chiefs. On December 30, a frustrated Francisco Leyva would write 
Acapulco’s chief that it had been impossible to retrieve Galeana from his prison in San 
Diego.435 Leyva’s final attempt at seizing the prisoner included the dispatch of an emissary 
to the San Diego barracks with the mission of requesting Galeana to undertake a highly 
important legal procedure (“para la práctica de una diligencia importantísima”) in 
Acapulco. The emissary went back empty-handed, since people in the barracks had orders 
of delivering the rebel only by request of the federal army’s general command.436 Galeana’s 
protection by the federal army did not save him from those who wanted him dead, as his 
first-instance sentence demonstrates. It only bought him some time for appearing before a 
judge and standing a formal trial. His case, nevertheless, illustrates how local authorities 
in Mexico resorted to extrajudicial executions as a way of intimidating enemies and 
                                                
434 “Letter from Francisco Leyva to the Governor of Guerrero. Papayo, December 27, 1890,” in Salazar 
Adame, “Movimientos,” 176. 
 
435 “Letter from Fancisco Leyva to the Governor of Guerrero. Acapulco. December 30, 1890” in Salazar 
Adame, “Movimientos,” 178. 
 
436 “Letter from Francisco Leyva to the guard officer in San Diego Fortress. Acapulco, December 30, 1890;” 
and “Letter from Leutenant Juan P. Monyoya to Acapulco’s political chief. Acapulco, December 30, 1890.” 
All documents in Salazar Adame, “Movimientos,” 178. 
 294 
punishing rebels without the inconvenience of observing due process and abiding by the 
justice system.  
Díaz’s response to a millenarian insurrectionist movement in Tomochic, 
Chihuahua, sheds light on additional dynamics of state repression that had little to do with 
legal or judicial initiatives. The insurrection started and developed as a local peasant 
uprising of heavy religious overtones. In December 1891, villagers from Tomochic 
declared themselves in disobedience to the Mexican authorities and claimed exclusive 
obedience to their god. Although the insurrection did not pose any serious military 
challenge to the state government, it certainly affected the image and political carrier of 
Chihuahua’s current governor, Lauro Carrillo. Standing for a reelection that he was unsure 
to win, Carrillo perceived the local movement as a situation that his rivals could use to 
question his capacity of maintaining public order in the state. In consequence, he opted to 
downgrade its significance and presented it as an irrelevant protest by a few fanatic Indians. 
The movement, nevertheless, called the attention of the federal government, already 
concerned with the recent rebellion of Catarino Garza and unwilling to ignore another 
insurrection in northern Mexico. Díaz ordered the federal army to intervene and crush the 
rebellious peasants in the quickest and most discreet way. His orders would emphasize 
time and again the verb frighten or escarmentar: punishment should be exemplary and 
work as an example –an intimidating one– to the offenders.437 
The military offensive against the rebels from Tomochic met an unexpected 
resistance that would extend hostilities between the army and the insurrectionists until 
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October 1902. During that time, Díaz’s troops would experience a few stunning defeats, 
including a rebel ambush in December 1901, and a failed incursion on Tomochic next 
September. Despite such drawbacks, by the end of October the army had managed to lay 
siege to the town with more than a thousand men, determined to crush the rebellion once 
and for all. After six days of combats, the army succeeded in raiding the town. According 
to military reports, the offensive eliminated the enemy “to the last man.” The army 
completely wiped out Tomochic, captured six survivors and shot them without any judicial 
formality. On October 27, once the carnage was over, the state governor issued a circular 
warning people from the region that anyone “who directly or indirectly assists the rebels 
of Tomochic or their accomplices or sympathizers, or offers them any sort of protection 
[…] will be punished.” The threat would provoke a wave of denunciations, many of them 
product of personal grudges and local political rivalries. As a result, and despite the fact 
that the military took no captives during the raid, authorities would still report the 
dispatching of alleged “Tomochic indians” to Mexico City even two months after the 
attack. According to an American newspaper, prisoners went to the capital only to find 
their death after a brief interrogation regarding the uprising.438 
The “invention” of war prisoners and the extrajudicial execution of alleged rebels 
were also common practices in Díaz’s war against the people of Ruiz Sandoval and Garza 
between 1890 and 1891. According to Duclós-Salinas’s memoir, Bernardo Reyes 
responded to Ruiz Sandoval’s incursion with a huge military display that achieved barely 
nothing. After all, the rebels had retreated back to the United States right after their first 
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and only engagement with Mexican troops. Determined to show some results, Duclós-
Salinas maintains, Díaz’s strongman had no option but arresting a handful of “made-up 
revolutionaries,” many of whom experienced the ley fuga.439 Reyes’s reaction to the Garza 
movement would claim a more drastic toll. Ramón Prida’s account denounced, for 
instance, that the General’s struggle against Garzistas south of the border included the 
execution of over 80 people, all of them without any formal trial or any sort of judicial 
intervention.440 Within the first month of the rebellion alone, denunciations of official 
abuses mentioned the shooting with no previous trial of at least 25 rebellion suspects. As 
part of his measures against the 1891 expeditioners, Reyes ordered his officials to “execute 
without a great display” all suspects he got to arrest, no matter if they were actual armed 
insurgents or just sympathizers distributing revolutionary manifestos.441  
 Reyes’s wave of executions against alleged Garzistas terrorized the U.S.-Mexico 
border. It provoked the flight of many Mexican families to Texas, and even claimed the 
lives of a few American citizens with no clear links to the rebel movement. The 
assassination of the first two Americans, Juan Bazán and José Ángel Vera, forced Reyes 
to warn his officers “to be careful not to execute prisoners if they turned out to be U.S. 
citizens.” According to Elliot Young’s monograph on the Garza rebellion, Reyes regularly 
informed Díaz about the extrajudicial executions his men practiced in the north. His reports 
offered the President details about the name of the victims, their alleged charges, and the 
execution methods applied in each case. To Young, “the casual tone with which eight of 
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these murders were recounted to Díaz indicates that these sorts of killings were not 
surprising or shocking for Reyes or for the President.”442 Several years later, after the 
frustrated rebellion of September 1906, authorities in northern Mexico unleashed a similar 
wave of extrajudicial executions that allegedly ended up with a great number of summary 
assassinations.443 
 These other, extrajudicial modalities of repression reveal that state retribution in 
Porfirian Mexico unfolded in different ways and in correspondence with multiple logics. 
Law and justice mattered, of course, and law enforcement and justice administration 
represented in fact important instruments of punishment against the regime’s internal 
enemies. They also served as recurrent arenas for the performance of ritualized displays of 
state power and sovereignty. Yet, law and “lawfulness” at no point encompassed the 
totality of the logics of state repression vis-à-vis rebellion in the Porfiriato. State retribution 
unfolded as well beyond the limits of the law and away from the reach of formal justice, 
shaping punitive practices unrestrained by the law and unhindered by judicial rules and 
proceedings. These extralegal practices allowed authorities to dodge constitutional 
prohibitions regarding the application of the death penalty for political crimes, and to 
punish internal enemies with a promptness and severity that no ordinary trial could grant. 
They also represented informal, less public, non-institutionalized demonstrations of state 
power that, just like their legal and judicial counterparts, aimed at underscoring and 
reestablishing governmental sovereignty against those who had challenged or defied it. In 
Porfirian Mexico, state retribution against internal enemies operated thus in two parallel 
                                                
442 Young, Catarino Garza’s, 104-105. 
 
443 Turner, México, 73. 
 298 
levels. While one was formal, institutionalized, self-restricted, and legalized, the other was 
informal, commonly unrestricted and extralegal. 
 What does this parallelism suggest about the nature and workings of state 
retribution in the Porfiriato? Overall, it reveals that Porfirian practices of repression were 
not unidimensional. They relied on the law and the justice system, but not exclusively. 
Likewise, they entailed extralegal and extrajudicial punishment practices, but at no point 
were reduced to them exclusively. Analyzing the Porfirian experience in terms of either 
“legality” or “extra-legality,” understood as absolute, mutually exclusive notions, entails 
the risk of addressing only a portion of the problem. As the Colombian case would suggest, 
“the legal” and “the extralegal,” “the judicial” and “the extrajudicial” were not 
contradictory categories but notions of reference for understanding complex repertoires of 
retribution practices with more or less reliance on the law. Both sorts of practices worked 
in the same direction, pursued analogous purposes, and represented equivalent practices of 
state retribution as well as similar manifestations of state sovereignty. 
 
Governmental Responses to Rebellion in Colombia: Legislation, Justice 
Administration, and State Retribution during the Thousand Days 
As in Mexico, responses to rebellion in Colombia involved a combination of legal and 
judicial practices with extralegal and extrajudicial strategies. Nevertheless, while Díaz and 
his people grounded a great deal of their legal treatment of rebellion on the Criminal Code 
and the ordinary justice system, Colombian governments relied heavily on extraordinary 
legislation –emergency executive decrees– and court-martials to repress their rebels. The 
extraordinary nature of this treatment and its heavy inclination towards the logics and 
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procedures of the military justice was particularly evident in the context of the Thousand 
Days’ war.  
 
Responding to Rebellion through Legislation. 
Governmental responses to rebellion during the Thousand Days were highly legalistic.  
From the start of the war until the signing of the Wisconsin Treaty, Colombian 
governments attempted to manage the conflict primarily through legislation. Both 
Presidents Sanclemente and Marroquín would enact hundreds of executive decrees dealing 
with all sort of matters, from appointments of public servants and adjustments in the salary 
of military officers to issues of taxation and administration of mines. This rich and varied 
legislation had, nonetheless, an extraordinary nature, for it stemmed from the emergency 
powers that the Constitution granted the government in cases of disruption of public order. 
Its many decrees were part of a legal regime of exceptionality whose foundations dated 
back to the declaration of the state of siege in July 1899, and that would extend way beyond 
the formal end of the war.444 
This intense legal production involved, of course, the punishment and repression of 
rebels and other armed and unarmed internal enemies. Legislation in this case drew upon 
a series of decrees and administrative orders grounded on prescriptions from the Criminal 
and Military codes. These legal acts redefined legal jurisdictions and juridical proceedings, 
established and transformed penalties, imposed different measures tending to hinder the 
activities of rebels, and reinvented notions of internal enmity. Such changes would bring 
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about important redefinitions, not only in terms of the notions, criminal categories, and 
penalties included in both codes, but also regarding the organization and functioning of 
Colombia’s judicial system. These transformations would engender tensions between 
constitutional precepts and limits, on the one hand, and the state’s powers of legislation 
and retribution, on the other hand.  
Some of these extraordinary decrees combined the purposes of broadening the reach 
of military justice, establishing more expedite ways of judging political and military 
crimes, and creating more severe and exemplary ways of punishing such offenses. Reforms 
in these regard started almost as soon as the rebellion erupted, as illustrated by a decree 
from October 20, 1899. The decree put outside the jurisdiction of the ordinary justice a 
series of heinous crimes associated to actual or potential war actions, and made military 
tribunals competent to prosecute and judge them. Crimes included serious cases of 
homicide, poisoning, attacks against public authorities and servants, use of explosives 
outside war maneuvers, and damages against telegraphs and roads.445 About two years 
later, in February 1901, a second decree would extend even more the jurisdiction of these 
tribunals, allowing them to judge though verbal court-martials an additional series of 
common crimes. Offenses in this occasion included a very telling series—namely, arson; 
asalto en cuadrilla de malhechores; all sorts of homicide; robbery with violence; 
castration; mutilation; injuries against sick or defenseless people; attacks against catholic 
priests; kidnapping; and property damage. The decree also established that sentences issued 
by military tribunals were irrevocable and should be carried out immediately, unless they 
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involved the death penalty. In that case, the decree gave military authorities a 48-hour term 
to confirm the decision with the corresponding department’s governor.446 An additional 
decree from July that year added treason to the list of crimes subject to verbal court-
martial.447 
The jurisdictional changes that the 1901 decrees brought about responded to the 
conflict’s evolution. Regular rebel armies were scarce by 1901. In most of the country, the 
continuation of the movement relied on the operation of liberal guerrillas that, at least to 
the government’s eyes, were devoted to the execution of all sorts of crimes. In 
correspondence with such consideration, the February decree stated that “many 
individuals, taking advantage of their condition of rebel guerrilla members, [committed] 
serious offenses that demanded immediate punishment.” They required a quick, effective, 
and exemplary punishment that ordinary justice, with its “lengthy proceedings,” was 
unable to grant, maintained the same decree. Considering the inefficacy of the formal 
justice system to “remedying the war’s exceptional evils,” it was necessary that the military 
justice, with its simpler and more expedient procedures, took up its place.448  
Transformations in the military jurisdiction not only concerned the treatment of 
crimes committed by Liberal rebels, but also the punishment of serious military crimes. In 
May 1900, for instance, a decree ordered the establishment of a permanent and mobile 
verbal court-martial for the crimes of treason, cowardice, desertion, and insubordination 
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committed by members of the military. The measure was grounded on the idea that the 
current state of war demanded the maintenance of the military’s “discipline” and 
“morality,” and that the offenses in question represented serious threats against such 
principles.449 The subjection of these crimes to a more severe treatment within the military 
sphere illustrates how the Sanclemente administration understood internal enmity during 
the first year of the war. To the government, cowards, deserters, and traitors were as 
dangerous as armed Liberals, for their actions directly harmed the state’s legitimate cause 
and indirectly benefited rebels. They were thus, in their own way, enemies of the 
government.  
War legislation on military justice remained in force until mid-1903. A law from 
August that year derogated, among others, the decrees from October 1899 and February 
1901. The law also reestablished the jurisdiction of ordinary tribunals over the non-military 
crimes included in the previous decrees, and reestablished the authority of the formal 
justice system in the resolution of ongoing processes linked to such offenses. People 
serving sentences imposed by military tribunals for these crimes could request a second 
trial by an ordinary court.450 The restoration of the ordinary justice’s jurisdiction nine 
months after the end of the war suggests that the transition to “judicial normality” after the 
Wisconsin Treaty was gradual and did not have automatic effects on the treatment of 
processed rebels. 
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Extraordinary war decrees also gave place to significant redefinitions in matters of 
crime and punishment. The most important transformation in this regard had to do with the 
conversion of guerrilla members into “culprits of assault by a gang of thugs” (reos de asalto 
en cuadrilla de malhechores) during the Marroquín administration. This conversion, 
allowed by both the Criminal and the Military Codes (Articles 178 and 1099, respectively), 
materialized itself in a decree from January 1901. The decree established, among other 
provisions, that all guerrilla leaders that refused to surrender within a 30-days term would 
be considered as authors of robbery in cuadrilla de malhechores. Marroquín’s decision 
relied on two major considerations. He maintained, first, that Liberals did not count any 
longer with regular armies and only had “guerrillas incapable of fighting formal battles.” 
He claimed, additionally, that those irregular troops “live[d] off pillaging […] and [were] 
incapable to triumph over the government.”451 Later that year, the governor of the province 
named Bolívar would enact a similar decree, this time against the remnants of Rafael Uribe 
Uribe’s Liberal troops that operated in the department. The governor’s order not only 
declared the remaining rebels cuadrillas de malhechores, but also threatened with their 
immediate execution if they refused to surrender.452  
The decree by the governor of Bolívar sheds light on the legal and juridical 
consequences of this conversion. By turning rebels into malhechores, authorities were able 
to subject them to the military justice and process them through verbal courts martial. More 
importantly, they were able to charge rebels with one of the few crimes that the Constitution 
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and the Criminal Code punished with the death penalty. It was, in sum, a conversion that 
turned political criminals into common offenders and put them outside the reach of the 
formal justice system. It was also a legal maneuver that denied the political nature of the 
rebellion and the rebels’ acts, and allowed the government to dodge constitutional 
restrictions regarding the punishment of political offenses. 
 Transformations in terms of crime and criminality also included a progressive 
extension of the repertoire of actions that the government considered acts of internal 
enmity. As the conflict unfolded and intensified, national and regional authorities expanded 
the conditions under which a person could be subject to punishment for political and war-
related reasons. Right after the beginning of the hostilities, for instance, a prefect from the 
Department of Cauca enacted a decree declaring “enemy” all people that refused to offer 
their services in defense of the government and punishing them with conscription. People 
who refused to give their war weapons to the provincial authorities should also be 
considered and punished as “disrupters of public order.”453 In an analogous way, a decree 
from December 1899, this time from the national government, established a series of 
pecuniary penalties that should fall on “sympathizers, authors, accomplices, and 
accessories (auxiliadores) of the crime of rebellion.”454  
This vague differentiation, that authorized the government to act indistinctly against 
both armed rebels and simple liberal sympathizers, had its legal grounds in the Military 
Code. Article 1344 of the Codification established that, in a “war of rebellion,” the 
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legitimate government should distinguish, outside the battlefields, between “loyal” and 
“disloyal” citizens. “Disloyal” individuals were those that, without being involved in the 
hostilities, manifested some degree of sympathy towards the rebel movement or actively 
supported it. Article 1246 allowed military authorities to act against “disloyal” citizens and 
other “desafectos” (opponents, malcontents) anytime the war’s needs demanded it.455 The 
article was an extension that made internal enmity in contexts of civil war not only a matter 
of military confrontation, but also an issue of mere political affiliation and ideological 
dissidence. The possibility of punishing unarmed Liberals as internal enemies led to the 
enactment of measures like the one from 1901 that authorized the government  armies 
deployed in rebel provinces to “live off the assets of the desafectos al gobierno.”456 
 Legal understandings of internal enmity continued evolving during 1900 and 1901 
In February 1900, another presidential decree considered “enemy” not only armed liberals 
or Liberal sympathizers, but also all public servants whose compromise with the 
government proved dubious. The decree ordered the removal of all official employees “that 
by word or deed manifest[ed] hostile to the government, that refuse[d] to cooperate in the 
defense of the institution, or that sympathize[d] in any way with the rebel cause.” The order 
considered that all these actions not only harmed the government but also fostered “the 
spirit of rebellion that maintain[ed] the nation in alarm.”457 Official notions of enmity 
continued expanding during the Marroquín administration. In October 1900, a provincial 
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decree ordered a pecuniary penalty against all the “government’s enemies” in 
Cundinamarca. The decree considered enemies “all those whose political opinions gave 
authorities motives to consider them as such.”458 The levels of discretion involved in this 
order remind of the vagueness of much of the legislation on press and public order from 
the first decade of the Regeneration. In January 1901, the same decree that turned guerrilla 
leaders into malhechores also prescribed the imprisonment of all people that spread “fake 
news” encouraging rebels to persist in their effort or people who helped them with any sort 
of resources.459 
An analogous extension took place with the enactment of the decree from July 1901 
that established verbal courts martial for traitors. The decree declared traitors all 
Colombians that invaded the national territory as parts of foreign or partially-foreign armed 
expeditions. It was a response to the intensification, by early 1901, of the movement of 
rebel troops back and forth along the border between Colombia and Venezuela, and to the 
alleged existence of rebel armies composed of citizens of both countries.460 The decree’s 
notion of treason also involved foreigners taking part in these expeditions; Colombians and 
foreigners that worked as “revolutionary agents” promoting invasions before other nation’s 
governments; and Colombians that helped both rebels and foreigners invade the national 
territory. All these modalities of treason, with the exception of the last one, were subject to 
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the death penalty.461 The decree also gave authorities the opportunity to punish with death 
the several rebel leaders that between 1900 and 1901 had visited Venezuela, Ecuador, 
México and various Central American countries in search of international support for the 
rebellion. The list of potential victims of this measure included prominent rebel leaders 
such as Avelino Rosas, Rafael Uribe-Uribe, Foción Soto, and Benjamín Herrera.462 
Penalties for rebellion and other modalities of internal enmity also experienced 
similar transformations. Some of these war decrees diversified the conditions for the 
application of the death penalty and made it a possibility for crimes others than the ones 
originally included in the Constitution. The conversion of rebels into malhechores in 
January 1901 offers a first example in this regard. Transformations concerning the 
application of capital punishment, nonetheless, dated back to the beginning of the conflict. 
The decree from October 20, 1899, that extended the jurisdiction of the military justice 
also established the death penalty as a punishment for cases of “espionage and treason in 
civil war,” arson, and use of explosives outside war operations.463 These prescriptions 
pushed the limits of the constitutional mandate that restricted the application of capital 
punishment for treason to contexts of foreign war (Art. 29). It was a measure that, at least 
in terms of penalties, made “states of internal conflict” and “states of international war” 
equivalent. The decree from July, 1901, on treason would give new life to this equivalence, 
punishing rebels as if they were part of a conflict of international dimensions.    
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Outside the sphere of the death penalty, changes in punishment focused primarily 
on pecuniary penalties such as “war taxes” and “forced contributions.” Although monetary 
punishments for political crimes in the Criminal Code only included fines, the codification 
still offered authorities the possibility of making people accountable for the expenses 
occasioned by the repression of episodes of sedition, mutiny, and asonada. Articles 231, 
232, and 233 of the Code established that these expenses should fall not only on the leaders 
and participants of the movements in question, but also on the inhabitants of the locality in 
which they took place. This, nevertheless, was not a generalized punishment. The articles 
differentiated between “active and direct opponents” of the insurgent episodes and “active” 
or “passive” supporters, and limited the application of the penalty only to the latter. Right 
after the outbreak of the war, President Sanclemente decreed the extension of this 
possibility to the crime of rebellion, making all Liberals, armed and unarmed, subject from 
then on to the eventual imposition of “war taxes.”464 During most of the conflict, both 
national and provincial authorities used these pecuniary penalties in order to raise money 
to support conservative troops and punish Liberals outside tribunals, prisons, and 
battlefields.  
Sanclemente ordered a first round of “forced contributions” in December 1899. The 
president explained the measure by arguing that it was a principle of justice to make the 
calamities of war fall on “all those who have contributed to promote it or have supported 
it with their sympathies, their interests, of their involvement.” The decree imposing the 
contribution ordered the collection of five million pesos, and distributed the sum among 
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the nine departments or provinces in a way that paralleled their presumed degrees of 
political and military dangerousness. More than a half of this amount corresponded to the 
departments of Santander and Cundinamarca, where the rebellion had originally started.465 
Almost two years later, in 1901, a decree by President Marroquín threatened Liberals from 
all departments with the collection of a sum of eleven and a half million pesos if the 
rebellion did not come to an end. The regional distribution of the 1901 contribution 
illustrated the regional evolution of the conflict since late 1899. More than half of the sum 
corresponded to the departments of Cundinamarca (four million pesos), Santander (a 
million and a half), Bolívar (a million, two hundred fifty thousand pesos), and Tolima and 
Boyacá (a million each).466 Bolivar and Santander were by then the theaters of operation 
of the last regular forces of the Liberal Party, while Cundinamarca, Tolima, and Boyacá 
concentrated the bulk of the rebel guerrilla activity. Marroquín justified the measure with 
the same arguments that Sanclemente used back in 1899. 
Regional authorities would follow the President’s example and impose similar 
contributions in their departments, as happened for instance in Cundinamarca and Tolima 
in October 1900. That month, authorities from Cundinamarca issued a decree that punished 
all “enemies of the government” with a “contribution” that should equal the sum of their 
corresponding property taxes.467 Almost simultaneously, Tolima’s government ordered the 
collection, until the end of the war, of a weekly sum of fifty thousand pesos. The order 
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encouraged local authorities and collectors “to use all available means” to apply the 
measure. It also established that authorities would confiscate the property of all individuals 
that fled the department in order to avoid the collection. To the department’s governor, this 
was a response to the rebels’ obstinacy in “continuing a war that is causing the nation’s 
ruin,” and a punishment against those “unarmed revolutionaries” that encouraged the 
prolongation of the conflict.468 The imposition of these additional contributions in 
Cundinamarca and Tolima proves unsurprising considering that both departments suffered 
the most from the intensification of guerrilla warfare after Palonegro. 
What do these decrees reveal about the legal responses to rebellion during the 
Thousand Days and the workings of repression during the administrations of Sanclemente 
and Marroquín? The first and most evident conclusion in this regard has to do with the 
highly legalistic nature of the government’s repressive responses to the rebellion. 
Colombian authorities reacted to the rebellion not only with weapons and armies, but also 
with legislation. Executive decrees like the ones reviewed here allowed the government 
not only to strengthen their reactions to armed liberals, but also to punish and repress the 
rebel movement outside the battlefields. They also made possible the inclusion of unarmed 
Liberals and other “potentially dangerous” opponents as subjects of state retribution during 
the war. Armed with both weapons and decrees, the Colombian government managed to 
generalize the state of war throughout the entire society.  
This generalization of state retribution had major legal and political consequences. 
The decrees in question redefined the boundaries between common and political offenders; 
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challenged the distinction between “armed” and “unarmed” opponents; and made the 
separation between combatants and civilians blurry. Also, by reinventing the distinctions 
between “the rebel” and the “traitor in foreign war,” this legislation made “civil war” and 
“international warfare” almost equivalent notions. In its effort to craft legal responses 
against armed and unarmed liberals, the Colombian governments of the Thousand Days 
ended up redefining the legal nature of the conflict itself and the parameters regulating its 
treatment. These legal reinventions, nonetheless, did not correspond to a legislative will 
that reinterpreted crimes and imposed penalties out of the blue. Regardless of the apparent 
acts of arbitrariness that many of these measures seemed to involve and the unconstitutional 
nature of a few of them, all the responses in question were solidly grounded in previous 
legal and constitutional prescriptions. They were nothing but re-interpretations of current 
legislation that elaborated on –and took advantage of– its many grey areas –those that 
subtly allowed the government to strengthen its power of retribution without directly 
violating any legal or constitutional limitation. Liberals, as expected, would disagree with 
the legality of these reinterpretations and the measures and legal responses they shaped.  
Liberals’ criticism of the measures in question revolved around a variety of issues. 
Political prisoners from Bogotá’s Panóptico complained that the conversion of rebels into 
malhechores and their judgement by verbal courts martial was both unfair and 
unconstitutional. These measures criminalized actions that, to the Criminal Code, were not 
criminal, and made liberals victim of “severísimas penas” that did not even exist in the 
codification.469 Liberals also criticized the government’s decision of treating rebels as 
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“bandits” and “traitors.” Earlier that year, in a letter to President Marroquín, Rafael Uribe 
Uribe had also contested the accusation that he and his people were traitors working for 
Venezuela. The letter criticized the 1901 decree on treason by claiming that it established 
penalties created a posteriori, manufactured on purpose (“forjadas adrede”), and of a 
retroactive nature. In addition, the rebel leader claimed, none of the “new” or 
“reinterpreted” crimes addressed in the decree stemmed from formal, legitimate laws. They 
were simply imposition of an executive decree that the government had issued in exercise 
of “a dictatorial power that no one had granted it.” Finally, the General argued, there was 
no reason for speaking of “treason in foreign war,” for there had never existed a declared 
state of international warfare.470 Later that year, in October 1902, officials from the Liberal 
army in Panamá published a document protesting “against the false imposture that we are 
instruments of foreign governments to dismember the country. We say here to the entire 
world that Colombian Liberalism has pacts with no one. Colombia’s honor is our life.”471 
 Other liberals, like José María Quijano Wallis, criticized the forced contributions 
system. These contributions, the Liberal writer maintained, represented arbitrary 
confiscations that the government imposed to a particular political collectivity as a 
punishment against “a determinate number of citizens that are not criminals 
whatsoever.”472 As acts of confiscation, they represented a punitive practice that the 
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Constitution had banned. As punishments, they were illegal and illegitimate, since there 
was no previous formal law that establish them as a possible penalty for the crime of 
rebellion. Additionally, Quijano Wallis concluded, it entailed the absurd injustice of 
treating mere sympathizers as criminals.473 Criticism of the decrees in question also came 
from the Conservative side. Moderate conservatives were particularly critical of the decree 
from January 1901, whose prescriptions, as they claimed in August 1902, had provoked a 
regrettable wave of executions. According to conservative critics, the decree had implicitly 
formalized the application of the death penalty for political crimes, which clearly violated 
the Constitution. Applying this punishment through the conversion of rebels into 
malhechores and their consequent judgement by verbal courts martial posed additional 
legal and judicial predicaments, they claimed. Either the rebels were political criminals, 
and therefore were exempted from capital punishment, or they were common offenders, 
and in that case their judgement should correspond to the ordinary justice. At no point any 
military tribunal should claim jurisdiction over crimes in cuadrilla de malhechores, for 
they were offenses properly defined in the Criminal Code that had nothing to do with acts 
of war.474 
 
Criminalize or De-criminalize? Conversations on Civil Warfare and Belligerence. 
Concerns about the legal treatment of rebels during the Thousand Days were not limited to 
questions about the fairness and constitutionality of presidential war decrees. There was an 
additional matter of contention that concentrated the attention of both government and 
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rebels during most of the war: the recognition, on the part of the state, of Liberal combatants 
as belligerents. The question of whether or not the state should recognize and treat armed 
liberals as belligerents had serious legal and political implications. Treating rebels as 
belligerents implied recognizing that the rebellion had escalated into a generalized state of 
civil war in the terms and conditions of the International Law. Such a recognition implied, 
among other things, that the government should treat rebels as combatants and not as 
criminals. It also meant that governmental responses to the rebellion should rely on the 
rules of the International Law instead of on the prescriptions of the Criminal Code. It was 
a recognition that, additionally, turned rebels and government into “relative enemies”: 
counterparts that, despite their “legal asymmetry,” agreed to recognize each other as 
“morally symmetrical” and, therefore, were able to reach legal and political agreements. 
Recognizing the belligerence of a party in an internal conflict meant, in practical terms, 
adopting strategies for the “regularization” and “humanization” of the confrontation, 
preventing the criminalization of armed opponents, and establishing mechanisms of 
political transaction between rebels and the government.475 
 Conversations about civil warfare and belligerence were common in almost all 
internal conflicts in nineteenth-century Colombia. Colombian governments of the period, 
nonetheless, were always reluctant to give their armed opponents full recognition as 
belligerents, and the Sanclemente and Marroquín administrations were no exceptions.476 
Almost since the beginning of the war, Sanclemente rejected all liberal attempts at finding 
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a negotiated solution to the conflict, and insisted on subjecting rebels to the prescriptions 
and penalties of the Criminal Code. Sanclemente’s position on matters of criminality, 
belligerence, and political negotiation became evident since November 1899, when he 
rejected a petition by a group of pacifist Liberals to propose the rebels a truce. To the 
president, it was unthinkable that the government proposed any sort of agreement in this 
regard, even more considering that the rebels were the ones that insisted on keeping the 
conflict alive. A truce in those conditions not only would give the impression that the 
government was weak, Sanclemente maintained, but also involved the implicit recognition 
of the rebels as “belligerents in civil war.” That, the president underscore, was an 
impossible option, for Liberals in arms were “nothing but rebels according to the Criminal 
Code.”477 
A second letter, also from November 1899, offers additional details about 
Sanclemente’s position. Responding to a second group of Liberals that requested him a 
political pact with the rebels, the president manifested that, while he was willing to respect 
all rights and guarantees, he would never consider insurrection a right. The rebellion was 
criminal, illegitimate, and therefore deserved no special treatment. Proceeding otherwise, 
the President pointed out, implied to tell all criminals, both common and political, that they 
could demand concessions from the government anytime they wanted.478 Another letter, 
this time from February 1900, would reinforce Sanclemente’s unwillingness to de-
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criminalize the rebellion. The letter was a response to a recent proposition for an exchange 
of prisoners between the Liberal and Conservative armies. Sanclemente rejected the 
proposal on the grounds that accepting it would imply admitting that the conflict was a 
formal civil war, “which is a far cry from reality.” “What I see,” argued the President, “is 
the nation’s legitimate government, on the one hand, and a group of insurrectionists that 
with no reason have taken up arms in order to seize power, on the other hand.” Rebels, in 
this light, had no right to take prisoners, while imprisoned rebels were nothing but criminals 
subject to punishment according to the Criminal Code, Sanclemente concluded.479 
 Conservative newspapers would back Sanclemente’s decisions. In December 1899, 
the paper El Orden Público, quite a telling name, manifested that it was unrealistic for 
Liberals to expect the government to consider rebels “equals” and accept to negotiate with 
them. It was as unrealistic as pretending to convince the government that the rebellion was 
a right and not a crime. Drawing on an essay from 1862 by the Liberal Felipe Pérez, the 
paper maintained that political crimes were the most serious crimes there were and 
deserved a punishment that corresponded to their seriousness. Political crimes affected 
society as a whole and thwarted morals, law, and reason alike, “giving robbery and murder 
deceitful and forgiving forms.” The practices of treating rebel leaders as “equals” to the 
government and granting them pardons that brought nothing but impunity was, in this light, 
more than paradoxical.480 By bringing up the words of a liberal, El Orden Público aimed 
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to underscore the lack of moral and legal grounds of the rebel’s claims for a negotiated 
solution to the conflict.  
Sanclemente would insist on his position until the end of his administration. Soon 
before the coup of July 1900, a group of liberals sent him a petition asking for both the 
regularization of the conflict under the terms of International Law and the subsequent 
recognition of the rebels as belligerents. Sanclemente, once again, denied the petition by 
arguing that it was necessary to respond to the rebellion with the Criminal Code and that 
any other treatment would grant armed liberals nothing but impunity. To the President, 
revolutions would be less common in Colombia if governments put a halt to the deep-
rooted practice of granting rebels “guarantees and impunities of all sorts.”481 
 The events of July 1900, a coup staged by a member of the President’s own party, 
did not bring any change regarding the government’s opinion on the legal and political 
status of Liberal rebels. Soon after his possession, Marroquín declared that, while he was 
willing to treat with leniency all rebels that surrendered, he would not grant the rebellion 
any political concession. A political, non-criminal recognition of the rebels, in the 
President’s opinion, would do nothing but encouraging them to continue the rebellion in 
order to push for more political compromises.482 A year later, Marroquín would discredit a 
series of recent petitions asking him to give the conflict a negotiated solution. He claimed 
that Liberals requested “concessions that neither the law nor the government’s decorum 
allow me to grant.” Acceding to the rebels’ claims and demands implied to subvert the 
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nation’s entire legal and political order. In the same light, the government could not 
negotiate with its armed opponents without abdicating its constitutional duty of repressing 
them as disturbers of public order. Similarly, the state could not allow that a group of 
people, by “violent” and “criminal” means, succeeded in fostering any legal, constitutional, 
or political reform. Agreeing to both things meant to admit the possibility that any 
alteration of public order could lead to the annulment of all legitimate institutions and the 
derogation of all laws. “Maintaining the opposite is like affirming that the commission of 
a crime implied the immediate derogation of the Criminal Code,” Marroquín concluded.483 
 Marroquín was not alone in his decision of not granting rebels any sort of political 
recognition or treatment. That was also the position of his War Minister, José Vicente 
Concha. In November 1901, Concha would reject a petition by the rebel General Foción 
Soto requesting the application of the international law to the conflict in order to humanize 
it. In his petition, General Soto maintained that the hostilities had reached alarming levels 
of barbarity and the conflict seemed to drift away from the limits that civilized nations 
recognized in cases of international or civil warfare. To Soto, the government was at least 
partially responsible for this situation, since its obstinacy in treating rebels as criminals had 
ended up damaging the common sense of all its representatives and officials.484 The 
Minister’s response was no different from what Marroquín and Sanclemente had stated 
before: the conflict was a mere insurrection and not a civil war and, therefore, should 
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remain subjected to the Criminal Code. To Concha, the rebellion did not deserve a 
treatment according to international law because it did not have the features that, according 
to this legislation, characterized “formal” civil wars. The rebels, the minister argued, did 
not count on an established government, did not permanently control a portion of the 
territory, and neither administered justice nor exercised sovereignty in the areas where they 
operated. In these circumstances, there was no legal obligation to recognize Liberal armies 
as belligerent, let alone to declare the nation in a state of civil war.485 
 Foción Soto’s petition was not the only request that Liberals made in this regard 
during the Marroquín administration. More than a year earlier, in July 1900, José M. 
Quijano Wallis and eleven more people had written the Minister of War a lengthy 
manifesto requesting the recognition of Liberal rebels as belligerents. The manifesto’s 
arguments were similar to those from Soto’s petition. Almost a year of war had brought 
nothing but destruction and barbarity: “twenty thousand men dead in the battlefields […] 
Thousands of injured and mutilated people; [and] lots of women and children engulfed in 
orphanage and misery.”486 The humanization and regularization of the conflict were, in 
these circumstances, more than urgent. Its regularization did not require major legal or 
political sacrifices, the manifesto maintained. It only took the state to recognize the rebels 
as “armed enemies against the government” and not as offenders subject to the Criminal 
Code. The idea, simply, was that the relationship between state and rebels followed the 
practices and principles of “good war” established by international law for these kind of 
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conflicts.487 To the petitioners, all these requests were in tune with the Constitution, which 
encouraged the government to use the ius gentium in cases of “internal commotion.” 
Furthermore, they were grounded on the nation’s past, full of precedents of political 
transaction between governments and rebels.488 Quijano’s petition sums up many of the 
questions and claims that made up the debates about belligerence during the Thousand 
Days.   
 Conversations about belligerence and International Law tackled important matters 
regarding the workings of law and state retribution during the Thousand Days. Questions 
about the validity of the ius gentium in the context of the war entailed deeper 
preoccupations about the limits, scope, and authority of Colombian law regarding the 
punishment of the country’s internal enemies. It was, also, a concern about the tensions 
between state and international law concerning the legal status and treatment of rebels and 
other political offenders. Regardless what Regenerationist authorities decided in that 
regard, what is clear is that the legal treatment of political criminality during the conflict –
as it had happened in previous civil wars– was a question that extended beyond the limits 
of Colombia’s state law. The definition of the legal status of rebels, together with their 
legal treatment, did not depend exclusively on provisions from Colombian law, and 
somehow involved a legal and legislative sphere that existed way beyond the limits of the 
state. Like in Porfirian Mexico, the fate of political criminals was a matter that surpassed 
–at least at a discursive level– the power and authority of state law.  
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 Debates about the recognition of rebels as “relative enemies” of the government 
also involved questions about the political and legal nature of the rebellion, and about the 
ways in which Sanclemente and Marroquín perceived armed liberals as internal enemies. 
Discussions on the recognition of the conflict as a civil war involved concerns about the 
legitimacy of the armed movement and the state’s right to react to it through its 
criminalization. They also entailed queries about how the government understood “internal 
enmity,” “political crimes,” and “common criminality” in the context of the rebellion, and 
how authorities could –and should– react to them. All these issues also raised questions 
about the normative framework that should guide and limit state retribution against liberal 
rebels, as well as the adequacy of the nation’s criminal code to underpin legal practices of 
state retribution. The government’s position in these regards evidences a perception of the 
conflict not only in terms of an unquestionable criminalization, but also in terms of a threat 
deserving retributive responses free from political considerations and concerns about the 
“good war.” These responses, as arbitrary and unfair as they might have seemed to some, 
still maintained a legal nature and relied on complementary judicial practices that would 
give state repression some degree of “procedural formality.” 
 
Rebels on Trial: Administering Justice in Times of War 
Judicial practices during the Thousand Days differed from the dynamics of “preventive 
justice” that characterized the Regeneration between the 1880s and 1890s. Although during 
the war there were no formal ordinary tribunals for the judgement of rebels and other armed 
Liberals, political and military authorities still made an effort to give repression and 
punishment a façade of judicial formality, rationality, and security. Whether by 
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administrative judicial procedures or by courts martial, authorities during the war 
attempted to administer punishment primarily through judicial ways. Multiple purposes 
converged in this judicialization of punishment. There was, for instance, the purpose of 
applying, in a strict and unquestionable fashion, the prescriptions from the Criminal Code 
regarding the treatment of rebellion and other political crimes. There was also the intention 
to reinforce state sovereignty through a strong reliance on its mechanisms for the 
prosecution and punishment of criminality and internal enmity. Finally, there was the 
purpose of buttressing state power by underscoring the ritual ways in which it operates. 
The regular functioning of a justice system during the war could have represented, in this 
regard, an effort on the state’s part to reinforce its sovereignty through the accentuation of 
its ritual displays of power and retribution. 
 The judicialization of state punishment during the war fell on multiple modalities 
of crime and criminality, involved diverse modalities of internal enmity, and extended to 
both rebels and members of the Conservative armies. Trials against rebels commonly 
involved political crimes like rebellion, sedition, and treason; common offenses such as 
homicide, arson, and robbery; and “mixed” crimes like the ambivalent offense of asalto en 
cuadrilla de malhechores. The results of these trials tended to depend more on the 
characteristics of the defendants than on the nature and severity of the crimes involved. 
Rebel officials of medium- and high-rank were more likely to receive death sentences than 
their subalterns. That was the case, for instance, of the rebel chiefs Antonio Suárez Lacroix, 
Juan Vidal, and Julián Lezama, executed in July 1902, or the liberal officials Cesáreo 
Pulido, Gabriel María Calderón, and Anatol Barrios, executed in September that year. 
Different courts martial sentenced them to death under charges of “rebellion in cuadrilla 
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de malhechores” and treason.489 That was also the case of the German citizen Otto 
Hiurichs, a sergeant major charged with rebellion and arson and sentenced by a military 
tribunal in February 1901.490  
Minor officials and rank-and-file soldiers often had better luck. In August 1901, a 
court-martial opted to give a group of minor-rank rebel officials lenient treatment. The 
tribunal initially charged the officials with rebellion, asalto en cuadrilla de malhechores, 
robbery, and damages to telegraphic lines, crimes that made the defendants subject to an 
almost a certain death sentence. Nonetheless, after hearing the defense, the tribunal opted 
to sentence the defendants only for rebellion and considered the rest of crimes simple 
delitos conexos. In addition, the tribunal declared that the officers in question did not play 
a significant role in their army and could not be considered neither directors, ringleaders, 
nor promoters of the rebellion. They were, in this light, “petty rebels” that should not 
receive more than the penalties established for the lesser modalities of rebellion. The 
tribunal ended up giving the defendants penalties of prison ranging between one to four 
years.491 Months later, in April 1902, a court-martial sentenced to prison the soldiers Juan 
Clímaco Herrán, Gratiniano Sánchez, Pablo Amaya, and Jesús Caro, together with other 
fellow combatants. The tribunal, in a similarly lenient treatment, only charged them with 
rebellion, with no supplementary charges of cuadrilla de malhechores.492 
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“Accomplices” and “auxiliadores” of the rebel movement also obtained lesser 
penalties, as illustrated by the judgement, in November 1901, of five people from Palmira, 
accused of providing rebels with weapons. The trial was conducted by Palmira’s municipal 
authorities, which decided that the act qualified only as sedition. It had merely been an 
action of hostility towards the government, which had not implied a direct involvement 
with the rebellion. Authorities sentenced them all to prison, and imposed one of the 
defendants –the owner of the house in which the weapons remained stored– an additional 
forced contribution of five thousand pesos.493 
Trials against members of the Conservative armies commonly involved offenses of 
treason and supplementary charges of desertion and/or insurrection. “Traitors” from the 
military were often responsible for actions or omissions that, to the authorities’ eyes, 
involved some degree of support for or complicity with the rebellion. Some of the people 
subjected to these trials faced accusations for deserting and switching sides, like it 
happened to the  soldiers Víctor López and Feliciano González, from the southern province 
of Cauca, in April and May 1901, respectively.494 The trial of the soldier Manuel Esteban 
Camacho in October that year sheds light on another modality of military treason. A court-
martial sentenced Camacho to 40 years of prison in Panamá for stealing five rifles and 
selling four of them to the rebels of the Cauca Valley. After a first revision, a military judge 
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reduced the sentence to 20 years in the prison of Palmira, considering that the defendant 
was a minor and deserved a less strict penalty.495  
The case of the prison guard Gregorio Sánchez offers additional details on the 
government’s understanding and criminalization of military treason during the war. 
Sánchez had to appear before a court-martial in August 1901, after apparently being 
involved in a prison mutiny and a jailbreak while he was on duty. The tribunal charged him 
with “triple treason.” To the court, Sánchez had committed treason by not giving alarm 
when the mutiny started, by joining the runaways in their escape, and by deserting from 
his post as a prison guard. His desertion was aggravated by the fact that, by escaping with 
the runaways, he had implicitly joined the rebels and therefore the rebellion. The 
prosecution requested that the court punished the guard “to the full extent of the law.” Yet, 
a medical examination proved that Sánchez was mentally handicapped and therefore 
unable to commit a crime in the terms of the Criminal Code. The trial resulted in an 
acquittal and a call to the government to improve its system of recruitment.496 Sánchez was 
not the only soldier that authorities charged for treason after a jailbreak. That was also the 
case of a captain and three soldiers in Cartago, court-martialed for treason and desertion in 
July 1901.497 An analogous case occurred in Bogotá after a massive escape of Liberal 
prisoners in November 1901. A verbal court-martial accused the inmate Régulo Ramírez 
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of orchestrating the break and, since he was a spy at the government’s service, sentenced 
him to death under charges of treason.498 
How did verbal courts martial work and what sorts of guarantees and protections 
did they offer? Military trials were commonly brief and did not last more than a week. 
Usually, before the installation of the tribunal, a war auditor decided whether or not the 
case in question corresponded to the military jurisdiction.499 If his concept was favorable, 
the court-martial could take place. Despite the trials’ short duration, there was a brief space 
for defense. Time limitations made it difficult to defendants to pick a lawyer of their 
preference, and most of the time they had to accept an ad hoc military lawyer. Once the 
defense had made its arguments, the tribunal debated whether or not the defendant 
committed the crimes in question, decided on his degree of criminal responsibility, and 
inquired about possible “aggravating” or “mitigating” circumstances. Finally, the tribunal 
issued a sentence.500 Although the law prescribed that court-martial sentences were 
undisputable and irrevocable unless they involved the death penalty, sentence revisions and 
appeals were not uncommon.  
In practice, court-martialed rebels and servicemen could request sentence revisions 
regardless the penalties they faced. Death sentences required the revision and confirmation 
of a local political and military chief. As illustrated by the case of the rebel Gerardo 
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Vásquez, sentenced to death June 1901 for homicide and robbery in cuadrilla de 
malhechores, the chief in question had two responsibilities. First, he had to inquire if there 
were procedural reasons that could lead to the annulment of the sentence. Second, he had 
to decide whether or not there were motives for either reaffirming or commuting the 
penalty. In the case of Vásquez, the chief confirmed the legality of the sentence and decided 
that there was no place for commutation. The prompt “reparation of society’s moral order” 
demanded the penalty as “indispensable.” Similarly, the chief maintained, the nation’s 
security required “the sacrifice, in the name of the law,” of all those that breaking away 
from any legality had provoked “the most dreadful disorders.”501 It was a decision that 
seemed to respond more to the “social” and “moral” convenience of the penalty than to the 
specific circumstances surrounding Vásquez’s crimes.  
Confirmed death sentences could still be subject to further revisions, as illustrated 
by the case of Otto Hiurichs. Despite being sentenced to death by a verbal court-martial, 
Hiurichs managed to take his case to the Supreme Court. The German citizen grounded his 
appeal on the arguments that the military tribunal that judged him was incompetent to 
decide on his case, and that his trial involved several procedural inconsistencies –
especially, he did not legally receive his acta de enjuiciamiento. The high court partially 
supported Hiurischs’s first claim, and considered that while military justice was competent 
to process him for arson, it had no jurisdiction at all over crimes of rebellion. The Court 
considered the second claim completely valid as well, and concluded that it entailed a 
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procedural informality that rendered the entire process null. This conclusion would save 
Hiurischs’s life.502 
Revisions of sentences that did not involve capital punishment also paid special 
attention to judicial formalities that could potentially annul the decisions of verbal courts 
martial. After his initial sentence to 40 years in Panamá, Manuel Esteban Camacho 
appealed and obtained a reduction of half the time in a less hostile place. Camacho, 
nonetheless, would request a second revision based on procedural inconsistencies. His 
second attempt proved successful as well, and forced the annulment of the sentence on the 
grounds that the authority that summoned the court-martial did not have the power to do 
so.503 Not all revisions of prison sentences were successful, tough. In June 1902, the rebel 
Jesús Caro appealed the court-martial decision that put him in jail before the Supreme 
Court, claiming that his trial had been unfair. The high tribunal considered that, while it 
had jurisdiction over these sort of claims, the defendant’s appeal lacked all formalities that 
the law required in these cases. According to the Court’s concept, Caro had not requested 
the revision through a representative of the judicial power. Neither had him grounded his 
claim on any of the causes of revision (causales de revision) that the law allowed. The 
tribunal ended up rejecting the appeal and suggesting the defendant to wait in prison until 
the Excutive decreed an indulto.504 
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On the whole, the functioning of justice during the war aimed to give state 
repression some sort of ritual formality that reaffirmed the government’s power while 
legitimizing its practices of retribution. Administrative judicial processes and, more often, 
verbal courts martial represented spaces for administering punishment and retribution in a 
“regulated,” “rational,” and “formalized” way. These judicial practices allowed the 
government to exercise its right to defense and retribution without ignoring or violating, at 
least formally, the rights and guarantees of its enemies. Administrative and military trials 
always left place for defense –no matter how minimum or restricted it was–, and their rules 
and procedures somehow granted defendants a few guarantees and protections. Despite the 
alleged arbitrariness, discretion, and partiality of these ways of administering justice, the 
cases reviewed here show that procedural formalities mattered and that courts-martial did 
not necessarily give the government a carte blanche for eliminating enemies. These 
formalities could also work on the defendants’ benefit and give them additional 
safeguarding against state retribution. The judicialization of punishment, nonetheless, 
represented only a face of the government’s strategies of repression and retribution during 
the Thousand Days.  
 
Punishment Beyond Courts: The Arbitrary and Extrajudicial Side of State Retribution. 
Practices of state punishment and retribution during the Thousand Days went way beyond 
the proceedings and protections of the judicial sphere. Outside the formalized, regulated, 
and ritualized field of justice administration, state retribution operated in more direct and 
straightforward ways, without the mediation of procedural restrictions or legal and 
constitutional limitations. Arbitrary arrests, extralegal imprisonments, and extrajudicial 
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executions were part of these “other” displays of state retaliation. As punitive practices, 
they were common throughout the entire conflict and served multiple purposes. They were 
public displays of state sovereignty; “exemplary” practices of punishment; means to 
terrorize and intimidate Liberal rebels; ways of punishing liberals outside the battlefields; 
and even strategies for “preventing” rebel outbursts in some areas.  
 Complains about arbitrary, extralegal, and unjustified imprisonments were usual. 
In Medellín, a conservative town that never experienced a single battle during the war, 
authorities arrested over 500 Liberals for “preventive purposes.”505 The bulk of these 
arrests corresponded to Liberals accused of supporting the rebellion with weapons and 
other materials, local and regional partisan leaders, and plain members of the Liberal party. 
Sinforiano Arcila, for instance, faced prison between December 1899 and January 1900 
after somebody accused him of hiding weapons for the rebels. In his petition, Arcila 
claimed that the accusations were false and ill-intentioned, that he was a pacific man, and 
that his imprisonment was nothing but the result of personal animosities.506 Other town 
liberals faced prison for no reason other than their political sympathies. Juan Crisóstomo 
Uribe, a prominent city Liberal, ended up in jail three times despite not having any –
proven– direct link with the rebel movement –twice in 1900 and once in 1901.507 Like him, 
many other Liberals from Medellín would face consecutive prison sentences merely on 
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506 AHM, Alcaldía, Tomo 158, FF. 25-27. 
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grounds of their political affiliation, as they manifested in dozens of complaints before the 
city authorities.508  
 Liberals in Cauca, south of the country, faced a similar situation. There, hundreds 
of people would also file complains for unjustified or arbitrary imprisonments.509 
Complainants pointed out that authorities from the Department had sent them to prison 
with no order of arrest, no proof of their alleged criminality, and no consideration about 
their pacific behavior and lack of compromise with the movement.510 Like in Antioquia, 
several Caucanos ended up in jail due to false accusations product of personal conflicts. 
That happened, for instance, to Euclides Salcedo, who attributed his arbitrary 
imprisonment in Pasto to “the mala voluntad that the local mayor has towards me.”511 
Cauca’s authorities also had the habit of arresting Liberals with no other reason than their 
political sympathies and later processing them as rebels captured in combat. That was the 
case of  Emilio Burgos and his brother Benjamín, Santos Padilla, and Samuel Salazar, 
arrested during the first days of January 1900 and then presented as prisoners from a 
combat that took place on January 23rd.512 Octaviano Caicedo, also from Pasto, had a 
similar experience at the beginning of the war. He spent about a year in jail as a war prisoner 
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despite the fact that no combat had occurred in the region around the time of his arrest. 
When reviewing Caicedo’s request for liberty, Pasto’s authorities admitted that once the 
rebellion had explored in Santander, they had proceeded to arrest as many Liberals as they 
could in order to prevent an analogous insurrection in the region.513 
 Arbitrary imprisonments intensified as the conflict dragged on. Interested in 
showing positive results in their war against the liberalism in arms, military authorities 
resorted to the strategy of arresting farmers and peasants and turning them in as war 
prisoners. In Cauca, for instance, Conservative General Enrique Palacios sent to a prison 
in Cali dozens of “humble folk people” disguised as Liberal combatants.514 In his memoir, 
a former political prisoner from Bogotá’s Panóptico recalled that, during the Marroquín 
administration, authorities imprisoned hundreds of innocent people “unable to tell the 
differences between the Liberal and the Conservative parties.” According to him, the waves 
of incoming prisoners included several children between eight and ten years old, 
“completely incapable of understanding politics, let alone of harming the government.”515 
During the last stages of the war, the Panóptico remained packed with “sympathizers” of 
the rebellion and civilians that authorities presented as combatants. Some Liberals would 
even accuse the current Minister of War, Aristides Fernández, of “collecting” political 
prisoners “with the obsession of a stamp collector.”516 
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 Extrajudicial and unlawful executions were also common, especially as a practice 
of retribution against rebels captured in combat. In December 1899, just a few months after 
the outbreak of the war, Rafael Uribe Uribe denounced the “inhuman execution” of a group 
of Liberal war prisoners in Santander.517 In Tolima, one of the main theaters of the guerrilla 
warfare between 1900 and 1902, conservative troops executed 14 war prisoners under the 
argument that taking care of them was a logistic nuisance. Tolima’s conservative armies 
would also be responsible for the beheading of 25 Liberal prisoners by the Magdalena 
River.518 The conservative response to the guerrilla warfare in the region included the 
extrajudicial execution of seven members of Tulio Varón’s guerrilla, 18 political prisoners 
from El Guamo’s prison, and 20 officers from Cesareo Pulido’s army. According to a 
contemporary source, conservative troops escorted Pulidos’s men to a river, ordered them 
to take a bath, and then opened fired against them.519 In his memoire, the liberal Adolfo 
León Gómez recalled the execution of Colonel Martiniano Arenas, prisoner of 
Conservative troops in the border between Boyacá and Santander. His guards accused him 
to try to run away riding a mule, and both prisoner and animal fell victim of a machete 
charge that reduced them both to pieces.520 
 Perhaps the most polemic Conservative attempt at executing war prisoners during 
the Thousand Days had to do with the Prevención that Minister Aristides Fernández sent 
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to the rebel leader Juan Mac Allister in February 1902. Mac Allister, leader of the Liberal 
guerrillas in Cundinamarca, had recently ordered the delivery of four high-profile war 
prisoners to a prison in Pore, a deserted, insalubrious town in the region of Casanare. 
Minister Fernandez’s response came in the form of a manifesto that, under the title of 
“Prevención,” circulated throughout all of Bogotá. In the document, the Minister 
demanded Mac Allister the liberation of the Conservative prisoners within a 20-days term. 
Otherwise, Fernández would order the execution of four high-rank rebel officials 
imprisoned in the Panóptico. The manifesto also threatened Mc Allister with executing the 
principal rebels in the hands of the government if the rebel troops dared to attempt against 
the lives of the Conservative soldiers they had captured.521  
The Prevención spawned rejection both within Liberals and Conservatives. In a 
letter from March 1902 to President Marroquín, a group of over 200 political prisoners 
from the Panóptico manifested their concerns about the measure and denounced that it 
entailed three major injustices. First, it contradicted the constitutional principle that 
prohibited the application of the death penalty for political crimes. Second, it violated basic 
procedural guarantees by ordering the execution of people that had not had the chance of 
being heard and defeated in a trial. Finally, it punished a group of individuals –already 
subject of punishment– for crimes which they were not responsible for at all. All this, to 
the eyes of the signatories, involved “something extraordinarily strange, if not 
extraordinarily monstrous.”522 That was also the opinion of a group of Conservatives that, 
around the same time, wrote Conservative General Ramón González Valencia a letter 
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rejecting Fernandez’s ways. In their opinion, the Prevención entailed “an outrageous 
proceeding” that contradicted “humanity’s natural laws.” “Since when can a member of 
the government freely proclaim ‘I kill,’ ‘I execute’?” the letter asked. “Do not we have 
already courts martial? Did this conflict already derogate all judicial processes?”, it 
continued. To the signatories, Fernández’s initiative undermined the basis of the republic, 
and, even worse, involved the risk of “turning crime into an institution.”523 
A complementary punishment practice, also related to the extralegal application of 
the death penalty, had to do with the intentional disregarding of both judicial sentences and 
armistices. Writing to General González Valencia in September 1902, Luis Martínez Silva 
denounced that Minister Fernández had recently annulled a court-martial sentence that 
punished a rebel with five years of prison. Wanting a death sentence, Fernández had 
summoned a second court-martial and forced it to punish the defendant with the desired 
penalty. By the time Marroquín heard of the double-trial and decided to intervene, the 
Minister’s people had already carried out the new sentence.524 Something relatively similar 
would happen later in 1902 after the signing of the Treaty of Neerlandia. The peace treaty 
did not prevent General Aristóbulo Ibáñez from being hunted down and executed.525 
Neither did it impede Conservative General José Joaquín Casas from ordering a court-
martial  apply a “suggested” death sentence against Rafael Uribe Uribe in October 30, 
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1902.526 Legal agreements and judicial decisions were sometimes insufficient to contain 
and channel the forces of state retaliation during the Thousand Days. 
What do these arbitrary and extrajudicial punishment practices reveal about the 
workings of state repression and retribution during the war? Overall, they show that it is 
not possible to reduce the government officials’ logic to a simple opposition between “the 
legal” and “the illegal.” State retribution during the Thousand Days was highly legalistic 
and relied heavily on judicial rituals. Yet, it did not unfold in a complete and absolute 
“legal” fashion. Arbitrariness was common, as were extrajudicial punishments, and the 
logics of state repression often dodged –or straightforwardly ignored– existing 
constitutional, legal, and judicial limitations. This, by no means, can lead to the conclusion 
that state repression during the war was a simple matter of “illegality” or “legal 
deformations,” as historian Mario Aguilera maintains.527 State repression was complex and 
unfolded and manifested in different, even complementary ways, not exclusionary at all. It 
never had a single, simple goal. On the contrary, it encompassed a panoply of military, 
political, and legal purposes. The intertwining of “legal” and “extra-legal” responses to the 
rebellion was nothing but a natural outcome of such complexity. Here, the legal and the 
illegal, the judicial and the extrajudicial were never absolute, irreconcilable categories. 
They were just points in a continuum of governmental responses to the rebellion that, 
according to the purpose in question, could rely more or less on legal practices and judicial 
resources.  
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The Thousand Days Experience in Context: From 1895 to 1906. 
Governmental responses to the liberal rebellion of 1899 did not greatly differ from the 
repressive practices that marked the reaction of Colombian governments to other episodes 
of internal turmoil during the period. There were no major differences between the logic 
of state retribution during the Thousand Days and that from the war of 1895, for instance. 
Similarly, responses to the plot against Reyes’s life in 1906 would build on some of the 
legal and judicial practices to which the government resorted between 1899 and 1902. On 
the whole, governmental reactions to insurrections and junctures of civil warfare, during 
the Regeneration and the Reyes era, did not experience any substantive transformation. 
After all, they were manifestations of a “culture of governance” consistent with the basic 
premises of the Regeneration and the principles of the 1886 charter. They reflected a style 
of government whose fundamental tenets were the maintenance of public order, the 
sacrifice of individual liberties to “society’s welfare,” and the prevalence of the Executive 
over the rest of public powers. It was also a style that relied heavily on the law as an 
instrument of control and punishment, and on the ritualization of justice and punishment 
as a means for strengthening and reaffirming state sovereignty.  
Legal responses to the war of 1895 included a series of measures that the 
Sanclemente and Marroquín administrations would replicate years later. Measures 
included, among others, the imposition of forced contributions, which by the 1890s 
represented already a customary repressive practice for junctures of civil warfare. These 
“war taxes” were indeed common during all the civil wars of nineteenth-century Colombia; 
and, throughout the second half of the century, had evolved into a structured, generalized, 
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and systematic scheme for the punishment of non-armed dissidents.528 The Colombian 
custom of charging dissidents with forced contributions was in fact so particular that it 
would even call the attention of contemporary experts on international law. That was the 
case, for instance, of the Peruvian jurist Carlos Wiesse, whose Reglas de derecho 
internacional (1893) criticized this practice as “contrary to the laws of war” and repudiated 
by all international treaties.529  
 Repressive measures during the 1895 conflict also included the enactment of 
legislation reorganizing the jurisdiction and attributions of military justice. A decree from 
January 17 redefined and extended the limits of the military jurisdiction in almost the same 
terms of Sanclemente’s decree from October 20, 1899. This same decree would also extend 
the repertoire of crimes subject to the death penalty, and formalize the application of forced 
contributions for the crime of rebellion.530 A second decree, from March, made legal the 
celebration of verbal courts martial for the judgement of rebels that were reluctant to 
surrender. The measure involved rebel ringleaders, officers of all ranks, and even people 
responsible for “promoting or encouraging the uprising” and “working for the success of 
the rebellion in any possible way.”531 As during the Thousand Days, defendants had the 
option of requesting sentence revisions or taking their cases before the Supreme Court. 
That was the case, for instance, of Domingo Rodríguez, a political prisoner that managed 
                                                
528 Aguilera Peña, “Canje o fusilamiento,” 41.  
 
529 Carlos Wiesse, Reglas de derecho internacional aplicables a las guerras civiles (Lima: Librería El Siglo, 
1893), 101-102. 
 
530 Decreto 17 de 1895 (enero 29): “Que contiene disposiciones en materia penal y de organización y 
procedimiento judicial,” Diario Oficial 9693, January 30, 1895. 
 
531 Decreto 7 de 1895 (marzo 21): “Del jefe civil y militar del departamento del Tolima,” Diario Oficial 9718, 
March 22, 1895. 
 339 
to obtain the annulment of a court-martial prison sentence by appealing to this high 
tribunal.532 Something similar happened to the rebels Juan Bautista Martínez, Miguel 
Marmolejo, and Fabio Victoria, who faced a court-martial for homicide that concluded 
with two orders of imprisonment and one death sentence. The defendants appealed before 
the Supreme Court, which ultimately annulled the sentence on the grounds of procedural 
irregularities and “jurisdictional incompetence.”533 
 The attempt against President Reyes’s life on February 10, 1906 also provoked a 
series of reactions that resembled the legal and judicial practices of the Regeneration. Right 
after the attack, Reyes ordered the arrest of the conservatives José Joaquín Casas and 
Aristides Fernández. The President acquitted Casas, kept Fernández in prison, and applied 
to the former War Minister the formula that he (Fernández) had applied against Juan Mac 
Allister back in 1902. On February 15, Reyes ordered the publication of a “Prevención” 
in which he threatened Fernández with the death penalty in the case that the President’s 
life were in danger once again.534 Days later, nonetheless, Reyes retired the threat and, in 
correspondence with the legislation on alta policía, sentenced him and two other high-
profile suspects to expatriation.535 Two days after the publication of the Prevención, the 
President would enact a decree ordering the judgement by a verbal court-martial of all the 
people captured either as authors or accomplices of the attack. The court-martial issued its 
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sentence on March 5, a few days after the arrest of the three material authors of the crime. 
The tribunal sentenced the three attackers to death and gave a dozen more people prison 
penalties ranging from five to twelve years as accomplices and masking agents 
(encubridores).536 
 According to the terms of the sentence, the court-martial considered the attack 
against Reyes a common offense and not a political crime. The tribunal charged the 
defendants with asalto en cuadrilla de malhechores, and declared that their actions had no 
political nature whatsoever. Political crimes, the sentence stated, always pursued an 
“abstract goal,” and what the plotters against Reyes intended was very specific. The crime 
in question, in addition, was a heinous, monstrous one, with no precedents in the nation’s 
history. It was an act that had profoundly moved the nation, entailed all the perils of 
anarchism, and reflected a criminal impulse that required urgent and energetic extirpation. 
The “extirpation” of the threat materialized in a death sentence that authorities carried out 
as an organized, almost ritualized public display of state retribution. In correspondence 
with the sentence, the execution took place in the same spot that the attack against Reyes 
had occurred –a public road in the center of Bogotá–, and counted with the presence of the 
rest of the defendants.537 The shooting of the three attackers in March 6, 1906, marked the 
last time that a Colombian government applied the death penalty. 
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Conclusions: Legality, Extra-legality, and the Legal Treatment of Political Crimes in 
Mexico and Colombia 
The responses analyzed in the previous sections do not comprise the totality of repressive 
initiatives to which the Porfiriato and the Regeneration resorted in times of rebellion and 
internal turmoil. Yet, they certainly include the most recurrent ones. Additional measures 
in the Colombian case included, among many others, restrictions to the mobility and 
circulation of rebels and other “dangerous” people both in the cities and in the countryside. 
In Barranquilla, for instance, a decree from late 1901 established that “no Liberal [could] 
transit the city’s streets, squares, and public places after 7 p.m.,” and prohibited the public 
reunion of more than two “enemies of the government” during daytime.538 In México, 
punishments for rebellion and insurrection also included conscription in the federal forces 
stationed in Yucatán and Quintana Roo with the mission of fighting the Mayas.539  
 Repertoires of governmental responses to rebellion in Mexico and Colombia were 
rich, diverse, and complex. They encompassed multiple, often parallel legalities, 
jurisdictions, and legal authorities, as well as both national and international legal domains. 
The Mexican case, for instance, involved jurisdictional tensions between state and federal 
judicial authorities regarding the judgement of political criminals, as well as a difficult 
interplay between Mexican and American law concerning the punishment of “dangerous” 
political exiles. Analogously, the Colombian experience entailed conflicts between 
ordinary and military tribunals, as well as multiple preoccupations about the role of 
international –or extra-national– legislation in the criminalization and treatment of rebels 
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and other political offenders. As in the case of the preventive management of political 
criminality (see previous chapter), responses to actual episodes of rebellion emerged out 
of a plurality of legal authorities and jurisdictional spheres. Even within the domains of the 
state and state law, legal logics of repression were fragmented and did not exclusively rely 
on a monopolistic authority or institution. State law concerning the treatment of political 
criminality was, then, neither monolithic nor unrivaled by other international or extra-
national legal spheres.  
 These responses also involved elaborated combinations of of legal and extralegal 
initiatives, judicial and extrajudicial punishment practices, and formal and informal 
measures. These combinations were neither paradoxical nor contradictory. Here, “the 
legal” and the “extra-legal” did not function as absolute and mutually exclusive categories. 
“Legality” and “extra-legality” coexisted as complementary notions –and spheres– as 
governments devised different strategies to tackle the many political, legal, and military 
requirements of their war against rebellion. Responses to political crimes and criminals 
were as legal as they were extralegal, and as judicial as they were extrajudicial.  Their 
different degrees of “legality” or reliance on the judicial sphere depended primarily on their 
purposes, from underscoring state power and authority through the justice system and its 
rituals to intimidating and crushing rebels through unbridled displays of state violence. As 
illegal, unconstitutional, and arbitrary these extrajudicial practices might have seemed to 
many, they were an integral part of the government’s repertoire of responses to 
insurrection, rebellion, and civil warfare. They accompanied and complemented its roles 
as law enforcer, administrator of justice, and guardian of public order. As practices of 
retribution and displays of sovereignty, these “other” responses were in tune with the type 
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of government –and governance– that both the Regeneration and the Porfiriato tried to 
shape –one whose fundamental tenets were the maintenance of public order, the sacrifice 
of individual rights to the society’s welfare, and the prevalence of the Executive over the 
rest of the public powers. 
 Despite these basic similarities between the Mexican and Colombian experiences, 
there were important differences between one country and another. In matters of law and 
legislation, for instance, Colombian authorities relied primarily on extraordinary and 
emergency decrees, shaping “new,” “alternative” legalities for the criminalization and 
punishment of rebellion and other modalities of internal enmity. Mexican authorities, on 
the contrary, drew predominantly on their regular legislation, charging and punishing 
rebels in correspondence to their Criminal Code. This difference between “ordinary” and 
“extraordinary” legalities is also manifested in the ways in which both countries 
administered justice in cases of rebellion. While in Mexico the judgement of most rebels 
remained in the hands of ordinary tribunals, in Colombia the government tended to make 
it a matter of administrative proceedings and military tribunals. This characteristic 
contributed even more to the “exceptional” nature of the legal and judicial treatment of 
Colombian rebels. A third difference in this regard has to do with the nature of people 
subject to punishment according to each country’s legislation and judicial practices. In 
Mexico, legal and judicial punishment tended to fall on people directly and indirectly 
involved in rebel movements or episodes of rebellion. In Colombia, on the contrary, 
punishment involved, besides rebels and individuals with actual or alleged connections 
with them, non-combatants and people with no links at all with a revolutionary movement. 
Although both Mexican and Colombian governments recognized certain equivalence 
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between dissent and criminality, it was in Colombia where authorities legally declared 
dissent a subject of punishment.   
The nature and evolution of rebellions and rebel movements in each country help 
explain many of these differences. In Colombia, the conflicts of 1895 and 1899-1902 were 
generalized civil wars that shook most of the country and put a big portion of the nation on 
a war footing. In México, on the contrary, the reviewed rebellions and expeditions did not 
evolve into nation-wide confrontations –these larger conflicts would correspond to the era 
of the Mexican Revolution. Legal and judicial responses to rebellion in Colombia entailed 
such levels of exceptionality mostly because they were reactions to generalized states of 
emergency and nation-wide disruptions of public order. Governments perceived them as 
serious threats against the nation that demanded quick, efficient, and energetic responses 
that neither the ordinary justice system nor the current Criminal Code were able to offer. 
The resulting exceptionality was not the product of a capricious, over-authoritarian power 
placed above the constitution and the rule of law. Despite their undeniable traces of 
authoritarianism, these “exceptional legalities” were deeply-rooted in prescriptions of the 
Constitution and the Criminal Code regarding the management of public order. They also 
drew heavily on the many grey areas that marked the 1886 Charter concerning the faculties 
and limits of the Executive power.  
 Regardless of the degrees of exceptionality and alternative legality present in both 
experiences, responses to rebellion in Mexico and Colombia subjected political crimes and 
criminals to analogous processes of legal reinvention. Reinventions affected the logics of 
state punishment and the sphere of crime and criminality alike. Penalties for rebellion in 
the two countries were not reduced to the punishments that their respective legislations 
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prescribed for it. Whether by charging rebels with both common and political offenses, or 
by straightforwardly indicting them as common criminals, Mexican and Colombian 
authorities managed to redefine what the law allowed and forbade in terms of penalties 
against internal enemies. It was a reinvention of the limits and differences between 
common and political crimes that allowed governments to repress their rebels in ways that 
dodged the limits that constitutions and criminal codes established for the punishment of 
political offenders. The imposition of forced contributions to rebels and Liberal 
sympathizers in Colombia, the extradition of rebels and Liberal agitators in Mexico, and 
the imposition of the death penalty to political offenders in both countries illustrate the 
result of these reinventions.  
Reinventions on the sphere of offenses, offenders, and criminal categories had 
analogous legal implications. When responding to rebellion through legal and judicial 
means, Mexican and Colombian governments criminalized a particularly diverse set of 
people and actions. It was a set of crimes and criminals much wider and varied than those 
that the respective criminal codes delimited in their definitions of treason, rebellion, and 
sedition. Legal and judicial responses to insurrection and civil warfare extended and 
redefined existing notions of rebellion to the point of criminalizing, besides actual rebels 
and active supporters and advocates of rebellion, several other modalities of alleged or 
actual internal enmity. “Extended” modalities of rebellion turned criminal the actions of 
unarmed political agitators; opposition journalists; peaceful, non-combatant dissenters; 
deserters from governmental forces; “untrustworthy” public servants; and people whose 
actions or omissions could directly or indirectly benefit a rebel movement. If reinventions 
in matters of penalties combined common and political crimes as parts of a same set of 
 346 
actions of internal enmity, reinventions regarding crime and criminalization brought 
together, as subjects of punishment, both actual rebels and different sorts of dangerous 
“non-rebels.”  
Taken together, all these reinventions and extensions reveal that, at least in times 
of rebellion and political turmoil, political crimes in Mexico and Colombia did not exist as 
a clear, definite, and stable criminal category. Governments in both countries defined and 
redefined these crimes –together with the penalties linked to them– in correspondence with 
the evolution of political conflict and the always changing dynamics and needs of state 
repression. Reinventions and redefinitions took place in different and simultaneous 
scenarios. They emerged, first of all, in the legislation, whether through the reinterpretation 
of current laws or the enactment of new ones. They did, too, in the judicial system, through 
the combination of common and political charges and the treatment of political offenses as 
common crimes. Trials and tribunals also played a role in this regard, with the intervention 
of multiple actors and instances, each one with their specific understandings of what 
political crimes were and were not. So did legal and judicial practices of punishment, which 
extended the logics of state retribution against political criminals way beyond the original 
limits of a political crime. Marked by their diversity, flexibility, and mutability, repressive 
and punitive reactions to rebellion in Mexico and Colombia did not comprise the totality 
of governmental responses to political criminality during the period. While punishment 
and retribution played a major role in this regard, leniency and mercy also had an important 
part to play. 
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VII. CHAPTER 6. THE LOGICS OF STATE LENIENCY: THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF STATE MERCY TO POLITICAL CRIMINALS AND 
THE POLITICAL USES OF PARDON 
 
Reactions against rebels, conspirators, and political agitators during the Porfiriato and the 
Regeneration involved a myriad of cases like those of Ricardo Flores Magón, Catarino 
Garza, or Juan Galeana in Mexico. They also encompass dozens of stories of people that 
fell victim of political and military repression during the administrations of Marroquín and 
Reyes in Colombia. Do these experiences of persecution, repression, prison, confinement, 
and death sum up the bulk of governmental responses to political criminality in both 
countries during the period? Were there other ways of dealing with actual or potential 
rebels, or any alternative mechanisms for neutralizing the political and military threats they 
posed? Was there anything else other than repression and punishment? This final chapter 
delves into one of the most overlooked aspects in the literature on the Díaz regime and the 
Regeneration, and in general in the scholarship on civil wars and late-nineteenth century 
authoritarianism in Latin America: pardon. Both in Mexico and Colombia, the legal 
treatment of political criminals not only included diverse displays of state retribution. It 
also involved multiple manifestations of state leniency and many different mechanisms 
through which political criminals and prisoners could obtain some degree of redress from 
the, otherwise prevalent, logics of state retribution. 
 
Repression, retribution, and punishment represented just one side of the overall repertoire 
of governmental responses to political criminality in the Porfiriato and the Regeneration. 
 348 
Multiple manifestations of state mercy, together with a handful of legal and judicial 
resources that allowed people to negotiate or terminate their penalties complemented this 
repertoire. How did these manifestations of mercy operate in both Mexico and Colombia? 
How and in which conditions did Mexican and Colombian governments used mercy in 
responding to political criminality? What were the purposes of state mercy for political 
criminals, as well as their legal and political effects? And, how did political prisoners and 
criminals take advantage of these options in order to improve their legal and judicial 
situation?  These are some of the main questions structuring this chapter, intended to 
analyze the logics of state leniency in both countries and explore what they reveal about 
the workings of state power in the Porfiriato and the Regeneration.  
 The chapter relies on a diverse series of primary sources. Memoirs, newspapers, 
and official bulletins shed light on the multiple opportunities in which governments in 
Mexico and Colombia responded to political criminals with different manifestations of 
mercy. Constitutions and Criminal Codes account for the legal framework regulating the 
administration of state leniency. Pardon decrees and amnesty laws offer a glimpse into the 
effects, conditions, and restrictions of these acts of leniency. Requests for pardon and 
petitions for other forms of grace illustrate the language of these acts and how people 
managed to obtain mercy by legal means. Finally, judicial records and other similar sources 
reveal the ultimate outcomes of such requests, together with other details concerning the 
interactions between the state and the people requesting mercy. Section one explores the 
administration of mercy for political crimes in Porfirian Mexico, and pays special attention 
to the dynamics of state leniency during the conflictive 1890s. Section two focuses on the 
Colombian case, exploring a series of pardons and amnesties during the Regeneration and 
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the Quinquenio. These sections also address a variety of issues concerning the individual 
negotiation of mercy, especially during the early 1900s in Mexico and the Thousand Days’ 
war in Colombia. Section three, finally, includes a few reflections on the relationship 
between retribution and mercy as expressions of state power in both Mexico and Colombia.  
 Overall, the chapter argues that the logics of state leniency for political crimes in 
the Porfiriato and the Regeneration did not differ much from the logics of state retribution 
previously analyzed. Such similarities stem from the fact that they both were parallel and 
complementary manifestations of state power and sovereignty. State mercy was a powerful 
tool for bolstering state hegemony, advancing the state’s interests in political and military 
conflicts, stimulating relationships of allegiance, dependence, and patronage, and 
attempting to turn unruly political dissidents into obedient and submissive citizens. In this 
light, mercy, like punishment, played a key role in fostering sovereignty, neutralizing 
internal threats, and helping ensure state hegemony.   
 
Political Crimes and State Mercy in the Porfiriato: The Selective and Uncertain 
Logics of Porfirian Leniency 
The administration of state mercy for political crimes in Porfirian Mexico involved two 
major mechanisms. On the one hand, there were formal, legal manifestations of state 
leniency that took the form of amnesty laws or general pardons. These could emanate from 
different authorities depending on the jurisdiction in question. They could be either federal, 
granted by the President and the Congress, or provincial, issued by a state’s governor or its 
legislature. It all depended on whether the crimes in question had a federal/national nature 
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or not.540 On the other hand, there were multiple practices of individual petitioning and 
bargaining that aimed to negotiate punishment and obtain redress from the workings and 
effects of state retribution. Individual requests for presidential pardons represented the 
most common practice in this regard. Taken together, all these mechanisms reveal 
important details concerning the nature and functioning of both state power and state mercy 
during the Porfiriato.   
 
Pardons and Amnesties in the Porfirian Era. 
Both the Constitution and the Criminal Code set the basic normative framework for the 
administration of state leniency in Porfirian Mexico. Amnesties, understood as generalized 
acts of grace that benefitted an indefinite number of people regardless of the crimes they 
had committed, were a matter for the Legislative power. Pardons, more restricted in their 
scope and commonly directed towards a determinate number of individuals, corresponded 
to the Executive, which according to the Criminal Code had no restrictions for granting 
this grace to political criminals. The pardoning of political crimes, according to the Code, 
depended exclusively on the president’s “prudence and discretion.”  
Presidential pardons always had a relative, incomplete effect, tough.  According to 
the law, pardoned criminals still had to remain subjected to the authorities’ surveillance, 
and could face prohibitions regarding where they could go or where they could live. In 
addition, there were other provisions regulating the request and administration of pardons 
by the Executive power. Convicted criminals could request the President a pardon the same 
                                                
540 Constitución Federal de los Estados Mexicanos, Arts. 72, sec. XXI, and 85, sec. XV; and Código Penal 
Mexicano, Arts. 288 and 289. 
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way they could ask the Supreme Court for an injunction or amparo. Requests for pardon, 
nevertheless, had to count on the approval of the Junta de Vigilancia de Cárceles before 
they could go to the Executive power. The Junta was an organism in charge of supervising 
prisons and monitoring the behavior of their inmates. Anytime prisoners wanted to file for 
a pardon, they needed to ask the Junta for a “certificate of good behavior.” According to 
the organism’s regulations, its members could refuse to issue the certificate if they 
considered the petitioner had not acquired “habits of order, morality, and work.” Prisoners 
also needed to demonstrate the Junta that they had performed some sort of work during 
their time in prison.541 Such requirements gave this organism and its members a great deal 
of discretion regarding who could ultimately request a pardon and who could not. 
 Overall, official manifestations of mercy through legal acts were relatively common 
during the Porfiriato, especially during the late 1880s and the conflictive first half of the 
1890s. Most of the acts of leniency from this period came from state governors and 
legislatures, and responded to the need to put down local and regional insurrections. In 
October 1886, for instance, the governor of Sonora decreed a pardon to all people involved 
in a series of riots that had recently shaken the region. The grace in question was limited, 
nonetheless. Citizens willing to enjoy the pardon had to appear before the provincial 
authorities in order to obtain a salvoconducto –a safeguard document– that protected them 
from further official persecution. People that did not appear before the authorities a month 
after the enactment of the decree would be considered accomplices of the riots and 
prosecuted as salteadores. The decree also excluded from the grace those responsible for 
                                                
541 “Sobre denegación de indulto a los reos que no se hayan dedicado a algún trabajo en la cárcel. Julio 7 de 
1886,” AGNM, Secretaría de Justicia, Caja 184, Expediente 57. 
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the assassination of a senior executive official (prefect) that apparently had been murdered 
during the events.542  
During 1887 and 1888, the governments of Campeche, Veracruz, and Puebla would 
grant amnesties for episodes of political turmoil that went back to 1882. In May 1887, the 
governor of Campeche decreed a general amnesty for the benefit of all those involved in 
an insurrection that took place in June 1886. The decree ordered the suspension of all 
ongoing processes related to the event that corresponded to the state’s judicial power, and 
requested President Díaz to intervene in favor of those whose cases belonged to the federal 
military justice. To the state’s official newspaper, the grace did not respond to the fact that 
there were political prisoners after almost a year of the incident, but to the circumstance 
that there still were handfuls of fugitives running away from justice.543 Veracruz 
proclaimed theirs in July 1888, in reference to an uprising that occurred in September 1885 
under the leadership of the rebel Faustino Mora. The grace had no restriction or condition, 
and only left out people that, during the events, had committed crimes unrelated to the 
movement.544 Finally, the grace from Puebla came in August 1888, when the state 
legislature amnestied a group of people charged with rebellion for participating in an 
insurrection in the town of Itacamaxtitlán in November 1882. Unlike the previous ones, 
                                                
542 “Amnistía,” La Patria, November 12, 1886. 
 
543 “La amnistía,” Periódico Oficial del Estado de Campeche, June 3, 1887 ; and “La ley de amnistía,” 
Periódico Oficial del Estado de Campeche, June 7, 1887. 
 
544 La Voz de México, June 15, 1888. 
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this amnesty included no restrictions, probably as a result of the long time that had elapsed 
between the events and the granting of the grace.545 
The states of Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Guerrero would grant analogous graces 
throughout 1893. In September, Coahuila’s legislature granted an amnesty for all political 
crimes committed in the state up to the date of the legislative act. The grace implied the 
suspension of all ongoing process for political offenses, the release of all political prisoners, 
and the restoration of their civil and political rights.546 The amnesty took place soon after 
the insurrection of Emilio Carranza in August that year. The movement was a result of the 
tensions between Carranza and the current governor, José M. Garza Galán, for the control 
of the state Executive. Díaz would mediate in this conflict of regional strongmen by 
ordering the replacement of Garza Galán and encouraging the state legislature to treat 
Carranza and his people with leniency.547 A month later, the legislature of Nuevo León 
would amnesty the participants in Monterrey’s April revolt. The grace left out all people 
charged with homicide and injuries, as well as the authors of a publication from April 29 
that, allegedly, attacked and slandered the state governor.548 
Guerrero’s amnesty, proclaimed by the state legislature on November 1893, 
followed the surrendering of the rebel general Canuto Neri after an insurrection against the 
Governor Francisco Arce a month earlier. Neri’s conflict with Arce resembled, to a great 
extent, the rivalry between Carranza and Garza Galán in Coahuila. It was also a struggle 
                                                
545 La Voz de México, August 9, 1888. 
 
546 “Amnistía,” La Patria, September 14, 1893. 
 
547 Falcón, “La desaparición,” 439-440; and Prida, De la dictadura, 147-148. 
 
548 “Amnistía,” La Voz de México, October 20, 1903.  
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between two regional strongmen over the control of the state’s Executive. As in Coahuila, 
the insurrection counted on the mediation of Díaz, who pressed not only for Neri’s 
surrender but also for Arce’s resignation. Both moves proved successful, and the conflict 
concluded soon. The grace in question would mark the end of the conflict, granting “the 
widest and most complete amnesty” to all people involved in the movement, regardless of 
the crimes they had committed. As in previous cases, there were some conditions. The 
legislative act gave Neri’s people a 15-day term to appear before the state authorities and 
turn their weapons in. Authorities also had to keep a record with the names of all 
surrendering rebels, the date and hour of their surrender, and the number and type of 
weapons they turned in.549 The amnesty certainly benefited Neri, but for many of his men 
it did not bring about the promised effect. Many of Neri’s subalterns and soldiers would 
fall victim of the federal army soon after the enactment of the grace.550 
The initiatives of the government of Chihuahua during and after the rebellion in 
Tomochic offer a last example of these provincial acts of grace during the convoluted 
1890s. In June 1892, months before the government’s final strike against the indigenous 
rebels, the state legislature studied a draft of an amnesty law that aimed to benefit people 
involved in the demonstrations and attacks of December 1891 and January 1892.551 There 
is no further evidence regarding the fate of this draft. Chihuahua’s government would not 
                                                
549 Memoria que presenta al Congreso de la Unión el General Manuel González Cosio, Secretario de Estado 
y del Despacho de Gobernación (México: Imprenta del Gobierno Federal, 1900), 31-32, and 272. 
 
550 “Amnistía en Chihuahua,” El Monitor Republicano, March 4, 1894. The newspaper denounced that Neri 
had been the only beneficiary of the amnesty in question, and that it had proven worthless for the rest of his 
people, systematically hunted down by the federal army. The same complain is also present in Prida, De la 
dictadura, 150. 
 
551 “Proyecto de amnistía,” El Partido Liberal, June 29, 1892. 
 355 
give rebels a formal offer of leniency until March 1894, when the state governor issued a 
decree granting them a conditioned pardon. The grace involved “all Mexican citizens that 
since September 1892 to today have taken up arms against the legitimate authorities,” and 
only covered political crimes.552 In order to enjoy the effects of the pardon, rebels had to 
present themselves before the state authorities within a two-month term. Once there, they 
had to manifest “their submission to the supreme powers of the federation and the state,” 
as well as their compromise to surrender any weapons and ammunition in their possession. 
All rebels that failed to comply this requirement would be excluded from the grace and 
subjected to prosecution as “disturbers of public order.”553 A second amnesty decree, this 
time from January 1895, would offer a complementary and non-restricted grace to the 
rebels involved in the events of January 1892.554 
Formal acts of grace at the federal level were, in comparison, scarce. During the 
1880s and the 1890s, Mexico’s Congress enacted only one amnesty law, involving a 
rebellion that took place in Zacatecas during September to November 1886. Like many 
other amnesty acts from the period, this law represented a grace for political crimes, 
ordering the release of all political prisoners, and authorizing the suspension of all ongoing 
judicial processes concerning the events.555 According to the legislative debates prior to 
the law’s enactment, the amnesty had the primary goal of benefitting the prisoners who 
                                                
552 This timeframe included the last two months of the Tomochic rebellion, from the arrival of federal troops 
to the town on September 1st, 1892, to the end of the ride against its people on October 27 that year. See: 
Vanderwood, The Power. 
 
553 “Amnistía a los revolucionarios de la frontera,” La Voz de México, March 8, 1894.  
 
554 “Decreto de amnistía,” El Siglo Diecinueve, January 4, 1895. 
 
555 La Voz de México, June 9, 1887. 
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remained in the prisons of both Zacatecas and Mexico City. The rebellion had concluded 
with the death of its ringleaders, and the rebels that authorities had sent to prison had neither 
political importance nor a criminal background. Their release, therefore, would not put the 
public order at risk. In addition, the authors of the amnesty project maintained, the 
Zacatecas movement did not have the characteristics of other revolutions. Neither did it 
cause the evils that civil wars commonly brought. As per the legislators it was, in sum, 
nothing but “a revolutionary creature (engendro revolucionario) that died right after it was 
born, leaving no other consequences but twelve graves and a handful of prisoners for whom 
we request mercy.”556 
 Individual presidential pardons seemed to be slightly more common than federal 
amnesties. Between the late 1880s and mid-1890s, Porfirio Díaz would pardon at least 
three political criminals, one in May 1887, another in April 1894, and one more in June 
that year. The first of these pardons corresponded to  general Miguel Negrete, prisoner in 
Tlatelolco “for political reasons.”557 The second one benefited a  Colonel Marín, also 
prisoner in Tlatelolco under similar charges.558 The last pardon, finally, involved a 
journalist from one of the many newspapers that the government suspended in the 1890s, 
who remained an inmate in the prison of Belém.559 Although individual petitions for pardon 
by political criminals were common, Díaz was not always willing to grant former rebels 
                                                
556 Diario de los debates de la Cámara de Diputados, 13ª legislatura constitucional de la Unión (1887). 
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557 “Magnanimidad,” La Convención Radical Obrera, May 8, 1887. 
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mercy. When informing about the pardoning of Colonel Marín, the newspaper La Voz de 
México wondered why the President did not treat the political prisoners from Belém with 
the same leniency he had treated the rebellious colonel. Díaz selectivity in matters of 
pardon was striking, the paper suggested. While in many cases he would deny petitions for 
pardon with the argument that the law made him unable to intervene in the course of 
judicial processes, in others he seemed to have no problem at all in pardoning political 
criminals. It was curious, then, that political prisoners whose charges were similar to 
Marin’s –and ever less serious– could not enjoy the same sort of grace he had been 
granted.560  
 La Voz de México was not alone in his criticism of Díaz’s selective mercy and 
overall disregard for political prisoners. In May 1894, the paper El Tiempo published a note 
denouncing that, while common prisoners in Mexico City were able to receive daily visits, 
political prisoners were not able to see any visitors at all. To El Tiempo, it was also unfair 
that the President actively mediated in the granting of amnesties to regional strongmen like 
Canuto Neri, while he did nothing to better the situation of the many journalists imprisoned 
in the capital for political crimes. It seemed that Díaz considered Neri and other “estimable 
rebels” “very respectable and worthy of consideration,” and deemed their insurrections as 
mere results of their “bad mood.” In any case, the paper pointed out, Díaz did not seem to 
be resentful towards armed strongmen, contrary to the way he felt about dissident 
journalists.561 
                                                
560 “Cosas de la cafrería.” 
 
561 “Las visitas a los presos políticos,” El Tiempo, May 17, 1894. 
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 The complains of El Tiempo and La Voz de México were not unfounded. Díaz’s 
manifestations of mercy were not only selective but also strategic, as his mediation in the 
insurrections of Neri and Carranza suggests. In both cases, the President’s managed to 
appease the underlying power struggles by replacing the challenged governors and granting 
amnesty to their respective challengers. The opportune replacement of governors in the 
states allowed Díaz to strategically distribute regional power among the different 
strongmen of every province, securing their submission and allegiance. The administration 
of leniency to rebel regional leaders also played a part in this mechanism of political 
cooptation, as Díaz’s tendency to pardon high-profile rebels from the regional elites 
suggests. Neri and Carranza were not the only recipients of this sort of “strategic grace:” 
so were people like Diego Álvarez in Guerrero and Luiz Terrazas in Chihuahua, 
responsible for encouraging uprisings in their respective states during the early 1890s.562 
Díaz’s strategic intervention in these regional conflicts would make antiporfiristas like 
Ramón Prida insinuate that, ultimately, all these revolts had been plotted and encouraged 
by the same President with the interest of safeguarding his interests in the states in 
question.563 
 Partial, selective, politically instrumental, and even subject of criticism, 
governmental acts of grace in Porfirian Mexico carried nonetheless the meaning of acts of 
magnanimity that both expressed and reinforced state sovereignty. Congressmen and 
newspapers alike tended to present amnesty laws and executive pardons as displays of 
                                                
562 Falcón, “La desaparición,” 439-440. For a similar argument regarding Díaz’s strategic administration of 
leniency see the introduction of Katz, Porfirio Díaz, 17. 
 
563 Prida, De la dictadura, 147-149. 
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mercy that fostered the government’s sovereignty and reinforced the President’s authority. 
While discussing the amnesty law regarding the insurrection in Zacatecas, the project’s 
supporters defended the importance of the grace in question by using arguments of this 
sort. To them, “[state] authority [was] never stronger than when it [displayed] itself as 
magnanimous, through the exercise of the derecho de gracia and the granting of pardons.” 
“Forgiving the guilty,” the congressmen explained, “is one of the greatest attributes of 
sovereignty,” as well as a “humanitarian right” that the Congress should exercise anytime 
required.564  
 Analogous arguments guided the paper La Convención Radical Obrera when it 
informed about the presidential pardon of General Miguel Negrete in May 1887. The note, 
titled “Magnanimidad,” maintained that with the pardoning of the rebel official Díaz had 
“given a demonstration of his greatness of spirit.” “The current government, strong, 
respected, and loved, knows to defeat its adversaries with displays of generosity,” the paper 
explained. “And we are positive that the brave General Negrete will know to appreciate 
and value the magnanimous action of his former brother-in-arms,” they concluded.565 Later 
that year, the official newspaper of the state of Campeche used analogous terms in 
reference to two recent acts of governmental mercy. The first one was the federal amnesty 
for the people involved in the Zacatecas rebellion, which the paper considered “an example 
of magnanimity from the federal powers.” The second one was the recent amnesty that the 
state governor had declared for the participants in the uprising of June 1886. With this act, 
the newspaper claimed, the governor “had given the ultimate proof of magnanimity and 
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clemency.” Both amnesties suggested that the current policy towards political criminals 
throughout the country privileged pardon and leniency over “political resentments,” they 
concluded.566 
 The interpretation of governmental leniency as manifestations of state magnanimity 
and government sovereignty reveals an interesting detail regarding the workings of and 
discourses about state power in late-nineteenth century Mexico. Arguments linking mercy, 
authority, and magnanimity, as well as discourses emphasizing mercy as a demonstration 
of the Díaz’s “greatness of spirit” –or presenting mercy as “one of the greatest attributes of 
sovereignty”– had a striking similarity with colonial discourses about mercy and royal 
sovereignty. These notions about authority, governance, and mercy in the late 1880s 
seemed to present Díaz as a paternal figure of power modelled –at least partially– after the 
image of a king. In the colonial Spanish Atlantic, the king was a sort of father whose 
majesty and authority manifested both through acts of punishment and retribution and 
through displays of leniency, kindness, and forgiveness. The dispensation of leniency, 
indeed, was considered a prerogative of the king, who was expected to forgive criminals 
regardless the severity of their actions. Royal mercy played multiple roles in the colonial 
era. It helped instill obedience and loyalty in the crown’s subjects, strengthened the 
legitimacy of the king and the monarchy, and fostered royal hegemony by promoting 
gratitude.567 There are no major differences between these colonial discourses and the idea 
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567 See: Víctor Uribe-Urán, Fatal Love: Spousal Killers, Law, and Punishment in the Late Colonial Spanish 
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account of the multiple ways in which Royal mercy manifested and unfolded during the late-eighteenth and 
early-nineteenth centuries. 
 361 
that Díaz’s manifestations of mercy were displays of generosity on the part of a “strong, 
respected, and loved government.”  
 The critical decade of the 1900s closes with the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution 
in November 1910, the exile of Porfirio Díaz in May 1911, and, curiously, a generous 
amnesty following Díaz’s departure. The amnesty seemed to bring closure to a complex 
decade of failed insurrections, frustrated conspiracies, and strong repression against 
antiporfiristas both in Mexico and abroad. Enacted by the interim president Francisco de 
la Barra on May 27, the grace granted an unrestricted amnesty for political crimes and actos 
conexos committed up to the date of the decree’s expedition. As in previous cases, the 
amnesty ordered the release of all political prisoners and the suspension of all ongoing 
processes. In addition, it established that no further criminal process could invoke or take 
into account the crimes subjected to the grace. It was a long series of crimes including, 
among others, rebellion; sedition; conspiracy; hiding or helping spies; providing rebels 
with supplies, weapons, and means of transportation; recruitment rebels; helping revolts, 
seditions, and rebellions to succeed; and even encouraging people to commit any of these 
offenses. The amnesty also involved any military crime that the rebels had committed as 
part of their other offenses, as well as any gathering of funds  to finance  insurgent 
enterprises –as long as it did not correspond to acts of plunder, robbery, kidnapping, and 
homicide.568 No formal act of leniency during the Porfiriato had been as generous, 
comprehensive and detailed as the amnesty that marked the end of Díaz’s regime was. 
                                                
568 See the attached documents in SCJ, 1910, Expediente 3: “Toca al incidente de libertad preparatoria 
promovido por Aarón López Manzano.” The amnesty law was originally published in the Diario Oficial on 
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 What does this overview of formal acts of leniency reveal about the workings, 
purposes, and understandings of state mercy in Porfirian Mexico? A first aspect has to do 
with the political uses of mercy and the importance of leniency as a mechanism to ensure 
allegiance, submission, and obedience. At a discursive level, mercy was both an attribute 
and an expression of state sovereignty; a practice that reflected the paternal magnanimity 
of the sovereign and reinforced both his authority and people’s respect and love towards 
him. These understandings of mercy, authority, and sovereignty drew upon a discursive 
legacy from colonial times, which accounts for the survival of pre-independence notions 
of governance and state legitimacy even by the end of the nineteenth century. At a more 
practical level, the administration of mercy made possible the consolidation of political 
relationships of dependence, negotiation, cooptation, and conflict resolution that helped 
consolidate Díaz’s hegemony throughout Mexico in the 1880s and 1890s. This also helps 
explain the concentration of pardons and amnesties in these two decades, in comparison 
with the equally convoluted but –apparently– less merciful 1900s. The selectivity of 
presidential pardons and the strategic uses of mercy as a mediation tool in conflicts about 
regional power during these years illustrate this political instrumentalization of state mercy 
during the first part of the Porfiriato.  
 A second aspect in this regard has to do with the decentralized nature of state mercy. 
Amnesties and official acts of grace seemed to be more common at the regional level than 
at the federal one. Although most regional insurrections during the Porfiriato counted on 
the intervention of the federal military, the pardoning of the political crimes committed 
during these episodes tended to remain a matter of provincial politics and legislation. A 
third element concerns the restricted, conditional nature of most of the amnesties reviewed. 
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Some of these acts of grace had a limited application and seemed to leave out some crimes 
and criminals on purpose, as happened with the amnesty decreed in Nuevo León, in 
response to the events of April 1903 in the state’s capital, Monterrey. Others simply did 
not come fully into effect, as occurred with the amnesty for Canuto Neri and his people 
that same year. Also, the willingness of state governors and the legislature to treat rebels 
with leniency often contrasted with the many conditions established for the enjoyment of 
the grace. Leniency was commonly conditioned by the legal and symbolic submission of 
rebels to the authorities, their acceptance of the government’s legitimacy, and their 
reconversion from unruly dissidents into obedient, submissive citizens. In Porfirian 
Mexico, mercy had a political price that primarily benefited the government and its 
authority. 
 
The Nature and Fate of Individual Negotiations of Mercy in the Porfiriato. 
Political prisoners in Porfirian Mexico did not necessarily had to wait for amnesties or 
similar acts of leniency in order to achieve some sort of grace from the government. They 
could also find their own ways to obtain a presidential pardon or a prison release by directly 
negotiating their legal situation with the corresponding authorities. As mentioned in 
previous chapters, appeals and amparos were always available options for walking out of 
prison, and the law allowed prisoners to request presidential pardons as long as they met 
the requirements of their respective juntas de vigilancia. Prisoners also had the option to 
negotiate a conditioned release under the figure of “preparatory liberty” (See Chapter 2), 
and even could negotiate a judicial bond (caución judicial). Commonly used in cases of 
threats against individuals, judicial bonds were a mechanism that allowed criminals to walk 
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out of jail after signing a compromise of not committing the crime or crimes they were 
supposed to commit. A specific amount of money that the offender had to pay in case he 
failed to keep his word reinforced the compromise in question. It was, in sum, a mechanism 
for the prevention of certain crimes that authorities could use in order to secure the good 
behavior of an actual or potential criminal.569 
Common and political criminals during the Porfiriato seemed to be particularly 
aware of the multiplicity of mechanisms they could use in order to negotiate their penalties 
or walk out of jail. Many of them would even try to combine several of these resources as 
part of their overall strategies to obtain a grace. As some of the examined cases illustrate, 
this last strategy did not always lead to positive outcomes for the petitioners. Despite the 
diversity of options available for negotiating punishment and mercy in Porfirian Mexico, 
individual requests for pardon were often complicated processes that demanded a careful 
navigation through a complex array of legal options and requirements.  
 The cases of Antonio Bustamante in 1894 and Aarón López Manzano in 1910 shed 
light on the workings of judicial cautions during the period. Authorities from Nuevo 
Laredo, Tamaulipas, arrested Bustamante and two other people at the beginning of May 
1894, all of them under charges of rebellion. After just a few days in prison, Bustamante 
succeeded in requesting a judicial caution that allowed him to walk out of jail.570 López 
Manzano’s case was much more complicated. Arrested for his alleged participation in the 
failed revolutionary plot of 1906, López Manzano still remained a prisoner in 1910. In 
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April that year, a judge finally sentenced him to 6 years in prison. Two months after 
receiving the sentence, the prisoner filed a petition for a judicial caution. Several months 
later, in February 1911, the corresponding authorities let him know that they had denied 
his request, with no further explanations. López Manzano appealed the decision before the 
Supreme Court, but the high tribunal backed the original decision.571 
 It was not the first time that López Manzano requested his release from prison. After 
receiving a first sentence in 1910, he had filed a petition of release under the mechanism 
of preparatory liberty. The prisoner supported his second request with a document from his 
Junta de Vigilancia certifying his good behavior. The certificate stated that, during his 
years in prison, the petitioner had neither infringed the establishment’s rules nor been 
subject of any sanction or reprimand. The response to the petition came a month before the 
denial of his judicial bond: the authorities in charge of reviewing his case had decided to 
reject the petition because the certificate of good behavior was not convincing enough. 
According to them, the fact that López Manzano had had a “good negative behavior” in 
prison –meaning not doing anything against the institution’s rules– did not automatically 
make him worthy to obtain preparatory liberty. It was also necessary that the petitioner 
demonstrated “positive facts” proving that he “had dominated the vicious passion or 
inclination that led him into the criminal path.” Preparatory liberty required not only 
respecting the prison’s rules, but also acquiring “habits of order, work, and morality,” 
authorities explained. Since López Manzano had been unable to prove the acquisition of 
such habits during his time in prison, he could not enjoy the benefit in question. It was the 
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same response that, a short while before, authorities had given his fellow political prisoner 
Juan Sarabia when he tried to request his preparatory liberty.572 
 The experiences of Agustín Villaraus, José Sagardi and Silvestre F., imprisoned for 
their participation in an uprising in Jalapa, Veracruz, in August 1878, offer additional 
examples regarding people filing simultaneous petitions for grace. Between September and 
October that year, after spending no more than a couple months in prison, the four prisoners 
decided to request a presidential pardon. In his petition, signed on September 26, Silvestre 
F. argued that his participation in the movement had been involuntary and therefore he had 
surrendered at the first opportunity. Sagardi filed his petition on the same day, mentioning 
similar arguments concerning his involuntary involvement in the uprising. Villaraus’s 
petition came a few days later, on October 1. Besides mentioning that his family was poor 
and depended on him for their subsistence, the petitioner also argued that the uprising in 
question had been insignificant. It had been a short-lived movement with no major actions 
of war and no regrettable consequences. Furthermore, it had concluded with the prompt 
and voluntary surrender of all insurrectionists.573 
 The petitions had different outcomes. A couple of reports from October 10 reported 
that President Díaz had pardoned Silvestre F. and Sagardi. Two weeks later, a third report 
mentioned that it was possible that Villaraus did not share his fellow’s fate, since he had 
served the insurrection as a captain. The President also accepted the request of a fourth 
prisoner, Vicente Zarelo, who had filed an analogous petition around the same time. 
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573 “Relativo al levantamiento ocurrido en Jalapa el 16 de agosto,” AGNM, Secretaría de Justicia, Caja 85, 
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Sagardi and Zarelo, nonetheless, had gone further than their fellow prisoners in their 
requests for pardon, submitting not one but two individual petitions to the President. Either 
because of their insistence or because their little value as political prisoners, both 
petitioners managed to obtain a grace that seemed elusive to others.574 
 The simultaneous combination of strategies for the negotiation of penalties not 
always worked in benefit of the petitioners. In October 1909, Bernardo Bargo Gómez, 
prisoner in Yucatán under charges of sedition, tried to walk out of jail by requesting an 
amparo from the Supreme Court. The reasons for the amparo had to do with irregularities 
concerning his capture and subsequent imprisonment. The tribunal denied the request, not 
because his complain was unfounded, but because of a technical reason. Bargo Gómez not 
only had requested an amparo, but also had appealed the judicial sentence that put him in 
jail, which complicated the situation and blocked any possibility of an immediate 
intervention by the Supreme Court. Facing this situation, the high tribunal decided that it 
could not annul the sentence before the appeal process came to a full resolution. Bargo 
Gomez, in consequence, had to remain in jail.575 His case is just an example of several 
other cases involving both political and common criminals whose simultaneous requests 
for freedom or pardon ended up working against them for technical reasons. The case of a 
prisoner sentenced to death, that in 1910 managed to obtain a presidential pardon but could 
not enjoy the grace because he had an ongoing appeal process, offers a dramatic illustration 
of the consequences of such technicalities. Apparently, this situation was so recurrent by 
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then that the Secretary of Justice issued a recommendation to all public defenders telling 
them to file requests for pardon exclusively after exhausting all other available legal 
means.576 
How did state mercy work at the less solemn, more quotidian level of the individual 
negotiation of penalties? The reviewed cases, as diverse as they are, reveal that although 
state punishment was often subject of revision and bargaining, leniency was an elusive 
outcome. The existence of a variety of legal and judicial mechanisms for requesting and 
obtaining some sort of grace did not necessary mean that mercy was an easily attainable 
goal. None of these mechanisms could grant it automatically or guarantee it beforehand. 
Similarly, no argument seemed to have unequivocal effects concerning the granting of 
denying of mercy. It did not matter that such arguments invoked the violation of 
constitutional rights, “good behavior” in prison, a prompt surrender to the government, or 
the lack of political and military significance of a given uprising. Mercy for political 
crimes, in short, was always a possibility, but sometimes a remote one. It depended on 
many factors including the legal strategies employed (case Bargo Gómez); the qualities 
and background of petitioners or their value as political prisoners (case Villaraus); and even 
the discretion of the authorities in case of reviewing the petitions (case López Manzano). 
The uncertainty surrounding these individual requests shows again that, in the Mexico of 
Porfirio Díaz, leniency for political crimes was commonly selective and a matter of legal 
and political strategy.  
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Mercy, Rebellion, and Regeneration: Political Crimes and the Administration of State 
Leniency in Colombia 
The administration of state mercy for political crimes in Colombia had several points in 
common with the Mexican experience. Leniency could take the form of official acts of 
grace like amnesties and pardons, or emerge out of individual negotiations leading to 
judicial cautions and other classes of benefits and concessions. Regulations regarding 
amnesties and pardons were relatively similar in both cases, although there were slight 
differences concerning the definition, nature, and limits of these acts. Other general 
similarities between the two experiences include the fact that, like in Mexico, leniency in 
Colombia was also conditioned by the submission of rebels to the authorities, their 
acceptance of the government’s legitimacy, and their conversion from unruly dissidents 
into obedient, submissive citizens. 
 
Amnesties and Pardons during the Regeneration and the Quinquenio. 
The granting of amnesties and pardons during the Regeneration and the Quinquenio also 
depended on a series of constitutional and legal regulations concerning the administration 
of state mercy by the different public powers. Amnesties, according to these regulations, 
were general, comprehensive acts of grace whose intentions were to “forget” or “overlook” 
the criminality of certain acts and exempt criminals from the corresponding penalties. 
Pardons, like in Mexico, worked in a different way. They did not necessarily have a 
comprehensive scope and could target either an entire group or a single individual. Pardons 
did not overlook the criminality of a given offense; they merely forgave the penalty that 
should correspond to the crime. According to the definitions in the Colombian law, much 
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more developed than their Mexican counterparts, amnesties “erased” the criminality of a 
particular action, and their effects turned criminals into “non-criminals.” Pardons, on the 
contrary, recognized such criminality and considered offenders subjects of punishment. 
Their effects consisted only on forgiving the deserved penalty. According to the 
Constitution, the administration of amnesties corresponded to the Legislative power, which 
should grant them only in response to grave motives of public interest (“graves motivos de 
conveniencia pública”), and always for political crimes, which marks another important 
difference with respect to the Mexican case. Pardons, like in Mexico, were a matter of the 
Executive power, which could grant them either for common or political offenses.577 
 The political and military turmoil of the 1890s and 1900s would give Colombian 
governments several opportunities to administer state mercy through amnesties, pardons, 
and other analogous modalities of grace. These acts of leniency materialized in diverse 
ways, at different moments during a given conflict, and in response to multiple political, 
military, and legal interests. Sometimes, a president could offer pardons in the middle of a 
civil confrontation in order to “encourage” the surrendering of rebels. Analogous acts of 
mercy commonly followed the end of a civil war and marked its formal end. Pardons, in 
this case, represented the government’s compromise of not prosecuting –or hunting down– 
its surrendered enemies, and allowed rebels to reincorporate to civil and political life free 
from legal restrictions and criminal charges. Governments could also enact amnesties or 
pardon decrees several years after the end of a conflict. These late manifestations of mercy 
entailed both symbolic and legal purposes. On the one hand, they represented acts of 
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governmental reconciliation with former internal enemies. On the other hand, they 
commonly expanded the scope and effects of previous pardons, eliminating many of their 
–always existing– restrictions and therefore making more people eligible for  state mercy. 
The series of amnesties and pardons for political crimes granted by Colombian 
governments during the period offers several examples of how these modalities of 
governmental leniency worked and unfolded. 
 A first example of these formal manifestations of state mercy comes from 1894. In 
August that year, the House studied a draft of an amnesty law that aimed to give formal 
closure to two years of internal turmoil and insurrectionist plots –which included the 
Bogotá riots of January 1893, the frustrated insurrection of Avelino Rosas seven months 
later, and a failed revolutionary plan in April 1894. The proposed measure granted a “broad 
amnesty for crimes and faults of political nature, committed up to the date of the 
promulgation of this law.” It also ordered the cancellation of all ongoing judicial processes 
for political crimes, and allowed the return to the country of all political exiles and 
fugitives.578 Although the project did not prosper, an analogous decree issued that year 
ended up granting political prisoners a grace that mainly benefited those frustrated April 
insurrectionists that by mid-year remained in prison.579 
 The civil war of 1895 involved at least two major formal manifestations of state 
mercy vis-à-vis political criminals. In March that year, days after the battle that signed the 
ultimate defeat of the Liberal forces, Conservative General Manuel Casabianca issued a 
decree granting rebels some basic guarantees in exchange of their surrender. Casabianca’s 
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decree offered rebel ringleaders, officers, and rank-and-file soldiers liberty as long as they 
laid down their arms and presented themselves before the corresponding authorities in 
order to negotiate their legal situation. The offer excluded rebels responsible for common 
crimes. The promised liberty, nonetheless, had significant restrictions. It was subjected to 
the authorities’ surveillance and dependent on judicial bonds, which meant that 
surrendering rebels still had to regularly present themselves before a local or provincial 
authority and secure their “good political behavior” with a sum of money. In addition, the 
Decree gave authorities the power to order the imprisonment of confinement of 
surrendering officials “for special reasons,” and left to their discretion the criteria for 
deciding what a “special reason” was.580 
 The state of siege that the government had declared by the beginning of the war 
remained in place until November 1895, when President Caro finally succeeded in 
pacifying the region of Casanare, southwest of the country. The formal reestablishment of 
public order that month came together with the enactment of a pardon decree aiming to 
offer the defeated Liberals better and less restrictive guarantees. The decree declared the 
conflict terminated and granted pardon to all people involved in the revolution with a few 
important exceptions. Rebels charged with common crimes, ringleaders accused of 
organizing armed expeditions outside Colombian territory, and people sentenced in courts- 
martial for the same offense remained outside the effects of the grace. The decree also 
allowed political refugees to return to the country, as long as they formally promised “to 
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maintain a peaceful and respectful behavior towards the legitimate authorities.”581 The 
limitations and conditions in question met with rejection from the Liberal party. To Rafael 
Uribe Uribe, the decree contained “wretched restrictions” (mezquinas restricciones) that 
narrowed down the effects of the pardon rendering it  applicable only to an insignificant 
number of people. As a congressman in 1896, Uribe Uribe would propose an amnesty law 
reforming the terms of the 1895 Decree, especially in those points pertaining the exceptions 
to the pardon and the conditions for the return of Liberal exiles.582  
 Uribe Uribe’s project would meet serious resistance from the Conservative bloc in 
the Senate, which insisted in keeping all Liberals accused of or processed for common 
crimes outside the reach of the government’s mercy. It took the Congress two years to turn 
Uribe Uribe’s project into an actual amnesty law –Law 14, 1898. The new legislative act 
reformed most of the restrictions that the 1895 Decree had imposed, and made the pardon 
accessible to all rebels and political prisoners with the exception of those who had already 
been sentenced for common crimes. It also allowed exiles to return to the country without 
the requirement of a formal promise of good political behavior.583 
 Pardons during and after the Thousand Days followed a relatively similar pattern. 
Although both Sanclemente and Marroquín manifested in multiple times their willingness 
to grant Liberals mercy in exchange of their surrender, an official offer of pardon would 
not materialize until well into the third year of the conflict. It was already June 1902, when 
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President Marroquín enacted Decree 933 granting pardon to all rebels that laid down their 
arms. The offer, according to the President, responded to three circumstances. First, it was 
a response to the clamor of “several honorable citizens [that have] requested, in lively and 
patriotic ways, a grace for the revolutionaries still in arms, who are expected to lay them 
down if the government […] grants them guarantees.” Second, it took into consideration 
the facts that the revolution was virtually defeated and the rebels’ situation was “truly 
deplorable.” It was, then, the “most conducive moment” for “experiencing the effects of 
government’s benevolence.” Finally, it manifested that the government was “in its best 
disposition to contribute –as far as its decorum, the nation’s laws, and the ius gentium 
allowed–, to the rapid termination of the war.”584 
 The terms of the offer did not differ much from the conditions of Casabianca’s 1895 
Decree. Decree 933 granted a “wide pardon” to all Colombians involved in the revolution 
that were willing to capitulate and surrender their weapons and war material to the 
government. If the major revolutionary armies accepted the deal, the Decree also promised 
the release and pardon of all political prisoners. There were several restrictions and 
conditions, though. Surrendering Liberals had to declare before the government “their 
willingness to live subjected to the legitimate authorities and laws,” as well as their 
compromise to “not take up arms against the government once again.” Similarly, and like 
in 1895, the offer left out rebels charged with common crimes, leaders and promoters of 
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foreign expeditions against Colombian territory, and people judged in courts-martial for 
the same offense.585  
Rebel ringleaders reacted to the Decree the same way their fellow Liberals reacted 
to Casabianca’s offer during the previous war. In a letter from July 1902 to President 
Marroquín, General Uribe Uribe maintained that the proposed pardon did nothing but 
requesting from the rebels what the government had been demanding since the beginning 
of the war: an unconditional surrender. To the General, if the rebel movement had to admit 
its defeat and plead for state mercy, it would not settle for less than a formal amnesty. 
Amnesties meant “a reciprocal forgetfulness of all past events, the beginning of a new life, 
or at least the massive and anonymous remission of guilt.” A pardon, on the contrary, meant 
nothing but simply the forgiveness of a deserved penalty. “Accepting the pardon would 
amount to confessing that we have committed a crime.”  Yet, the rebellion had not been a 
criminal endeavor whatsoever, explained Uribe Uribe. To him, rebels had acted as 
“defenders of freedom” committed to carry on a “virtuous action” that had no traces of 
criminality at all. The general’s criticism also fell on the many restrictions that the Decree 
included, which pretty much applied “to all Liberals and even to quite a few 
Conservatives.” “There is no major difference between your Decree and an order to 
reinitiate hostilities,” Uribe Uribe concluded.586 Ultimately, Decree 933 did not have any 
relevant impact on the course of the conflict.  
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The surrender of Uribe Uribe’s troops in the Caribbean region, on October 1902, 
gave both rebels and government a new opportunity to discuss and negotiate issues of state 
mercy. This time, the rebels tried to press for an agreement that, instead of granting 
individual and limited pardons, offered Liberals collective and comprehensive 
guarantees.587 Liberal negotiators also sought to eliminate the differentiation between “acts 
of war” and “common crimes” from the resulting treaty, and to erase from it the terms 
“pardon” and “amnesty,” which they deemed “humiliating.”588 Their efforts proved 
successful. The Neerlandia Treaty, signed on October 24, gave new life to the July grace 
by eliminating all its restrictions (Art. 8). It also established that the government could not 
prosecute, judge, or punish  surrendering rebels for any act they had committed as soldiers 
in active military service (Art. 7). Other compromises included the release of all political 
prisoners in the departments or provinces of Magdalena and Bolivar (Art. 9), as well as the 
suspension of all forced contributions against Liberals from both regions (Art. 12). The 
treaty also offered legal and judicial protection to all political exiles that decided to return 
to the country (Art. 11). It also exhorted President Marroquín to use of his derecho de 
gracia in benefit of Liberals sentenced by courts-martial and that, for any reason, were 
unable to enjoy the effects of the treaty (Art. 8).589 
The Wisconsin Treaty, signed on November 21 after the surrender of Benjamín 
Herrera’s forces in Panama, extended the effects of state leniency over to the rest of the 
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country. The agreement granted “wide amnesty and complete guarantees for both all people 
involved in the current revolution and their property,” and ordered the immediate 
suspension of all ongoing processes for political crimes (Art. 4). Following the lines of the 
previous agreement, the treaty ordered the immediate release of all political prisoners in 
the country (Art. 2), as well as the suspension of all forced contributions (Art. 3). Finally, 
the agreement suspended the jurisdiction of military justice over common crimes 
committed by the rebels, turning their judgement into a matter for the ordinary justice 
system (Art. 5).590 A decree issued three days later would ratify and reinforce these 
compromises by declaring the war terminated and granting Liberals a “general pardon.” 
The decree declared pardoned “all individuals that, as a result of their involvement in the 
rebellion, have been sentenced to presidio, prison, or any other penalty imposed by courts- 
martial or any other authority.” It also ordered the immediate release of all political 
prisoners remaining in all jails and punishment establishments throughout the country, and 
stated that all political exiles were free to return.591 
A couple of laws enacted in October 1903 would give further support to the legal 
compromises that accompanied the end of the Thousand Days. On October 10, Congress 
enacted Law 23, which granted common criminals a grace consisting of the reduction of a 
fifth of their corresponding sentences. According to the Law, the grace responded to 
extensive pleads for mercy from several places in the country, and represented a sort of 
“reparation” for the hardships and privations that prisoners experienced during the three 
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years of the conflict.592 A few weeks later, on October 31, a second law proclaimed a new 
and wider grace for political criminals –Law 57. The Law conferred “wide pardon for the 
political crimes committed during the time of the last rebellion.”593 These two additional 
acts of mercy not only benefitted the legal situation of those Liberals formerly charged 
with political crimes. They also helped alleviate the situation of those rebels that, as a 
consequence of the legal and judicial reforms that took place during the war, had been 
judged and punished as common offenders.  
Governmental reactions to the plots of 1905 and 1906 against Rafael Reyes’s life 
offer another example of these practices of state mercy during the period. Although the 
government’s response to both plots was energetic and involved strong displays of state 
retaliation, there was some room for leniency as well. On July 20, 1906, President Reyes 
would enact a decree pardoning the five people that a court martial had sentenced in 
February that year for their responsibility in the plot of December 1905. The decree also 
granted pardon to “all individuals that are currently confined for political crimes.” The 
grace, nonetheless, was limited. It did not apply to people involved in the attack of 
February, and left out “those individuals that being notoriously dangerous in a particular 
town had been confined to another place for the sake of public peace.” In addition, the 
pardon in question did not have a general and immediate effect, but depended on special 
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resolutions from the War Minister, who had the power to decide which people could and 
could not enjoy the grace.594 
This conditioned and very limited pardon did not represent the only formal act of 
state mercy during the Reyes administration. In May 1907, the Congress enacted a law 
ordering the suspension of all penalties against combatants charged with common or 
political crimes during the last civil wars. The grace did not differentiate between people 
at the service of the government or combatants enrolled in an insurgent army, and made 
them both subjects of the pardon. The only people who could not enjoy the grace were 
those whose crimes involved death sentences according to the Criminal Code.595 A second 
law enacted the following year would eliminate this restriction and make the grace 
accessible to everybody, as long as their respective judicial experiences proved their 
condition as combatants at the moment of the commission of their crimes. In addition, the 
law declared under the statute of limitations all penalties imposed –or susceptible to apply– 
for common crimes committed before 1875.596 
 
The different laws and decrees granting some sort of grace for political crimes between the 
mid-1890s and the first decade of the 1900s reveal a series of important things about the 
nature of governmental reactions to rebellion in Colombia during the period. The most 
important aspect in this regard is that, although these reactions involved a great deal of 
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repression and manifestations of state retribution, they also entailed significant displays of 
leniency, mercy, and forgiveness. Legal responses to rebellion and political criminality did 
much more than allowing the government to punish its internal enemies: they also set the 
conditions for the negotiation of punishment and even for its eventual suspension or 
forgiveness. As the experiences of 1895, 1902, 1907, and 1908 show, leniency was always 
an option within the repertoire of possible governmental responses to episodes or rebellion 
and civil warfare. Certainly, it was an option limited to specific circumstances and interests. 
Yet, governments ended up falling back on it sooner or later throughout the course of a 
given conflict. To forget and forgive criminal accusations and penalties was a means to 
either encourage the surrender of insurgents or give legal closure to the confrontations, 
while enhancing the regime’s legitimacy.  
 Legal manifestations of state mercy throughout the period were relatively consistent 
in their effects but not completely uniform in their nature. Governments administered grace 
in the form of amnesties, pardons, the releasing of prisoners, and sentence suspensions. 
Each of these modalities had their own conditions and limitations. Amnesties seemed to be 
scarce during the period, while pardons and sentence suspensions tended to be more 
recurrent. To the logic of the Colombian governments of the time, it seemed easier –or 
more convenient– to forgive the punishment their internal enemies deserved than to forget 
or “erase” the criminality of their acts. In most of the reviewed cases, pardoned rebels 
remained as “forgiven offenders,” not as “non-criminals.” Colombian authorities did not 
seem prone to perceive and treat their surrender adversaries in a non-criminalizing way. 
 The contents, restrictions, and limitations of these legal acts of mercy reveal that 
state leniency during the period was conditional and filled with exceptions. Many of these 
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laws and decrees distinguished between common and political crimes, and limited the 
effects of their grace to the latter. Some of them even differentiated between “serious” and 
“less serious” political offenses, and excluded the former from the benefits in question. 
Rebel ringleaders tended to have more difficulties than their subalterns for enjoying the 
effects of state leniency, as illustrated by the pardons enacted during the war of 1895 and 
the Thousand Days. That was also the case of high-profile rebels charged with treason, as 
in the case of the same two conflicts, or processed for crimes punished with the death 
penalty, as happened in 1907. Regardless of these limitations –often overridden by 
subsequent legislative acts–, all the laws and decrees reviewed here reflect the existence of 
two basic and fundamental premises regarding the government’s reaction to political 
criminality. The first premise was that it was possible for the government, and even 
expected from it, to forgive political crimes and criminals, either on the grounds of 
“generalized pleads for mercy” or for reasons of “public convenience.” The second premise 
was that political crimes could always be the subject of pardon, for they represented a 
special, “less criminal” kind of criminality. The logics of state leniency, nevertheless, were 
not limited to these formal manifestations of mercy, as the next section shows.  
 
 Negotiating Leniency One Case at a Time: Individual Petitions for Mercy during the 
Thousand Days. 
Like in the Mexican case, Colombian political prisoners were able to request mercy or 
analogous benefits on their own initiative. As their fellow Mexicans, they could 
individually negotiate and obtain sentence reductions, prison releases, and reassessment of 
their penalties by directly negotiating their legal situation with local and provincial 
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authorities. A series of petitions submitted by Liberals from Cauca and Antioquia during 
the Thousand Days illustrates the characteristics of these individual negotiations of mercy. 
What were the goals of these petitions and requests? What were the arguments and 
discursive strategies that petitioners used in order to strengthen their claims? How did 
authorities react to these petitions, and how much leniency were they willing to grant in 
these cases? The examination of these petitions sheds light on how logics of state leniency 
unfolded outside the formal sphere of legislative acts of mercy. 
 A first group of these individual requests includes petitions for prison release by 
political prisoners claiming that their imprisonments were unfounded, unfair, or 
exaggerated in light of their minimum or nonexistent compromises with the rebellion. 
Requests of this kind commonly followed a similar pattern. They included the formal 
petition, an explanation of the reasons why the petitioner considered he should not remain 
in jail, and the indication of two or three witnesses who could account for the authenticity 
of such reasons. In order to make a better case for themselves, most petitioners opted to 
appoint witnesses that were either Conservative or well-known “friends of the 
government.” Commonly, witnesses had to answer to three or four questions regarding the 
criminal background of the petitioner, his political compromises, or his behavior during 
the war. After hearing the witnesses, local authorities decided whether or not it was 
convenient to release the petitioner.597  
 The fate of the requests commonly depended on the political background of the 
petitioner and the discretion of local and provincial authorities. In November 1900, 
                                                
597 See the collection of petitions included in ACC, República, 1901, Caja 295, Legajo 54: “Documentos 
sobre presos politicos.” 
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Secundino Rodríguez, prisoner in Popayán, requested his release on the ground that he 
“had not intervened, neither directly nor directly, in the current revolution.” After 
collecting the corresponding testimonies confirming Rodríguez’s claim, a war auditor from 
Cali denied his petition arguing that “while the revolution continued, no political prisoner 
should walk free.” An authority from Popayán would support this decision a few days later, 
arguing that, since the petitioner was an enemy of the government, he could not walk free 
until the rebellion ceased to disturb the department. Finally, in December that year, 
authorities decided to release Rodríguez by confining him to the city and forcing him to 
secure his good political behavior with a judicial bond.598 That was also the case of Rafael 
Ágredo, who requested his release in November 1900 with similar arguments. Authorities 
from Popayán denied his request by arguing that no enemy of the government could walk 
free while the rebellion continued. Yet, later on, they would grant him home detention and 
a bond. This “partial release” responded to the reason that, while it was true that he had not 
taken up arms against the government, it was also true that he had done nothing to defend 
it either.599 The argument that no prisoner should be released while the rebellion persisted 
also allowed Cauca’s authorities to deny the request of Apolinar Santander the same 
month.600 
 Prisoners accused of playing an active role in the rebellion and their armies 
commonly had limited possibilities of succeeding with their petitions. In May 1900, 
                                                
598 “Solicitud de Secundino Rodríguez, vecino de Túquerres,” ACC, República, 1900, Caja 281, Legajo sin 
número: “Solicitudes de presos políticos.” 
 
599 “Solicitud de Rafael Ágredo,” ACC, República, 1900, Caja 281, Legajo sin número. 
 
600 “Solicitud de Apolinar Santander,” ACC, República, 1900, Caja 281, Legajo sin número. Like in the two 
previous cases, Santander had managed to succesfully prove his non-existent links with the revolution.  
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authorities rejected José Mera’s petition on the ground that he had been part of a rebel 
company led by Primitivo Solarte, and therefore had taken part in the rebellion in an active 
and direct way.601 That would also be the case of Eleuterio Rosero, a caucano prisoner, 
who requested his release the same month  because of his poor health. Authorities from 
Popayán argued that the fact that Rosero had taken up arms against the government in the 
town of Patía made him unable to enjoy the requested benefit.602 The case of Valentín Basto 
offers a final example in this regard. Basto requested his release in November 1900 
arguing, among other things, that the six months he had spent in a Popayán jail had caused 
him a serious pulmonary disease. Despite counting on the favorable opinion of a medical 
doctor, Basto’s request met the opposition of a war auditor that accused him of leading a 
rebel squadron that operated in the region of Tambo, Cauca. Since he had been an active 
combatant, he had to remain in prison. A month later, nonetheless, authorities would grant 
him home detention while he recovered from his condition.603 
 Non-combatant Liberals tended to have better luck with their petitions and often 
managed to walk out of prison after their first attempt. That was the case, for instance, of 
Rogerio Montenegro, who in November 1900, and after two months in prison, was able to 
prove that he had lent no support to the rebellion at all. In his defense, Montenegro also 
mentioned that he had paid most of the installments of his corresponding war contribution 
in a timely manner. Authorities from Popayán accepted the petition and let him walk out 
                                                
601 “Solicitud de José E. Mera,” ACC, República, 1900, Caja 286, Legajo 56: “Memoriales presos políticos.” 
 
602 “Solicitud de Eleuterio Rosero, vecino de El Bordo,” ACC, República, 1900, Caja 283, Legajo 39. 
 
603 “Solicitud de Valentín Basto,” ACC, República, 1900, Caja 281, Legajo sin número. 
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with a judicial bond.604 In May 1900, petitioner Euclides Caicedo, from Pasto, obtained his 
release after five months of imprisonment once he proved not only his lack of political 
compromises with the rebellion but also his extreme poverty. Caicedo, nonetheless, had to 
publicly declare his obedience to the government and agreed to  a judicial bond before 
leaving prison.605 That was also the case of Sergio Parra, who requested his release the 
same month arguing that he had to take care of his moribund 90-year-old mother. 
Authorities accepted his petition and let him walk out with the same conditions they had 
imposed to Caicedo. Parra, nonetheless, had to remain confined within the limits of 
Popayán.606 
 Judicial bonds represented the standard procedure through which most political 
prisoners in Cauca and Antioquia walked out of prison after negotiating their case with the 
corresponding authorities. Originally established in the Colombian Criminal Code for 
crimes involving threats against people’s lives, honor, and property, bonds were supposed 
to work, like in the Mexican case, as “deterrent” mechanisms against the potential 
commission of a crime. Bonds in Colombia consisted of a written promise of not 
committing the crime in question, followed by the stipulation of a given sum of money or 
fianza that the person should pay in case he broke the promise.607 Sometimes, the process 
also involved the appointment of a guarantor or fiador, a third party in charge of paying 
                                                
604 “Solicitud de Rogerio Montenegro,” ACC, República, 1900, Caja 281, Legajo sin número. 
 
605 “Solicitud de Euclies Caicedo, natural y vecino de Pasto,” ACC, República, 1900, Caja 283, Legajo 39: 
“Solicitudes de presos políticos.” 
 
606 “Solicitud de Sergio Parra,” ACC, República, 1900, Caja 283, Legajo 39. 
 
607 See: Código Penal de la República de Colombia, Article 767; and Porras, Proyecto, ciii. 
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the sum on behalf of the criminal if needed. As tools for preventing the further commission 
of political crimes, Colombian bonds required from the subjects in question a promise of 
“good political behavior,” as well as their compromise to appear before the authorities on 
a regular basis. In Medellín, some people were forced to appear before the city’s alcalde 
every single day until the end of the war.608 Others had to do it at least once every five 
days.609 They also had to inform the authorities about their place of residence during their 
confinement in the city. The breaking up of any of these compromises allowed the 
government to collect the arranged fianza.  
 According to the language of these promises, maintaining a “good political 
behavior” meant basically to stay away from any act or manifestation of political or 
military hostility towards the government. Such a compromise could take many different 
forms. In Medellín, Antioquia, one prisoner promised for instance that he would “maintain 
a peaceful behavior both in word and deed,” and “would not take up arms against the 
government or give the rebels any sort of support.”610 A fellow prisoner from the same city 
assured that, once released, he would abstain from “participating in the revolution against 
the government and from spreading news that did not appear in official bulletins.”611 A 
third inmate also from Medellín went even further and declared that he “would not wage 
war against the government or encourage, support, or recommend the rebellion in any 
                                                
608 See, for instance, the case of Sinforiano Arcila: “Fianzas políticas prestadas en la Alcaldía Municipal de 
Medellín,” AHM, Alcaldía, Tomo 158, Folios 25-27. 
 
609 “Fianzas políticas,” Folios 1-4. 
 
610 “Fianzas políticas,” Folio 5. 
 
611 “Fianzas políticas,” Folios 26-27. 
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way.” His commitments also included not criticizing the government’s acts, not 
questioning the orders the authorities dictated, and not spreading news that were prejudicial 
to the government and its supporters. Finally, the prisoner committed himself to not 
supporting the revolution neither performing any act that could be construed as subversive 
and contrary to public order.612 In Popayán, a prisoner promised, among other things, to 
remain secluded in his house and refrain from hosting there any “suspicious” or 
“conspiratorial” political meetings.613 Similarly, another inmate from the same city 
undertook to live at his fiador’s house without receiving any visits from “enemies of the 
current regime,” and to not attend any political meeting of a subversive character.614 
 Authorities kept a close eye on the released prisoners and looked after the 
fulfillment of their political compromises, as the case of Antioquia illustrates. In April 
1900, for instance, the department’s authorities asked Medellín’s alcalde to submit a report 
about the state of political bonds or fianzas in the city. The report had to include detailed 
information concerning the bonds that had been violated and thosethat had been collected 
or were awaiting collection.615 The alcalde’s response included a series of cases occurred 
between January and August 1900. There was, for instance, the case of Manuel Echavarría, 
who not only broke the promise of showing up regularly to the alcaldia but also 
disappeared from the place he had registered as his house. Apparently, Echavarría had fled 
                                                
612 “Fianza política de José M. Escalante,” AHM, Alcaldía, Tomo 159, Folio 459. 
 
613 “Acta de compromiso de buen comportamiento político de Manuel M. Velasco, de Caloto,” ACC, 
República, 1900, Caja 281, Legajo sin número. 
 
614 “Acta de compromiso de Joaquín Cifuentes, vecino de Palmira,” ACC, República, 1900, Caja 284, Legajo 
44: “Documentos de fianzas.” 
 
615 “Carta al Alcalde de Medellín, Abril 7 de 1900,” AHM, Alcaldía, Tomo 160. 
 
 388 
the city and enlisted in a rebel camp near Panama.616 The alcalde also mentioned the case 
of eight political prisoners that, after securing their freedom with a fianza, had participated 
in a skirmish with government’s troops somewhere in Antioquia.617 There was also the 
case of  Liberal colonel Diógenes Zárate, who left his prison in Medellín but was later 
recaptured for opening fire against Conservative authorities that were hunting down one of 
his fellow Liberals.618 The index of political fianzas granted in Medellín between 1899 and 
1902 shows that, out of the 510 prisoners that –at least once–walked out with a bond, 59 
of them ended up returning to jail for recidivism. 48 of them went twice to jail, seven made 
it three times, and four more people made it four times.619 
 Imprisonments and cautions were not the only penalties subject to negotiation 
between “criminal” liberals and authorities. A second group of these individual requests 
for mercy had to do with the revision, remission, and payment of forced contributions. The 
language of these requests somehow paralleled the terms of the previous petitions. As in 
the negotiation of prison releases, petitioners commonly stressed their “peaceful,” non-
belligerent character and their lack of commitment to the rebel movement.  Other recurrent 
arguments included complains about the costs of the contributions, the burdensome nature 
of their monthly installments, and the overall unfairness of the penalty. Petitions commonly 
followed a process that tended to vary from province to province. In Antioquia, for 
                                                
616 On the case of Manuel Echavarría, see AHM, Alcaldía, Tomo 160, Folios 222-224. 
 
617 AHM, Alcaldía, Tomo 160, Folio 227. 
 
618 AHM, Alcaldía, Tomo 160, Folio 234. 
 
619 On the index, see: “Fianzas Políticas – Índice,” AHM, Alcaldía, Tomo 158, Folios 447-455. The index 
includes 584 cases corresponding to 510 people, covering from October 1899 to August 1902. 
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instance, petitioners commonly sent their requests to specific public servants that acted as 
“state collectors.” In Cauca, people had to submit their petitions to a Junta Calificadora, a 
group of local and provincial authorities in charge of assigning liberals in the region their 
corresponding contribution, the number of installments, and their respective amounts. 
Cauca’s Junta had its own rules for the filing and processing of these sorts of petitions, 
including the principle that no request should be considered unless the claimant had not 
paid at least the first installment of his contribution.620 In Antioquia, state collectors often 
ignored first-time petitioners, and sometimes even disregarded any reduction or discount 
they might have gotten from the authorities.621 In both regions, collectors and members of 
the Junta could also force claimants to support their requests with witness testimonies. 
 Petitions grounded on financial arguments were relatively similar from one case to 
the next. Petitioners often described themselves as poor people with minimal incomes and 
meager assets, and in consequence claimed that the government reduced their installments 
to a “fair and equitable” amount. In his petition from October 1901, the antioqueño Rafael 
Ángel expressed that although he was willing to submit to the government’s will and pay 
his contribution, the elevated amount of its monthly installments made it impossible. If the 
government reduced the fine, he would pay it with no problem. Otherwise, Angel lamented, 
his only possible option would be to stop paying and go to jail.622 That same month, Valerio 
Sierra, from Medellín, requested a reduction of his monthly installments to an amount he 
                                                
620 ACC, República, 1899, Caja 268, Legajo 2: “Memoriales sobre rebaja de contribución.” 
 
621 For an illustration of this process in the case of Antioquia, see AHM, Alcaldía, Tomo 160, Folios 288 and 
subsequent.  
 
622 “Solicitud de Rafael Ángel. Octubre 8 de 1901,” AHM, Alcaldía, Tomo 160, Folio 288.  
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could afford. After filing an unsuccessful petition months before, he filed a second request 
accompanied by a series of letters from different people mentioning that he was the head 
of a numerous family and had huge financial responsibilities.623  
 The cases of the antioqueño Rafael Lema and the caucanos Leandro Cuevas and 
Fidel Ordóñez offer additional examples in this regard. In October 1901, Lema asked 
Medellín’s collectors for a reduction of half his monthly installment. His petition included 
a complaint against the unfairness of the way in which the local authorities had distributed 
the contribution. Contributions, he maintained, had to be collected among wealthy Liberals 
that supported the rebellion, not among poor people –like him– who could not pay their 
fines without depriving their families of food, regardless of whether they were hostile to 
the government or not.624 Around the same time, Cuevas demanded from the Junta in 
Cauca the complete remission of his $100 contribution. His request included the 
appointment of a few witnesses that should prove that he had maintained a pacific behavior 
during the war, and that he had not moved from his hometown since the conflict started. 
Cuevas’s witnesses also had to prove that he was a poor bricklayer completely incapable 
of paying the mentioned sum. His petition succeeded partially. Although authorities did 
not exonerate him from the war tax, they reduced his contribution to only $30.625 Ordoñez, 
finally, had better luck with his petition, in which he explained that he was a poor saddler 
unable to pay his $50 contribution. Authorities decided to exonerate him after confirming 
                                                
623 “Solicitud de Valerio Sierra. Octubre 23 de 1901,” AHM, Alcaldía, Tomo 160, Folio 291. 
 
624 “Solicitud de Rafael Lema. Octubre de 1901,” AHM, Alcaldía, Tomo 160, Folio 292.  
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that since the beginning of the war he had not left his workshop and that there were no 
criminal charges against him.626 
 Arguments of a political nature commonly accompanied petitions grounded on 
financial reasons. Compared to these, political arguments tended to be more diverse. Some 
people merely stated that they had remained neutral during the war, and had lent no support 
to the rebel movement whatsoever. The petition of exoneration of the caucano Hilario 
Escobar, in late 1901, included the testimonies of a group of “friends of the government” 
accounting for his “peaceful behavior” and non-existent compromises with the rebellion. 
Authorities denied his request with the argument that “it was impossible to exonerate any 
disaffected person,” but still granted him a substantial reduction of his monthly 
installments.627 That was also the case of José Isidro Victoria, also from Cauca, who based 
his petition on the argument that he had remained neutral during the war and accompanied 
his request with recommendation letters from two Conservative generals. He would also 
obtain a reduction of a third of his original contribution.628 
 Other petitions involved more complex political arguments. In his request, the 
mentioned Rafael Ángel admitted that, as a Liberal, he had to deal with the tax, and 
understood that contributions had the purpose of punishing rebel activity in the department. 
He had not taken any part at all in the movement, Ángel explained, and yet the government 
had sent him once to jail and then charged him with a contribution. Although he understood 
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that his imprisonment was “preventive,” for he was not charged with any crime at all, his 
petition stressed time and again the fact that he had no compromise at all with the 
rebellion.629 Similar arguments accompanied Valerio Sierra’s request, in which he 
maintained that, besides his economic problems, he was completely uninterested in 
political matters.630  
Others, particularly in Antioquia, attempted to counter-balance their condition of 
Liberals –and therefore alleged enemies of the government– with their past experiences at 
the service of Conservative authorities. Miguel Navarro, for instance, requested a revision 
of his contribution by arguing that since the beginning of the war he had provided supplies 
for the Conservative troops, and that he currently worked for the government as a 
telegraphist. In his opinion, authorities should not charge “helpful” Liberals –like him– 
with contributions. They should be reserved for those “other” Liberals that, regardless of 
their attitude towards de rebellion, did not provide the government with any service at 
all.631 The petition of Tomás Zapata in October 1901 offers a similar case. In his request, 
Zapata presented himself as a “friend of the government” and a “Liberal in name only,” 
with no political compromises at all and no feelings of hostility towards the government. 
He also was careful enough to mention that, at the beginning of the conflict, he had lent 
Antioquia’s government 16 thousand pesos for supplying conservative troops.632 Agapito 
Vargas, another petitioner from October 1901, mentioned that he was not only a peaceful 
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630 “Solicitud de Valerio Sierra. Octubre 23 de 1901” 
 
631 “Solicitud de Miguel Navarro. Septiembre 26 de 1900,” AHM, Alcaldía, Tomo 160, Folio 235. 
 
632 “Solicitud de Tomás Zapata. Octubre 13 de 1901,” AHM, Alcaldía, Tomo 160, Folio 289. 
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Liberal with no trace of political compromise, but  also had helped supply Conservative 
troops in previous civil wars. Moreover, Vargas pointed out, his son was currently enrolled 
in the Conservative army.633 
Some petitioners went even further at the moment of supporting their requests with 
political arguments. In his petition, the mentioned Rafael Lema maintained that he did not 
question neither the legality nor the legitimacy of the contributions, but he did question the 
assumption that every Liberal was an enemy of the government by default. To Lema, the 
fact that a person had a given political ideology did not make him automatically an enemy 
or a rebel, especially when ideas were devoid of any subversive aspiration. He was a 
convinced Liberal, certainly, but he did not cause –or had caused– the government any 
harm.634 In a similar light, the antioqueño Libardo López claimed in his request that the 
government had wrongfully overestimated his political compromises. Political 
compromises, explained the petitioner, were relative by nature, ranking from mere “evil 
thoughts” to the actual action of taking up arms against the government. López had not 
been in any rebel camp, was not a party leader, and had no had any contact at all with the 
military elements of the party. His political allegiances, then, were closer to mere “evil 
thoughts,” the lowest, less significant, and less harmful modality of political dissidence.635 
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634 “Solicitud de Rafael Lema. Octubre de 1901.” 
 
635 “Solicitud de Libardo López. Octubre 23 de 1901,” AHM, Alcaldía, Tomo 160, Folio 293. 
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The negotiation of political imprisonment and forced contributions during the Thousand 
Days sheds light on an often overlooked aspect of the logic of state mercy vis-à-vis political 
criminality in Colombia: the individual, bottom-up bargaining of punishment and leniency. 
Governmental offers of grace did not represent the only ways in which actual or alleged 
political criminals could enjoy the effects of state leniency. Individual petitioning in search 
of lesser penalties was as important as pardon decrees and amnesty laws were. It was a 
widespread, recurrent practice that gave several people opportunities to search and obtain 
redress from the severity –and often arbitrariness– of state retribution. Moreover, it was a 
process that allowed the government to unfold its dynamics of state mercy outside the 
immediacy of the battlefields, the formality of the legal acts, and the exceptionality of its 
generalized manifestations of leniency. By allowing the people to personally request a 
prison release, a judicial bond, or a lower contribution, the government was able to include 
in its dynamics of mercy noncombatant dissidents, “peaceful” Liberals, and harmless 
political adversaries –people who, despite their non-belligerent position, still were the 
subject of state punishment. These intense yet discreet and somewhat hidden negotiations 
helped, thus, to extend state mercy throughout the bulk of Colombian society. It was a 
process that not only involved liberal petitioners and local and provincial authorities, but 
also people from the two political parties acting both as bondsmen or fiadores and as 
witnesses or recommenders. 
 What was the kind of mercy at stake in these individual yet generalized 
negotiations? These were not great and solemn displays of mercy like those that pardons 
and amnesties used to involve. They were much more modest, commonly partial acts of 
leniency, conditioned not only by the qualities and background of the individual petitioner 
 395 
but also by the discretion of local and provincial authorities. Yet, they mattered to both the 
people that requested them and the authorities in charge of administering them. For a 
person charged with political crimes or simply punished for being a Liberal, for instance, 
these small negotiations could make the difference between remaining in or walking out of 
prison. Individual negotiations also bolstered the power of local and provincial authorities 
by letting them act as dispensers of mercy in the name of the government, able to decide 
who deserved mercy and who did not. Furthermore, they gave authorities a unique 
opportunity to contact, measure, organize, classify, monitor, and control political 
dissidence within the territories under their control.  
 This last effect deserves special attention, for it reveals important aspects of the 
ultimate goals of state mercy in contexts of internal conflict and civil warfare. Leniency 
benefited both the recipients of the graces in question and the government that granted 
them. Requests of judicial cautions and petitions concerning forced contribution forced 
Liberals to appear time and again before the authorities. This interaction gave authorities 
the chance of gathering information about how many Liberals were in their respective 
jurisdictions, their residence, their backgrounds, their actions, their connections, and their 
whereabouts. Bonds put released prisoners under the direct and constant monitoring of 
authorities, and the promises of “good political behavior” that accompanied them worked 
as a ritualized practice through which dissidents re-submitted themselves to the 
government. Such promises forced Liberals to redefine their roles as dissenters and 
members of the Liberal party, and to rethink what they could and could not do as political 
agents and members of a political faction. They also represented an attempt to turn 
malcontents and potential rebels into submissive, harmless dissidents. Petitions concerning 
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forced contributions, with their reiterative arguments of “good political behavior,” 
neutrality, and disdain for the rebellion also worked in the same direction.  
Taken together, all these practices of bargaining had similar effects. They forced 
Liberals to recognize the legitimacy and authority of the government –as pardons and 
amnesties did as well–, and to negotiate with authorities the terms, conditions, and 
meanings of their political subjection. State leniency, either in the form of legal acts of 
grace or expressed through of individual concessions, always had a cost for its recipients. 
For pardoned and amnestied combatants, it was the recognition of their defeat and the 
acknowledgement of the government’s legitimacy. For liberal dissidents and others, it was 
the resignification of their political allegiances and their transformation into harmless 
political subjects. Either way, the administration of state mercy always ended up with the 
re-submission of the internal enemy to the government and the strengthening of the 
authority and legitimacy of the state. The Mexican experience was not that different in this 
regard. 
 
Conclusions: Towards a Characterization of the Logics of State Leniency in the 
Porfiriato and the Regeneration 
Overall, the logics of state leniency for political crimes in the Porfiriato and the 
Regeneration did not differ much from the logics of state retribution analyzed in the last 
two chapters. The dynamics of both retribution and mercy relied on a wide set of formal 
and informal practices, encompassed a very diverse set of political, legal, and judicial 
actors, and unfolded simultaneously in multiple spaces. Even more importantly, they both 
were parallel and complementary manifestations of state power and sovereignty. While one 
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represented the state’s right to punish those who disturbed public order and took up arms 
against it, the other manifested its prerogative to forgive them. Facing rebellion and other 
modalities of political criminality, state power did not exclusively operate through displays 
of force, repression and retaliation: it also unfolded and worked through demonstrations of 
clemency, compassion, and mercy. By forgiving its internal enemies or allowing them to 
negotiate their penalties, the state did not necessarily lose power or diminish its attributes 
of sovereignty and legitimacy. The effect was, indeed, the contrary. State mercy was a 
powerful tool for bolstering state hegemony, advancing the state’s interests in political and 
military conflicts, stimulating relationships of allegiance, dependence, and patronage, and 
turning unruly political dissidents into obedient and submissive citizens. Both punishment 
and mercy were, in sum, expressions of state power that fostered sovereignty, neutralized 
internal threats, and helped ensure political hegemony.  
 The logics of state leniency had their own particularities, though. Unlike the 
workings of state repression, which tended to unfold in a vertical, univocal way, the 
dynamics of state mercy often functioned in two directions. Political criminals could obtain 
mercy whether through formal acts of state magnanimity or through individual petitions of 
pardon or release. While the first mechanism involved a top-down dynamics whereby the 
state reached its citizens, the second one implied a bottom-up approach where citizens 
reached the state. It was a two-way relationship that in part relied on the premises that 
political crimes could be pardoned, that it was expected from the state to forgive political 
offenders, and that penalties for political crimes could be subject to negotiation and 
bargaining. As some of the reviewed cases illustrate, negotiation of both punishment and 
mercy was frequent. It was present, for instance, in the treaties that gave wars closure, in 
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the political fianzas and judicial bonds that allowed political prisoners walk out of jail, and 
in the petitions concerning forced contributions. Mercy, in this light, fostered interactions 
between political criminals and the government that, at the same time, stimulated and made 
possible the exercise and administration of state leniency. It was a cycle of legal and 
political interactions whose outcomes included, besides the granting of different forms of 
grace, the emergence of new relational arrangements between state and criminals –
arrangements of submission, good political behavior, and similar. 
 Many different actors intervened in these interactions and made the administration 
of leniency possible. Rebels in arms; political prisoners; civilians charged with political 
penalties; public defenders; political and military authorities of different sorts; legislators 
and congressmen; judges, and even presidents. Not all of them intervened simultaneously, 
but they all played a part in the overall process of requesting and granting mercy –a process 
that, directly and indirectly, fostered multiple connections not only among the three public 
powers but also between them and citizens. Almost as diverse as this network of legal and 
political actors –and maybe more– were the arguments mediating in this process, 
encompassing legal, procedural, political, military, and even economic reasons. Political 
arguments were particularly important at the moment of requesting mercy both in Mexico 
and Colombia. They reflected in many different ways the petitioners’ acceptance of state 
authority as the primary condition for obtaining pardon, as well as their conversion from 
dangerous or threatening dissidents into obedient, “well-behaved” citizens. Legal 
arguments were equally important, especially to determine whether or not authorities 
should grant mercy and who could or could not enjoy it. These arguments had to do not 
only with the fulfillment of a number of legal, judicial, and technical steps and 
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requirements, but also with the existence of conditions and restrictions that could make 
mercy inapplicable to some offenses or criminals.  
 This last consideration sheds light on another important characteristic of the 
administration mercy in the Porfiriato and the Regeneration. State leniency for political 
crimes was commonly limited and full of restrictions. Pardons and even amnesties in 
Mexico depended, to a large extent, on Díaz’s willingness and on how much the graces 
could further the President’s position in the many political conflicts taking place during the 
Porfiriato. Similarly, the success of individual requests for mercy in Mexico was often 
unpredictable and conditioned by circumstances of all sorts. The situation in Colombia was 
not any different. Treaties and pardons used to leave people out for legal and political 
reasons, acts of leniency tended to include some crimes and exclude others, and authorities 
had the power of denying mercy requests on the basis of political and military 
considerations. Restrictions and conditions tended to vary depending on the circumstances 
that motivated the graces in question and their ultimate goals. As the Colombian case 
illustrates, restrictions tended to be wider in pardons decreed in the midst of an armed 
conflict and relatively minimal in amnesties enacted years after the end of a confrontation. 
Similarly, acts of mercy aiming to force the rendition of rebels or the termination of a 
conflict tended to include more restrictions than those that gave a war formal closure or 
granted pardons for past conflagrations.  
 Acts of state leniency were diverse both in form and effect. There were important 
differences between the kind of grace that pardons and amnesties entailed, for instance. 
Likewise, there was a significant distance between these and other modalities including 
judicial bonds, petitions of prison release, or any other form of negotiating a given penalty. 
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While some of them represented formal manifestations of state mercy –amnesties and 
pardons–, others were legal and judicial mechanisms through which criminals could obtain 
some sort of redress from the punitive logics of state punishment. Although these forms of 
redress did not properly represent formal, official acts of mercy, the logics of state 
benevolence still played a role in them, and their effects somehow pointed in the same 
direction that amnesties and pardons did. The Mexican case shows that, in some cases, 
people combined these direct and indirect modalities of leniency with requests of 
preparatory freedom or judicial amparos, merging the logics of state mercy with additional 
strategies of legal and constitutional protection against state retribution.  
 There were important differences between the workings of state leniency in the 
Mexican and Colombian experiences, as well. The Mexican case shows a decentralization 
of state mercy that, for obvious reasons, did not exist in Colombia. Pardons in Mexico 
remained a prerogative of the federal Executive, while amnesties were more frequent at the 
provincial level. This particularity not only accounts for the regional nature of the uprisings 
of the Porfirian era. It also reveals that, even when these events involved crimes against 
the federal order, their management in terms of mercy tended to remain in the hands of 
state legislatures. Another major difference between the Mexican and the Colombian cases 
had to do with the political uses of mercy. Governments from both countries used amnesties 
and pardons to force the termination of armed conflicts and the surrender of rebels, and 
even to grant political prisoners and fugitives leniency after the end of a confrontation. Yet, 
in the Mexican case, formal acts of leniency seemed to respond as well to greater dynamics 
of political transaction and cooptation. Díaz administered mercy not only because it was 
his duty as President, but also because it allowed him to mediate in conflicts over regional 
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power and tilt the balance in his favor. It was an instrumentalization of mercy that seemed 
to be much more evident in the Porfirian experience than in the logics of leniency of the 
Regeneration.  
 A final difference between Mexico and Colombia refers to the language 
surrounding the administration of state mercy and what it suggests about understandings 
of state power in the two cases. In both countries, the figure of presidential pardon had its 
roots on colonial conceptions of monarchical power and sovereignty, surviving as a 
reinvention, with modern overtones, of the idea that the sovereign, as father of his people, 
had the prerogative to forgive them. The singularity in the Mexican case in this regard lies 
in the fact that its languages of mercy tended to accentuate these colonial legacies in order 
to uphold the image of Porfirio Díaz as a traditional, patriarchal figure of power. By 
framing leniency as an expression of Díaz’s generosity and sovereignty, languages of 
mercy in Mexico reveal an understanding of state power in which the relationship between 
state and citizens seemed modelled after the relationship between a monarch and his 
subjects. Colonial notions of power and sovereignty still had an echo in late-nineteenth 
century Mexico –and echo that had major political and legal effects. 
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CONCLUSIONS: CHARACTERIZING GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES TO 
POLITICAL CRIMES AND CRIMINALITY IN THE PORFIRIATO AND THE 
REGENERATION 
 
Several commonalities linked the experiences of opposition journalists, political agitators, 
dissident leaders, conspirators, armed and unarmed dissenters, rebels, and other 
insurrectionists in the Mexican Porfiriato and the Colombian Regeneration. For one thing, 
they were all stories of political dissidents that dared to challenge by different means the 
political exclusion, the concentration of power, and the traces of authoritarianism that 
characterized both regimes. They were also stories of individuals whose political stances 
and actions made them targets of surveillance, persecution, and repression by the state; 
experiences of people that paid with their freedom and lives the price of their political 
challenges. On a more personal level, all these cases tell stories of shut-down newspapers, 
journalists and partisan leaders forced into exile, writers and common people imprisoned 
for political reasons, and political prisoners often deprived from basic legal and judicial 
guarantees. They were, too, stories of uprisings repressed by fire and sword; and rebels 
hunted down within and outside battlefields; legal and extrajudicial executions, of striking 
episodes of blood and violence, and even constant and consistent manifestations of mercy 
and pardon.  
Beyond the sphere of direct personal experiences, these cases tell many other stories 
concerning the functioning of the Mexican and Colombian societies of their time. There is, 
for instance, the story of the relationships between state and citizens in the Porfiriato and 
the Regeneration, or the story of how state power worked and manifested in contexts of 
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intense political conflict and internal turmoil. Other stories concern the evolution of 
legislation on public order in a climate of almost constant political unrest, as well as the 
tensions between the protection of individual rights and the safeguarding of order and 
peace. That is also the case of the changing balance between public powers that marked 
the evolution of both regimes, and the tensions between these changes and the 
constitutional and legal frameworks structuring the political life in both countries. 
Furthermore, there were the stories of constitutions, laws, and a wide array of legislative 
and executive acts regulating all sorts of conducts and matters; and of their conception, 
creation and enactment. The stories of how governments and political authorities 
interpreted, applied, and enforced these laws, and how they affected the experiences and 
expectations of rebels, dissidents, and other political actors are also fundamental parts of 
this broader narrative. Repression against rebels and political dissidents in the Porfiriato 
and the Regeneration offers a window into a wide variety of features characterizing 
politics, law, and society in Mexico and Colombia. 
Questions about the definition and treatment of political crimes and criminals were 
present in all these stories, either directly or indirectly. Concerns about the meanings of 
political criminality, its legal and political implications, its differences with other 
modalities of crime, and the most appropriate ways to respond to it were everywhere in 
these experiences. What were the differences between criminal and non-criminal 
dissidence? What were the legal boundaries separating both types of dissidence? Was the 
criminality of dissent exclusively and purely political? How many forms or modalities of 
criminal dissent were there? Was the criminalization of dissent a legal, legitimate, and 
efficient way of keeping political dissidence in check? What were the limits among 
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criminal dissent, subversion, and overt rebellion? These and many other similar questions 
link these experiences to the broader matter of political crimes and political criminality. 
Were all those crimes political? What made them political, in that case? Were they purely 
political? Which attributes differentiated it from common, ordinary crimes? Did that 
difference exist beyond the spheres of law, legislation, and legal doctrine? The way in 
which Mexican and Colombian governments during the Porfiriato and the Regeneration 
addressed and tried to solve these questions represented the main subject of this study.  
 
Defining and Punishing Political Crimes: A General Overview 
Judging from the dozens of cases examined throughout the previous chapters, what were 
Mexican and Colombian laws, governments, legal experts, and rebels talking about when 
they talked about political crimes? There was no single, uniform notion defining what these 
offenses were. Constitutions and criminal codes understood political crimes in an 
ambiguous way. On the one hand, they conceived political offenses in terms of an abstract 
criminal category deserving special treatment due to their political nature. On the other 
hand, they defined a series of offenses of a political nature including a variety of acts and 
behaviors against the nation, the constitution, the government, and public order. These 
offenses, nonetheless, did not strictly had a “political” label, and remained associated to a 
variety of other criminal categories.  
Governments, political, military, and judicial authorities, also worked with 
ambiguous, imprecise notions political criminality. To them, acts against the government, 
the authorities, and public peace could be sometimes political, sometimes common, and 
sometimes of a mixed nature. It all depended of the actions included, the people involved, 
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and even the discretion of the authorities in question. Legislators, legal experts, lawyers, 
and even rebels often equated political crimes with offenses such as treason, rebellion, 
sedition, and other similar acts of collective political violence. Laws and executive decrees 
entailed mutable notions of political criminality, switching from small series of offenses 
involving different manifestations of collective violence, to large lists of crimes 
incorporating a variety of “threatening” or “offensive” expressions of individual or 
collective dissent. The fact that legal definitions of political crimes depended as well on a 
variety of legal jurisdictions and authorities with different understandings of what political 
crimes were and what made them criminal rendered this framework even more complex. 
This plurality of jurisdictions accounts not only for a panoply of different, often rival, legal 
regimes and authorities within the fragmented sphere of state law. It also accounts for 
complex interplays between national and foreign legal regimes and legislations, and even 
between state and “extra-national” legal spheres.  
Regardless the scope, ambiguity, or vagueness of the definitions they involved, all 
these notions and understandings agreed on a few basic ideas about what political crimes 
were. First and foremost, they were actions and expressions of political dissent, violent or 
non-violent, collective or individual, and clearly established in the law or not. Secondly, 
they all had a criminal nature. Legislation, state authorities, and government officials 
considered them criminal regardless their real nature and the original motivation of their 
perpetrators. Third, their criminal nature stemmed from the fact that they entailed more or 
less severe threats to the established structure of the government, governmental institutions 
and their representatives, state authorities, and public order and peace. These fundamental 
agreements conditioned a legal and political framework in which authorities could target 
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almost any manifestation of dissidence as criminal, and where the label “political criminal” 
could refer to both a simple opposition journalist and a major rebel ringleader. In the 
Mexican Porfiriato and the Colombian Regeneration, political crimes were not a clear, 
definite, and stable series of actions straightforwardly defined in a Code or in a specific set 
of norms. Rather, they represented an abstract criminal category whose contents mutated 
time and again both in the sphere of law and legislation and in the context of every day 
politics. Political crimes were flexible and subject of constant redefinitions and 
reinventions, in correspondence with changing legal, political, judicial, and even military 
circumstances and interests. 
Flexibility and mutability characterized not only the definition but also the 
treatment of political crimes. Repertoires of governmental responses to political criminality 
were not restricted to a particular, predictable set of penalties established in a Code. 
Although these “codified” penalties certainly existed, governments and authorities often 
broadened and reinvented them either through complementary laws and decrees or through 
administrative acts and decisions. Under certain circumstances of intense political conflict 
or severe internal turmoil, such reinventions could go far enough to clash with 
constitutional and criminal law precepts concerning the treatment of both political offenses 
and crimes in general. The judgement of political criminals by the military justice, their 
subjection to court martials with no procedural guarantees, the extradition of political 
offenders, and the establishment of the death penalty for political crimes illustrate the 
ultimate consequences of such reinventions. These legal reactions by no means comprised 
the totality of governmental responses to political crimes. Both in Mexico and Colombia, 
governments resorted as well to extralegal and extrajudicial practices of punishment in 
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order to deal with rebels and other “dangerous” political dissidents. It was a way of acting 
against political criminals without the restrains and limitations established in the 
Constitution and the law. These extralegal practices included, among others, extrajudicial 
executions, uses of paramilitary forces against rebel suspects and dissidents, and even 
political kidnapping.  
Overall, what the Mexican and Colombian experiences reveal in this regard is a 
slight yet significant change over time in the ways in which governments responded to the 
threats and challenges that political criminals posed. From the late 1870s to the early 1890s, 
responses to political criminality tended to involve energetic displays of state violence and 
practices of repression and punishment that commonly challenged existing legal and 
constitutional parameters. Here, both “legality” and “extra-legality” characterized official 
reactions to rebels, political agitators, and other troublesome dissidents. Nonetheless, 
between the late 1890s and the following decade, these responses, at least in their most 
formal and “official” manifestations, tended to become less violent, less “extra-legal,” and 
more legalistic and reliant on the workings of legislation and judicial authorities. This 
progressive “legalization” of state repression did not put an end to other extralegal or 
extrajudicial practices of retribution, though. They still existed, but not as part of those 
“official” displays of state punishment. They unfolded in the shadows, like a parallel sphere 
informally linked to the government but still serving its interests, as the Mexican case 
illustrates. 
This general overview raises a series of questions regarding the legal and political 
workings of state repression vis-à-vis political crimes during the Porfiriato and the 
Regeneration and their transformations over time. Some of these questions have to do with 
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the political logics behind the definition and criminalization of political offenses. Others 
refer to the many complexities that characterized the legal treatment of political crimes and 
criminals. A final set of questions asks about the nature and functioning of a series of 
apparent dichotomies that were present in the ways in which both Mexican and Colombian 
governments responded to political criminality. These dichotomies included “the ordinary” 
and “the extraordinary,” “the constitutional” and “the unconstitutional,” and “the legal” 
and “the extralegal.” The relationship between “punishment” and “mercy” as possible 
responses to political crimes also makes part of this set of alleged oppositions under 
scrutiny.  
 
The Mutable Nature of Political Crimes and the Many Faces of Internal Enmity 
Political crimes in the Porfiriato and the Regeneration described a criminal category whose 
contents were always imprecise and fluid. Barely defined in constitutions and criminal 
codes, they took form and content over time through a complex series of legal 
developments, judicial decisions, and reinterpretations of current legislation. Their 
contents and scope were not only mutable, but also dependent on specific –and always 
changing– political and military circumstances. These attributes of fluidity and 
contingency, nevertheless, did not prevent historical definitions of political crimes in 
Mexico and Colombia from having some degree of consistency. Regardless the multiple 
forms and contents they took, political crimes always made reference to “criminal” 
manifestations of political dissent. Understandings about what this criminality was or 
entailed were also mutable and changed in each country in response to the evolution of 
their respective political conflicts.  
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 Political criminality, thus, was first and foremost a matter of political dissent. 
Governments and authorities labeled dissenters criminal anytime they perceived their 
actions or intentions as “dangerous” or as “threats” against the constitution, the public 
order, or the legitimate authorities and institutions. Such threats, real or not, turned political 
criminals into enemies of the government and the larger political community it represented. 
Their actions were, in this light, acts of internal enmity: political offenders were internal 
enemies of the nation that threatened to undermine it with their threats against the 
government and the public order. By labelling them as political criminals, governments 
and authorities in Mexico and Colombia turned “dangerous” dissenters not into 
“troublesome” political rivals, but directly into internal enemies of the nation.  
 Modalities of internal enmity were particularly diverse. Besides the typical acts of 
treason, rebellion, sedition, riot, and asonada and their several gradations defined in the 
criminal codes, internal enmity also involved a variety of actions whose criminal nature 
did not depend on any code. The criminalization of these “other” actions emerged from 
governmental responses to specific conjunctures of political conflict or internal turmoil. 
Governmental campaigns against opposition press in Mexico and Colombia, for instance, 
extended current notions of political criminality into the field of journalism and turned 
dissident journalists into internal enemies. Counter-insurgent endeavors in Mexico during 
the 1900s practically labelled as “enemy” all people belonging to or sympathizing with the 
Partido Liberal Mexicano. Porfirian repression after the expeditions of Ruiz Sandoval and 
Garza in the early 1890s fell not only on people that had been actually involved in the 
movements, but also on a large number of dissidents with no clear links with them. The 
logics of punishment and retribution in Colombia during the Thousand Days involved 
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much more than rebel ringleaders, officers, and combatants. It also extended to non-armed 
liberals that paid with imprisonment, fianzas, and forced contributions their political 
inclinations. At some critical moments, notions of internal enmity in both countries also 
involved people accused of providing rebels with any kind of support, and even citizens 
that “did not do enough” in defense of their governments. Regional and national partisan 
leaders, electoral contestants, and potential military adversaries were subject of political 
criminalization at some point as well.  
Both the Mexican and Colombian experiences show a diversification of political 
crimes that increased over time. Between the late 1870s to the late 1900s, legal definitions 
of political criminality became more and more encompassing. This diversification, 
although simultaneous, had different sources in one case and another. In Mexico, for 
instance, it emerged out of the judicial sphere, where judicial decisions and interpretations 
produced a systematic extension of the crimes considered “political.” In Colombia, it was 
primarily the result of legislation and lawmaking. It stemmed from a panoply of 
consecutive laws and decrees expanding not only the scope of political crimes but also the 
reasons according to which authorities could label somebody as internal enemy or criminal 
dissenter. All in all, the systematic extension of political crimes in Mexico and Colombia 
produced a series of “extended,” non-previously codified modalities of internal enmity that 
had major repercussions on the exercise of political dissidence in both countries.    
 These other, “extended” modalities of internal enmity deserve attention not only 
because of what they say about how far governments in Mexico and Colombia went in 
their efforts to neutralize political dissidence through its criminalization. They also matter 
because of the political and legal consequences they had. By targeting internal enemies 
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outside the sphere of actual insurgent movements and beyond battlefields, these “extended” 
understandings of political criminality generalized internal enmity and state repression 
throughout the bulk of society. This generalization, nonetheless, had different 
manifestations and effects in Mexico and Colombia. In Mexico, it covered opposition 
journalists, rebellion suspects, and other people actually or allegedly linked to the 
subversive endeavors of the Mexican Liberal Party. In Colombia, it fell at different times 
on “subversive” writers, political malcontents, “disobedient” public employees, and 
unarmed liberals with no links at all with any rebel or insurgent movement. This last feature 
was a striking particularity of the Colombian experience. Unlike the regime of Porfirio 
Díaz, which criminalized its internal enemies on the grounds of actual or alleged charges 
of subversion, the Regeneration criminalized not only “subversive” political dissidence but 
also political affiliation as a whole. As the case of the Thousand Days illustrates, liberals 
charged with forced contributions were subject to punishment not because they were part 
of the rebellion, but merely because they belonged to the Liberal Party.  
 This distinction between the criminalization of certain acts of dissent and the 
criminalization of political affiliations as a whole marks a substantial difference between 
the Mexican and the Colombian experiences. Mexican notions of internal enmity, as 
widespread as they were, maintained the logics of state retribution relatively circumscribed 
to people directly or indirectly linked to subversive acts, materialized whether though the 
press or through armed plots. On the contrary, Colombian conceptions of internal enmity 
fostered an unrestricted dynamic of state punishment that made no major distinctions 
neither between armed and unarmed dissidents nor between “dangerous” and “non-
dangerous” dissenters as targets of repression. The Porfiriato, with its high levels of 
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authoritarianism and presidentialism and its infamous strategies of political repression and 
persecution, still involved more contained displays of state retribution than the Colombian 
case. As the reflections in the next section show, this would not be the only striking 
difference between Mexico and Colombia in this regard. 
 
Political Crimes and the Law: Between Legal Exceptionalities and Parallel Legal 
Regimes 
Legislation on matters of political criminality during the Porfiriato and the Regeneration 
was neither uniform nor straightforward. It remained dispersed in constitutions, criminal 
and military codes, and dozens of laws and legislative decrees. Similarly, it was a changing 
legislation created and reinvented in different scenarios and through the intervention of a 
variety of actors. Part of it emerged from congresses and analogous corporations, as the 
result of legislative debates and agreements and doctrinal conversations. Part of it stemmed 
from the Executive power and its interpretations and reinventions of current legislation in 
the midst of specific political and military conjunctures. Some portions of it emanated from 
the ordinary law, while others did from the parallel sphere of the military legislation. 
Additional parts of it were merely the creation of diverse local and regional authorities. On 
the whole, it was a non-systematic and mutable legislation gathering a wide array of voices 
and emerging out of several places and contexts.  
 The complexity of this legislation goes way beyond these characteristics, though. It 
also has to do with the conformation of a series of regimes of exceptionality concerning 
the criminalization and punishment of political crimes. By defining a series of conditions 
and limitations for the repression and punishment of political criminality, constitutions and 
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criminal codes in Mexico and Colombia turned political offenses into a special criminal 
category whose treatment depended on exceptional rules. As a consequence, political and 
common criminals were subject to different laws, different punishments, and even different 
carceral regimes. The exceptional nature of political crimes, together with the distinction 
between common and political offenses, proved more than problematic issues, though.  At 
a theoretical and doctrinal level, this differentiation was never exempt from questioning, 
and there were no clear agreements about what exactly separated these two criminal 
modalities. At a more practical level, the exceptionality of political crimes often clashed 
with the common practice of indicting rebels on both common and political charges. This 
combination of charges forced a convergence, in the prosecution and judgement of many 
political criminals in Mexico and Colombia, of the ordinary legal regime of common 
criminality and the extraordinary regime of political crimes. These exceptionalities 
illustrate what was one of the most striking characteristics of the legal treatment of political 
criminality in both countries: the fragmented, “pluralistic” nature of state law regarding the 
definition and punishment of political offenses. 
 The exceptionalities surrounding the legal treatment of political criminality went 
beyond the “exceptional nature” of political offenses. They also had to do with the fact 
that, unlike common offenses, political crimes did not necessarily depend on ordinary laws 
or on the ordinary justice system. Both the Mexican and the Colombian constitutions put 
the management of public order in the hands of the Executive power, and therefore allowed 
governments and political authorities to freely legislate on matters of political criminality. 
As a consequence, the legal treatment of political crimes depended not only on fixed and 
stable codified precepts, but also on the will of an extraordinary legislative agent able to 
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reinvent time and again what political crimes were and what sort of punishments they 
deserved. It is yet another indicator of the aforementioned fragmentation of the sphere of 
state law vis-à-vis political crimes –a de-centralized sphere that involved parallel legal 
regimes, authorities, and jurisdictions. This particular characteristic was specially 
notorious in the Colombian case, where legislation on public order and political criminality 
became practically a monopoly of the Executive and unfolded almost completely outside 
the spheres of the ordinary law and the formal justice system. It was a monopoly that gave 
regenerationist governments powerful legal tools for acting against unarmed and armed 
dissidents, and that submitted Colombian dissenters to a legal regime marked by the lack 
of legal, constitutional, and judicial protections and guarantees. 
 Besides establishing a regime of exceptionalities for the treatment of political 
crimes, and adding to the complexities already mentioned, criminal codes in Mexico and 
Colombia shaped two different regimes for the penalization of these offenses. On the one 
hand, there was an abstract regime of political crimes, involving penalties and procedures 
but no concrete offenses. As a criminal category, political crimes existed in the codes only 
in abstract –a notion that had legal effects but no specific crimes associated to it. On the 
other hand, there was a series of crimes that had a clear political nature but no direct 
recognition as political offenses. The differences and limits between one regime and 
another were never clear, and therefore the recognition –and punishment– of specific 
offenses as political crimes depended on the discretion of the authorities in charge of 
applying and enforcing the codes. This parallelism and the uncertainties that came with it 
shaped a series of legal grey areas that allowed governments and authorities to define and 
redefine, at their convenience, what a political crime was and was not. Both the Mexican 
 415 
and the Colombian experiences offer multiple examples in which authorities denied, on 
purpose, the political nature of some political offenses or retraced the boundaries between 
common and political criminalities. It was a common strategy that allowed authorities to 
repress political criminals without the restrictions that constitutions and criminal codes 
established for the treatment of their crimes –a strategy that had serious legal and political 
consequences, as well as elevated costs in terms of lives.  
 The practices of turning the management of public order an administrative matter 
and leaving the punishment of rebels to the military justice made the situation even more 
complex. Both strategies were particularly common in Colombia, and left an imprint of 
uncertainty and legal insecurity on the legal and judicial experiences of armed and unarmed 
dissidents alike. There, the “administrative turn” put the definition and punishment of 
political crimes in a legal sphere separated from other offenses and outside the reach of the 
Judicial and Legislative powers. It was a parallel, alternative sphere that depended 
exclusively on the Executive and where the rules regulating the treatment of ordinary 
offenses barely applied. Analogous effects had the intervention of the military justice in 
the prosecution and punishment of rebels in contexts of civil warfare, which added another 
dimension to the already complex panoply of alternative spheres and jurisdictions shaping 
the legal treatment of political crimes. Involving its own set of rules and provisions, its own 
system of penalties, and its own judicial procedures, the military justice put the punishment 
of political crimes even further from the reach of the formal judicial power. Trapped 
between two legal spheres that granted no legal security and had little regard for 
constitutional procedural guarantees, political criminals in Colombia were, most of the 
time, at the mercy of the government and its unbridled manifestations of retribution.   
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 The Colombian and Mexican experiences contrast significantly in this regard. 
Certainly, the exceptionalities surrounding the treatment of political crimes, together with 
the existence of parallelisms and grey areas concerning the definition and punishments of 
these offenses were common to the two cases. So was the intervention of the Executive in 
the management of public order at the expense of the independence and autonomy of the 
Legislative and Judicial powers. Yet, the Mexican case shows a more centralized, less 
complex legal context that relied less on extraordinary, alternative legislation and more on 
the provisions of the criminal code and the proceedings and decisions of the ordinary 
justice. Regardless the actual levels of independence and autonomy of Mexico’s justice 
system, it still monopolized the prosecution and judgement of political offenders. This 
difference is crucial for a variety of reasons. First, it suggests that there was a major 
difference in the number of jurisdictional spheres that intervened in the treatment of 
political criminality in one country and another. Second, it implies that the administration 
of justice vis-à-vis political offenders in Mexico was much more centralized and 
rationalized than it was in Colombia. Third, it demonstrates that political criminals in 
Mexico, compared with their Colombian counterparts, enjoyed greater degrees of judicial 
protection and greater procedural guarantees. As personalistic, centralized, and 
authoritarian as the Porfirian regime might have seemed to its contemporaries, it still 
granted its dissidents protections that dissenters in Colombia would never be able to fully 
enjoy –at least not on a regular, systematic basis. 
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The Fluid, Non-binary Nature of State Power and Punishment in the Porfiriato and 
the Regeneration 
What does the relationship between “the ordinary” and “the extraordinary” in the legal 
treatment of political crimes in Mexico and Colombia reveal about the nature of the logics 
of state power and punishment in the Porfiriato and the Regeneration? Above all, it shows 
that, although there was conflict between “ordinary” and “extraordinary” ways of dealing 
with political crimes through the law, such ways did not necessarily contradict or exclude 
one another. The treatment of political criminals was at no point an exclusive matter of 
either “ordinary” or “extraordinary” legal means. Regardless the conceptual differences 
separating common and political crimes, “pure” political crimes barely existed in real life. 
In practice, the treatment of political criminality combined things from the theoretically 
extraordinary regime of political crimes with things from the ordinary realm of common 
offenses. This does not mean that authorities, judges, and other political and legal actors 
considered that political crimes had no special nature at all and therefore treated them as 
yet another modality of common criminality. It simply means that, even though they 
recognized and believed in the special nature of political offenses–and they certainly did–
, they commonly treated and addressed them in conjunction with other, less exceptional 
crimes. In practice, “the ordinary” and “the extraordinary” were not mutually exclusive 
notions. Instead, they marked two possible ways of action that usually complemented each 
other as part of a major legal strategy concerning the criminalization and punishments of 
certain actions of political dissidence.  
 It is possible to develop analogous reflections concerning the nature and workings 
of the constitutional regimes that in Mexico and Colombia regulated the management of 
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public order –and therefore the treatment of political criminality. Both the Mexican and the 
Colombian charters allowed the Executive power to suspend or modify the force of the 
constitutional rule in cases of internal turmoil, either by allowing it to suspend specific 
rights or by providing it with almost unrestricted –and certainly undefined– legislative 
faculties. Was there an actual contradiction between the normal, ordinary regime of the 
Constitution, on the one hand, and the extraordinary legal regime emanating from these 
emergency powers? On a superficial level, contradictions seem evident. The suspension of 
certain individual rights in cases of emergency clearly contradicted basic constitutional 
principles. So did many of the laws that the Executive enacted in use of these extraordinary 
powers, as the establishment of the death penalty for political crimes illustrates. Yet, even 
when these provisions seemed to contradict or annul the spirit of their respective 
constitutions, they ultimately had a constitutional nature. They emanated from 
constitutional precepts, and unfolded as part of a constitutional strategy for dealing with 
actual or potential threats against public order. A significant portion of the logics of state 
retribution against political criminals in Mexico and Colombia had solid constitutional 
grounds, regardless how arbitrary –or even illegal– their repressive measures might have 
seemed.  
 From this perspective, asking whether or not the logics shaping the legal treatment 
of political crimes in Mexico and Colombia were constitutional becomes a misleading, 
imprecise question. Certainly, these logics contradicted and entailed the suspension of 
several constitutional principles. Yet, their foundations were primarily constitutional. In 
both cases, constitutions made them possible and gave them force and legitimacy. In this 
light, what would be a more appropriate way of assessing the constitutional character of 
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these measures and capturing their historical specificity? An approach that does not 
conceive “the constitutional” and “the unconstitutional” as absolute, exclusionary notions 
could be useful in this regard. In Mexico and Colombia alike, the legal management of 
public order, as well as the legal treatment of political crimes, involved attributes of 
constitutionality and unconstitutionality at the same time. For the most part, they 
functioned as the two sides of a same coin: behind the apparent unconstitutional nature of 
a given measure, there were solid constitutional precepts backing it. Both in Mexico and 
Colombia, legal and political authoritarianism did not necessarily mean “illegality” or 
“unconstitutionality.” After all, both countries relied on constitutional frameworks that 
overemphasized the role of the government in the prevention and repression of attacks 
against public order, and that gave their respective Executives the required constitutional 
tools for acting in that direction.  
 Similar considerations apply to the combination, in both Mexico and Colombia, of 
legal and extralegal responses against political criminality. “Legality” and “extra-legality” 
were not absolute and mutually exclusive notions. Responses to political crimes in Mexico 
and Colombia were diverse, complex, and fluid, and entailed both formal and informal, 
legal and extra-legal practices of punishment and retribution –and even state and private, 
non-state practices of repression, at least in the Mexican case. Here, “the legal” and “the 
extralegal” were basically points of reference in a continuum of punitive actions and 
measures that, depending on their specific purposes, could lean more towards one extreme 
or the other.  
The explanation to this non-exclusive continuity between “legal” and “extralegal” 
practices of repression lies on the fact that, both in the Porfiriato and the Regeneration, 
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punishment and retribution did not work in a univocal, straightforward way. They entailed 
multiple responses to a variety of legal, political, and military challenges. Likewise, they 
unfolded in reaction to diverse circumstances and aimed towards a diversity of goals. In 
some contexts, repression was nothing but a matter of law enforcement. In other situations, 
it was just a political strategy that governments and authorities deployed against 
“problematic” dissenters. Sometimes, repression had the primary goal of upholding state 
sovereignty and legitimacy against political challenges that rebels and other “unruly” 
dissidents posed. In some cases, governments used repression as an intimidation tool 
tending to discourage the workings of both unarmed and armed dissidents. In other 
circumstances, repression had no other goal than neutralizing such workings through 
unbridled displays of retribution aiming to crush and defeat the dissidents in question. It 
was a variety of factors, purposes, and situations that demanded an analogous diversity in 
the ways in which governments responded to them. The merging of legal and extralegal 
strategies in the repression of rebels and other dissidents emerged precisely out of this 
demand. More than opposite, irreconcilable extremes, “the legal” and “the extralegal” 
acted here primarily as complementary strategies serving an overall purpose. 
A final dichotomy concerning the logics of state power and retribution in Mexico 
and Colombia that deserves an analogous reconsideration has to do with the notions of 
“repression” and “pardon” –or “punishment” and “leniency.” As concepts referring to 
specific ways of treating political criminals, repression and pardon did not represent 
exclusive options.  Mexican and Colombian governments alike responded to rebellion and 
other modalities of political criminality with a strategic combination of punishment and 
mercy. Here, neither repression implied a total absence of leniency nor mercy entailed a 
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complete abandonment of punishment as a possible response to political crimes. Instead, 
they both worked and complemented each other as manifestations of state power and 
sovereignty.  State power in the Porfiriato and the Regeneration not only operated through 
displays of force, repression, and retaliation. It also unfolded and worked through 
demonstrations of clemency, compassion, and mercy. Mercy was, indeed, a powerful and 
effective tool for bolstering state hegemony, fostering political obedience, and even 
neutralizing “dangerous” manifestations of dissidence –just as repression and punishment 
were. Both in Mexico and Colombia, the inclination of governments towards a more 
repressive or a more lenient treatment of political criminals within specific circumstances 
depended, in every case, on a series of legal, political and military considerations. Here, 
neither the administration of punishment nor the granting of mercy were incidental: they 
all responded to specific needs and interests.  
   
Comparing Mexico and Colombia: Concluding Remarks 
On the whole, the comparison between the Mexican and Colombian experiences reveals 
that political crimes had a fluid, mutable nature. Their meaning, always changing, 
depended on a diversity of legal, political, and military circumstances, and emerged out of 
the concurrence of multiple instances and interests. Governmental responses to these 
crimes were as flexible as those meanings were. They involved a variety of changing 
strategies, both legal and extralegal, that unfolded and evolved in correspondence with 
concrete needs and purposes. Most of the time, these strategies pushed and redefined the 
limits that laws and constitutions established in order to protect citizens from unbridled 
displays of state power and retribution. Although such redefinitions took relatively 
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analogous forms in Mexico and Colombia, there were important differences between one 
case and another.  
Three differences stand out here as the most striking in terms of their repercussions 
for the experiences of political criminals in each country. The first one has to do with the 
jurisdictional complexity involved in the prosecution and judgement of political crimes, 
which was greater in Colombia than in Mexico. The next one concerns the levels of legal 
and constitutional exceptionality underlying the treatment of political offenders, higher, 
again, in the Colombian case. The last one refers to the maintenance of basic constitutional 
guarantees and judicial protections in the punishment of political criminals, which was 
much more effective in Mexico than in Colombia. These differences made the 
administration of justice for political crimes in Mexico simpler and more straightforward 
than in Colombia, and made possible that Mexican political offenders enjoyed greater 
degrees of legal security and judicial protection than their Colombian counterparts.  
 The contrast in this regard is intriguing. The Porfiriato was a highly personalistic 
and –relatively– autocratic regime, where matters of public order and political criminality 
did not experience significant legal developments, and whose strategies against 
“dangerous” dissidence involved a diversity of extralegal displays of state retribution. The 
Regeneration, on the contrary, experienced regular changes of president, fostered 
continuous legal developments in matters of public order and political crimes, and entailed 
highly legalized responses to rebellion and other “criminal” manifestations of dissent. 
Considering these circumstances, it would be tempting to think that the treatment of 
political criminals was more unpredictable, unregulated, and devoid of basic protections in 
Mexico than in Colombia. Yet, this study shows that the opposite was true. For most of the 
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period under examination, political criminals in Colombia remained at the mercy of a series 
of logics of state retribution that unfolded away from any formal legal, constitutional, or 
judicial restriction. Constitutional and procedural guarantees for offenders were almost 
inexistent, and the formal justice system could barely intervene on their behalf. It was a 
situation that strikingly differed from what occurred during the Porfiriato. In Mexico, the 
treatment of political criminals –at least of those that did not fall victim of Diaz’s extralegal, 
semi-privatized, and overly-violent strategies of repression– commonly remained in the 
hands of the ordinary justice system. Criminals also had a diverse repertoire of 
constitutional guarantees that they could invoke to obtain some sort of redress from the 
regime’s iron fist.  
 These conclusions raise a number of questions for future research. How did 
Mexican authorities respond to political criminality during the Mexican Revolution, and to 
what extent these responses parallel those of Colombia during the Thousand Days?  What 
characterized the legal treatment of other forms of criminality in both countries during the 
Porfiriato and the Regeneration? Can the comparative study of these other criminal 
categories reinforce or question the conclusions of this study? How did lawyers, legal 
experts, and legislators discussed about the definition and punishment of these other 
crimes, and what were the differences between these conversations and the ones revolving 
around the treatment of political criminality? Did Mexico and Colombia share a common 
intellectual framework for thinking about other crimes as they did in the case of political 
crimes? From the perspective of other modalities of criminality, how similar or how 
different were the legal cultures of Mexico and Colombia during the period? These are just 
a few questions suggesting the potential of further comparative analyses between the 
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experiences of Mexico and Colombia during the period. Additional questions could involve 
comparisons with other Latin American countries, and even with other Atlantic 
experiences throughout the decades in question. As this dissertation has demonstrated, 
comparative studies of this nature are valuable not only because of what they reveal 
regarding the nature and development of certain legal phenomena in specific historical 
contexts. They are also crucial considering what they uncover concerning the very essence 
of the workings of state power and the relationship between state and citizens in concrete 
historical settings. 
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